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C o n c e p t u a l  F r a m e w o r k  a n d  t h e  M e t h o d o l o g y
The thesis is divided into two Parts. Part 1 has four Chapters (1 to 4) and the second 
has three (Chapters 5 to 7). As the Part that combines all Chapters through the 
methodology, Part 1 therefore lays out the key themes, literature discussion, 
conceptual framework and the methodology. Part two presents the findings and 
concludes the thesis with a discussion.
Chapter 1 is an overview of the study. It introduces the main themes, research 
problem, question and the case study countries. Chapter 2 discusses literature and 
explores key arguments on participation, participatory development and 
decentralisation. It discusses in part the question of whether ‘real’ participation occurs 
in popular organisations, decentralised structures, is based on stakeholder institutions 
or different shades of all these. This discussion extends aspects of the research 
question summarised in Chapter 1 providing a base for further elaboration of the 
research problem in Chapter 3.
Chapter (3) restates the research problem and presents the conceptual framework for 
the study. In a way, it (Chapter 3) bridges the literature chapter (2) and the 
methodology chapter (4), synthesizes the debate, explains the broad study approach 
and identifies key institutions critical in facilitating participation. Chapter 4 presents 
the methodology, methods, research sites, the general fieldwork experiences and 
issues posed by the methodology and methods.
C h a p t e r  1: In s t it u t io n a l is in g  Pa r t ic ip a t io n : A n  
In t r o d u c t io n  t o  t h e  S t u d y
1.1. Introduction
This thesis concerns the institutionalisation of participation in rural development. In 
the thesis, I define participation as the taking of meaningful and voluntary action in 
development spaces, structures and processes. Participation can be direct, through 
local organisations, stakeholder institutions or through elected, appointed and/or 
traditional, religious and other categories of representatives. Where pursued through 
the latter, the representatives have to have some form of contact with those they 
represent. I return to this in Chapter 2 but suffice to emphasize that the thesis is not 
about which form or channel of participation is better than the other. My focus is on 
how participation occurs and the role organisational interaction plays in initiating and 
sustaining it. Development (the improvement of life conditions) does not have a 
straight forward relationship with participation. However, as discussed in Chapter 2 
and from a normative perspective, participation is desirable for development to occur 
(see African Charter 1990).
The study is about opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participation in 
rural Zimbabwe. The study did a comparative analysis of Zambia to broaden the 
evidence base for the discussion. Zimbabwe is in a deepening socio-economic and 
political crisis since 2000. I return to the causes and manifestations of the crisis 
briefly in sections 1.5 and 1.8 but suffice to observe that studying Zimbabwe has 
presented theoretical and practical challenges. In theory, questions about the 
generalisability of the findings and conclusions were critical. I adopted two 
viewpoints. First, was that Zimbabwe’s crisis is not unique. Other countries have had 
similar or worse crises. Crises per se do not render studies inadmissible. Secondly, 
Zimbabwe’s crisis presents exciting aspects regarding participation and organisational 
interaction. Some procedures, structures and organisational relations are changing 
irretrievably, which is critical for institutionalising participation or doing development 
generally. The study captures some of these for use in building development theory. I 
have not naively assumed away that I was studying and living in a country in crisis
but have embraced this reality. This realization explains the inclusion of Zambia as a 
comparator.
The study analyses rural development institutions1 and processes as provided for by 
the laws of the two countries and in terms of practical experiences. Rural District 
Councils and other development organisations involved in planning and managing 
rural development activities and the communities they serve (in doing development) 
were key sources of the data used in the discussion. I see the doing of development in 
two ways. One is social mobilization organised through social and political structures, 
processes or organisations. The other is actual generation and distribution of benefits. 
Social mobilization and generation of benefits are not mutually exclusive. 
Development occurs (is done) in particular physical and social spaces with 
determinate or physical but also fuzzy or socio-economic boundaries. Absence or 
presence of some development organisations in an area affects doing development in 
form and process because of the relations that emerge between and amongst 
development organisations on the one hand and with people on the other.
I define institutionalising participation as the taking of formal and informal actions to 
ensure that ordinary people2 have access to or control structures3 and processes 
affecting their lives. As process and experience, it has a long history within and 
outside government (Thompson 1995; Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998). 
Participation can be (externally) facilitated or (internally) directly accessed. 
Facilitators of participation include Councilors, NGOs, government staff, local leaders 
and various types of local champions, socio-economic and political groupings (see 
Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998). Support for and criticism of participatory 
methods, like with decentralisation arises from diverse intentions, imperatives and 
agendas (see Conyers 2003; Cooke and Kothari 2001). Before discussing the history
1 Refers to organisations (government and non-government), rules/laws, policies, structures & spaces. 
Harriss (1982) defines them as regulatory systems, informal agreements, norms o f  behaviour and 
organisations. Changes in institutions affect the performance o f  a society.
2 Persons, families and communities not in positions o f  authority.
3 In Zimbabwe and Zambia structures include Committees, Task Forces and other sub-components o f  
an organisation through which they function. A  structure can therefore be part o f  one organisation or 
may have multi-organisational membership. This is the sense in which the concept is mainly used more 
than in terms o f  the sociological notion as defined by Giddens (1984), see section 1.3.
of participation, I connect with the issue o f organisational interaction as the central 
theme o f the thesis.
Interactions amongst development organisations and between them and communities 
occur in spaces and structures created through policy frameworks and programmes. 
Analyzing policy intentions and practical outcomes of participation often exposes the 
dominance of externally over locally defined agendas or spaces (see Stiefel and Wolfe 
1994; Chambers 1983; Ayittey 2005; Krishna et al 1997; Cooke and Kothari 2001). 
Power differentials are critical in defining problems, implementing solutions and 
sustaining actions (see Haidari and White 2001; Nelson and Wright 1997; Green 
2002; Hammar 2003; Francis and James 2003). However, as people participate in 
external organisations’ interventions they also live their lives and exercise agency (see 
Mercer 2002; Essof 2005; Ayittey 2005; Green 2000; 2002; Kamete 2002; Mapedza 
and Mandondo 2002; Hintjens 2000; Mbembe 2001). External development 
organisations thus equally participate in local processes. This two-way interface 
transforms ways of thinking and doing development.
I argue in this study that inter-organisational relationships and the interaction between 
ordinary people and development organisations are critical in defining and furthering 
participation. Further, I note that local spaces and institutions tend to be oriented more 
up and out than in for resources to address challenges or to seize opportunities. The 
looking up and out reinforces weaknesses amongst local institutions. Limited strategic 
support from national institutions compounds the situation discussed above (see 
Mukamuri et al 2003; Mbaku 2004; Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Calderisi 2006; Ayittey
2005). Inter-organisational friction and friction between development organisations 
and communities is often externally-prompted. The thesis further explores these 
issues in later Chapters. I however need to highlight that there are considerable 
opportunities for strengthening historical traditions o f locally-anchored participatory 
processes in both Zimbabwe and Zambia. This may perhaps be true of other countries 
with comparable rural socio-economic and governance architectures. The findings and 
conclusions of the study are to a degree applicable to countries other than crisis ones 
like Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s crisis has acted more to deepen the severity of factors 
stressing local institutions than to make these same factors peculiar to it.
In this Chapter, I present the focus of the study in the sections that follow. The 
starting point is laying out the different histories and trajectories of participation, 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical frameworks used in approaching the study 
i.e. participation and decentralisation. These theories are further elaborated on in 
Chapter 2. The focus and evolution o f the study, the contours of the Research 
Question and the methodological approach are also discussed in this introductory 
Chapter before I introduce the case study countries.
1.2. Contested histories and trajectories of participation
Different development approaches use participation as a basis for locally meaningful 
action (see Uphoff 1996; Krishna et al 1997; Uphoff et al 1998; Chambers 1983; 
Tilakaratna 1987; Nyoni 1987; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Eversole 2003; Green 2002). 
Participation has been used in community development, colonial Indirect Rule and 
post-colonial development administration (see Turner and Hulme 1997), and has 
underpinned populist development approaches (see Brand 1991; Makombe 1993; 
Makumbe 1996; 1998). It is seen as emancipatory and an anchor for social capital and 
participatory governance (see Houtzager et al 2003; Gaventa 2005; Cornwall 2002). 
In theory and practice, participation is malleable. Some commentators argue that this 
malleability is a sign of strength rather than weakness. I do not downplay the ‘tyranny 
thesis’ (Cooke and Kothari 2001), the abuses of participation and the ‘myth of 
community’ (Guijt and Shah 1998) but seek to highlight the opportunities and 
controversies associated with the concept in practice especially in Zimbabwe.
Participation gained an amplified impetus in the 1980s although it has a longer history 
(Eyben and Ladbury 1997; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Widespread agreement on the 
failure of top-down approaches and disillusionment with development in most of the 
South particularly towards and after attainment of political independence are some of 
the factors explaining the rising appeal of participation (Olowu 1990; 2001; Enemuo 
2000) especially within the framework o f decentralisation policies (Ndegwa 2002; 
Ndegwa and levy 2003; Conyers 2003; 2007). The fight for Zimbabwe‘s 
independence4 especially from the late 1960s saw significant mobilisation of ordinary
4 From 1893 throughout most o f  the 20th century upto 1980 notable uprisings and low-key resistance 
towards the colonial authorities in Zimbabwe were witnessed. The most protracted phase o f  the 
struggle for independence was however from the late 1960s.
people including women and youths. Articulation of the causes for the struggle and 
promises5 made regarding the post-independence nation state motivated people to 
participate in the liberation struggle. In the process people formed expectations which 
have had an enduring effect on their perception of the state and what it can (or should) 
do for and with them. Zimbabweans also attained socio-political, organisational and 
economic skills at the grassroots level. The liberation movements and processes 
therefore made participation in all fundamental facets of people’s life an important 
goal (see Kriger 1992). The process of attaining independence thus shaped people’s 
views o f participation and the different actors critical for the development process.
The shift, especially by non-governmental development organisations (including 
NGOs6, church-related welfare organisations etc) from welfarist approaches towards 
self-sufficiency and empowerment explain the increased interest in participation (see 
Nyoni 1987; Korten; 1987). Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
policies/programmes in the 1980s and 1990s also gave further impetus to the use of 
participatory approaches. ESAP in Zimbabwe started in 1991 and was characterised 
by significant ‘state-roll-back’ and tightening of social spending (see Abrahamsen 
2000; Mukamuri et al 2003; Nyangoro 1999; Bernstein 2007). ESAP policy options 
placed a premium on self-sufficiency and community efforts to compensate for the 
withdrawal of state subsidies in education, health, agriculture and other basic services 
(see Davies and Rattso 2000; GRZ 1991; 1998). Cost-sharing and co-production of 
services became important modes of participation. Worker participation was also 
enhanced alongside the liberalisation of labour laws at a time when companies were 
downsizing through, mainly, worker retrenchments. This contributed to the growth in 
civil society activity in the form of labour unions (active in collective bargaining
5 In Zimbabwe these included rights to health, education, housing, employment, the vote, access to 
state machinery and resources hitherto the preserve o f  a (white) minority, land and a generally 
egalitarian society.
6 These are organisations not formed or directly controlled (but regulated) by government, not private 
sector-owned or run. They operate beyond and are not formed by a single community. NGOs are not 
community groups and while they work with other organisations (public, private and community 
structures) they maintain operational independence from but are strategically influenced by these other 
organisations. NGOs secure resources for their work from within but mainly outside the communities 
and countries they serve or work in, they can be membership or non-membership based, they do not 
focus on making profit although some run commercial activities usually to raise funds for their 
activities. The activities done by NGOs are often complex and include both social mobilization and 
delivery o f  actual services (health, water and sanitation etc). The delivery methods vary from but 
borrow significantly from both the private and public sector. In Zimbabwe NGOs are registered as 
private-voluntary organisations (which defines what they are perceived legally as) and in Zambia they 
register as Societies.
processes, worker buy-out of struggling companies etc) and statutory community- 
based organisations (Health, Water, Neighborhood and School Committees) through 
which communities took part in the management of services hitherto exclusively 
managed by the state. As Anheier (2004) notes partnerships between the state and 
non-profit organisations, in developed countries, became the locus of increased civil 
society activity within the framework o f new public administration. Some of these 
ideas found their way into adjusting countries particularly where public sector reforms 
were an important component of the reform package (see Therkildsen 2001; 
Makumbe 1998).
A number o f studies have been undertaken on participation in practice (see Uphoff 
1996, Uphoff et al 1998; Krishna et al 1997; Green 2000; Haidari and Wright 2001; 
Mercer 2002; Jackson 1997) as well as theoretical engagement with the subject 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004, Cornwall 2000; 2002; Chambers 
1983; 1989; 1997). Some o f the studies have focused on the policy and legislative 
frameworks for participation (Makumbe 1998; McGee et al 2003; Blackburn and De 
Toma 1998; Lisk 1985; Majeres 1985; Chambers 1989). Others have looked at 
recognized successes in applying participatory approaches (Krishna et al 197; Uphoff 
et al 1998). Robert Chambers and others have been associated with tracing the 
genealogy o f participation, developing and popularizing tools that enable ordinary 
people to take greater charge of knowledge generation, analysis and decision-making 
i.e. entrenchment of people’s participation in development planning and management 
(see Brock and Pettit 2007; Chambers 1994a).
Synergies between participation and decentralisation have also been explored (see 
Conyers 2003; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; Brand 1991), for instance in the light of the 
changing role of the state (see Abrahamsen 2000; Bernstein 2007; Tendler 1997), the 
relationships between local government and non-state actors (Krishna 2003) and in 
relation to the democratization of development (see African Charter 1990; Clark 
1991; Fisher 1998; Staudt 1991). Co-governance (Ackerman 2004), i.e. the 
participation of social actors in core state activities, extended the range of practical 
applications of the concept of participation, among others. Issues of managing and 
negotiating relationships, interests, goals and outcomes have been cited as constraints 
to the transformation o f the existing development paradigm to a more democratic one.
The role of NGOs in developing, applying and perhaps popularizing participatory 
approaches has been highlighted (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; World Bank 1994; 
Nyangoro 1999) alongside other mechanisms and organisations for improving 
participation like the localization of Millennium Development Goals (see UNDP 
2003). I return to these in Chapter 2 and expand on them in Chapters 5 and 6.
The above perspectives of participation are not mutually exclusive. They provide 
different insights or guidelines for institutionalising participation. Analyses informed 
by the different perspectives illuminate comparative advantages of different 
approaches and the promoting organisations. Belief in any one o f them as a starting 
point or best strategy has informed policy options at different times and in different 
countries. For instance, the diminishing role of the central state under neo-liberal 
approaches (Abrahamsen 2000; Bernstein 2007) has seen the ascendancy of 
decentralisation strategies as well as the programme visibility of NGOs (see Moyo et 
al 2000; Mungate 1993; Anheier 2004). I acknowledge the different perspectives 
above particularly the shifts in the currency o f the ideas. For instance the role of the 
developmental state or a ‘working state system’ (Ayittey 2005) is regaining currency 
(see also Booth 2003; Gasper 2002; Fritz and Menocal 2007; Abrahamsen 2000). 
That said, in this study I juxtapose participation and decentralisation since state 
established structures and non-state actions are important in institutionalising 
participation.
1.3. Theoretical context of the study and key concepts
The study draws on participation and decentralisation literature. These two are 
presented as being about structures and power distribution in relation to planning and 
managing development. While decentralisation and participation may enable 
empowerment of the poor, they are not fool-proof or ‘fail-safe’ frameworks to this 
end, let alone for development generally. The two are used as critical lenses through 
which institutional arrangements for development are viewed and analyzed. In other 
words, participation and decentralisation are not of concern in this study in 
themselves but as filters for discussing and understanding the governance of local 
development and the importance of inter-organisational relations.
In undertaking this study, key concepts applied relate to structures, agencies/actors 
and the processes through which development is planned and implemented. Such a 
conceptualisation relates to Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration (see Bentzon et al 
1998). Structures (committees, organisations, laws, plans, programmes, terms of 
reference etc) enable or constrain organisational activities internally and in working 
with other organisations on the one hand and in terms of working with communities 
when they think and do development on the other (see Chapter 5). However, 
development organisations and ordinary people are not passive agents. They act 
within, to influence or resist structures. As Bentzon et al (1998) put it ‘social and legal 
change takes place through interaction between human beings...not some abstract 
medium such as the law’ (1998:101). In their exhortation of lived experiences and 
legal pluralism, Bentzon et al (1998) dichotomize local/internal and external 
influences to interaction. In this thesis intra and inter-organisational structures as 
further elaborated in Chapter 3, constitute the areas where change occurs. Using Eade 
and Williams’ (1995:9) definition of participation as ‘...the process o f transforming 
lives and transforming society’ the thesis argues that the transformation results from 
interactions enabled or constrained by developmental structures.
Agency refers to capacity to act often within existing structures but also as part of 
changing same (see Giddens 1984; Bentzon et al 1998). In Chapter 3, I refer to 
streams and stores of influence, which depict this usage of the concept o f agency. 
However, development organisations are often referred to as agencies perhaps in 
recognition of the fact that they act (in thinking and doing development) and their 
actions are largely defined by existing structures. To avoid confusion I use the term 
agency mainly to refer to capacity to act (see Chapter 6) rather than to organisations.
Another concept used in the thesis is that of civil society. Civil society organisations 
(CSOs), like NGOs, have a contested distinctiveness from say the state and private 
sector (see Tandon and Mohanty 2003) and the three ‘interpenetrate’ (Raftopoulos 
and Sachikonye 2001). CSOs cover the broad range o f associational life and 
encompass cultural, economic, social and political associations, institutions and 
relations outside the state (Abrahamsen 2000). For Anheier (2004) CSOs are located 
between state-led and market led development paradigms focusing on expressions of 
democracy, citizenship, individual freedom, social participation and responsibility.
The re-discovery of the concept of civil society is seen as coinciding with the 
increasing importance of non-profit provision o f health, social, educational and 
cultural services (Ibid). In Africa civil society rebirth and renewal is seen as a 1990s 
phenomenon (Nyangoro 1999) particularly as the post-colonial state experienced 
legitimacy challenges and weakening authority alongside its inability to provide 
enough social and economic services (Dixon 2002; see also CPIA 2005; Hall 1995).
I use civil society to include NGOs (but not donors), voluntary socio-economic clubs 
or associations and groups, solidarity networks, faith-based groups/organisations, 
membership networks, professional bodies, social movements (students, women), 
labour bodies and farmers’ unions, various political formations and employers’ 
groupings. CSOs form around and articulate specific interests (e.g. land movements) 
on which they lobby others to recognize and respect. In Zimbabwe, organisations that 
are defined (or define themselves) as CSOs include registered and unregistered 
entities. For those registered, the registration is through different ways. Trusts are 
registered at the High Court while NGOs are registered by the Ministry o f Public 
Service, Labour and Public Service and still others are registered by other arms of 
Government. Civil society in its broader sense is less active in development structures 
than local and international NGOs. Hall (1995) for instance, questions NGOs’ record 
of alliance building arguing that supporting them does not lead to civil society 
strengthening. However, it cannot be denied that NGOs are the ones most visible and 
active in development. As such, the thesis proceeds by making regular reference to 
NGOs using the term non-governmental development organisations. Smaller sub- 
District organizations are referred to in the thesis either as community-based 
organizations (CBOs) or local groups to avoid confusing CSOs with NGOs.
1.4. Focus and evolution of the study
The dynamics of inter-organisational interaction in thinking and doing development 
are critical to participation. These dynamics are influenced by structures and policies 
and in turn, relationships influence these same structures and policies in ways that are 
important in institutionalising participation. In my view, participation becomes about 
building and living relations, which resonates with Eade and Williams’ (1995) 
transformation of lives and societies. How the living and building o f relations is done
and why it is important to the study is detailed in Chapter 3. Critical though is that the 
living and building of relations is a dynamic process.
The research focus is informed by a metaphorical cul-de-sac concerning whether the 
state should take a lead in development (Fritz and Menocal 2007; Chambers 1989; 
Berner and Phillips 2005; Nyangoro 1999), particularly in Africa where the state is 
considered to be in crisis (see Vaughan 2005; Zack-Williams et al 2002; Ayittey 
2005; Calderisi 2006). Such a debate on leadership of development has greater 
pertinence when NGO (or non-state) prominence is seen as a panacea as can be 
gleaned from the work of some analysts (see Staudt 1991; Fisher 1998; Krishna et al 
1998; Bernstein 2007). The 1980s saw a growing perception that governments were 
an obstacle to development, debarred ordinary people from political or economic 
participation and constituted a corrupt structure of power (Enemuo 2000, Ayittey 
2005; Calderisi 2006; Mbaku 2004; Dixon 2002; Ndegwa 2002). Ayittey (2005) for 
instances characterises the modem African state as presided over by 4.. .the vampire 
parasitic elite minority’ (2005:21) In many ways this was tied in with movement away 
from state to market-led development (see Abrahamsen 2000). The fright brought 
upon the state through proposals of multiple power centers particularly emphasizing 
civil society growth (see Nyangoro 1999; Abrahamsen 2000; Dixon 2002) often 
makes state and non-state relations unhealthy. From the year 2000 Zimbabwe went 
through such a frightening experience, which has polarized society.
The idea of a strong government that enables, provides and protects even when it 
expands is gaining currency (Ayittey 2005; Fritz and Menocal 2007). Arguments that 
aid for poverty reduction chronically undermines its conditions for success by 
weakening governmental capacities are getting louder (see Booth 2003; Moss et al
2006). Other analysts caution against favoring anti-govemment local institutions (see 
Ribot 2001) e.g. in terms o f channeling aid (EU 2007). They note that this may 
undermine good and accountable governance systems and thus unsustainable in the 
long run. The realization that there are some problems that are too big for any 
institution except government is also influencing policy and institutional development 
(see Chambers 1989; Annis 1987). In short, emerging from the metaphorical cul-de- 
sac presents challenges for state and non-state mutuality considering that there have 
always been questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of non-state
development organisations’ programmes particularly in the South where their support 
is mainly from external sources (see Moyo et al 2000, Mararike 1995; Eyben and 
Ladbury 1997; Nyoni 1987). Institutional mutuality does not come naturally even 
where beneficial for participation, and potentially for both sides. The relationship 
between government and non-governmental development organisations in most 
developing countries is often tenuous (Nyangoro 1999; Tandon and Mohanty 2003; 
Dixon 2002; Pankhurst 2002; Bangura 1999; Mungate 1993; Berner and Phillips 
2005). This study analyzed the mechanisms for the transfer (or blocking) of 
participatory cultures between organisations. Chapters 3, 5 and 6 illuminate prospects 
for while engaging with constraints to institutional mutuality.
I initially viewed the Zimbabwean rural institutional environment as complex and 
having too many organisations. From planning to implementation, different types and 
levels of government interact and overlap on their own and with other actors and the 
community. Over-populated and complex, I generally viewed the terrain as unwieldy
n
and often misaligned in comparison to a much less complex urban governance 
terrain. This view remains strong and is corroborated by some literature on 
Zimbabwe (see Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; GRZ 1994a; Mararike 1995; Makumbe 
2001; Gasper 1997), which points to perennial local governance challenges. Having 
worked for twelve years in and with the NGO sector, I observed limited engagement 
with the role of NGOs, in spite o f their growing importance i.e. programmatic and 
numerical visibility. In this vein, the research proceeded as an exploration of 
mechanisms for ‘thinning’ the rural institutional maze. Although the study has 
challenged the ‘thinning quick fix’, a concern with finding ways to deal with
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Urban Councils generally enjoyed relative autonomy and capacity to deliver (Makumbe 2001) as 
central government did not have as much presence through line Ministries and Departments as in Rural 
District Council areas. However the situation has changed in recent years. This is seen partly as 
Government’s response to the upsurge in opposition-controlled Urban Councils. The establishment o f  
Metropolitan Provinces (Harare and Bulawayo) with Provincial Governors and Administrators, Central 
Government’s increasing exertion o f  control through assigning service delivery responsibilities to 
Parastatals (Water), dissolution o f Councils (Harare and Mutare) and instituting much closer 
supervision reflects the changing urban governance situation. Urban Councils and residents have 
resisted e.g. Mutare City Council refused to allow a Government employee to sit on its Executive 
Committee as directed by the Minster o f  Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development 
{The M anica Post, 8-14 July 2005) although Government eventually prevailed through dissolving 
Council. In Harare, the Combined Harare Residents Association has taken Government to Court on 
several occasions on civic matters including seeking Council reinstatement (dissolved in 2003). 
Bulawayo City Council remains adamant (September 2007) that its water and sewerage functions 
cannot be taken over by the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) a Parastatal.
institutional clutter or what I call avoidable duplication, building capacities and the 
unwieldy maze of overlapping jurisdictions has remained. What has also emerged as 
more critical are issues of inter-organisational relations.
In some cases, organisations seem to be able to work well together. However, this 
seems more the exception than the norm in Zimbabwe. A number o f development 
organisations working in agricultural development in Zimbabwe developed the motto 
‘we all serve the same farmer \ The premise of the motto is organisational 
collaboration to ensure that the farmer’s needs are met in a coordinated manner. There 
is little emphasis on farmers’ determination of how development organisations work 
with them. Other cases of inter-organisational co-operation include collaboration 
amongst NGOs and with local authorities on HIV and AIDS issues8. Though such 
collaborative work is limited, it suggests important lessons. This study explored 
whether such experiences are being extended in the two countries i.e. promoting 
partnerships amongst development organisations.
1.5. Importance of studying Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe has a land area of about 39 million hectares in five agro-ecological regions 
(see Maps in Chapter 4). Regions 4 and 5 constitute about 64.5% of the country, have 
the least potential for intensive agro-based livelihoods because of limited rainfall, 
poor, and generally overworked soils. These regions however hold much of 
Zimbabwe’s rural population by virtue o f being the areas where colonial 
administrators created reserves (tribal trust land areas) to which Africans were 
resettled to give way to commercial agriculture and other socio-economic activities 
conducted in European areas. Regions 1 to 3 have better natural factors to support 
intensive agro-based livelihoods and until 2000 constituted the heart of the 
commercial farmland in the hands of largely white farmers. The main land categories
8 Like other countries Zimbabwe has a National AIDS Council (NAC) that coordinates the national 
AIDS response. NAC manages the National AIDS Trust Fund as w ell as other funds channelled 
through it e.g. from the Global Fund for Malaria, TB and AIDS. Its structures include Provincial, 
District, Ward and Village AIDS Action Committees. District AIDS Action Committees were mostly 
based at Rural District and Urban Council offices and in some Provinces Council Executives chaired 
the committees allowing AIDS Service Organisations (NGOs, CBOs etc) to directly interface with 
Council and other players. Recent changes (late 2006) to make the Committees more independent o f  
Councils are yet to be fully institutionalized and it is therefore difficult to ascertain whether and how  
they will affect the management o f  the HIV and AIDS responses.
in Zimbabwe are commercial farming areas (large/small-scale), resettlement areas 
(pre/post 2000 generally referred to as old and new respectively) and communal areas.
The persistence and depth of poverty in Zimbabwe has been associated with semi-arid 
areas that are remote from urban economic nodes and with limited geographic/natural 
capital (Bird and Shepherd 2003). The institutional structures for planning and 
managing development in the main land categories noted above differ but since 2000, 
Government has extended the jurisdiction of traditional leaders, hitherto only present 
in communal areas to resettlement areas, both old and new. Communal areas have 
generally experienced socio-political marginalization (.Ibid) and as such have the 
highest concentration of poor households. Poverty has increased in Zimbabwe in 
recent years across the rural and urban divide. The proportion o f households below 
the Food Poverty Line (very poor) increased from 29% in 19959 to 58% in 2003 while 
those below the Total Consumption Poverty Line (very poor and poor) increased from 
42% to 63% in the same period (GRZ 2003c). Although poverty remains higher in 
rural areas the rate of increase has been higher in urban than rural areas. The number 
o f households below the total consumption poverty line (TCPL) in urban areas 
increased by 65% compared to 42% in rural areas between 1995 and 2003 (Ibid). 
Land occupations since 2000 triggered changes mainly in large-scale commercial 
farming areas and the ongoing economic and political challenges faced in the country 
have increasingly become important in explaining the causfcs and distribution of 
poverty in Zimbabwe than agro-ecological factors.
The current crisis that Zimbabwe is facing is complex. Government has generally 
accepted its existence since about 2003 (GRZ 2002a) where its budget presentation 
for the year 2003 touched on economic shrinkage, agricultural underperformance 
{Ibid) and de-industrialization (see Pankhurst 2002; Carmody and Taylor 2003). What 
has however not been publicly agreed are the causes. In this section, I share my 
perspective on the crisis. A series of events and policy choices since the mid to late 
1990s collectively contributed to the crisis. I cite here the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP), compensation for War Veterans10, participation in the
9 This is the year the first Poverty Assessment Analysis Study (PASS 1) was undertaken.
10 This refers to the men and women who were combatants during Zimbabwe’s 1960s and 1970s war o f  
liberation, originally estimated to be about 50 000 (figure used at the time the compensation perks were
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Carmody and Taylor 2003; 
Bond and Manyanya 2003; Pankhurst 2003; Davies and Rattso 2000) and the 
handling of the land question.
Regarding ESAP, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
supported structural reforms met with limited success. The first ESAP phase between 
1991 and 1995 missed key targets in part because of the 1991-2 drought and policy 
inconsistencies. Some analysts (CPIA 2005; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Davies and 
Rattso 2000) note that policy inconsistencies were always in existence since 
independence and ‘...the system of economic governance has been marred by a 
number of flaws...policies adopted from independence to present failed to achieve 
expected results’ (CPIA 2005:139). For Davies and Rattso (2000) one hallmark of 
such policy inconsistencies was what they call ‘fiscal populism’ defined as budget- 
based poverty reduction measures, which are susceptible to reversal if macro- 
economic instability sets in. ESAP’s attempts to address the policy or structural 
challenges in the economy did not yield much (see Davies and Rattso 2000; Bond and 
Manyanya 2003).The economy shrunk discemibly, workers lost employment and 
social services (education and health) became increasingly inaccessible as 
government subsidies were removed. Poverty levels started rising (Bond and 
Manyanya 2003). The reasons why ESAP failed vary. For instance, Pankhurst (2002) 
argues that World Bank measures were too harsh to be productive while Carmody and 
Taylor (2003) blame ESAP’s own design weaknesses citing for instance the 
autonomous growth of the trade and financial sectors in ways detrimental to 
production. The movement from state-based planning and control to a market-based 
economy was therefore unable to address the fundamental weaknesses o f Zimbabwe’s 
economy. Subsequent phases of socio-economic transformation from 1996 proceeded 
without WB, IMF and other donor support, which saw Zimbabwe’s balance of 
payments position worsening (Bond and Manyanya 2003). In recent times direct state 
control o f the economy including through ‘operations’ like Sunrise (currency change­
over), Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (housing), agricultural mechanisation and the army-led
distributed). However some ruling party activists, ordinary members and people who were non- 
combatants increasingly assume the identity o f  War Veteran making it more o f  a movement than a 
direct reference to the combatant identity. Establishment o f  actual numbers and identity has become 
difficult. Non-combatants who were involved in the struggle belong to War Collaborators, Ex- 
Detainees and Ex-Restrictees. The latter two were banned from Zimbabwe and stayed in refugee camps 
and other areas outside the country.
operation Maguta/Inala (food security), among others, reflect reintroduction of 
controls and state-led planning and management of development processes that ESAP 
sought to reduce.
As the economy declined the population became restive, which some analysts link to 
the growth of civil society (CPIA 2005; Nyangoro 1999; Pankhurst 2002). One group 
that increasingly demanded recognition and support was the War Veterans. 
Government was forced to respond by making unbudgeted payments to War Veterans 
on 14th November 1997 (Black Friday), which precipitated currency devaluation, 
inflation and economic decline (Bond and Manyanya 2003). In my view, this was one 
key policy decision that significantly changed the country. While ESAP was a suite of 
policies, this was a response to one social group. Apart from financial costs, War 
Veterans also asserted themselves socially and politically. This visibility was 
subsequently captured by the ruling party to address its waning support more so with 
the advent of a strong labour-based opposition party (Movement for Democratic 
Change) in 1999 (see Raftopoulos and Savage 2004).
War Veterans were able to achieve and retain access to public resources, spaces and 
institutions including leadership of the land occupations from 2000. In short 
compensating War Veterans was not bad public policy per se but the process of 
arriving at it, the amounts and the institutional momentum it engendered precipitated 
institutional and policy dissonance. More demands from War Veterans and other 
sections of society (e.g. former War Collaborators, Detainees and Restrictees) also 
followed generally making the state insecure.
The third major event was Zimbabwe’s participation in the war in the DRC. Although 
the cost of the country’s participation in the war remains undisclosed it nevertheless 
was a significant investment in terms of financial, human resources and equipment. In 
short, the war blew a deep hole in the national purse and Zimbabwe is yet to recover 
(see Pankhurst 2002).
The fourth set of circumstances related to the manner in which Zimbabwe’s land 
question11 was handled. During the first one and a half decades of independence 
Zimbabwe implemented market-based land reform and resettlement initiatives in 
keeping with the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution and related compromises, which 
gave white minority capital a decade of consolidation and effectively defined state 
consolidation (Raftopoulos and Savage 2004). As noted by Moyo (1995), 
Government forcefully and legally resisted radicalisation of land reforms up to 1998. 
Although the first phase of land reform and resettlement (1980 to 1998) missed its 
targets in terms of number o f families/households resettled and land acquired (see 
Masiiwa 2004) it is fair to observe that the livelihoods o f those resettled especially in 
Region 3 improved (see GRZ 1994a; Moyo 1995). In addition, most of the people 
targeted, persons internally displaced by the liberation war, returning refugees, people 
from over-crowded communal areas and communities who took over abandoned 
farms contiguous to their communal areas, were deserving cases.
The second phase o f land reforms started with the September 1998 (international 
donors’) Land Conference, which was however unsuccessful in terms of coming up 
with a broadly supported plan for resolving the land question. Although some 
capacity building and other institutional support was committed and in fact 
provided12, stakeholders’ inability to raise money for land purchase when 
Government lacked resources allowed land reform to be politicised. This is not to 
downplay the growing community agitation and spontaneous land conflicts and 
occupations that Marongwe (2002) notes but to highlight that the capture of the land 
movement first by War Veterans and then the ruling party and Government created a 
different and violent trajectory. Under the post-2000 land reform programme land was 
acquired without immediately compensating farmers, valuation was only for 
improvements not the land, new farmers were emplaced before proper planning and 
without social and economic infrastructure, institutional structures and extension
11 The historical inequities in land ownership or distribution, in terms landholding size and agro- 
ecological endowment along racial lines, is what is referred to in Zimbabwe as the ‘land question’.
12 An example was USAID’s Land Reform and Resettlement Research facility which generated 
comparative research evidence for the Land Reform Program. I managed the last 14 months o f  the 
facility (May 2002 to June 2003). Researchers from the Land Tenure Centre (University o f  Wisconsin- 
Madison), the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University o f  Zimbabwe, UZ) worked on key 
themes (land markets, subdivision policy, alternative resettlement models, land administration and 
geographical information systems) and interacted with the public, private and civil society sectors.
services largely because the state lacked resources and the programme was ‘fast 
track13’. As has now become evident, the land reform programme has contributed to 
Zimbabwe’s 8-year economic shrinkage (CZI 2007) characterised by reduced 
agricultural productivity in an agro-dependent economy, food deficits and raw 
material shortages. However, the food insecurity situation has to be understood as a 
product of the economic decline since the 1990s compounded by labour shortage in 
communal areas more than merely a result of the post-2000 land reform programme. 
This is because from the ESAP period loss of formal employment meant that incomes 
that usually supported smallholder food production through the purchase o f farm 
inputs were no longer available. Other ESAP-related developments were reduced 
government funding for agricultural research, extension and input subsidies. HIV and 
AIDS has also acted to reduce labor availability and productivity in agriculture 
thereby also affecting food security.
In constructing the above triggers of Zimbabwe’s crisis the way I do above, my aim is 
to link them to the question of local governance and local development. The role of 
local governance institutions has tended to be debated at the national level, perhaps in 
recognition of the high degree of centralisation that exists in Zimbabwe. However, 
this has obscured the reality that development mainly takes place at District level. 
The extent to which District level dialogue can enable the thinking and doing of 
development in such an environment is an open one. As stated in section 1.4 the study 
engaged with how the understanding o f sub-national institutional mutuality or its 
absence (including and beyond governmental structures) can aid participation and 
development in Zimbabwe today. Whether the theory and practice o f participation 
applies to Zimbabwe remained a question I was confronted with. My view is that if 
the theory and practice of participation do not apply to a crisis like Zimbabwe’s, they 
may not apply to many countries at all. This is because most countries are in, about to 
enter or recovering from one crisis or another. More importantly, the crisis in 
Zimbabwe could benefit from the kind of analysis projected in this thesis.
13 Fast Track is a term used to define the ‘front-to-back’ nature o f  the program where people self­
mobilized to occupy farms and the hurried pace o f  acquisition (gazetting) o f  land often with little room 
for legal contestation with the formal processes o f land pegging, settler regularization, planning o f  
services (schools etc) and other modalities following later.
The crisis that Zimbabwe is going through in part reflects the limitations o f the 
country’s post-independence (post-conflict) governance and development trajectory. 
Configuring and managing institutions and processes, people’s expectations and 
reliance (or lack of) on the state, the trust in public institutions and the decay evident 
in such institutions are important aspects in studying participation and development 
theory. Similarly, the country stands to benefit from the study insights as it engages 
with practical challenges being faced on the ground. However, I need to highlight that 
direct demonstration of the study’s importance or the value of studying Zimbabwe, 
are not principal aims of the study.
1.6. Framing the research question
Poor people’s fight against poverty is often constrained (or made possible) by the 
institutional relationships within which they live. Governance14 institutions in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia have the challenge of facilitating development activities with 
poor and generally powerless people. The question is then about whether existing 
institutions see it as part o f their mandate to facilitate participation. In the event that 
they do, the mechanisms they deploy become as critical as the responses or 
perceptions of the poor people themselves to such facilitation of participation. The 
interaction between central and local governance structures as defined in law and in 
practice can enhance or constrain the effectiveness of Councils. Local authorities’ 
ability to facilitate participatory development will depend to some extent on central 
government support. There are cases where local authorities are seen as presenting 
opportunities for institutionalising participation (Schroeder 2000) although other 
instances show weaknesses in this respect. In Chapters 5 through 7, I present and 
analyze the research evidence to show whether and to what extent Councils and other 
local governance institutions in Zimbabwe and Zambia facilitate participation.
Various state and quasi-state actors mediate the institutional landscape for NGO-state 
relations. Since independence, Zimbabwe has sought to establish effective working 
arrangements for these clusters of players, with ordinary people and with NGOs (see 
Plan Afric 1997; Nyangoro 1999). Although NGOs mobilize communities and deliver 
actual services they often lack inter-NGO coordination and clear identities other than
14 This relates to the manner (traditions, institutions and processes) o f  ruling, controlling, determining 
or directing public affairs (CPIA 2005).
being perceived as either opposed to or an extension of the state. NGOs operate 
within donor-imposed constraints prompting Governments to criticize them as 
technically shallow and donor rather than locally-driven (see Moyo et al 2000; Green 
2000; 2002; Eyben and Ladbury 1997).
In Zimbabwe, non-governmental organisations including UN-related organisations are 
receiving the lion’s share of the available donor funding (personal contact with key 
organisations and Programme staff). For instance, DFID has been supporting a 
Protracted Relief Programme, which is entering a second 5-year phase worth at least 
£50 million to be disbursed through non-governmental actors and managed by a 
Managing, Technical Learning Coordination Unit. Together with other major donors, 
USAID and DFID have pooled their resources since 2005 into a Programme of 
Support (POS) ‘basket’ administered by UNICEF towards the implementation o f the 
National Action Plan for Orphan and Vulnerable Children (NAP-OVC) through 
NGOs (technically called Implementing Partners). The EU is also implementing a 
Food Security Programme and its other activities through NGOs and the UN. Food 
and non-food humanitarian programmes in Zimbabwe are being managed through the 
Office of the Commission for Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA). While different 
Government organisations are involved in planning and implementation, financial and 
other resources are being channeled through non-state channels. I will return to some 
of these issues in later Chapters but suffice to reinforce the point that this aid structure 
affects state and non-state interface in different ways e.g. some Implementing Partners 
have to offer logistical support (office supplies, transport, fuel etc) to their 
Government partners without which their programmes would suffer.
Sections 1.1 through 1.5 raise questions that are relevant to the debate on the 
prospects for and challenges faced in institutionalising participation. The central 
research theme for this study concerns institutional factors supportive o f  and  
inhibitions towards development. The key research question is therefore as follows; 
what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to 
participatory development at District level? I explored this question in the context 
of contemporary Zimbabwe. Subsidiary concerns for this research related to whether 
people’s participation matters, how such participation is facilitated and the 
instruments used to initiate and sustain people’s participation at the District level. Put
differently the key research question is about whether people’s participation 
strengthens the institutional factors supportive of development (i.e. weaken the 
inhibitions). The research also sought to ask whether institutional mutuality matters in 
the initiation and sustenance of participation. By asking these questions and seeking 
to find some of the answers (and more questions), I contribute to the debate on 
development and local (District) governance particularly in Zimbabwe. The research 
questions are operationalised further through the research problem, which is 
introduced below and further discussed in section 3.2
1.7. Research problem and study methodology
Parts o f section 1.1 engaged with what participation is and how it occurs citing that it 
occurs directly or via the facilitation of different development organisations. 
Institutionalising participation depends on the knowledge, skills and attitudes of both 
ordinary people and the facilitators of participation. The research question was 
therefore explored through gathering data on key variables pertaining to these two 
sides of participation. The research problem is further discussed in section 3.2. The 
study is a qualitative and exploratory analysis o f institutional relations and their effect 
on development. However, I need to highlight that the study used the case study 
approach. This involved two Rural District Council areas in Zimbabwe and one in 
Zambia with data gathered at both the District and sub-District levels (Wards). The 
study also drew on historical and contemporary literature.
The main fieldwork was done between April and December 2004 in Zimbabwe and 
between January and March 2005 in Zambia. In terms of literature (which included 
some grey literature and published material), the study made use of existing Acts of 
Parliament and Government policy directives which were further interrogated in the 
light of the lived experiences of ordinary people. People’s lived experiences were 
also captured as they relate to developmental interactions i.e. in relation to projects, 
policies, physical and organisational spaces and in time. I explored the complex 
effects on participation of these multiple and dynamic processes.
In undertaking the study, I often found myself reflecting on my work experience since 
1994 when I started working as Project Officer in the NGO sector. From 1994,1 have 
been involved in NGO management, development research and advisory work across
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different sectors and with different governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. The different development interventions and relationships that I was 
involved in before embarking on my doctoral research shaped my views in different 
ways. These insights found their way into the study from choice o f research area and 
sites through reflecting on actual cases. The methodological implications o f my 
experiences are discussed in section 4.2 but suffice to note that fieldwork in particular 
challenged and validated some of my experiences.
In keeping with the traditions of qualitative research, the study adopted a multi­
method and pragmatic approach (see Marshall and Rossman 1999) as explained in 
Chapter 4. What has been termed relational analysis is the over-arching framework 
within which a range of methods were used to access and interpret the interactions of 
development organizations on one hand and with ordinary people on the other. This 
way I was able to explore the extent of lived experiences (see DeVault 1999; Lincoln 
2003; Marshall and Rossman 1999). Actual methods used included a household 
survey, key informant interviews, use o f community diaries, analysis of documents, 
attendance of relevant events and a focus group discussion. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the household survey was essentially a community entry tool also used to identify 
issues eventually explored using more qualitative methods. The different methods 
were used iteratively and flexibly. A multi-stakeholder approach to defining 
institutional relevance and competence emerges as critical methodologically and 
regarding discussion of results. The research framework applied allows me to 
contribute to cross-organisational definition o f expectations and community 
perceptions, in ways useful to define and pursue institutional mutuality.
1.8. The case study countries
The study focuses on Zimbabwe and uses Zambia for comparative purposes. The two 
countries share a colonial and post-colonial history. By the time Zimbabwe attained 
independence in 1980, the Federation (of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland) had long collapsed but not before benefiting Southern Rhodesia. Under 
the Federation, Salisbury (now Harare) was the de-facto capital of British Central 
Africa15 with Southern Rhodesia receiving most of the investment. Zimbabweans and 
Zambians have strong social ties established during colonialism, the liberation
l5Nyasaland ( Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
struggles and after independence. There are Zimbabwean communities in Zambia and 
vice versa. Zambians (and Malawians) came into Zimbabwe during the colonial 
period to work in the farming, mining, manufacturing and other urban sectors of 
Southern Rhodesia. The British ‘Empire’ in Central Africa collapsed with Zambian 
and Malawian independence both in 1964 and Southern Rhodesia’s 1965 Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) further deepened the separation. Stronger ties 
with South Africa bolstered Zimbabwe’s economic architecture at a time of economic 
de-linking for Zambia (from Zimbabwe and South Africa), which was significant in 
effect as the Zambian economy had been structured in a dependent fashion to the two. 
However, good world copper prices enabled Zambia to develop its socio-economic 
infrastructure until the oil crisis of the early 1970s and the slump in commodity prices 
(Chikulo 1981). Thereafter Zambia experienced an economic downturn and 
governance challenges through the late 1980s costing then President Kaunda and his 
party’s hold on power in 1991 when the Movement for Multi-party Democracy won 
elections.
Post-independent Zimbabwe, despite starting positively compared to Zambia, has 
followed the Zambian post-colonial trajectory o f economic collapse, political 
polarization and social malaise. It is however misleading to paint a picture of total 
similarity for the two countries. Attaining independence at different times also meant 
that implementation of decentralisation and participation policies, among other 
programmes, occurred at different times. Zambia pursued decentralisation at a time 
when centralised (state) planning was fashionable unlike Zimbabwe. At Zimbabwe’s 
independence in 1980, expectations were high because of its good economic 
infrastructure and human capital. Zimbabwe had more University graduates because it 
had hosted the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (see Chikulo 1981; Browne 
2007). Naturally, the disappointment with the resultant development performance, 
internal and external factors considered has tended to be higher.
Zimbabwe has repeated certain mistakes made by say Tanzania and Zambia. 
Examples include the way it carried out centralised planning, the cooperative 
movement and other socialist-style institutional arrangements, which I discuss in 
Chapter 2. Centralisation, cooperatives and socialism are not inherently bad policy or 
institutional frameworks if effectively regulated and supported. The lack of such
support and regulation in Zimbabwe explains the less-than-optimum performance of 
say the cooperatives (see Mararike 1995; Makumbe 1996). For instance, most 
cooperators abandoned cooperatives to pursue individual goals. It would appear that 
by being privately capitalist despite the public socialist rhetoric, business and political 
leaders undermined socialism. Similarly, re-centralisation appears to invoke memories 
of colonial administrative processes amongst ordinary people. Currently official 
pronouncements on decentralisation seem hollow, as real public administration is 
centralistic considering the range and frequency of government-run programmes. It is 
important to explore such policy inconsistencies (see Moyo 1995, Raftopoulos and 
Savage 2004; Makumbe 2001; Bond and Manyanya 2003; Ayittey 2005; Davies and 
Ratsso 2000) and their implications for participation. The Table below summarises 
some of the key features o f the two countries. Zambia was chosen as a comparator 
more for its similarities to Zimbabwe and (spatial) proximity than its differences.
Table 1; Basic facts about Zimbabwe and Zambia:
Variable. Zimbabwe. Zambia.
Land Size. 391 000 square kilometers. 753 000 square kilometers.
Altitude (min to max). 162 to 2 592 meters. 329 to 2 301 meters.
Population. 12.7 million. 11.3 million.
Adult Literacy. 90.7%. 80.6%.
Population Growth Rate. 0.51% per annum. 2.12% per annum.
Life Expectancy at Birth. 39.13 years. 39.7 years.
Infant Mortality. 68/1000 live births. 88/1000 live births.
Percentage o f  people living 
below Poverty Datum Line.
80% (2004). 86% (1993, and 70% in 2005).
HIV and AIDS Prevalence. 24.6% (2001, and 18.1% in 
2006).
16.5% (2003).
Government Type. Parliamentary Democracy. Republic.
Head o f  Government. Executive President. President.
Constitution. 21st December 1979 (17 changes 
since 1980, 18th change under 
consideration September 2007).
24th December 1964 (a 
Commission concluding draft, 
2006).
Suffrage. 18 years. 18 years.
Legal System. Rom an-Dutch & Customary 
Law.
English Common & Customary 
Law.
Administrative Structures; 
Provinces.
Local Authorities (both 
Urban and Rural).
10 (2 urban and 8 rural). 
86 (28 urban & 58 rural). 
30-35% urbanized.
9 (1  mainly urban; Lusaka).
72 (most cover rural & urban). 
38-40% urbanized.
Source; http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (2005). grey literature and field 
data.
The economic fortunes o f the two countries are moving in different directions. 
Zimbabwe’s inflation was at 590% in December 2005 (4530% in May 2007 and
7634% in July, RBZ16 2007) according to the CSO compared to 19% for Zambia in 
2005. Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was above the African average in 1990 and 1991 
but has been consistently lower since then and despite recovering between 1993 and 
1996 it has been going done since 1997 from USD700 to USD371 in 2001 (ADB and 
OECD 2003) and USD363 compared to USD471 for Zambia (UNDP 2006). In 2001 
Zimbabwe was a medium HD (human development) category country falling to low 
HD category by 2003 (UNDP 2003, 2006). South Africa is a main trading partner for 
both countries. Zambia currently receives considerable foreign direct investment and 
aid, while Zimbabwe is experiencing international isolation. Zimbabwe’s agricultural 
productivity has slumped while Zambia is experiencing a boom.
Table 2; Economic factors-Zimbabwe and Zambia
Variable. Zimbabwe. Zambia.
Current Account 
Balance.
-$517 million. -$327 million.
Public Sector Debt. 30.1% o f GDP. 104.2% o f GDP.
GDP Growth Rate. -4% (2005). 5.8% (estimate for 2005).
GDP by Sector. 17.9% agriculture, 24.3% Industry and 
57.9% Services.
21.7% agriculture, 29.5%  
Industry and 48.8% Services.
GDP per capita. $363. $471.
FDI received. 1.3% o f  GDP. 6.2% o f GDP.
Inflation Rate. 590% December 2005. 19%.
Unemployment. 60%. 50%.
Labour Force by Sector. 66% Agriculture, 10% Industry & 24% 
Service.
85% Agriculture, 6% Industry & 
9% Service.
Import Partners (least 
and most important).
UK 3.4% and South Africa 46.9%. Zimbabwe 6% and South Africa 
46.2%.
Export Partners (least 
and most important).
Germany 4.3% and South Africa 
31.5%.
Zimbabwe 5.8% and South 
Africa 25.6%.
Economic Aid 
Received17.
$178 million (2000), $186.5 million 
(2004), 193.3 million Euros (2006).
$640.6 million, $1 081 million 
(2006).
Main Telephone (and 
Mobile Phone) Lines.
300 900 (379 100) in 2003. 88 400 (241 000) in 2003.
Internet Users 500 000 (2002). 68 200 (2003).
Source; http://www.cia.eov/cia/oublications/factbook; U NDP 2006; EU 2007 (NB:
where dates are not indicated figures are estimates for 2005).
Tables 1 and 2 reflect the development positions and performance of the two 
countries. The tables also show the challenges faced by the two nations. From the 
above it is fair to say that the two countries share a lot of commonalities in terms of 
their basic facts. For instance, the two countries have both experienced significant 
declines in social indicators like life expectancy at birth. For Zambia, the drop was 
from 47.2 years (1970-75) to 40.5 years (1995-2000) while Zimbabwe dropped from
16 Monthly Statement by the Reserve Bank o f  Zimbabwe for July 2007.
17 Humanitarian Aid from the EU, USAID, DFID and others for Zimbabwe excluded from this figure.
56 to 42.9 years during the same period (Afrol News18 2002). Recent figures show a 
decline to 36.6 years for Zimbabwe and 37.7 years for Zambia (UNDP 2006). The 
effects of HIV and AIDS have been used to explain the declining social indicators. 
The greatest decline occurred in Zimbabwe and like its economy, the rate and 
direction of decline have been different from regional trends. In terms of human and 
poverty rankings, the countries are number 88 for Zimbabwe and 87 for Zambia 
(UNDP 2006). The same source gives the percentage of Zimbabweans living on less 
than USDl/day as 56.1% and 75.8% Zambians suggesting deeper poverty levels for 
Zambia than Zimbabwe. Anecdotal evidence however suggests poverty levels in the 
80% region for Zimbabwe and the difference could be attributed to problems with 
availability of official statistics in recent years.
The two countries also share a dependency on South Africa’s economy in terms of 
imports and exports. Zimbabwe’s economy fares worse than Zambia’s in all macro- 
economic fundamentals like public debt, inflation and GDP. According to Browne 
(2007), Zambia is emerging from decades of bilaterally-assisted economic 
mismanagement to take charge of its development agenda although it remains low on 
the state fragility matrix. Aid to Zimbabwe e.g. the EU’s Euro 193.3 million (including 
bilateral assistance) is managed through restrictive policies where donors target social 
sectors as a means of directly supporting the population (EU 2007) while Zambia 
receives aid through direct budgetary support (see Browne 2007).
1.9. Structure of the thesis
The thesis is presented in seven main Chapters. The next Chapter (2) discusses the 
literature used in articulating the research area and question. It engages with 
participation and decentralisation separately and makes some theoretical connections 
to illuminate the focal points of the study. Chapter 3 presents the research problem 
and conceptual framework. The Chapter explains how the institutional terrain creates 
constraints and opportunities for participation. The constraints are further articulated 
to illuminate the research problem. The Chapter justifies the specific units of analysis, 
which are further elaborated on in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 discusses the methods used 
and details the experience of carrying out the research. Chapters 5 and 6 are
18 http://www.aegis.org/news/afrol/2002/A00207704.html
presentations of the research findings. Chapter 5 presents the institutional structures, 
their relations and implications for participation. Chapter 6 discusses popular 
perceptions and uses of institutional spaces and structures. The issues and 
opportunities observed are presented to illuminate arrangements that work and areas 
for improvement to ensure access to and control o f relevant institutional spaces by 
ordinary people. The last Chapter (7) draws together discussions and presents 
conclusions from the study and raises additional questions for further exploration.
1.10. Conclusion
In this Chapter, I discussed the focus and structure of the thesis including how the 
research idea evolved. The key questions as they relate to formal and informal 
processes of ensuring access to and control of development spaces were discussed. 
These processes include setting up o f organisational structures and coming up with 
policies to guide planning and management of development activities (see Brand 
1991; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991), funding (see EU 2007; Browne 2007; Booth 2003) 
and discussed questions relevant to the debate on participation (see Mararike 1995; 
Makumbe 1996; 1998; 2001). I return to discuss these processes in Chapter 2 using 
literature. Chapter 1 also introduced the methodology used to explore the research 
question, which concerns spaces and structures for inter-organisational relations. I 
elaborate this further in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 1 has laid out the general contours 
of the study, sketched the basic theoretical arguments in relation to participation and 
decentralisation. Decentralisation and participation will be explored further in 
Chapters 2 and 3 to detail the research question and approach.
C h a p t e r  2: T h e  R e s e a r c h  F r a m e w o r k  a n d  C o n t e x t
2.1. Introduction
This Chapter proceeds from the foundation laid in Chapter 1 .1 explore participation, 
participatory development and decentralisation in some detail and link participation 
and decentralisation asking whether participation is anchored in popular 
organisations, decentralised structures, stakeholder institutions or different shades of 
all (section 2.3). In discussing decentralisation, I explore its implications for and 
relationships with participation, which sheds some light on the research problem. 
Some of the bases of, mechanisms for and key constraints to ‘genuine’ participation 
and decentralisation are discussed. The experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia are 
discussed as part of applying the literature to the case study countries and to further 
ground the research questions. A number of commentators’ work is used without any 
one of them being singled out as holding a particular sway on the analysis. These 
include Conyers (2003), Ndegwa (2002) Olowu (2001), and Makumbe (1996) on 
decentralisation, Zack-Williams (2002), Ayittey (2005), Calderisi (2006), and 
Vaughan (2005) on the African state in/and development and Chambers (1983), 
Berner and Phillips (2005), Brand (1991), Charlick (2001), Craig and Porter (1997) 
on participation. In selecting the literature, an important filter was Craig and Porter’s 
(1997) concept of ‘framers’ of participation, which explains the concern with local 
level state-society nexus (local governance).
Participation is given considerable weight compared to decentralisation. The intention 
is to keep the focus on the institutionalisation of participation as decentralisation can 
be seen as one of the means to that end. The terms participation and participatory 
development are deliberately interwoven. Participation is the taking of meaningful and 
voluntary part and achieving control of development processes and spaces. In the 
context of Zimbabwe and perhaps other post-colonial countries, the emphasis on 
voluntary is important for two reasons. One is because pre-independence community 
development programmes had elements of coercion and hard labor. Public Works 
included making o f contours and other conservation works, roads and establishment 
of dip tanks all of which were labour-intensive (Chanaiwa 1981; see Bowman 1973). 
Some of the people involved in public works were convicts and thus the work was
regarded as punishment. Second is that local governance institutions involved in the 
programmes were equally forced to ‘facilitate’ the activities making them generally 
unpopular with ordinary citizens. As such, the institutions and products of the 
programmes were perceived and experienced as extensions o f a repressive central 
state (see Wekwete 1990; Mamdani 1996; Makumbe 1998). This is one reason why 
some of the institutions (traditional leaders, Mission centers) and programmes 
(schools, bridges and clinics) were targets during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. 
Given this context, participation can only be meaningful and voluntary if the 
financial, socio-political or organisational, technical and administrative mechanisms 
in place allow the involvement of ordinary people and their institutions. A 
development approach that provides such mechanisms is what I refer to as 
participatory development. There is a two-way relationship between people and 
institutional arrangements on the one hand and the approaches to development on the 
other regarding the nature, quality and extent of participation. This explains why I 
start this Chapter by discussing structures and spaces for participation and return to 
these using the theory and practice of decentralisation in the two countries. In section 
2.5, I further discuss the definitions of participation, development and participatory 
development originally introduced in section 1.1.
2.2. Structures and spaces for participation
Structures as defined in section 1.3 can be governmental, non-governmental, popular 
or traditional. They can be committees, whole organisations, institutions like that of 
chieftainship, or networks set up to act as vehicles for pursuing certain goals or 
representing specific interests (see Essof 2005 on women’s movements in 
Zimbabwe). In this study my concern is with structures that are set up or exist in 
specific sub-national locations whose boundaries are defined by central government 
or traditional authorities. In the context of Zimbabwe and Zambia the sub-national 
spaces of concern to the study are Provinces, Districts, Wards and Villages. As stated 
in section 1.1 these are at once physical, social, economic and political spaces. Much 
of the data for this study was gathered in the Districts, Wards and Villages where 
ordinary people live and interact more closely with existing structures to pursue socio­
economic and other goals. The organisations in these spaces include Provincial and 
District Governments, Development Committees, Councils, Councilors, NGOs,
traditional leaders and community groups. The organisations and the structures they 
work in provide the links and act as forums for decision-making processes.
The notion o f space is critical because it bestows identity on the people living within 
the defined area, the culture and norms affecting socio-political interaction, the 
legitimacy o f the structures and the use of the spaces as administrative or planning 
units. Even in the definition of poverty and actual provision of services (physical or 
social) spaces are critical. In keeping with the above introductory definition of 
participation and participatory development, spaces and structures thus provide a 
practical context within which approaches to facilitate (or frustrate) people’s access 
to, control o f or to influence present or future courses o f action are deployed. The 
discussions that follow relate to spaces (sub-national to international) and structures 
of various forms as well as the interventions in terms of the extent to which they 
enable (or disable) participation. I return to the case study countries’ spaces and 
structures in later sections in this Chapter. Below I discuss the African Charter for 
Popular Participation in Development and Transformation adopted in Arusha, 
Tanzania in 1990 and proceeds to draw on related work to pick issues and study 
variables.
2.3. The African Charter for Popular Participation
The Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (‘The
Charter’ or ‘African Charter’) was agreed at the Arusha Conference in February 1990
(African Charter 1990). It came at the end o f the implementation period for the UN
Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-
PAAERD) between 1986 and 1990. The Charter’s basis is:
‘.. .concern for the serious deterioration in the human and economic conditions in Africa 
in ... the 1980s...(and the) lack o f progress in achieving popular participation and the 
lack o f full appreciation o f the role popular participation plays in the process o f recovery 
and development’ (African Charter 1990:2-3).
The Charter makes a connection between popular participation and Africa’s economic 
recovery. It defines the African social, economic, legal, human and political crisis as 
unprecedented and unacceptable. It further notes that development takes place in a 
politically over-centralised context that impedes participation, argues that resolving 
the crisis requires altering structures, the pattern and political context of the 
development process and advocates for human-centered and participatory
development. Popular participation is defined as the empowerment of people to 
involve themselves effectively in creating structures, designing policies and 
programmes serving people’s interests and sharing benefits equitably. This requires 
opening up of political processes to increase freedoms, tolerance, accept consensus 
and ensure participation of people, their organisations and associations.
This study adopted some of the principles o f the Charter. The interest in poverty
reduction is an important part o f the analysis recognizing that participation as defined
in the Charter is concerned with dealing with Africa’s socio-economic crises. Another
critical aspect drawn into the analysis relates to the arenas for participation. The
framing of participation in the Charter resonates with Amstein’s argument that:
...citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of 
power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and 
economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which 
the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are 
set...benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out (Amstein 1969: 216).
By raising issues about people’s full and effective participation through their 
organisations, the Charter reflects rungs 6 through 8 of Amstein’s ladder of 
participation (partnership, delegated power and citizen control). The eight-rung ladder 
starts with manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, 
delegated power and ends with citizen control (Amstein 1969:217). In essence, the 
Charter mapped a discourse of participation that engages political issues fully. The 
Charter places responsibility for ensuring meaningful and constructive participation 
on the people, governments and international organisations, proposing that political 
systems needed to be democratized (see Clark 1991). This also ties in with the 
observations of Berner and Phillips who argue that ‘...no development strategy can 
opt out of the realities o f power’ (Berner and Phillips 2005:25; see Lyons et al 2001; 
Shah 1998; Nelson and Wright 1997; Guijt and Shah 1998).
Starting with the African Charter is not meant to foreclose other debates but lays a 
basis for further discussing the institutionalisation o f participation. Analytical models 
like the ones by Amstein (1969), White (1996) and Pretty et al19 (1995) reflect 
different forms of participation. For instance White’s framework distinguishes views
19 Pretty et al (1995:61) present a spectrum o f  participation starting with passive (lowest), information 
giving, consultation, for material incentives, functional, interactive and ending with self-mobilization 
(highest).
and interests or aspirations from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective i.e. outsiders, 
officials, project planners (those at the top) and the poor or local people in general 
(those at the bottom). Except in transformative situations, coincidence o f interest 
between those at the top and those at the bottom is rare. Pretty et al’s (1995) forms of 
participation run from passive to self-mobilization. The latter is the highest form 
where people take initiative and partner others on their terms. It is my assessment that 
higher or better forms of participation (which-ever framework one selects) require 
changes or improvements to existing power/political systems. However, the 
categories or stages constructed in the analytical models are not necessarily followed 
closely in change processes. Also, as shown with the examples of programmes 
implemented in Zimbabwe (Table 3 in this Chapter), individual organisations do not 
exclusively and always reflect the same level of participation in their dealings with 
the public or other development organisations. As such it is possible in a change 
process to move from Amstein’s rung 3 (informing) to 6 (partnership) or higher i.e. 
enjoy one rung on some issues and another on different issues and at different times.
Other analysts engage with who is participating. Normatively, such a question focuses 
on who would participate if different mechanisms for and approaches to participation 
existed (see Houtzager et al 2003; Nyoni 1987; Blackburn and de Toma 1998; 
Malhotra 2005; Dixon 2002; Kar 2003; Kamete 2002; Johnson and Wilson 2000; 
Lyons et al 2001; Mbaku 2004; Mbeki 2005; McCall 1988; Mararike 1995; Mercer 
2002). Generally, more informed, self-aware and organised communities are less 
likely to take part in nominal or lower forms of participation. A related question is 
whether participation is by insiders (locals) in outsider-led interventions, outsiders in 
insiders/local people’s everyday lives or varying shades of both (Green 2002; Stiefel 
and Wolfe 1994; Eversole 2003). I return later to this fundamental question. Suffice 
to say that if outsiders respect local realities (see Chambers 1983) then it becomes a 
case of them consciously intervening in locals’ existence and in insider-led 
participation. This perspective of participation (outsiders in locals’ life worlds) alters 
power relations between outsiders and insiders. Eversole (2003) extends the question 
of who participates by asking why, how and whose interests certain external 
development organisations advance through their interventions. The reversals (to use 
Chambers’ term) require at one level changes at higher and lower levels i.e. outsiders 
and insiders. My use of the decentralisation literature allows counter-balancing the
popular and representative (democratic) structures on the one hand with a myriad of 
alternative mechanisms e.g. stakeholders (see MacArthur 1997; World Bank 1994) 
and interest groups (see Ribot 2001).
The African Charter is mostly about popular or direct participation through people’s 
organisations. However, participation can also be through representatives (elected or 
appointed). A third vehicle is stakeholder participation e.g. where NGOs (or other 
CSOs as defined earlier) articulate specific interests on behalf o f distinct 
constituencies. Stakeholder institutions may also facilitate direct participation where 
they enable ordinary people to access spaces they would otherwise not be able to 
make use of. None of these three channels inherently guarantees participation that 
goes beyond the nominal i.e. genuine participation. However, the bigger the spaces 
(social, political, organisational and/or physical) in which to participate the more 
logistically difficult it becomes to achieve direct participation20 and even the 
participation of certain stakeholder categories. The creation o f structures or 
organisations and use of technology (print, web-based and electronic media, tele­
communication etc) are essentially meant to enhance the logistical feasibility of 
participation. Below I undertake a partial tracing of the history of participation before 
defining participation and development as well as looking at mechanisms for 
institutionalising it.
2.4. An historical analysis of participation
The application of participation in development theory and practice has a long history 
and varied genealogy (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; Lane 1997; Rahman 1995; Friedman 
1992; Brohman 1996; Cornwall 2000, 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004). Participatory 
approaches and programmes are shaped by diverse and often contradictory 
imperatives. This is true for both participation and decentralisation because o f varying 
institutional agendas (Conyers 2002, 2003, 2007; Olowu 1990, 2001; Ndegwa 2002; 
Wunsch and Olowu 1990; Cornwall 2000, 2002; Hickey and Mohan 2004; Green
20 One example is the closed nature o f  the processes by which debates on the African Union 
Government before, during and after the 1-3 July 2007, 9th AU Ordinary Session (Ghana 2007) 
proceeded. Civil Society organisations felt excluded and argued for broadening the discussion. Another 
is the 27th SADC Summit (18th August 2007 in Zambia) where issues on Zimbabwe and other regional 
integration issues proceeded through parallel Heads o f  Government and civil society sessions. Heads o f  
Government sessions were behind closed doors and civil society organisations ran parallel sessions 
making frantic yet generally unsuccessful efforts to access that space and its outcomes.
2002). As both an ideal and a concept participation is sometimes traced to The New 
Deal in the 1930s (Eyben and Ladbury 1997) and to community development from 
the 1940s to 1960s (Hickey and Mohan 2004). As such the history of participation 
predates the 1970s to 1980s although this latter period saw an upsurge in its 
application (Cornwall 2000; McGee 2002, Hickey and Mohan 2004).
Robb (2002) separates participation as used by social scientists in project work from 
participation to influence policy-makers for instance in Participatory Poverty 
Assessments or PPAs. The author defines PPAs as dialoguing with the poor to 
influence policy. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) also fall into this 
category. Participation to influence policy is more recent than participation in project 
work (Ibid). However, participation is perhaps as old as organised society. Eras 
identifiable since the 1930s deal more with better documented cases and available 
institutional memories than the discovery of participation.
Participation has been central to different development approaches. Hickey and 
Mohan 2004 cite colonial and post-colonial community development, political 
participation, emancipatory participation, alternative development, populism, 
participation in development, social capital, participatory governance and citizenship 
as some of the approaches. These strands are ascribed to distinct promoters and 
periods. For instance ‘participation in development’ since the 1980s is ascribed to 
development professionals, NGOs, the World Bank Participation Learning Group, UN 
development organisations (notably ILO and UNRISD) as well as commentators and 
development practitioners like Robert Chambers, Peter Oakley and others. 
Participation and participatory development have become widespread and for some 
time represented a new orthodoxy in development circles (Blackburn and de Toma 
1998; Green 2000).
The value attached to participation varies from ‘good-practice applications’ by NGOs 
to national policy insistence including constitutional guarantees as in Iran (Haidari 
and Wright 2001), donor guidelines (DFID 2000), government resolutions 
(Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002) and legislative provisions as in Zimbabwe 
(Makumbe 1996, 1998) and Bolivia (Blackburn and de Toma 1998). The adequacy of 
legislative provisions to entrench participation is doubted by some (McGee et al 2003)
especially where traditions of grassroots participation are weak. This skepticism 
resonates with the African Charter’s focus on both the policy arena and people’s 
organisations. Participation discourse in the 1980s and 1990s looked more at 
community consultation methods to improve local people’s input into development 
programmes on the one hand and outsiders’ understanding of and attitudes towards 
local realities on the other (see Chambers 1983, 1994a, 1994b, 1997; Kar 2003; Kar 
and Pasteur 2005). As an example, Mozambique saw an upsurge in participatory 
processes in 1990s after the civil war (Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002).
It is important to highlight that people’s organisational in poorer societies was neither 
discovered by nor awaited the arrival o f missionaries or community developers with 
their interventions from the 1930s onwards. Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) argue that some 
development processes disrupt poor people’s sources of livelihood, security and social 
cohesion. The participation current, while not new per se, has concerned itself with 
reversing such trends of marginalizing the poor which development itself tended to 
exacerbate (Ibid). However, resurgence in the concept of participation since the late 
1980s has generated a great deal o f academic and practitioner interest. The 1980s 
coincided with the mainstreaming of participation by development organisations like 
the World Bank and the entrenchment of NGOs as serious development actors (Clark 
1991; Moyo et al 2000) as they scaled up their work (Edwards and Hulme 1992). 
NGO application of participatory methods has been noted to be exemplary (World 
Bank 1994; Lane 1997; Krishna et al 1997 and Mungate 1993).
My consideration of participation engages with the widespread application and 
growing role of non-state actors (especially NGOs) in applying participation. In the 
process, I analyse the implications of inter-organisational interaction for participation. 
There are differences in versions of and approaches to enhancing participation in 
relation to poor people’s interests. In Zimbabwe at present, NGOs and the state often 
quarrel over who has the greatest legitimacy to make claims for and with the poor. 
The question ceases to be about methods and issues but about institutional ownership 
o f the participation agenda.
Faith in participatory development as a panacea for past development failure has 
grown over the years (Nelson and Wright 1997; McGee 2002; Brohman 1996;
Eversole 2003; Cooke and Kothari 2001). This faith has been inspired by the need for 
alternative, people-centered and popular development approaches (Brohman 1996; 
Friedmann 1992; African Charter 1990). There is generally nothing new about 
participation but there is a new passion, which has more to do with institutions 
promoting the approach, links with democracy and issues of rights than the 
developmental results that participation may bring. I have highlighted in this section 
concern with spaces for people’s own organisations versus outsiders. Using Robb 
(2002) I have shown there is a strand of participation in relation to projects on the one 
hand and another relating to policy influence using locals’ insights. These two do not 
substitute for greater and continuous capacity to advance own interests, which is in 
the realm o f participation as an end. I return to the different conceptions of 
participation below.
2.5. Defining participation and development
In section 2.1 above the definitions of participation and participatory development 
were introduced. In this section I return to these and link them to the concept of 
development. My point of reference is the design and implementation o f interventions 
in people’s lives. Participation and participatory development are seen as an 
alternative to top-down and expert-led development processes where outsiders play a 
more prominent role than local people’s perspectives is (see Cooke and Kothari 
2001). Related is the emphasis placed on approaches that start from local realities.
Participation is used in this study to refer to taking direct, meaningful and voluntary 
part and achieving control of development processes and spaces (see African Charter 
1990; Chambers 1983; 1997; Chatiza 2003; Cornwall 2002; Haidari and White 2001). 
It covers having a role in creating the necessary structures, designing policies and 
implementing programmes the serve a community’s interests. The making o f effective 
and voluntary contributions to a development process and sharing in the resulting 
benefits are critical aspects of participation. In relation to the discussion in section 1.6, 
the study looked at what allows ordinary people to take part in development activities. 
This conceptualization of participation is influenced by analysts like Haidari and 
Wright (2001) and, among others, Stiefel and Wolfe (1994). Haidari and Wright 
(2001) highlight the importance of decision-making and control by ‘insiders’ (see 
Eversole 2003). Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) define participation as ‘...organised efforts
to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations 
on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control’ 
(1994:5). For DFID (2000) participation involves enabling people to realize their 
rights and to access information relevant to deciding on their lives.
Projects play an important role in participation. However, their effectiveness in 
promoting participation is contested. The transformative effects of projects are often 
reduced by wider policy instruments and processes occurring through social relations 
outside project control (Green 2002). Such spheres of interaction govern and 
transform decision-making and benefit distribution. At the same time project-related 
structures may replicate existing social divisions (Ibid). However, shifts of power may 
result as people respond (react) in innovative ways to project realities (Mapedza and 
Mandondo 200221; Kamete 200222; see also Giddens 1984). I suggest that the 
introduction of projects in communities leads to three interpenetrating realities 
emerging, which have a bearing on participation. These are the ‘project’ reality, the 
‘without-project’ reality and the ‘plus project’ reality. The project and plus project 
realities are new. The first introduces changes to existing relations and processes 
while the plus-project reality adapts project and existing realities to create new forms 
of interaction. Projects generate participation at two levels. One is as a means of 
getting things done while the other is as an end in itself (see Nelson and Wright
1997). As means, participation concerns efficiently, effectively and perhaps cheaply 
accomplishing a project or refining a policy. As end or goal of an intervention, 
participation enhances capacities and control over social realities (see Nelson and 
Wrightl997; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002).
Participatory development is an approach with financial, socio-political or organisational, 
technical and administrative mechanisms that allow people to directly, meaningfully and 
voluntarily participate in their development. All things being equal, this enables 
attainment o f the capacities that Stiefel and Wolfe (1994) refer to relying on existing 
technical, political and administrative institutions and resources. As noted by McCall
21 Mapedza and Mandondo analysed responses to Forestry Company o f  Zimbabwe changes in a State 
Forest, showing community adaptations to/of institutions governing resource access and use.
22 Kamete observed that Harare authorities always follow behind ‘Harare’s poor’ i.e. they govern 
reactively.
(1988), this version o f participation focuses on the ideological end of promoting self- 
development, self-confidence, local capabilities and control.
I now turn to the conception of development used in this thesis and reflect on some of 
the implications for participation. Annis (1987) defines development as ‘a cultivated 
field’ in reference to direct intervention. Cowen and Shenton (1996) show that the 
evolution o f development as concept can be linked to the post-World War II Marshall 
Plan. Development is also seen as the official practices of developed countries mainly 
since the 1970s in dealing with ‘poverty and unemployment’ in developing countries 
o f Africa, Asia and Latin America (Ibid) but also in their own countries’ deprived 
areas. Because ‘development’ has some colonial heritage it does not exclusively owe 
its conception and application to the Marshall Plan. During the colonial era 
development proceeded on a modernisation slant while after World War II the focus 
was on restoring order and reconstructing. Cowen and Shenton (1996) trace this focus 
to ameliorating the disorder of the industrial capitalist era (late 18th and early 19th 
Century) characterised by rapid urban migration and poverty, squalor and 
unemployment. Applied outside the industrialized context, development becomes 
about ‘improving conditions’ in areas that are under-developed. Ameliorating disorder 
and ‘catching up’ are two different versions o f conceptions of development applying 
to different socio-economic contexts. Catching up suggests a comparison with a 
developed other whereas ameliorating disorder relates to addressing ‘faults’ occurring 
in the same context. In a post-colonial context like Zimbabwe it is possible to relate 
the ameliorating disorder conception o f development to ameliorating colonial chaos 
and neglect (see Thomas 2001). Colonial community development programmes were 
steeped in the catching up model of development. Critics of development as catching 
up argue that it ignores the role that local mobilization plays in attaining local 
objectives (Esteva 1992). Adebayo Adedeji is associated with a search for indigenous 
development paradigms, agendas and strategies (Cline-Cole 2006). Seen in this way 
development neither assumes outside intervention nor is it residually defined. The 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as a continental development 
philosophy and programme espouses both African initiatives while also tapping into 
developed countries’ experiences and resources through partnerships. It thus has 
territory-based development ambitions but looks up and out for material support for 
its implementation, which is one source of its criticism (see Ayittey 2005).
In defining and pursuing development there are analysts who do not smell the 
proverbial rat. For instance Sen (1999) defines development as different dimensions 
o f freedom while Thomas (1996, 1999 and 2001) looks at development as an 
historical change process, deliberate efforts at progress and an orientation towards 
progressive change. For Mosse (2004) the question is not about whether but how 
development works. These are more pragmatic views, which however do not 
downplay the controversies evoked by the concept and practice o f development. 
Although their views are converging, the World Bank and UNDP in the past had 
some important differences in conceiving and measuring development. The former 
has used economic criteria while the latter used human development indices. Thomas’ 
(1996) reference to value-based conflicts in defining development management 
captures a key basis for controversies in development practice.
For this study a simpler and practical definition o f development is adopted from the 
Government of Zimbabwe. Development is ‘...aiming at improving the social and 
economic conditions of people’ (Government of Zimbabwe-GRZ 1991:95). The 
definition is read within the context of the development challenge at independence in 
1980 where GDP disparities between the modem and monetized white-controlled 
sector averaged 20 times GDP per capita for black rural households (GRZ 1982). 
Makombe defines development in a related manner but emphasizes the ‘creation of 
conditions that improve access to goods and services...incomes, jobs, education, 
health facilities’ (1993:4). Given the marginalization of rural Zimbabwe before and 
expectations that people had at independence, development discourse highlighted 
direct material provisions more than ‘creating conditions’. This is however despite the 
socialist-inspired institutional (re)-arrangements that the ZANU PF government 
promoted to transform society e.g. the cooperative movement.
Participatory development is a way of thinking and doing development (an approach). 
Rahman (1995) defines it as collective action by socio-economically marginalized 
people to improve their life (see Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Shah 1998; Guijt and Shah
1998). Rahman does not directly engage with the role of external agents like the state 
and NGOs in such collective action. However, other analysts argue that most of the 
incentives that foster grassroots growth come from the state even through the state
and societal groupings maybe in adversarial relationships (Annis 1987). As Berner 
and Phillips (2005) put it ‘...governments and NGOs need to make themselves 
responsive to, not absent from poorer communities’ (Berner and Phillips 2005: 23). 
As the same authors remind us ‘...the purpose of empowerment is not to make 
beneficiaries independent but ...more powerful’ (Ibid: 23).
Collective action as stated by Rahman has connotations of activities outside the 
personal domain i.e. community arena, which is another contested term. An important 
point to reinforce relates to the role of ordinary people and their organisations rather 
than outside facilitators in the definition of participatory development. This brings me 
to a point that is ably articulated by Mosse (2004) who contends that development or 
policy ideas do not have a life of their own outside institutions, persons and 
intentions. Institutions and social relations are critical (see Cornwall and Brock 2005; 
Gaventa 2005). In reality the life breathed into development policies and ideas by 
outsiders tend to shape thinking and doing development more than locals’ efforts. For 
Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall and Brock (2005), spaces are neither neutral nor of a 
single type in form or governance. The different types of spaces include closed, 
invited and claimed occurring at local, national and global levels (Gaventa 2005). 
Some actors have access to and influence over the different spaces while others have a 
limited reach due to power and resources differentials. In Chapter 6 I return to issues 
of accessing and influencing spaces highlighting the covert and overt strategies 
ordinary people use to exercise their agency.
In using the term community above no assumptions are made about homogeneity, 
power neutrality or harmony. Berner and Phillips (2005) problematize the concept of 
community for its conflation of the administrative, spatial and social. They argue that 
this is an oversimplification of reality and often constrains proper examination of 
local power dynamics. In this study community refers to spatial and social contiguity 
that makes acting together and defining common interests possible. The geographical 
spaces used in this as reference points include the Village, Ward and District 
reflecting the sub-national focus of the analysis. In these spaces, structures and 
institutions exist. Power held by different players affects processes, outcomes and 
institutional relations. In these institutional spaces there are cases where participatory 
approaches have been used in a manipulative and often top-down manner (Cooke and
Kothari 2001; Mosse 2001; Green 2000, 2002) and glossing over community and 
gender differences (Guijt and Shah 1998). Manipulative uses of participatory 
approaches have arisen in part from use by big development organisations (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999; Mercer 2002) unable to respond to local 
dynamics. Section 2.6 below deals with some o f these issues using examples.
In this section so far I have defined participation, development and participatory 
development. These definitions are helpful in elaborating why and how the contests 
over approaches emerge. The role of the state is critical in defining and providing 
resources for development. However, the wide endorsement o f participatory 
development has not seen real structural reforms away from mainstream social and 
political interests and structures (Rahman 1995). Participation’s triumph in 
influencing orthodoxy appears more to imply cooption. This is because in practice 
participatory development approaches do not always yield expected practical results. 
In short the redistribution of power essential for institutionalising participation 
(African Charter 1990; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Nelson and Wright 1997; Rahman 
1995; Haidari and Wright 2001; Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001) is not occurring. 
Commenting on the role of social movements Mitlin and Bebbington (2006) observe 
that while their work is critical in the chronic poverty agenda the combined effects of 
neo-liberalism and internal constraints limit their capacities to shift the fundamental 
processes o f exploitation particularly those underpinning capitalism.
A number of mechanisms have been applied to extend participation. In discussing 
these mechanisms I show the roles played by different actors, particularly state and 
state-related development organisations. I also show in the process that the different 
mechanisms have been attempted by a broad spectrum of actors.
2.6. Mechanisms for institutionalising participation
In this section, I discuss examples of how participatory development (the approach) 
has been institutionalized. The section does not cover all mechanisms but sheds light 
on different contexts, methods and issues. Those issues central to the study are 
identified at the end of the section. The role that organisational interaction plays is 
discussed to illuminate opportunities and challenges for institutionalising 
participation. Examples include co-governance (Ackerman 2004) and Participatory
Budgeting (Houtzager et al 2003). The latter approach has been used in Brazil’s Porto 
Alegre where institutionally embedded actors participate more and that organisational 
forms affect the extent and nature of participation (Houtzager et al 2003). Civil 
society organisations introduced new forms of representation different from local 
government mechanisms.
The community development approach in colonial times accompanied by the 
establishment of semi-autonomous local government systems (Turner and Hulme 
1997; Enemuo 2000; Hickey and Mohan 2004) allowed people to participate but 
largely in top-down programmes. This made the programmes and associated local 
institutions unpopular. The examples of Participatory Budgeting and colonial 
Community Development show the different institutional spaces provided, the 
different actors involved and their effect on people’s participation. Gaventa (2005) 
makes important observations about how shifting constructions and repositories of 
power that affect access to policy-making arenas. These shifts often confuse debates 
on participation and inclusion in terms o f processes and levels or places, actors and 
outcomes (see Cornwall and Brock 2005; Robb 2002; Churches in Manicaland 2006).
2.6.1. International development organisations: role in promoting participation
International development organisations provide funding for development activities, 
dissemination of new ideas and exchange of staff. Their policy guidelines, funding 
conditions, technical assistance and staff provide scope for the promotion (or 
inhibition) of participation. Funders influence choice o f development priorities 
through research grants and disseminating results of such research, new approaches, 
supporting policy/programme development e.g. PRSPs and the UN on MDGs. Policy 
beliefs or values underpin support frameworks e.g. DFID’s argument that achieving 
the MDGs requires engaging the poor in decisions and processes affecting their lives 
(DFID 2000). This informs the rights-based approach that DFID implemented through 
Country and Institutional Strategy Papers.
The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies also address issues o f participation. 
Other organisations channel programme support towards processes based on credible 
consultation (see DFID 2000; UNDP 2003). The World Bank has supported 
Participatory Poverty Assessments or PPAs (Robb 2002), funded many Community-
Driven Development projects and other specific programmes that extend participatory 
approaches e.g. Zimbabwe’s Community Action Project and Zambia’s Social 
Investment Fund. The UN family has led relevant global initiatives culminating in the 
MDGs. The UNDP’s observation that entrenched groups’ resistance of policies that 
reallocate resources to the poorest will undermine MDGs (UNDP 2003) reflects the 
kinds of threats that need to be addressed (see African Charter 1990; Gaventa 2005). 
The organisation further argues that MDG success should be based on finding 
‘...avenues for citizens to participate in decision-making’ (Ibid 2003:134; see DFID 
2000).
However, the activities of international development organisations can be 
controversial. Where new structures are created or foreign funders intervene in 
national policy spaces, questions about sovereignty may be raised. Sankore (2005) 
raises such questions over the participation o f Oxfam GB and Action Aid alongside 
USAID, JICA, the EU, UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO in President Obasanjo’s 
Millennium Development Committee23. The two INGOs replied in the October 2005 
issue o f The New African (p7, N° 444) that they were not members of the Committee 
although Oxfam stated its interest in and direct support to debt relief work by civil 
society. The perception that INGOs act as the new officials running post-colonies 
reminiscent of Indirect Rule is evident. Sankore further observes increasing NGO 
programme shifts towards policy execution through participation in Budgetary 
Committees and Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs). National NGOs rarely access the 
spaces that INGOs and donor organisations do for political and capacity reasons. 
Other commentators argue that external support itself weakens domestic 
accountability and institution building (Booth 2003; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006; 
McGee and Norton 2000), may offer false hope, dampen development initiatives 
based on local resources and simply ‘calms Western consciences while dulling them 
to even greater horrors that lie ahead’ (Calderisi 2006:209). In short, aid or external 
support may act to undermine participation (see Kar 2003; Kar and Pasteur 2005). 
Cornwall and Brock (2005) note that PRSP implementation, for instance, narrowly 
conceives participation, that consultative processes may follow externally-dictated
23 The Committee was set up to monitor the use o f  proposed Paris Club debt relief packages.
timetables and processes often vary from domestic policy-making rhythms (see Booth
2003).
From the above questions about whether donors sufficiently mainstream citizen or 
broader community involvement in development processes beyond and in addition to 
aid-supported interventions arise. As with projects generally (Green 2002), state- 
society interface is not confined to aid-supported activities. Other questions include 
who participates (national governments, international players, nationals). What form, 
culture or rhythm does participation take? Why do governments accept donor- 
supported participation? How can such participation be sustained? Where 
participation in donor-supported interventions remains confined to national capitals 
questions about the transfer of experiences to local governance institutions also arise. 
Essentially, the issue is about whether donors extend existing or create new forms of 
and platforms for participation given local and non-local value-based conflicts (see 
Thomas 1996). Related are issues of cultural, material (resource) and political 
sustenance of forms of participation. Because underlying socio-economic and political 
circumstances determine possibilities for international support to participation, a 
polarized environment with relatively closed democratic spaces like Zimbabwe limits 
the effectiveness of such support. In Chapter 5, the limited financial and general 
capacity support for local institutions in Zimbabwe and Zambia is highlighted to 
reflect the challenges international development organizations face regarding the 
sustenance of their efforts once they withdraw. Where external support is perceived 
as, interference options for promoting participation effectively remain limited.
2.6.2. Use of national policies, the law and institution building
Participation has been institutionalized through policy and legislative provisions. 
Planning and other legislation24 in most countries provide for public consultations. In 
Zimbabwe settlement layouts, by-laws, Council budgets and planning applications go 
through a legal process whereby public objections are sought and considered as part 
of the plan approval process (see Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990). The Prime Minister’s 
Directive of 1984 and subsequent legislation that gave it formal force also defined
24 Zimbabwean Local Government Laws, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act and the 
Environmental Management Act provide for public participation. Zambia’s Local Government Act, 
Village Registration Act and National Decentralisation Policy also provide for people’s participation. 
In both countries laws detail the process, structures and recourse procedures.
structures and processes for participation (Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991; Mutizwa- 
Mangiza 1991). However, there are often challenges in terms of limited public 
understanding of plans, access to officials for lodging objections and following up to 
ensure that objections are considered. Most Zimbabwean Councils especially on 
budget consultations seem to hold the view that residents object to everything they 
propose (The Standard 26th August 2007). Since it is the Minister of Local 
Government and not the residents who approve budgets, Councils tend to lend more 
weight to Ministry Directives than resident input. A High Court case where business 
people in Gwanda Rural District Council unsuccessfully sought to interdict Council 
from increasing rates by 1000% reflects this institutional dilemma. The Court ruled 
that section 76 of the RDC Act does not make budget consultations a legal 
requirement but a forum to allow ratepayers to lobby Council (The Standard 26th 
August 2007).
Other international examples include Bolivia’s Law of Popular Participation (LPP) of 
May 1994. The LPP provided for local institutions (Municipalities) as practical spaces 
for participation without de-linking from the state (Blackburn and de Toma 1998). 
Partly because of diligent implementation of the LPP Bolivia’s decentralisation 
programme is considered to have increased indigenous people’s participation (UNDP 
2003). However, the emergence of peasant communities, indigenous people’s and 
neighborhood councils collectively known as OTBs (Organizacion Territorial de 
Base) created challenges. Complex relationships amongst the OTBs and with existing 
civil society organisations posed challenges in entrenching participation.
A study by McGee et al (2003) of legal frameworks for participation in 19 countries 
in all continents provides some insights into why legislative and policy provisions 
while essential may not be sufficient to entrench participation. The study concluded 
that the processes of creating the frameworks, extent of fiscal decentralisation, and 
level of commitment to participation, state-citizen relationship and allied legislation 
are also very critical. Where these processes are weak a ‘good policy (on 
participation) may become unimplementable’ to borrow a phrase from Mosse (2004). 
It is my view that the LPP challenges and aspects highlighted above are relevant to 
Zimbabwe particularly aspects of institutional relationships.
Institution-building is one important strategy for ensuring participation. It involves 
creation of procedures for decision-making and enabling their appropriate application. 
It may cover creation of actual organisations or ‘refurbishing’ existing ones. Lisk 
(1985) and Majeres (1985) note that structural changes, i.e. shifts in socio-economic 
systems and institutional arrangements, provide meaning to participation. Institutional 
arrangements, procedures and relationships can be changed nationally or at sub­
national levels simultaneously or in phases. Often institution-building is rushed, 
imposed or both leading to non-use which reduces institutional efficacy. Analysts 
agree that governments are critical to social development and promotion of 
participation (Annis 1987; Friedmann 1992; Brohman 1996; Blackburn and de Toma 
1998) considering the structural nature o f poverty (Friedmann 1992; Chambers 1989; 
Berner and Phillips 2005). Governments play this role through institution-building.
Examples of challenges faced in institution building for participation include 
Ethiopia’s mid-1970s land reform programme. Through its 1975 land reforms, 
government established peasant associations empowered to redistribute expropriated 
land, establish cooperatives and encourage local infrastructural development and 
villagization (Lisk 1985; Abbink 2005). The government deployed 60 000 ‘Zemecha’ 
(facilitators) consisting mainly of urban-based students and state functionaries to 
implement the process. These facilitators ended up controlling the process and 
implemented centrally pre-conceived ideas with consequences for institutional and 
programme sustainability.
Another example is Tanzania’s 1960s policy o f self-reliance or villagisation/ujamaa. 
It saw a significant conceptual chasm between the state and the people (Wignaraja 
1993). This difference and the popular intransigence it inspired, among other factors, 
resulted in the eventual abandonment of the programme. Zimbabwe supported 
farmers’ groups and cooperatives after independence (GRZ 1981) as did Zambia 
during President Kaunda’s reign. The demise of some of the Zimbabwean 
cooperatives followed dwindling state support and the decline of cooperatives as a 
mode of socio-economic organisation (Mararike 1995; Makumbe 1996). Zimbabwe’s 
land reform programmes (past and present) have often seen national and sub-national 
level institutional confusion (see Adams et al 1996; GRZ 1994a; Chatiza 2003). In the 
post-2000 programme, local spaces were captured by War Veterans in Committees of
Seven affecting participation forms and channels. What is important to reiterate is the 
point that institutional conflict or inappropriateness is not always accidental but may 
be deliberate and purposeful (see Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Mbaku 2004; Hammar 
2003; Mbeki 2005).
This section has shown how policies and laws alone may not fully provide for 
participation. At the same time, it has shown that state structures alone or together 
with popular structures may be difficult to coordinate for effective participation. State 
support or its absence, central and local institutional differences and policy 
imperatives all affect participation. Concern with mandates explains why institution- 
building is often associated with specific interventions. As with projects, institution 
building tends to have objectives other than participation per se or as an overall goal. 
However, with project-related institution-building gains may be abandoned on project 
completion. Policies, legislation and institution-building programmes are not always 
explicitly about participation but have a bearing on its entrenchment. Similarly, some 
projects may not be about policy, legislative and institutional changes but may 
eventually support such processes. The following section discusses how project 
implementation dynamics may support or inhibit participation.
2.6.3. Participation in/and projects or programmes
Participatory methods have also been institutionalized through programmes and 
projects. Project implementation is the practical realm for participation (Krishna et al 
1997; Kothari and Minogue 2002). Projects are social and physical spaces for 
organisational interaction and interaction with ordinary people. The interactions affect 
organisations and communities differently. Projects are often used as incentives to 
influence behavior (see also section 2.6.1 above). They may catalyze changes within 
an organisation through exposing implementing organisations or partners to realities 
that allow forging of new partnerships, access to information, scrutiny and feedback. 
In this section, I explore how projects are used to institutionalize participation. I 
highlight the scope projects provide for participation before, during and after their life 
cycles. Additionally I engage with the difference project ‘promoters’ make in terms of 
participation and whether the nature of a project and its management processes 
matter.
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Krishna et al (1997) explain that projects per se cannot be faulted if participation is 
lacking. They are critical of the way that government and donor organisations rigidly 
design and implement projects within tight and predetermined schedules. The authors 
argue that this limits project delivery and potential responsiveness to socio-economic 
changes. Iterative and reflective experimentation backed by supportive and flexible 
policy contexts are seen as critical for participation and sustainability. However, most 
project sponsors neither have the time nor the inclination to be patient. Often they 
apply approaches inconsistent with local capacities and realities. Zimbabwe’s 
Capacity Building Coordinating Committee (CBCC) identified some of these 
problems in donor and Government o f Zimbabwe supported rural development 
programmes (GRZ 1999). The CBCC study concluded, among other things, that many 
programmes actually undermined the capacities o f established structures (see Booth 
2003; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006), created ineffective monitoring and evaluation 
processes and excluded the provincial tier of government.
The list of programmes in the table is not exhaustive but shows how programmes in 
Zimbabwe have been used to enhance participation from institutional design, resource 
deployment to benefit extraction and distribution. Other national programmes not 
included in this analysis include the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
(IRWSS), District Environmental Action Planning (DEAP) and Land Reforms 
(Phases I through 1999 and II since 2000), among others. However, the analysis 
provides a balanced assessment of both achievements and challenges. Suffice to 
highlight that I was directly involved in terms o f commissioned work under the 
Community Action Project (CAP) in 1999 and 2000 as well as IRWSS in 2004, 
notwithstanding working in Districts where these programmes were implemented.
Table 3: Zimbabwe’s main development programmes relevant for participation
Programme. Focus and achievements. Implications for Participation.
1. Communal 
Area
Management
Programme
For
Indigenous
Resources
(CAMPFIRE).
Flagship programme o f  Zimbabwe’s Parks and 
Wildlife Management Authority (Parastatal) initiated 
in the mid-1970s and approved in 1988. Devolved  
natural resource management and use to communal 
area residents and set up support inter-organisational 
structures. Initial concept was for communities as 
land/asset management associations (producer 
communities) but later Appropriate Authority status 
assigned to Councils (2 in 1989, 21 in 1991 & 4 
others in 1995). Success attributed to governmental, 
academic, NGO enthusiasts & community leadership. 
Communities with ‘big five’ benefited from tourism- 
related revenue used for school and health centre 
construction, sharing dividends and handicraft sales.
Change from producer communities 
& restrictions on Councils limited 
programme performance. As 
income source, CAMPFIRE 
compares poorly to alternative land 
uses. Recent slump in 
tourists/hunters and land reform 
induced wildlife and wildlife 
habitat losses have affected the 
programme. Inter-organisational 
conflicts have also affected 
CAMPFIRE.
2. Pilot 
District 
Support 
Programme 
(PDSP); 1989 
to 1995.
Improving development planning from Province to 
local levels. Piloted in 2 Midlands Districts 
(Mberengwa and Gokwe/Cheziya) with block grants 
for inter-sectoral plans complemented by local 
revenue collected by traditional leaders. Linking local 
needs and local revenue increased collection 
efficiency from 10 to 70%. Council capacities built in 
monitoring, financial management, planning and 
supervising activities.
Elite domination; Village to 
Council (see Makombe 1993). 
Focused on infrastructure not socio­
economic changes. Weak continuity 
management i.e. rushing to new  
projects, weak support for Councils 
to deepen lessons.
3. Rural
District
Council
Capacity
Building
Programme
(RDCCBP):
1996-2001.
Upscaling PDSP, three grant components: capital, 
institutional and human resource development on 
‘learning by doing’ basis. District/Provincial Gvt 
increased Council monitoring, Strategic Plans 
developed (Masvingo/Midlands), and 
planning/budget guidelines developed (Mat. 
North/South), NGO coordination up 
(Man ical and/Midi an ds/Mat. South) & Council 
coordination role recognized.
Committees set up by 1984 PM’s 
Directive remained parallel to 
Council. After grants, Councils 
remained overshadowed by Gvt. 
RDCCBP did not build local (sub- 
Council) capacities.
4. Community 
Action Project 
(CAP) 1999- 
2002.
Part o f  Government’s Enhanced Social Protection 
Programme (ESS25) supported by the World Bank. 
Targeted 26 o f  the poorest Districts after the 1995 
Poverty Study (PASS I) & directly gave funds to 
boost community poverty coping mechanisms, met 
80% o f project costs (Communities 20%), built 
community capacities in participatory needs 
assessment, prioritization, planning and 
implementation, managing and maintaining 
investments. CAP encouraged collaboration with 
NGOs and private sector. In-District targeting 
followed Notional Poverty Maps indicating most 
deprived localities.
Discontinuance o f  direct resource 
disbursement to communities and 
use o f  the notional poverty map 
(NPM). The objectivity in resource 
allocation that the NPM enabled 
has been lost.
Source: Adapted from Makombe (1993); King and Cutshall (1994); Conyers (2003); Plan 
Afric (1997); Chatiza (2003); GRZ (2000c, 2000b) and personal experiences.
25
Other components included the Basic Educational Assistance Module (BEAM), Public Assistance, 
CAP and SDF: SDF funded micro-enterprise development and poverty monitoring, CAP community 
development, BEAM provided fees and other school needs for children from poor households and the 
Public Assistance program paid cash allowances to poor families.
The programmes were pre-cursors of and gave scope to the implementation of 
decentralisation policies, enabling delivery o f practical services while establishing 
new or building capacities of existing institutions. In the main, they show varying 
levels to which government has devolved authority as with CAMPFIRE and resource 
disbursement arrangements (CAP). In the different programmes different clusters of 
actors within and outside government supported genuine participation while others 
did not and used different methods to define and govern participation e.g. the 
guidelines used by the Parks and Wildlife Authority to determine wildlife off-take in a 
given season. In the CAMPFIRE case the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG26), 
later CAMPFIRE Association represents such a coalescing of interests supportive of 
participation. Coalitions occur at the level of individuals within institutions making it 
difficult to label whole institutions supportive or unsupportive of participation.
However, let me emphasize that projects tend to provide safer spaces for individual 
professionals and/or policy-makers to change procedures, policies and generally to 
work with and in new realities. To use Gaventa’s (2005) terms, projects allow 
‘claiming o f and being invited to’ spaces otherwise closed. Projects also allow the 
changing o f institutional mandates and procedures. CAP funding arrangements and 
the PDSP and RDCCBP grants made it possible to provide funding to Districts and 
communities using more flexible and timely procedures than comparable central 
government systems allow. The challenge however with projects relates to sustaining 
lessons and successful approaches. The above cases paint a picture of limited scope 
for continuing with some of the good practices. The issue of external resources to 
finance innovations is also critical. All the programmes including IRWSS and 
previous Land Reforms have had considerable external support e.g. 80% of IRWSS 
operational and infrastructure costs (GRZ 2000b).
97The World Bank’s Community-Driven Development Projects (CDD) since the 
1990s have generally aimed at strengthening the poor’s livelihoods through higher 
incomes and access to basic services like education, health, roads and water (Malhotra
26 The Parks and Wildlife Authority, Zimbabwe Trust, Ministry o f  Local Government, CAMPFIRE 
Districts, WWF and Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University o f  Zimbabwe).
27 Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) in Indonesia since 1998, National Rural Support 
Programmes in Pakistan since 1982, Brazil’s portfolio o f  CDD initiatives in North-Eastern States since 
1985 and Social Funds in Malawi, Zambia and Yemen.
2005). However, Mansuri and Rao (2004) note that CDD projects were not effective 
at targeting the poor and most were dominated by elites despite expressly focusing on 
empowerment of the poor. Grants and facilitation o f community-grounded planning 
and monitoring processes, standardization of procedures, cross-border learning, 
scaling up using different institutional avenues (local governments and state funding) 
and offering alternatives to state-based service provision all transform development 
processes. However, analysts note that political economy questions are critical to the 
sustenance o f CDD innovations and where decentralisation is tentative withdrawal of 
grants (World Bank in this case) almost always signal the end of the innovations 
(Malhotra 2005; see Green 2002; Mercer 2002).
The ‘Southern Case Studies’ by Krishna et al (1997) argue for well thought out and 
adaptable initiatives ‘...conceived by leadership that persisted and shared credit 
widely, by melding so-called traditional and modem features into new and attractive 
combinations...’ and also offering ‘the promise of change that is transformative, not 
just incremental’ (1997:6). This is presented as an alternative to a blueprint 
development approach. Critical aspects in this conception of projects and participation 
include flexibility, direct support, and use o f local resources, transformative changes 
and localization of interventions. This requires considerable local initiative and 
resource deployment. It looks at development as both continuous and endemic. This 
does not preclude external support but creates a basis for an insider-outsider 
relationship premised on the agenda, institutional and development processes 
determined by insiders. The challenge is about attaining and replicating this ideal. 
This raises questions about development organisations and the policy environments 
they experiment in regarding promoting participation.
This section has shown how and why projects are important in influencing or enabling 
institutional interactions and innovations supportive of participation. This is in part 
through creation of spaces that make changing procedures safe as well as freeing 
provision o f resources from certain bureaucratic inhibitions. Organisations and 
individuals are provided with space within which to innovate before and during but 
not so much beyond the life-cycle of interventions. Multi-stakeholder project 
implementation platforms seem to provide more space for questioning non- 
participatory practices more so where there are individual champions. Sustenance of
institutional gains enabled by projects seems to be predicated on the underlying 
political economy of a particular context, which resonates with the observation by 
Green (2002) about underlying social realities not fully accessible to project 
dynamics.
2.6.4. The role of NGOs in promoting participation
NGOs plan and implement projects some of which are innovative. They build 
institutional capacities at different levels through direct training, transfer o f lessons 
and working in partnerships (Charlick 2001; Johnson and Wilson 2000; Krishna 
2003). At times, they set up structures for managing projects. Where the structures are 
parallel, NGOs may be accused of by-passing and undermining formal structures 
(GRZ 1999; Sankore 2005). NGOs undertake research and analysis to inform their 
programmes or lobby governments, among others, to attend to issues considered 
critical. They thus can be or create a voice for the poor and marginalized, lead or 
participate in efforts aimed at increasing accountability and may participate in conflict 
resolution within and between communities and development organisations. These 
diverse activity arenas provide scope for the promotion and direct application of 
participation. As a result, NGOs have been commended for their substantial 
experience with participation (World Bank, 1994).
Lane (1997) observes that available evidence on NGO’s participatoriness is 
contradictory and partial while Ebrahim (2003) raises internal accountability 
questions and notes weak self-regulation. There is also growing critical literature 
challenging NGOs at the level of their identity i.e. whether NGOs (and the civil 
society of which they are part) are separate from the state (Tandon and Mohanty
2003) as some of the organisations are state dependent (Ibid; Bangura 1999). The 
other relates to the extent o f NGO transfer of power to the people they work with. 
Doubts are also expressed in relation to their management capabilities, the 
replicability of their interventions, the small-scale nature of their interventions, 
unclear levels and durations of NGO support and questions o f sustainability 
(Pijnenburg and Nhantumbo 2002; Pretty and Scoones 1997; Riddell et al 1995; 
Mungate 1993; Moyo 2002; Nyangoro 1999). In this regard, I would like to note that 
power, including NGO power might also constrain participation. As NGOs work in 
and with poor communities, their relations with the latter are not of equality. By virtue
of being in a position to support grassroots interventions while also engaging with 
government and other external stakeholders usually inaccessible to locals, NGOs 
become powerful actors in relation to communities.
The ephemeral nature of NGO-community contact through time-bound interventions 
cannot be a firm basis for entrenching participation. Lane (1997:189) argues that 
‘NGO projects in general do not guarantee either the high intensity or wide scope of 
participation implied by the empowerment approach’ (see Nyangoro 1999’s good, bad 
and ugly; Mararike 1995; Dixon 2002). Pretty and Scoones (1997) acknowledge the 
many successes in community-based and participatory approaches by NGOs but note 
that these tend to remain local. The reasons some NGO success stories remain 
localized despite their promise requires investigation within the context of finding 
avenues for scaling up in specific contexts. Perhaps more work is needed to detail 
Edwards and Hulme’s (1992) multiplicative and diffusive strategies o f scaling up 
particularly regarding the form and extent of lateral transfer of influence.
Limited documentary evidence and the above arguments notwithstanding, NGOs 
generally reach out to the poor innovatively (Clark 1991), emphasize processes 
through which people learn and gain control over their lives rather than execution of 
tasks. NGOs apply flexible, small-scale and experiment-based development 
interventions. NGOs’ claims to innovation and flexibility (i.e. being non-bureaucratic) 
do have some foundation in reality (Lane 1997; see Krishna et al 1997; Pretty and 
Scoones 1997; Uphoff et al 1998; Uphoff 1996; Brohman 1996; Johnson and Wilson 
2000). The autonomy and independence from political pressure, patronage and the 
grip of local elites are other potential advantages that NGOs have. This enables them 
to promote participation. Grassroots NGO operations tend to increase people’s 
demand for participatory interventions (Lane 1997), often creating problems for the 
state (see Blackburn and de Toma 1998). Nyangoro (1999) observes that in East and 
Southern Africa ‘NGOs have come to symbolise opposition to current regimes and the 
galvanisation of civil society’ (1999:9).
Let me conclude section 2.6 by summing up some of the key issues raised. First, is the 
reality that different clusters of actors (state-related agencies, international 
development organisations, NGOs and local level organisations) promote
participation singularly as well as through interacting with others. Such promotion of 
participation is affected by the internal uniqueness of the actors as well as their 
relations with others as was discussed with international development organisations 
and the sovereignty debate (see Sankore 2005). Actor-specific questions posed 
include around the implications of the limited replicability of NGO experiences with 
participation. Second, were issues o f ‘contextual participatoriness’. Given that most 
available evidence is tentative, of contestable generalizability and that NGOs alone 
cannot entrench participation, what other options exist? Which institutions have the 
comparative advantages for promoting participation i.e. breadth and depth? What role 
can local government structures play in this respect? Can their more commonplace 
and legislated existence (Schroeder 2000) be mobilized to structure participation more 
sustainably? What would be the implications for relationships amongst local 
governance institutions (including the different state structures) and the people? 
However, NGO experiences are crucial in institutionalising participation. Despite 
weak recognition as legitimate local governance institutions in Zimbabwe, NGOs 
have played a critical role. That NGOs are not linked to formal development 
structures and systems in some countries creates challenges. On their part, some 
NGOs feel accountable to communities while others do not. Principally funded from 
outside, NGO legitimacy is often questioned by the state (see Nyangoro 1999). 
Outside accountability is perceived as outweighing local accountability making NGOs 
doubtful participation promoters.
Mechanisms for institutionalising participation benefit from both state and non-state 
facilitated processes. State leadership of the promotion of participation, while 
indispensable, has been seen as proceeding in starts and stops trapping policy 
innovations in top-down frameworks (Haidari and Wright 2001; Makumbe 1998). In 
institutionalising participation, the form o f state leadership remains critical (Fritz and 
Menocal 2007). Issues of local-level consciousness and self-reliance (Tilakaratna 
1987; Nyoni 1987; Kar 2003) and whether poor people can ever be left alone (Berner 
and Phillips 2005; Annis 1987) also emerge as critical. On the other hand, does it 
matter if projects are ‘top-down’ as long as they use means accessible to the poor and 
yield benefits to them (see Schumacher 1973)? This is an important question 
considering that poor people robustly respond to ‘imposed’ processes and institutions
for their benefit (see Mapedza and Mandondo 2002; Kamete 2002; Green 2000). I 
return to this puzzle (state leadership and robust local responses) in section 2.8.
Another question relates to the role o f policy-making and institution-building. If 
policy and legislative provisions alone are inadequate (McGee et al 2003; Blackburn 
and de Toma 1998) how can the other dimensions (fiscal decentralisation, 
commitment to participation from above etc) be addressed? Is participation to focus 
on global, national policy formulation processes and spaces or sub-national ones 
(Booth 2003; Moss et al 2006; Browne 2007; Sankore 2005; Makumbe 2001; UNDP 
2003; Robb 2002)? A point to be made is that none of the mechanisms can singularly 
address all participation challenges. While the role of government is critical in 
creating a supportive policy, legislative and institutional environment, other actors 
make participation work by practicing it on the ground. The discussion that follows 
focuses on some o f these issues.
2.7. Constraints and dynamics in institutionalising participation
Institutionalising participation faces a number o f problems. The main ones are in four 
groups as follows:
2.7.1. Factors related to poor people themselves
These include literacy levels, levels of organisation and leadership, technical skills 
and ability to exert political influence (Lisk 1985; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Majeres 
1985; Esman and Uphoff 1984; Friedmann 1992), which are usually lower or weaker 
amongst the poor compared to the rich. However, some analysts deny that the poor 
lack initiative arguing that they are active and organised (Chambers 1983, 1997; 
Uphoff et al 1998; Nyoni 1987; Tilakaratna 1987; Robb 2002). Based on her
O ftexperiences with a Zimbabwean NGO , Nyoni (1987) contends that one can 
effectively work with the poor at any level. Arguing against what she calls 
‘international developmentalism she advises that understanding historical processes 
o f change in given communities stimulates inherent aspirations o f self-help. 
Tilakaratna (1987) also notes that self-reliance is an intrinsic human spirit and where 
not manifest it can be animated.
28 Sithembiso Nyoni is a founder member o f the Organisation o f  Rural Associations for Progress 
(ORAP) based in Bulawayo and working with poor people’s groups in Western Zimbabwe.
2.7.2. Economic Factors
Participation has a cost and often a high one in terms of people’s time and material 
resources. As a result, those with the resources tend to participate ahead of those 
without resources. In addition, some organisations lack resources to facilitate 
participation e.g. holding consultative meetings (see Mukamuri et al 2003). Where 
people do not perceive benefits, the likelihood of participation is low. The delivery of 
benefits from an intervention at times brings people together to develop common 
interests (Eyben and Ladbury 1997; World Bank 1994) and thus facilitates 
participation.
2.7.3. The role of professionals and organisations
As noted by Eyben and Ladbury (1997:196) ‘the professional training and culture of
some sector specialists militates against an emphasis on participation’. Nyoni
(1987:53) makes a relevant point thus,
‘ .. .interveners have to know that they are often more dangerous than they are 
helpful to the rural poor...they often pretend to represent the fashionable and 
universally acceptable development ideas, knowledge and skills. Great 
pressure is put on the poor to comply with certain universal conditions’.
Chambers’ reversals discourse is also informed by the reality that professionals often
lack the inclination to initiate and sustain participation (Chambers 1983, 1997). Craig
and Porter (1997) argue that projects, professionals and organisations are essentially
instruments of control rather than of participation and that, they frame or determine
the form and extent of participation. Jackson (1997) notes that field-workers as
professionals use their experiences to mediate between projects and people and in the
process shape participation. Organisational capacities, procedures or processes play
an important part in participation (World Bank 1994).
2.7.4. Political and institutional dynamics
Apart from the extent o f organisation amongst the poor, broader institutional 
processes and structures may block or facilitate participation. In some communities, 
power disparities play out in such a way that other powerful groups make it 
impossible for weaker ones to articulate, promote and protect their interests (see 
Green 2002; Narayan et al 2000; Mukamuri et al 2003). Political polarization, as 
currently in Zimbabwe, may constrain active participation for fear of victimization. In 
South Africa, the increasing strength o f representative democracy (Lyons et al 2001) 
is negatively shifting the nature of the participatory process with the state
repositioning itself as a critical actor and conduit for resources and re-configuring its 
relations particularly with NGOs/CBOs. Porter and Onyach-Olaa (1999) caution 
against over-valuing representative (democratic) structures citing the social, technical 
and economic distance between elected officials and the electorate. These dynamics 
have implications for participation spaces and processes i.e. ‘doing development’. A 
related argument is the politicization of local administrative staff, often making public 
servants’ accountability difficult leading to three distinct voices emerging i.e. 
politicians, administrators/technocrats and the public (Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999). 
These three internally heterogeneous clusters are critical in terms o f determining the 
form and extent of participation.
Enhancing effective participation is attempted through different mechanisms and 
interventions. Success is mediated by specific stakeholders, their internal 
characteristics and motivations but also the external circumstances including policies 
and power dynamics. External factors may be unique to individual development 
organisations or common to all stakeholders in an intervention, but the key may rest 
with value-based interpretations. I return to this point in Chapter 3, Figure 1. The 
quality and nature o f participation is thus affected by a myriad of factors and 
organisational systems, mandates and development visions. Field tensions, central- 
local government dynamics, NGO-state relationships and North-South divide all play 
a part. Below I discuss institutional structures based on decentralisation literature. The 
idea is to deepen understanding of the opportunities for and constraints to 
participation in decentralised governance and development management.
2.8. Decentralising for participation: theoretical issues and case study 
country experiences
This section does two things. It extends and contextualizes the theoretical discussion 
started above, focusing on decentralisation, and then grounds it in the experiences of 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. Theories of participation discussed in previous sections, are 
dealt with again only insofar as they relate to the case study countries to connect 
participation and decentralisation. As noted in section 2.1 the idea is to show whether 
participation is anchored in decentralised (usually state-created), popular structures, 
stakeholders, or is based on different combinations of all these. I link the literature on
participation to the experiences of the case study countries to help situate and provide 
a rationale for the statement of the research problem and research methodology in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Common issues, lessons and positive experiences from 
decentralisation in both countries are also discussed.
The underlying rationale for adopting and implementing decentralisation in both 
countries has been to enhance people’s participation in development and local 
governance generally. As such the main question in this section is what lessons can 
be drawn from the two case study countries about the extent to which decentralisation 
has expanded the possibilities for more participatory forms of development to be 
institutionalized at the local level. Whether decentralisation or participation comes 
first is not my focus. The emphasis is on clarifying the practical and theoretical 
symbiosis between them. Within the African context, the theoretical and practical 
rationale of the two concepts is shared. Related is the hope that simultaneously 
adopting and applying decentralisation and participation addresses the problems of 
limited development (see African Charter 1990).
2.8.1. Conceptualising decentralisation and its connections with participation
Decentralisation concerns changes in the administrative and political relationship 
between the state and its organs. For Turner and Hulme (1997) decentralisation entails 
a search for a balance between central control and local autonomy that satisfies 
regime needs and popular demands but it is not the opposite of centralisation. Cheema 
and Rondinelli (1983:9) refer to decentralisation in terms of ‘...the degree of control 
that central governments can and should have over development planning and 
administration’. For Conyers (2002) it involves a process whereby functions 
previously undertaken by central government institutions become the responsibility of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions at sub-national levels.
Decentralisation has been applied in different policy environments and by 
governments and international development organisations with varied backgrounds 
and interests (Conyers 2002). The issue of costs for providing public services is also 
central in decentralisation processes. In virtually all instances, decentralisation 
proceeds on the basis of specific policies or legal instruments to guide the changes. 
Often, institutional structures, procedures and relationships are altered as part of
decentralisation. Key analysts thus agree that decentralisation is about changes in 
political and administrative power, structures, functions and processes that govern 
resources and accountability (Conyers 2002, 2003; Enemuo 2000; Wunsch and 
Olowu 1990; Crook and Manor 1998; Turner and Hulme 1997; Cheema and 
Rondinelli 1983; Olowu 1990, 2001, 2002; LGAZ 1998; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 
1999; Ndegwa 2002; Ndegwa and Levy 2003; World Bank 2002, 2003).
Decentralisation’s diverse appeal is both fascinating and a concern. Its popularity 
might be interpreted as showing beneficial potential. However, some decentralisation 
policies have ended up being strategies for deepening central control (see Brand 1991; 
Conyers 2003; Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991; Shah and Thomson 2004) suggesting that we 
should have serious doubts about the impact of decentralisation. The poverty- 
reduction agenda has also been regarded as one that could benefit from 
decentralisation (Conyers 2007; GRZ 2004; LGAZ 1998; King and Cutshall 1994). 
Doubts are however beginning to be expressed about this link, which is not always 
straightforward. Decentralisation appeals both to genuine decentralisers and 
centralists cloaking their autocratic tendencies (Crook and Manor 1998). Tensions 
over expectations often breed conflicts over the pursuit of decentralisation.
As discussed in previous sections, taking direct part in development is often mediated 
through socio-economic or political organisations notwithstanding participation on an 
individual basis, through representatives or stakeholders. I focus in this section on 
participation facilitated through or by organisational structures because this brings out 
the issue of how organisational arrangements and functions affect people’s 
participation. Because decentralisation concerns defining what is done at what level 
and the attendant organisational frameworks it can leverage participation. On the 
other hand participation may enable decentralisation in cases where active 
participation increases the capacity of an organisation (or individuals) to a point 
where it becomes possible to formally assume (or be assigned) more roles and 
powers. It is possible to argue that decentralisation enables participation and 
participation sustains decentralisation. As will be argued later, this symbiotic 
relationship is at once apparent and latent depending on contextual factors, the form 
of decentralisation and objectives being pursued. It will be further argued that, all 
forms of decentralisation can yield spaces for heightening participation (citizen
power). In this section, I adopt the view that participation is about speaking to and 
interacting with power. The further away those with power are i.e. the more 
centralised the structures and processes, the more limited participation becomes (see 
African Charter 1990).
Decentralisation has recurred in Africa since independence (Ndegwa 2002) although 
it also has a pre-independence history (Turner and Hulme 1997, Enemuo, 2000) e.g. 
Britain’s Indirect Rule Policy and the establishment of local government systems in 
colonies after the Second World War. For British territories the 1947 Colonial Office 
Dispatch (Turner and Hulme 1997) officially communicated this slant. British 
colonies in East Africa (Kenya and Uganda) and Central Africa (Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Malawi) bear the footprints o f this policy history as much as those o f subsequent 
decentralisation phases. Two further decentralisation phases can be noted. The first is 
the post-1960s wave inspired by the attainment of independence and the second is the 
post-1980s phase intricately tied to political and economic liberalisation programmes.
Three main forms of decentralisation are generally noted in the literature i.e. de­
concentration, delegation and devolution (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Turner and 
Hulme 1997). I briefly define these in turn below largely based on the views of 
Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) as they have relevance to the discussion that follows. 
De-concentration is shifting workload within central government institutions from 
head to field offices. De-concentrated institutions owe allegiance more to their 
institutional hierarchies than to local stakeholders. One of the more specific reasons 
for de-concentrating is to ensure central government closeness to the people. 
Delegation relates to the transfer of functions to semi-autonomous development 
organisations or Parastatals not under the direct control of central government. 
However, the Parastatals are linked to a ‘parent Ministry’ monitoring or supervising 
them. Devolution entails creation or strengthening o f independent levels or units of 
(local) government that are outside the direct control of central government and to 
which it (central government) relinquishes certain functions. The local governments 
operate within legally recognizable spatial boundaries, have a corporate status and 
powers to secure resources, perform public functions within their areas and interact 
reciprocally with other units of government. To many, devolution is seen as the ideal 
type of decentralisation (Turner and Hulme 1997).
Ndegwa and Levy (2003) present a framework (Table 4) depicting decentralisation 
phases from initiation to sustenance, juxtaposed to key stakeholders. In assessing any 
decentralisation policy their variables and questions are important.
Table 4: Analytical framework for assessing decentralisation
Political Elites. Bureaucratic
Stakeholders.
Community
Stakeholders.
Engaging
Decentralisation
(Initiating).
How strong is the elite 
political consensus in 
favor o f  
decentralisation?
To what extent is the 
decentralisation 
discourse underpinned 
by technical and 
comparative analysis?
How strong is bottom- 
up pressure for local 
empowerment?
Detailing 
Decentralisation 
(Planning etc).
How engaged is the 
political elite in 
ensuring that the details 
o f decentralisation are 
consistent with political 
intent?
How cooperative is the 
bureaucracy in 
developing and 
implementing new  
decentralised systems 
o f  governance?
How involved are civil 
society organisations in 
defining their entry 
points and their level o f  
involvement in 
contemplated technical 
details?
Sustaining
Decentralisation.
To what extent do elite political and bureaucratic 
stakeholders seek to re-assert central control over 
authority and resources?
How capable are 
communities o f  
enforcing downward 
accountability on local 
elites?
Source; Ndegwa and Levy 2003:6 (see McGee et al 2003 on role o f bottom up demand for 
participation, Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999 on community tracking o f decisions).
2.8.2. Reasons for decentralising
Sub-Saharan African countries have pursued decentralisation mainly for nation- 
building, in response to democratization pressures and, among other reasons, to make 
service delivery more responsive. Olowu (2001) cites at least four motivating factors 
for democratic decentralisation from the mid-1970s. These are economic, fiscal and 
political crises resulting from failing centralised public sector management, non-state 
domestic pressures, pressure from external donors, and growing urbanization. Some 
o f these factors closely relate to the reasons and mechanisms for institutionalising 
participation in section 2.6 above. Economic reform policies, especially the aspects 
relating to cost-sharing and removal of social sector subsidies, have played a part in 
making decentralisation popular. Decentralising service delivery has been seen as a 
panacea to the withdrawal of the state from specific sectors. It has often been 
criticized as ‘dumping down’ functions mainly to local government bodies without 
the commensurate resources for the delivery of such services. The discussion of 
decentralisation motivations is expanded in each of the country sub-sections below.
2.8.3. Decentralising for participation in Zimbabwe
Decentralisation has been a major policy thrust in Zimbabwe from independence as an 
integral part of nation-building (Makumbe 1996; 1998; Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990; 
Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991). For rural local governance, four main phases can be 
identified which coincided with the enactment of key legislation or policy instruments 
guiding decentralisation. First was the establishment of District Councils in 1980 
through the District Councils Act. Second was the 1984 Prime Minister’s Directive 
closely linked to and given legal force by the Provincial Councils and Administration 
Act of 1985. Third was the amalgamation of District and Rural Councils from 1993 
although the enabling legislation, the Rural District Councils Act had been passed in 
1988. The final changes were introduced through the Traditional Leaders’ Act of 
2000. Each phase is discussed below emphasizing the essential features and their 
effects on the structures.
The immediate post-independence decentralisation era was influenced by the policy 
desire to undo the racial white-settler colonial government policies of separate 
development and governance structures in rural and urban areas (dualism29). African 
rural areas (Tribal Trust Lands) were governed by traditional leaders (Chiefs) who 
were salaried based on their grades (dependent on numbers of tax-paying adults) and 
reported to Native Commissioners in the Department of Native Affairs. At least 220 
African Councils existed at independence (Hammar 2003; Plan Afric 1997). The 
District Councils Act created 55 District Councils by amalgamating the African 
Councils. The administrative head of Council was a District Administrator (Ministry 
of Local Government and Housing) while elected Councilors chose their Chair from 
amongst themselves. The District Councils co-existed with 45 Rural Councils, which 
administered mainly white commercial farming areas (former European areas). Phase 
one saw the bringing of all local government issues (in former European and African 
as well as in rural and urban areas) under one Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing (African Councils had hitherto been the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs). Traditional leaders were sidelined and one of the justifications for 
this was their alleged collaboration with the white settler regime before independence.
29 In urban areas the dual city (white and black sections) was also progressively abolished. Capacity 
building programmes with a focus on infrastructure, human and financial management components 
were implemented with significant bilateral and multilateral support.
The second phase o f the local governance reforms saw the appointment of eight 
Provincial Governors with Ministerial powers under the Prime Minister’s Directive of 
1984. The Directive launched the development planning policy, sought to integrate 
District with provincial and national planning structures and formalized ZANU PF 
institutions. It also entrenched the sidelining o f traditional structures (see Gasper 
1997; Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991). Governors’ brief related to coordinating and 
implementing development planning in their provinces using a consultative approach. 
Elected Ward and Village Development Committees (WADCOs and VIDCOs) were 
created to facilitate people’s participation in sub-District development planning while 
Provincial and District Development Committees (mainly made up of government 
officials) at District and Provincial levels were created for the participation of field 
(government) administrators and local authorities otherwise operating parallel to each 
other. In terms of planning five-year and annual planning cycles were introduced. 
Village through Provincial Development Committees were to facilitate inclusion of 
people’s priorities in National Development Plans. The policy had disappointing 
results at Ward and Village levels because of capacity, financial, organisational and 
other general support limitations (Gasper 1997).
The 1988 RDC Act amalgamated District and Rural Councils to form Rural District 
Councils (RDCs), ending the rural local government dualism (Feltoe 2006). The Act 
was however kept in abeyance until 1993 when the Rural and District Councils were 
amalgamated to establish 55 RDCs (58 by 2005 due to subdivisions to ease 
administration). The Act defines 64 functions that the RDCs can perform. Most of 
these functions are however performed by central government departments with 
deferred and often long transfer processes. A Rural Development Forum in the early 
1990s did preparatory work undertaking studies to ensure trouble-free amalgamation. 
The same period coincided with the implementation o f pilot programmes for rural 
local authority capacity building e.g. the Pilot District Support Programme (PDSP). 
One of the principal outputs of the Rural Development Forum was the Strategic Plan 
for Capacity Building o f 1994 later the Rural District Council Capacity Building 
Programme (RDCCBP) implemented between 1996 and 2001. In the same period, 
Government also came up with 13 principles of decentralisation defining the policy 
direction and implementation modalities particularly ministerial transfer of functions
and staff to RDCs, building their capacities, the division of functions between the 
centre and Councils and the channeling of resources (GRZ 1998). The principles were 
the clearest government got in terms of committing itself to giving Councils more 
developmental responsibilities. The promise to transfer functions to RDCs raised 
expectations amongst RDCs and provided momentum for RDC capacity building (the 
RDCCBP). This acted as an incentive for government to re-launch the 
decentralisation programme in 1996 alongside implementing the RDCCBP. In a way, 
the efficacy of the Development Committees seemed to become doubtful by this time.
The last phase saw the enactment of the Traditional Leaders’ Act in 2000 and 
Statutory Instrument 15 of 2001 with the intention of harmonizing elected and 
traditional leadership in rural local governance. The legislation focused on the sub- 
District structures where traditional leaders had been excluded (see also Abbink 2005) 
from the process in previous phases. Problems arising from traditional leaders’ 
retention o f influence (see Nugent 2004; Odotei 2005; Mukamuri et al 2003) caused 
operational anxieties especially for elected officials. From about 2 functions before 
the new Act, traditional leaders now have at least 14 functions and receive significant 
government allowances. Harmonization of traditional and elected leaders (see also 
Ray et al 1997; GRZ 1994a; UNECA 2005; Zack-Williams et al 2002) has been seen 
as a way o f ensuring effective local governance. This is based on the notion that 
traditional leaders ‘own’ the people, are a legitimating, unifying or socially stabilizing 
force and wield significant power arising from performing local land administration 
functions. As such their involvement is seen as critical to bridging the gap between 
‘their people’ and external development organisations (Councils, government etc). 
Ray et al (1997) argues that the political legitimacy of traditional leaders should be 
added to that of local government to strengthen the latter and expand its capacity.
Arguments for incorporating traditional leaders in local government are generally 
persuasive but also arise from the serious dilemmas that local people have regarding 
the different actors (Oomen 2002). Quoting a young woman in Sekhukhune, South 
Africa, Oomen (2002) notes that ‘...traditional leaders are not capable, the elected 
Councilors not reliable and the government is far away and does not listen to us. So 
for now let’s just keep the traditional leaders’ (Oomen 2002:2). In Zimbabwe, the 
payment of traditional leaders, colonial and post-colonial association with the ruling
party and government in a generally polarized environment all make local governance
difficult. The payment of allowances to traditional leaders in Zimbabwe is seen as a
reward for or inducement to support the ruling party (CPIA 2005). The challenges
associated with the place and role of traditional leadership institutions across Africa is
one legacy of colonialism. Nugent (2004) characterises the legacy in relation to the
perverse effect of colonial contradictions on the state and society (see Mbembe 2001;
Mamdani 1996), the contradictions associated with post-colonial continuities and
changes particularly the simultaneous transfers o f power from Europeans to African
political elites and from Chiefs to elected officials. As observed by Nugent,
‘Traditional rulers did not take rejection lightly and...often fought a rearguard action to 
capture political voice... They argued that ...they embodied a deeper legitimacy than 
politicians...they [were] duty-bound to speak out on behalf o f their people when the 
politicians got it wrong’ (Nugent 2004:107; see also Ray et al 1997).
WADCOs and VIDCOs created in line with the 1984 and 1985 Prime Minister’s 
Directives and chaired by elected officials who were mainly ZANU PF cadres (Brand 
1991; Hammar 2003) have been changed to Assemblies presided over by traditional 
leaders. Headmen chair Ward while Village Heads chair Village Assemblies. Village 
Assemblies comprise of all villagers above 18 years while Ward Assemblies are made 
up of all Village Heads, Headmen and the Councilor of the respective Ward. The 
Assemblies are assisted by Development Committees chaired by a Village Head30 and 
a Councilor for the Village and Ward Committees respectively. Councils have 
become visible actors in development with some of the functions transferred 
especially social welfare, health and roads with grants from the centre for 
implementing activities through relevant sector Ministries. The Rural District 
Development Committee (formerly District Development Committee), is chaired by 
the DA and brings together field administrators, NGOs and other development actors. 
Although the RDDC is a Committee of Council, that the DA (its chair) is a senior 
Government official makes it more powerful than other Council Committees made up 
of Councilors and serviced by Council executives.
Decentralisation in Zimbabwe has experienced stops, starts and detours. New 
institutions created experienced resistance e.g. the pre-2000 WADCOs and VIDCOs 
as well as ongoing friction between traditional leaders and Councilors despite the
30 Chairs both the Village Assembly and the Development Committee.
creation of Assemblies. Institutional friction/overlaps (see Nugent 2004; Engberg- 
Pedersen 1997), lack of resources and capacities to take on more responsibilities and 
the unwieldy nature of the structures have acted to constrain their effectiveness 
(Gasper 1997; Chiwewe 199731; GRZ 1994a). New structures appear to have had 
more o f a mandate to implement national programmes than to steer meaningful local 
participation. Others have observed that Zimbabwe’s decentralisation was not 
properly synchronized with capacity building o f local institutions (Chikate 199732). 
Some local institutions are given similar mandates e.g. Councilors and traditional 
leaders (both) are often defined as ‘community entry points’ for use by outside 
development organisations. This has caused confusion for outsiders and friction 
between the two.
Weak horizontal coordination and the center’s reluctance to cede power (see 
Makombe 1993; Feltoe 2006; World Bank 2002; Enemuo 2000) have also been 
experienced in Zimbabwe’s decentralisation. Some weaknesses arise from the caliber 
of people who participate in spaces like the RDDC. Brand (1991) and Mutizwa- 
Mangiza (1991) noted that RDDCs were weak because junior staff attended meetings 
and were unable to make key decisions or offer adequate advice. The Minister of 
Local Government and Urban Development observed in 2004 that ‘...it is painful that 
since 1984...we have not posted meaningful progress in regard to decentralisation. 
We continue to witness centrist tendencies in the management of business.. .integrated 
development has been difficult to achieve’ (Chombo 2004:333). At the level of 
creating structures, Zimbabwe’s decentralisation policies have thus seen some success 
(see Conyers 2007). The smooth functioning and relationships remain weak. 
Ironically, spaces with political, legal and administrative security seem operationally 
weak. Because of legal enshrinement (RDC Act) and being chaired by the DA, the 
RDDC wields significant power but is not effective in most cases. I return to these 
issues particularly in Chapter 5. However, the shifts and legitimacy questions 
regarding key District actors, which have not been consolidated, appear to stifle 
participation (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Feltoe 2006).
31 Official opening speech as Permanent Secretary o f  Local Government at an ARDCZ workshop on 
decentralization and capacity building (Harare).
32 Chief Executive o f  ARDCZ’s address at the decentralization and capacity building workshop
33 Keynote address to a workshop for Heads o f  Departments (in the Ministry), Provincial 
Administrators, Provincial Planning Officers, Public Works Officers, DAs, 1-2 April 2004 at the 
Zimbabwe Institute o f  Public Administration and Management (ZIPAM).
2.8.4. Decentralising for participation in Zambia
Post-independence decentralisation trends in Zambia have a longer history than in 
Zimbabwe by virtue of the country having attained independence earlier. Principal 
legislative milestones include the repeal of the Native Authority Ordinance by the 
Local Government Act of 1965, which ushered in Rural Councils. Between 1964 and 
1979, Zambia focused on dismantling the colonial legacy by creating structures for 
development at all levels starting with the National Planning Commission, Provincial 
Development and District Development Committees (P/DDC). The existence of 
parallel central and local government was seen as a duplication of effort, expensive 
and a source of institutional conflict. Furthermore, the PDCs and DDCs had no power 
to make decisions or source funds. Features of the UNIP government’s ‘decentralised 
centralism’ or one-party participatory democracy included strengthening party control 
of the bureaucracy and centrally appointing leaders for local party structures. As such, 
there was no decentralisation within sector Ministries. Throughout the UNIP era, local 
authorities remained sidelined (Chikulo 1981; Government of Zambia 1995; 2003;
2004).
The 1979 Village Development and Registration Act created Ward and Village 
Development Committees (WADCOs and VIDCOs) with villages becoming the 
primary focus for local development. The 1980 to 1990 period saw high levels of 
political interference as the one-party state took root. This was done under the Local 
Administration Act (LAA) of 1980, which repealed the Local Government Act of 
1965. The LAA abolished local government elections, resulted in ‘stuffed Councils’ 
as the party placed cadres to run Council business and functions were transferred from 
central to local government without commensurate resources. This era effectively saw 
the merger of Councils/local government with the party administration. Local and 
central government were also conflated until the LAA was repealed by the Local 
Government Act of 1991 under the MMD Government (see Government o f Zambia 
2003).
The Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ) observed that, through 
running electricity undertaking and receiving predetermined grants from the centre, 
Councils operated smoothly (LGAZ 1998). However, between 1973 and 1980,
Councils lost some government grants, revenue-generating undertakings like 
electricity and sources like land tax making it difficult for Councils to provide 
services. Local Government staff received hefty government-negotiated salaries, 
which further depleted Council resources. The trend continued after 1991. 
Government grants further declined (LGAZ 1998) and Acts of Parliament further 
reducing their revenue generation and related powers. Examples include the 
withdrawal of vehicle licensing functions, the sale o f Council houses and the increase 
in properties exempted from taxation, among others. This trend and the increasing 
poverty in both rural and urban Zambia makes it increasingly hard for Councils to 
provide services. Although the national decentralisation policy is clear on the role of 
local government such emphasis is not backed by existing legislation and previous 
processes that have left Councils weak.
A Cabinet Circular o f 1995 created Development Coordinating Committees at 
national, provincial and District levels spelling out the functions, membership, 
procedures, reporting and administrative arrangements for these structures 
(Government of Zambia 1995). Government has facilitated the setting up of Area 
Development Committees (ADCs) in rural areas and Resident Development 
Committees (RDCs) in urban areas since the early 1990s as structures for citizen 
participation. Ward-level institutions promote people’s involvement in decision­
making. Chiefs and Councilors are not directly involved in ADCs and RDCs but 
through representatives and as ex-officio respectively. These changes are currently 
picking up implementation pace since the adoption of the Decentralisation Policy in 
2003 and are therefore yet to bear fruit let alone settle into the Zambian local 
governance terrain. The force and effect o f the 1995 Circular has been widespread and 
significant in terms of shaping Zambian local governance. The decentralisation policy 
(to be implemented over ten years) is a culmination of MMD government initiatives 
since 1991 and further supports the 1995 Circular by defining government’s long­
term vision of a decentralised and democratically elected system of governance 
(Government of Zambia 2003). The policy highlights effective local community 
participation in decision-making, development and administration through 
maintaining sufficient core-periphery linkages {Ibid: 1).
Generally, Zambia’s decentralisation experiences failed to create strong local 
institutions. ADCs, RDCs and heightened implementation of the 2003 
Decentralisation Policy provide hope that emerging institutions will be rallying points 
for citizen participation. What remains is providing these structures with adequate 
resources and building their capacities to operate smoothly. Anxieties remain about 
centralist tendencies but positive economic performance appears to underpin people’s 
capacity to participate. As with the sub-section on Zimbabwe, the rest of the thesis 
discusses whether the structures discussed here can enhance participation.
2.8.5. Does decentralisation engender participation?
The implementation of decentralisation has been determined by political factors in 
both countries. Challenges faced relate to technical issues, local capacity questions, 
and the role of ruling party interests, bureaucratic inertia and local institutional 
dynamics (see Ndegwa 2002; Olowu 1990; Conyers 2002, 2003; World Bank 2002, 
2003; Enemuo 2000). While the general intention of decentralisation is to get 
government closer to the people it would appear in the two countries centralised 
government is what has been taken to the people. In earlier periods both Zimbabwe 
and Zambia used party structures to reach the people. Both countries have generally 
not empowered Councils enough to entrench participation.
To be fair however, some level of participation has been enabled through structures 
like traditional leaders and the Development Committees which did not exist before 
independence (see Conyers 2007). Support to cooperatives and other people’s 
organisations also increased. The advent o f NGOs and community-based 
organisations (CBOs) also increased participation avenues in both countries. 
Awareness of development processes and use o f participatory approaches by field 
administrators (see Eyben and Ladbury, 1997, Pretty and Scoones 1997, Thompson 
1995) have occurred in the two countries. On balance, despite serious challenges that 
remain, considerable ground has been covered. I explore how and why these aspects 
present themselves in the next Chapter and also discuss the findings from the field to 
show the extent to which the decentralised structures (my units of data collection and 
analysis) are acting to deepen or frustrate participation.
2.9. Conclusion
The research question was framed as follows; what are the key institutional factors 
supportive of and inhibitions to participatory development at District level? I
proceeded to pose subsidiary questions on whether people’s participation mattered 
and how facilitation methods (and facilitators) mattered. The sections in this Chapter 
engaged with issues that necessitate the posing of additional questions. One such set 
o f questions include the form and effect of organisational interaction, the place of 
ordinary people in such interactions and how organisational interaction affects 
people’s participation in development activities. Participation and decentralisation 
have some form of symbiotic relationship. Government-established structures in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia present genuine opportunities for entrenching participation.
However, challenges related to centralist tendencies and stop-start implementation of 
decentralisation, exist. I highlighted internal challenges, for instance those 
experienced by RDDCs (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991) and sub-District Committees 
(Brand 1991), inter-organisational conflicts between elected and traditional leaders 
(see Vaughan 2005; CPIA 2005), NGOs and the state (see Nyangoro 1999; Dixon 
2002) and citizens’ constrained access to public institutions (World Bank 2002; Aslop 
and Kurey 2005; Ayittey 2005). These challenges confound attempts at creating 
participatory structures and processes. Some commentators raise questions about the 
post-colonial African state (and allied institutions of governance) regarding 
legitimacy, capacity and overall relevance considering the serious development 
challenges on the continent (see Mbeki 2005; Ayittey 2005; Vaughan 2005; Mbaku 
2004; Mbembe 2001).
Using insights from Mapedza and Mandondo (2002) and Kamete (2002) I highlighted 
that in their dealings with institutions ordinary people robustly create additional space 
for themselves (see Green 2002; Mercer 2002; Nyoni 1987). Communities observe 
and directly experience inter-organisational interaction for instance between central 
and local government. Their observations and experiences inform the depth and 
breadth of participation. The assessment of the CBCC (GRZ 1999; see Chombo 2004; 
Chikulo 1981) and the discussion following presentation of Table 3 reflected that 
even government processes and programmes do not always support participation.
Development institutions relate to each other within legally defined structures and 
spaces, in projects and other non-formal spaces. Governmental and non-governmental 
development organisations use different spaces and opportunities to influence each 
other, which has a bearing on participation. Approaches and principles like 
participation and participatory development are useful in shaping expectations 
regarding the ends not just the means of development. This is why asking about who 
participates, how and why is critical because participation is at the heart of 
development politics and development is a by-product of it.
In this Chapter I explored the theoretical issues relating to participation and 
development separately and jointly using the concept of participatory development. I 
further looked at how and whether decentralisation provides for participation drawing 
a number of important points. These include that participation takes different forms. It 
is also governed differently. Project promoters steer policy changes while delivering 
material benefits and securing alliances critical for their work. Institutional interface is 
largely structured by centrally-formulated regulations moderated by local dynamics. 
However, in Zimbabwe and Zambia it is important to interrogate why it appears that 
central signals hold greater sway than local ingenuity in local governance. What 
appear to be legally, politically and institutionally secure spaces like RDDCs, PDCs 
and state-related development organisations remain operationally ineffective, which 
perhaps suggests structural flaws (see Davies and Ratsso 2000, Bond and Manyanya 
2003; CPIA 2005) and general state failure (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006).
Participation and participatory development are not a 1990s invention. As concepts 
they are not only old but complex. Thus, the importance of concepts and practices of 
participatory development was discussed with reference to their widespread 
application at many levels, by diverse development organisations and from grassroots 
up to international development organisations, including at the state and local 
government levels. Some gaps affecting the application of participation in practice 
were noted. At one level the gaps or questions are about location and the application 
of experiences from different actors and settings. In addition, some questions were 
raised in the Chapter about entry points, scale and implementation of participation, for 
example through projects, policy influence and changes to structures.
The Chapter further showed how conceptualising and applying participation can, be 
problematic. Some of the problems were shown to relate to who was expected to 
participate. Others were shown to be more a matter of external realities, in that 
problems may rest with development and other development organisations that the 
poor may interact with. It has been shown that whilst these development organisations 
create an exciting terrain, this can create complications, which may also frustrate 
participation. Some of the literature shows that both state and non-state development 
organisations tend to define and influence the nature and extent of participation and 
participatory development. At the very least, this makes universalizing the overall 
approach difficult. In Chapter 3 ,1 elaborate on how structures influence defining and 
practicing participation.
The state, at least in Zimbabwe, but perhaps more generally, has lost its previously 
unquestioned favored status regarding promoting development. However, the question 
about whether the state should be the favored institution in specific national settings 
remains a key one (see Fritz and Menocal 2007). Regarding participatory 
development, it has become fashionable to give central place to non-governmental 
development organisations, especially NGOs. In this Chapter, what has emerged is 
that the role of the state (central and local) remains critical in supporting any 
meaningful form of participatory practice. This is increasingly recognized in the 
literature, where the state has been brought back in from ‘the cold’ and is being 
restored to some kind of centrality in the political process and in development.
Empirical evidence reviewed suggested that the important lesson o f recent 
experiences has been that what works best is in fact synergy between state and non­
state actors, and collaboration through various forms of partnership. Obstacles to this 
exist, of course, but an optimism grounded in well-founded successes does provide 
hope. Early steps in this direction include the creation and strengthening of new 
institutional structures and procedures for partnership relations. In some instances, it 
has been shown that this may entail refurbishing existing relations between the state 
and non-governmental development organisations. In other cases, such relationships 
need complete re-definition in terms of new roles and responsibilities that can foster 
participation. The project approach remains central to participatory development
processes; that much is evident from the literature. However, the ways in which 
projects are conceived, implemented and managed overall is clearly in need of 
considerable rethinking. Critics of the project-based approach to participatory 
development emphasize the importance of ensuring that people ‘do not get lost in 
them’ and that projects need to remain means and instruments rather than becoming 
ends in themselves. Life in any community does not stop or start with a project, after 
all, and outsiders are as much active social change agents as insiders are, and need to 
acknowledge their responsibilities for the outcomes o f project-based initiatives.
Finally, I looked at the link between participatory development and decentralisation in 
the cases of Zimbabwe and Zambia. The review o f the literature suggested that one 
important way in which participation can become entrenched in practice relates to 
decentralising of central government structures to make them accessible to people at 
grassroots level. It was shown that decentralisation gives meaning to participation in 
state structures and processes inclusive of policy formulation and implementation. 
The section contextualised the discussion of participation within governmental efforts 
generally and in the context of Zimbabwe and Zambia particularly. This was linked 
back to the reality that the study anchored the analysis in local government, whose 
existence and sustenance is a function of central government. The mechanisms for 
institutionalising participation, decentralisation experiences and its connections with 
participation were discussed and linked to the research problem (see conclusion to 
section 2.6, section 2.7 and 2.8.5), which is further elaborated in Chapter 3.
There are questions of capacity limitations in Councils and other local institutions. 
Another problem noted is the weak linkages between local government structures and 
community organisations. The effectiveness of Councils in nurturing democratic 
practice remains weak, which is a missing link in participatory development. It can 
be noted that although there is agreement on the value of decentralisation as a policy 
option in Africa, it exists within the context of the general resilience of highly 
centralised governance processes, as has been observed, for example, by Porter and 
Onyach-Olaa (1999).
The hosting of national programmes by Councils remains difficult where Councils are 
under-funded and properly staffed. It is contradictory that decentralisation policies are
framed and implemented alongside programmes and processes that retain central 
control. The discussion of research findings elaborates the problems faced in 
implementing and institutionalising participation in extremely difficult policy contexts 
of this kind. The problem deepens in circumstances where poverty is growing. 
Zimbabwean and Zambian experiences show that a number o f good programme 
practices (e.g. the Community Action Project 1995-2000 and ZAMSIF34) previously 
implemented through Councils were later discontinued with few alternatives 
available. If funding for innovative programmes supportive of decentralisation stops 
then the lessons learnt may not be applied. As Mbaku observes, ‘...most o f the so 
called policy mistakes committed in the majority o f African countries...have actually 
been deliberate and purposeful programmes designed and implemented by 
opportunistic politicians and civil servants’ (2004:267; see Engberg-Pedersen 1997). 
Mbaku further adds that many o f the obstacles to development are a reflection of 
weak, poor and inappropriate institutions. In Chapter 3 I explore the institutional 
context in Zimbabwe to show the how levels and forms of interaction affect policy 
and programme performance.
34 Zambia Social Investment Fund (funded by the World Bank and Government o f Zambia).
C h a p t e r  3: R e s t a t in g  R e s e a r c h  P r o b l e m  &  
P r e s e n t in g  C o n c e p t u a l  F r a m e w o r k
3.1. Introduction
In this Chapter I conclude the last two Chapters and re-emphasize points and 
questions being taken forward in the thesis. The Chapter defines the main lines of the 
research problem and extends the research question looking at modes of analyzing 
institutional interconnections. Based on the institutional map on which this study 
focuses, I discuss spaces and structures as they obtain in Zimbabwe, the streams of 
influence at each node of interface and throughout the wider system. For all practical 
purposes, what I present in section 3.3 is a product o f my understanding of the 
institutional connections between and amongst key players in Zimbabwe’s 
development. In other words it is a simplified model of the institutional relationships. 
The model allows me to discuss the existing formal and informal access to and control 
of spaces and structures that manage development in Zimbabwe.
Knowledge of how these spaces work, and the attitudes and capabilities of actual and 
potential users o f the spaces on one hand and the spaces themselves (i.e. institutions) 
on the other determine the form and extent of participation. Section 2.6 touched on the 
different mechanisms that are used to ensure that ordinary people access and control 
spaces for policy and decision-making, in short participate. Four groups o f factors 
critical in this regard were discussed in section 2.7. These were cited as factors 
relating to professionals and organizations, to the poor themselves, to economic issues 
and lastly to political and institutional dynamics.
This Chapter lays out how the analysis of the research question was organised using 
the existing rural institutional terrain for (thinking and doing) development. The 
question was; what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions 
to participatory development at District level? Subsidiary questions related to:
1. The form and effect of organisational interaction including issues o f institutional 
mutuality and/or its lack.
2. The place of people’s participation in organisational interaction i.e. the 
instruments and methods through which development organisations facilitate 
participation.
3. The effect of the two (organisational interaction and facilitation of participation) 
on development activities.
4. People’s perceptions of and dealings with development organisations.
5. The effect o f such perceptions on participation.
6. Relations between central and local government viz participation.
The Chapter begins by exploring the key elements o f the research problem elaborating 
on the questions before detailing key development actors with a role to institutionalize 
participation as defined in sections 1.1 and 2.5. This builds on discussions in Chapter 
2 and draws on the main case study country (Zimbabwe). Drawing on Zimbabwe and 
to an extent Zambia was part o f selecting and refining the specific methodology in
relation to preliminary findings discussed in Chapter 4. After laying the broad
contours of the institutional terrain studied, the Chapter presents the framework used 
to distil critical aspects of the topic; participatory development at District level.
As already shown, the environment for participatory development in rural areas has 
changed quite dramatically in recent years in Zimbabwe, but less so in Zambia. 
Whereas in Zimbabwe there have been shifts in institutional actors in Zambia there 
has been modest change since the 1990s. One of the enduring results of institutional 
changes in both countries includes a lack of capacity amongst rural local governance 
institutions including Councils. The other is the continuance of direct control by 
central government over local development activities.
3.2. Elaborating the research problem
The ideologies of participatory development promoted by development organisations 
in Tanzania are at odds with popular aspirations (Green 2000:67).
Ministries’ continuing top-down approach and the weakness o f local institutions 
inhibits understanding of what the differential and gendered impacts...ideas o f what 
would constitute development (Haidari and Wright 2001:53).
The above quotations are helpful in distinguishing between participation promoted
through popular and external institutions. Chapter 2 elaborated on this using available
literature and noted that it is not possible to generalise easily. That notwithstanding,
three points can be drawn from the quotations to problematise participation and
participatory development both in practice and conceptually. First is that participatory
development approaches used by development organisations do not necessarily
capture ordinary people’s aspirations. It is as if the inherent human spirit of self-
reliance (Tilakaratna 1987) is not respected. The second is that state and other big
institutions are generally ill-disposed to promote participation. Thirdly local 
organisations lack capacity to promote participation from below.
The first o f the three points introduced in section 3.1 above speaks to a disjuncture 
between ordinary people’s active, careful and strategic actions on the one hand and 
the attitudes underlying official development efforts on the other. However, this kind 
o f institutional dissonance is not entirely negative as it can inspire further (potentially 
active, careful and strategic) actions by those who seek inclusion. Institutional 
dissonance may also not be accidental. For Engberg-Pedersen (1997), institutions 
relate to different domains o f life with partly incompatible ones co-existing or being 
deliberately made to co-exist and contradict. Green’s (2000) argument in the first 
quotation above touches on the models of development that individuals or households 
pursue based on their cultural and historical backgrounds. The study engaged with 
some of the underlying causes and practical manifestations of institutional 
contradictions regarding why (and how) they arise and are sustained.
The second point relates to observations, also discussed in some detail in Chapter 2,
that state institutions are generally unable or unwilling to foster participation. They
often apply top-down approaches. Staudt observes thus:
‘...aside from nongovernmental organisations, many institutions house staff who are 
distant and alienated from the people on whose behalf they are working. These staff get 
entangled in the procedure and process o f their institutions that often thwart rather than 
enhance partnership with people in their development’ (Staudt 1991:272).
The culture in most state institutions is one of control. Existing participation
mechanisms are largely accessible to a minority, which is also highlighted in The
African Charter (African Charter 1990; see World Bank 2002; Mansuri and Rao
2004). Thomson’s (1995) study o f participatory approaches in government
bureaucracies underscored the need for learning systems sustained through long-term
financial commitments, flexible funding, strong leadership and better monitoring and
evaluation (Thompson 1995; see Krishna et al 1997). Often these areas are weak in
most public institutions. The decentralisation experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia
discussed in Chapter 2 also show an inability to deal with this challenge. Public sector
reforms in many countries have also failed to address the challenge. A study by
Therkildsen (2001) noted the existence of fragmented administrative systems (see
Booth 2003; Adams et al 1996; Ayittey 2005; Chatiza 2003; Enemuo 2000). The
study also highlighted how donor-dependency makes donors a de facto  part of policy­
making and budgetary processes e.g. in Zambia and Mozambique (see Sankore 2005; 
Calderisi 2006; Browne 2007; McGee and Norton 2000). Local interest groups and 
state elites may play second fiddle to donors and experts (consultants) in shaping the 
reform process and outcomes (Therkildsen 2001). Reforms become less responsive to 
ordinary people’s expectations. How then can bureaucracies facilitate participation 
where decentralisation and New Public Management (NPM) reforms do not go far 
enough? In his analysis of South African and international experiences in public 
management, Gasper (2002) notes a disjuncture between meeting developmental 
needs and applying a management culture in the public sector.
The third point relates to local institutions’ lack of capacity to promote participation 
from below. Local institutions face serious capacity challenges, which Esman and 
Uphoff (1984) categorize into resistance, subordination, internal division, 
ineffectiveness and malpractice. Despite the reality that some local customs, social 
relations and power structures act to entrench marginalization of certain groups e.g. 
women and children, young unmarried adults and certain castes, poor people trust and 
depend on these local institutions (Narayan et al 2000). The relationships between 
local organisations and outsiders often limit their transformative performance (Ibid). 
While they may represent an appropriate, accessible and effective framework for 
interest articulation, local institutions insufficiently address structural causes of 
poverty and deprivation. In the light of the weaknesses of local organisations outlined 
here the question is how local organisations can provide bottom-up pressure for local 
empowerment and in sustaining participation (see Table 4 last column above).
The three points above present a weak front for institutionalising participation in 
development. I use them here to clarify the research focus. The points sum up forms 
of institutional interaction and development ideas pursued by state or other formal 
organisations. The research gathered data on these three issues to establish how they 
expressed themselves in the study Districts. The different institutions studied are 
important because they harness local input into planning, service delivery and 
evaluation. They also mediate the resourcing of development and accord space for 
articulating local aspirations. Responses to the challenges discussed above have been 
varied. For instance NGOs have tended to boycott some structures or spaces by
creating parallel structures through selective engagement. The use of alternative 
structures by NGOs has led to project-based community organisation, which often 
falters with the end of NGO support (Moyo et al 2000, GRZ 1999). The responses of 
the state have also been varied. These have included issuance of guidelines and 
directives (GRZ 2003a). The full range has been from repression to mutually 
beneficial relationships (Mungate 1993; Fisher 1998). However, the study also sought 
to identify positive or innovative measures that extend participation.
Institutional relations have become more varied with the growth of the NGO sector in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. The institutional terrain for rural development is populated by 
more actors operating from often divergent value premises (see Thomas 1996). The 
different local actors are politicians, traditional leaders, Government Departments, 
Councils, private sector and NGOs. In some instances, the first three can act as an 
extension of Central Government. In the study countries, the rural private sector is 
weak and not represented in local governance spaces despite providing critical goods, 
services and paying rates and licenses that sustain Council operations.
Table 5: NGO activity thrusts over time in Zimbabwe
P e r io d . M a jo r  th r u s t .
1979-1981. Welfare orientation as well as growth o f  w om en’s clubs.
Some NGOs linked to ZANU PF and competing for constituencies.
35
Ministry o f  Community Development and W omen’s Affairs main anchor point.
1982-1986. Some development activities (second generation).
Income generation activities and production sector activities in agriculture. 
Support and activities mainly to/with women.
Beginning o f  women’s movement (e.g. W omen’s Action Group 1983).
1987-1990. Growth o f  service sector NGOs.
Increasing networking including at regional level. 
Some lobbying and advocacy work.
Slump in donor funding experienced.
1991-1994. Rio/Agenda 21 (growth o f  environmental NGOs).
Poverty focus growing with beginning o f  Structural Adjustment Programme. 
R elief and recovery activities in response to 1991-2/1993-4 droughts. 
Growing advocacy and poverty analysis work.
1995+36. Clearer political advocacy and lobbying agendas around economic and 
constitutional issues heightening tensions with the state.
Human rights (lobbying around conventions etc).
Burgeoning HIV and AIDS sector and food insecurity responses.
Rio+ 10 (World Summit on Sustainable Development) and MDGs as clear 
frameworks for activities o f  NGO sector.
Source; Adapted from Moyo et al (2000).
35 Re-introduced in 2005 after an absence o f  about 15 years.
36 Some adaptation made based on personal experience o f  the sector.
The NGO sector has grown in terms of numbers and programme visibility. NGOs 
mainly depend on donor support. Moyo et al (2000) identify roughly five periods for 
their analysis of NGO activity in Zimbabwe (Table 5). NGO personnel and projects 
are an important part o f the development process (Craig and Porter 1997; Jackson 
1997). There are instances where NGO activities facilitate or obstruct those of 
Councilors and vice versa raising relationship challenges. This often stretches 
Councilors’ capacities regarding anticipating and managing conflicts as they facilitate 
the work of different development organisations in Council areas. NGOs place 
demands on central and local state structures for information, political support and 
protection in doing their development work. Central Government in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia often complains about weak, unaccountable and donor-driven NGOs (The 
Sunday Times o f  Zambia 31st January 2005; see Moyo et al 2000; Mungate 1993; 
Ebrahim 2003). The accusations and counter-accusations may be political 
gamesmanship as in Zimbabwe. However, state-NGO tensions form the reality in 
which the study was undertaken. Some of the national programmes discussed in 
section 2.6 above were theatres where these tensions were discussed and cooperation 
modalities forged, as was the case under CAP and CAMPFIRE. In the following 
section, I discuss the framework used to explore the relationship issues articulated 
here. The intention is to elaborate the research problem and to frame the 
methodological discussion in Chapter 4.
3.3. The framework: strategic institutional analysis
The development of the framework was guided by a search for the enabling and 
constraining factors for participation in practice. The guiding notion was that what 
one organisation does affects other organisations and, directly or indirectly, people’s 
participation as well. In other words the conceptual framework was about exploring 
institutional influences to participation i.e. how does participation occur (or does not) 
when institutions interact in doing development? Looking at implications of 
interactions provided a rationale for using communities’ lived experiences as they 
relate to development processes. The figure below illustrates the conceptual 
framework for the study. I discuss in detail the interconnections between and amongst 
the arenas of influence after presenting the model. Although the data for the study was 
mainly collected at the District level, the model is applicable at different levels from 
local through international. Looking at institutional interaction in this way allowed me
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to be conscious about or acknow ledge  the intra and extra-Distric t influences or factors 
relevant for participation. Figure 1 is the main fram ew ork. An adapted version (Figure 
2) is used to illustrate certain points based on insights gathered during fieldwork.
Figure 1: Locating influences on District participatory development
International;
A pproaches, P olicies, 
Funds & C ontact etc. A gency  N.
A gency  3.
A gency  2.
Dvt. 
A ctiv ities  in 
D istrict
S paces.
G vt.
A gency
P opular
O rgs.
G rassroots.
L ocal C ontext
(relig ious, political 
trad itional le a d e rs ...)
Jo in t 
S tructu res e.g. 
C om m ittees.
D i s t r i c t  & S u b - D is t r i c t  L e v e ls .
L e g e n d .
Dvt: Development. 
Gvt: Government. 
Orgs: Organisations.
C en tral G overnm ent;
Policy, O rganisations, 
P rogram m es and 
Influence.
The critical influences on participatory deve lopm ent flow through the centre, from 
G overnm ent to the people  via deve lopm ent spaces and activities i.e. left-right arrow. 
The How as represented by the main arrow s in Figure 1 is at once back-forth and 
circular within specific levels. Formal and informal feedback m echan ism s from 
grassroots up exist through p eo p le ’s organisations, Councilors  and other com m unity  
leaders but as discussed earlier this is generally  weak, hence a th inner right-left arrow. 
Feedback is anchored in the local context. Som e changes in practice, institutional 
interaction and interpretation o f  policies and p rog ram m es are informed by such 
feedback. This vertical (back and forth, top-dow n/dow n-top)  re la tionship  or dynam ic  
is how ever affected by other micro-level or horizontal dynam ics  at each level. W hile 
the vertical relations are the principal axis for change, localized dynam ics  em erging  
from practice also play a part. I envisage  about three levels as will be d iscussed 
below. In short, influences on participatory deve lopm ent can be explored from the 
field up, from the cen tre-dow n and myriad o ther intermediate starting points for 
analysis. In other words, the f ie ld /grassroots-up stream is w eaker  and does not usually 
reach national decis ion-m aking  spaces.
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3.3.1. Level one
The Governmental sphere: This is at the level o f Government and other national 
institutions e.g. Parliament. For this study Government was the focus and issues of 
how policy dissemination to others and application by government agents affect 
participation. At the same time the ability o f government, through its own actions or 
via persuasion can cause certain things (positive or negative) to happen in pursuance 
of participation outside its realm. This is what influence refers to.
3.3.2. Level two
The Sub-National sphere: In this sphere, there are individual development 
organisations (Organisation 1-N) both governmental and non-governmental. State- 
related development organisations are directly controlled by national government, 
manage sub-national joint structures, and accordingly influence other actors. Sub­
national development organisations are at once joined up and separate. They are 
joined up through common spaces for dialogue, planning and as in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia structures and processes provided for at law or policy directives for 
organisational interaction. Joining up occurs in terms of partnerships on specific 
tasks/programmes or because of relationships that exist e.g. NGOs working with a 
sector organisation or networking around say environmental, small to medium size 
enterprise development, vulnerable children and women’s issues. These development 
organisations are however separate in as far as they are individual entities often with 
distinct stakeholders, programmes and accountability structures. The spaces and 
processes joining them up and their distinct realities affect participation.
3.3.3. Level three
The third level relates to interface between organisations (Development 
organisations 1-N in Figure 1) and communities through programme activities i.e. 
development activities in District spaces. The joined up spaces, relationships and 
distinct identities are often replicated here. Development organisations that work 
together at the level of planning may also be seen jointly implementing activities 
while those working independently do the same on the ground. The community or 
development space (where say a borehole is sunk) is therefore an arena for intra­
community, community-development organisation and inter-organisational interface.
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The strands of influence, power inequalities, social relations and their impact on 
participatory development are numerous. All the levels are inter-connected. Some 
actors like Government have a presence at all o f them while others are more active in 
specific locations. Councils, because of their development planning and coordination 
functions are visible from level two to three. Communities on the other hand are 
predominantly at level three and struggle to get their feedback high up to influence 
government let alone the international donors and other players at that level. It is as if 
development organisations come too far down for communities to find time for 
upward influence. Their time is spent managing project level and inter-organisational 
dynamics in their areas. There are however cases where communities or individuals 
organise themselves or link up beyond the District to articulate their issues. The 
Zimbabwe National Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (ZNNP+) is one 
such national movement connecting its members effectively and recently influenced 
Government to ensure that 70% of National AIDS Trust Fund resources be allocated 
towards purchase of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs (The Standard 15-21 October 2006 
and October 29th to November 4th).
3.3.4. The extra-national sphere
In this respect what happens at global level filters to the local through national 
government, International NGOs (represented by Organisation N) or through funding 
of joint platforms or policy processes as with Zimbabwe’s RDCCBP and MDG 
localization processes, PPAs as well as PRSPs in other countries. Critical influences 
arise from organisation-based interpretations or applications. Like with level two, 
interpretations of external compulsions are at once shared and divergent.
Other points taken into account in using the framework include that participatory 
development is about influence and interaction. The two occur simultaneously and in 
separate domains. They occur at different intervals in the course of an organisation’s 
participation in development spaces. Secondly there are various ‘streams o f influence’ 
bearing on an organisation, situation or community. Participatory development is 
about discerning, responding and counter-influencing. When a community threatens 
to withdraw from working with an organisation it reverses that organisation’s stream 
of influence, which affects that organisation’s standing alongside others. If the 
organisation resolves the conflict by involving other development organisations, it re-
establishes its influence. W here a com m unity  w orks  with an organisation , the 
organisation  increases its ability to influence. As an exam ple , Plan International has 
been im plem enting  m ulti-m illion dollar activities in M utare  District for som e time. 
This w ay  Plan has built a considerable  store o f  influence in M u ta re ’s developm ent 
process. Analyses  o f  participatory deve lopm ent need to identify these s tream s and 
stores o f  influence. There  is need to acknow ledge  that organisational au tonom y and 
the w eakness  o f  com m unit ies  are a function o f  the extent o f  local connec tedness  i.e. 
resource and capacity  transfers m ade possible by available  spaces. How ever, other 
outsiders m ay be drawn upon to increase influence e.g. M em bers  o f  Parliam ent and 
politicians to  boost influence and capacities.
The m odel was useful in approach ing  the study from an institutional interaction 
perspective. Participatory deve lopm ent w as conceived  o f  as both product o f  and 
process within the interactions. Product in as far it can be an ou tcom e o f  or 
deliverable  from the interface am ongst  the different actors. Process in as far as it 
informs the w ay  certain th ings get done along the w ay  (e.g. in planning, com m unity  
entry etc) to producing  specific socio -econom ic  outcomes.
3.4. A p p ly in g  th e  m o d e l to  Z im b a b w e
F igure 2: Flows, levels and  spaces for p artic ip a to ry  developm ent
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3. G r e e n  A r r o w s :  F lo w  o f  In te rn a t io n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  fu n d in g .
Unlike Zambia, Tanzania or Mozambique, Zimbabwe is currently not receiving direct 
budget support, sector-wide, PRSP or major non-humanitarian assistance (see section 
1.8). The bulk of the development assistance is coming through local and international 
organisations (green arrows in the model) while government support for rural 
development activities through sector Ministries and the consolidated Rural Capital 
Development Fund, among others is flowing through government structures (red 
arrows). The blue line symbolizes curtailed development and funding interface 
between the international community and the Government of Zimbabwe since 2000.
The architecture of rural development funding has a strong bearing on the 
relationships amongst and between the key development actors. Some bilateral donor 
organisations (e.g. the Danish International Development Agency) and embassies 
(e.g. Embassy o f Belgium) have relocated from Zimbabwe and in the process 
programmes, which they were supporting have been rolled back. As noted earlier 
those bilateral and donor organisations still active in Zimbabwe (the EU, DFID, 
USAID, CIDA, SIDA and JICA among others) are channeling their assistance 
through International NGOs and the UN. Since implementing activities in Districts 
requires sufficient central and local government presence NGOs, among other non­
governmental actors make efforts to link up. The reality on the ground is that with 
limited public funding and a generally suspicious attitude the relations between key 
development organisations are unsupportive of participation. From Chapters 5 to 7, I 
provide evidence on how different actors address the issues with both positive and 
negative consequences for participatory practice and general institutional viability.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has returned to the central research problem elaborated in terms of 
failure o f the development approaches used by development organisations to capture 
ordinary people’s aspirations, inability of state and other big institutions to promote 
participation partly because of rigid systems and local organisations’ lack of capacity 
to promote participation from below. I elaborated on these aspects of the research 
problem and presented a conceptual framework for the study. The framework was 
used to highlight why (and how) institutional interaction can never be neutral. 
Different organisations bring their values and contextual interpretations to spaces in 
which they interface with others. Participatory development becomes about
interaction and influence in similar or different spaces creating what I called streams 
and stores of influence. Organisational influence is policy-based, resource-dependent 
and/or socio-politically underpinned (networks and contacts). Through dynamic 
cycles of discerning and responding to influences arising from interactions, 
organisations create and deploy their stores of influence. Therefore, in theory and 
practice becomes a process and product of inter-organisational interaction on the one 
hand and organisations’ engagement with people as they think and do development.
Inter-organisational interaction is a proxy for participation, first because organisations 
work with groups or individuals and second because they have specific mandates over 
certain areas/territories. The latter is true of central and local government. Chapter 3 
showed that organisational interaction occurs in spaces at different levels. This 
implies that interaction is informed from imperatives internal and external to the 
interacting organisations, the spaces hosting them and the people benefiting from the 
agenda of such interaction. This makes interaction space and level sensitive. To use 
Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall and Brock (2005) interaction varies from closed to 
open, invited to claimed spaces and from local to global levels. The analyses by Craig 
and Porter (1997), Jackson (1997), Lyons et al (2001), Porter and Onyach-Olaa 
(1999), among others also indicate this space and level sensitivity of participation 
largely because of differentiating factors like power (see Nelson and Wright 1997) 
knowledge (Chambers 1997) and gender (Guijt and Shah 1998). The Chapter also 
showed the level at which the research problem was conceived and researched 
(District) vis-a-vis others. It also showed that meaningful institutional analysis 
proceeds from unpacking the vertical and horizontal connections in law or policy and 
in practice, which was further elaborated through the conceptual framework.
The study was approached as being about relationships between and amongst 
development actors to explore how their different encounters present opportunities 
and challenges for participation. I extend this discussion in Chapter 4. Suffice 
however to note that the framework drew from some literature and realities from/on 
Zimbabwe to illustrate how the relationships were arranged for analysis. Chapter 3 
thus set the levels of analysis, their interconnections and the structures within which 
they relate forming the basis for discussing the research methodology below.
C h a p t e r  4: M a p p in g  In s t it u t io n a l  S t r u c t u r e s  in  t h e  
F ie l d : M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  R e f l e c t io n s
4.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, I present the research methodology, introduce the general research 
results and discuss fieldwork experiences. I also profile the research sites, the 
institutions studied and their interactions. In doing so, I discuss issues posed by the 
methodology and methods used laying a platform for the detailed presentation of 
research findings in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 4 also discusses here my research 
experience and share insights on aspects of methodology. In the process, I also share 
some answers to the central research question in as far as researching institutional 
structures goes and raise questions on my approach.
As shown in Chapter 3 (Figures 1 and 2) the study proceeded by looking at all levels 
but focusing on the District (including the sub-District) level. This is because in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia the District is the location for development activities, i.e. the 
‘doing level’. The District is governed by a democratically elected body, Council. It is 
at this level where services are delivered and local legislation (bylaws) made. Service 
delivery and making bylaws, among other Council activities, are guided by national 
policies. Councils have tax collection and revenue dispensing powers towards 
development priorities agreed at local level. As local governments, they have some 
measure of permanency that allows them to take and follow-up decisions over longer 
time horizons than say community groups or NGOs. I need to acknowledge the reality 
that individual politicians (Councilors) may be outlived by certain organisations and 
that they make and execute decisions based on personal interests. However, the notion 
of Council permanency relates more to the institution and its mandate than the 
individual Councilors and Council Executives.
Organisations that facilitate development processes in communities are located at 
District level and are organised differently in terms of extent of decentralisation 
beyond the District centre. The organisations are both governmental and non­
governmental. The inquiry focused on the interface within and amongst these
organisations and with the community level. As discussed in Chapter 3 these are the 
second and third levels of the conceptual model.
In terms of structure, the Chapter starts by elaborating the methodology and methods, 
which combine personal experience and interest on the one hand and the nature of the 
research question on the other. In this first section, the focal points o f the analysis are 
discussed in terms o f development spaces and anchor institutions. The reasoning 
behind using institutions (in the broad sense) as units o f analysis is also elaborated. 
The section on fieldwork presents the study sites (Districts, Wards and communities). 
The discussion of the research sites paves the way for looking at the actual methods 
used for data collection and analysis as well as reflections thereon.
4.2. Research methodology
The study was designed as a qualitative and exploratory study o f institutional relations 
using comparative case study methodology. The choice of methodology recognised 
the complexity of social interaction and the myriad meanings participants attach to 
such interaction (see Marshall and Rossman 1999). Two Zimbabwean Districts and 
one Zambian District were chosen purposively as discussed in detail in section 4.4 
below. Three Wards were selected in each of the Zimbabwean Districts covering the 
three main land categories of old resettlement, new resettlement and communal areas. 
Two Wards and three communities (one in one Ward and two in another) were 
selected in Kasempa (Zambia). The focus on the District to sub-District did not 
preclude gathering data at Province and National levels although the study gathered 
data mainly from the District and sub-District levels. At these levels Council 
(Councilors and Council Executives), traditional leaders, individuals in the Wards 
selected, key socio-economic groups and government extension staff were sources of 
data. Gathering data from Provincial authorities was to the extent that they play a 
supportive role to the District institutions in facilitating development. Overall, the 
organisations from which informants were drawn were both governmental and non­
governmental. What is also important is to discuss the concept of representativeness. 
The selection of Wards and the different informants was done to ensure that the 
broadest possible range of views on the subject could be gathered (see Marshall and 
Rossman 1999). It was not about statistical representativeness. In discussing the 
survey results, the weight attached to the results is more in relation to the socio­
economic and other characteristics of those who shared their views with me not how 
many they were vis-a-vis the Ward or Village populations. I proceeded this way first, 
as a personal choice not to create the impression that the study was quantitative and, 
second, the lack of a sampling frame and third lack of resources to undertake an 
extensive household survey. In accessing and interpreting people’s lived experiences 
in local governance, I sought to be pragmatic about methodology and methods (see 
Marshall and Rossman 1999; DeVault 1999). I return to this issue below as well as in 
Chapters 5 and 6 where I use some of the results o f the survey undertaken in 
Zimbabwe as part of the study.
A suite of qualitative research and analysis methods was used. The main ones 
included focus group discussions, keeping community diaries (only in Zambia), semi­
structured or key informant interviews, document analysis and attendance of meetings 
and/or events (section 4.3). In addition to these five qualitative methods, I also did a 
survey in Zimbabwe in all the six study Wards to increase the depth and range o f sub- 
District insights. The community diaries served a similar purpose in Zambia. These 
six methods were used with officials or leaders and community members. 
Records/documents were mainly from organisations with a few from community 
members. It is therefore important to highlight the fact that the study looked for 
evidence both from ordinary people and organisations. Gathering insights to answer 
the research question from these two dimensions was meant to enhance balance in the 
assessment of the opportunities and challenges to participation.
All the six methods are discussed in section 4.3 but suffice to highlight that the survey 
was a community entry tool to establish rapport and to solidify my identity as a 
student researcher on the one hand and to gather people’s perspectives on the research 
issues on the other. As it turned out both objectives o f using the survey were attained 
without unduly making the study a quantitative analysis of institutional relations. The 
questions and their analysis adopted a qualitative slant throughout. The diaries were 
useful considering my inability to speak the local language in Kasempa. Assigning 
Research Assistants to keep the diaries for a month in each Ward addressed this 
handicap. The six methods were used iteratively to reinforce each other. I discuss in 
section 4.3 for instance how document analysis allowed me to come up with issues for
exploration in key informant interviews. In this way, I was able to triangulate my 
results at the level of methods as well as in terms of actual data sources.
The comparative analysis of institutional interactions and experiences was in terms of 
policies and procedures. The study followed a critical tradition in social science 
research (Hammersley 2000), focusing on problems and policy as well as seeking to 
contribute to solutions for the challenges identified or deepening understanding o f the 
issues at hand. By approaching the study as a question of relationships between and 
amongst development actors, I explored the different ways in which encounters 
present opportunities or challenges for participation. However, while opportunities for 
feeding the findings into strategic discussions will be sought there is no presumption 
that this study will lead to changes in the policies governing local development 
situations in Zimbabwe or Zambia let alone other countries.
4.2.1. Elaborating the research approach
Many organisational capacity building interventions focus more on internal 
organisational spaces than on joint or inter-organisational ones. However, inter- 
organisational spaces are critical to organisational effectiveness. An approach that 
engages with the spaces in which organisations interface as a basis for developing 
organisational capacity, which I call a relational approach, can address some o f the 
issues I discussed in section 2.7 and at the end of Chapter 3. Using a relational 
approach, linkages and strategic capacities become the focus of a change process. For 
instance, questions were asked from two perspectives in key informant interviews, on 
one hand questions about a respondent’s organisation and on the other about other 
organisations. In Figure 1, the influences to participatory development were also 
discussed to highlight these relational aspects.
Essential questions to operationalize a relational approach include who to relate to, 
what the relationship is about or rather why relate, where and how the 
relationship/interaction takes place, what the instruments of the interaction are etc. 
Answers to some of these questions are codified (in laws, policies, directives), written 
in programme memoranda, contracts or proposals and still others are informal and 
rarely written as succinctly as laws would. Such fluidity can be by design or default 
but whichever it is, it governs particular spaces and relations. An example o f a space,
discussed later in this thesis is the District Assembly in Mutare. The Assembly does 
not have any policy or legal backing but its importance and sustenance is based on the 
challenges of observed disharmony between elected and traditional officials.
To operationalize the relational approach the study identified four key influences on 
an organisation’s ability to facilitate participatory development. These are regulators 
(central government mainly and local government), community or other service 
recipients, resource providers or other stakeholders and institutional spaces and 
structures. It is easier to map institutional relationships when an anchor organisation 
or programme/project is identified. In the context o f the study, the anchor organisation 
was local government or Council including Council-coordinated spaces and 
structures. Organisational interaction is largely in Council-related spaces (spatial and 
institutional) and structures but also community level programmes.
For relationships to be effective and to provide for participatory development some 
competencies are needed. The critical ones explored through the study are relational 
awareness, relational capacity, community signals/feedback and stakeholder 
influence/feedback. I will now discuss each of these in turn and how variables for the 
study were derived and operationalized in terms of data collection.
Relational awareness covers issues of organisational roles, capacities, expectations, 
operational constraints and decision cycles. People or organisations’ awareness of 
these aspects regarding relevant development actors allows them to formulate realistic 
expectations around which to establish workable partnerships.
Relational capacity is a concept used in this study to refer to the quality of horizontal 
and vertical relationships that individual organisations or a collective are able to 
generate and sustain for the benefit of their work and general organisational profile. In 
practice, relational capacity is deployed through joint action using mutual strengths or 
capacities. This draws on relational awareness i.e. identification and optimum use of 
organisational comparative advantages. The study explored the quality of 
relationships through analyzing bottlenecks (perceived and actual) to interface.
Feedback was explored in terms of vertical and horizontal articulation of interests to 
known and unknown organisations (or representatives). The nature, timing, 
communication and frequency o f feedback were also explored. This was also looked 
at in terms of its implications for relationships between communities and development 
organisations. People’s awareness of organisational roles was explored (relational 
awareness) because this has a bearing on people’s use of, organisations’ relational 
capacity regarding communities and the quality of community feedback. In a way, 
therefore the study sought to establish whether and how the depth, breadth and 
sustainability o f participation depended on institutional interaction. In choosing 
Council as the anchor institution and including others like traditional leaders, the idea 
was to explore whether semi or permanent institutions play a more critical role in 
initiating and sustaining participation than ephemeral ones like some NGOs.
During fieldwork, I participated in and observed some inter-organisational meetings 
where stakeholder feedback/influence was at play. The quote below is drawn from, 
such meeting which involved some UN organisations, the EU and SNV Zimbabwe. 
The meeting was part of a process to establish a collaborative framework for 
combined education sector support to ten Rural Districts in Zimbabwe. The process 
had been going on for at least seven months. ‘I did not realize that working together is 
so difficult... nothing seems to be working... the (planning) input from the 
organisations is still vertical...’ (UNICEF Education Officer, Education Working 
Group meeting, 10th March 2005). Having the benefit of both the verbal and non­
verbal aspects of the quote frustration was a feeling that captured it. Oftentimes 
development organisations seek ways of complementing others based on the spatial 
and/or sectoral determination o f common interests. In spatial terms, sub-national 
spaces like the region or District can be organising units. In sectoral terms, the 
organising units are often key organisations or sector policies.
In institutionalising participatory development reference points regarding 
organisations and spaces are important. Council (organisation) and the District 
(spatial area) were chosen. The choice was made conscious of the debate about the 
weaknesses of Councils. However, Councils’ ineffectiveness needs to be 
acknowledged mindful of the weaknesses of communities and other development 
organisations. Councils play the dual role o f implementing development activities
themselves from Council or Government resources and facilitating or regulating the 
development activities of others like NGOs. In the latter role, they often stand 
between communities and these other development organisations. In discussing 
opportunities and challenges for participatory development, these interconnected roles 
need careful consideration.
There is growing interest in institutional analysis and development studies generally 
in making institutions more pro-poor (see UNDP 2003; Robb 2002; World Bank 
2002; Ayittey 2005). This is because unless institutions are challenged, influenced or 
outright forced (e.g. through direct stakeholder demands), it is not automatic that they 
will meet even the minimum agreed expectations37. Much of Chapter 2 explored 
similar issues of power to influence, challenge or demand services from institutions. 
To challenge an institution presupposes a minimum appreciation o f the functions, 
form and operational realities of the targeted institution. Understanding also covers 
what the institutions are able to deliver based on an historical analysis.
It is important to highlight that the articulation of the gap between what institutions 
are delivering and what they could potentially deliver is value-laden. This is why no 
two institutional analyses o f the same arrangements done by different analysts yield 
the same conclusions. It therefore becomes critical to clarify the value-premises of 
any analysis. This was discussed in Chapter 1 and I elaborate how personal interests 
and practical considerations influenced the choice of methods. Although many 
institutional analysts use the ‘pro-poor’ position this does not preclude controversy 
over results as bias is only reduced but not completely removed. Different value- 
premises, which are neither neutral nor uncontested, have implications for 
development goals, processes and outcomes (see Thomas 1996).
4.2.2. Researcher interest and influence
In undertaking this study, the debate on objectivity was taken into account in relation 
to the importance of social researchers’ views. For instance, Cox (1998) argues that 
knowledge is socially located and our understanding of the world is based on our 
experiences and interests. Cox also asserts that knowing the world entails practical
37 For public institutions minimum expectations could be as stipulated in their enabling legislation and 
mission statements and client charters for private and non-state organisations.
intervention and further notes that ‘we only know the world in so far as we engage
with it and we only engage with it from the point of view of particular interests’ (Cox
1998:12). Other commentators categorically assert that social research is political (see
Hammersley 2000; Resnik 2001; Lincoln 2003; Burawoy 1998; Mobilized
Investigation 2003; Hintjens and Jarman 2002; Hintjens 2000). Approaching research
from clear standpoints is also evident in feminist methodology (De Vault 1999) and
according to Lincoln:
‘There is no gold standard method and inquiry. There are only studies which are open 
and above board about their findings, about the logic which led to their conclusions, 
about the standpoints o f their authors, about their limitations. There are studies which 
possess validity because those from whom the findings were gathered assent to their 
credibility, their match with the respondents’ lived experience’ (Lincoln 2003:15-16).
To research lived experiences implies engagement with the life worlds of participants 
and thus moving beyond objectivity to committed engagement. Researchers using 
race and ethnic standpoints, feminist theory, post-colonial theory and indigenous 
voice standpoints approach research, establish and present findings based on clear 
positions of interest i.e. go beyond the disinterest implied in objectivity. This 
corresponds to Burawoy’s (1998) notion o f inter-subjectivity between participant and 
observer, elevating dialogue rather than objectivity as a defining principle. This 
‘enjoins participant and observer, knowledge and social situation, situation and its 
field location, folk theory and academic theory’ (Burawoy 1998:14; see Davies 1999).
From the onset, therefore my selection of the specific area of study was premised on 
an interest in contributing to the debate on strengthening participation in development. 
The choice was based on professional interest in the subject principally from a 
planner’s perspective but more broadly from exposure to a diverse range of 
development settings. In interacting with communities and key informants and in 
analyzing documents, these interests were often declared and made apparent. The 
discussion of the methodology and methods will reflect the use o f mainly qualitative 
methods. However, it is important to reiterate that a quantitative tool (the survey) was 
used principally to enlist qualitative data. Chapter 6 is largely based on the 
quantitative data from the survey analyzed using qualitative insights. The qualitative 
emphasis is not in any way a reflection of methodological problems with quantitative 
analysis. Instead of dwelling on the merits or otherwise of the two overlapping
methodological approaches I place myself in view in this Chapter and discuss how 
this affected access to the reality explored and how the conclusions discussed in this 
study were arrived at.
4.2.3. Revisiting the analytical focal points
In Chapter 3, I discussed the institutional map of concern to this study. I discussed 
details of the operational aspects of the study in section 4.2. Here I detail the points o f 
reference. The starting point was the actors or organisations i.e. organisations, groups 
and individuals. In this instance, the units o f analysis were the actors. Such an 
analysis yielded a deeper understanding of the levels, extent and outcomes o f the 
player interactions at individual and collective levels. Within existing resource 
constrains for the study, it was not possible to look at the whole gamut of players 
involved in the District space. However, key ones were looked at. The second level o f 
analysis related to the bases of the rules/institutions. This was in terms of the contexts, 
processes and outcomes. Latent and manifest contestations over the rules were also 
elaborated. Here the rules were the units of analysis. Relevant Acts of Parliament, 
decentralisation policies and programmes were analysed to show their effect on 
organisational interaction. For instance in Chapter 5 I discuss cases of conflict 
between elected and traditional officials in Ward 18 of Seke/Manyame where issues 
of legitimacy were raised. In discussing this case I reflect on the actors and the de 
facto  and de jure  rules governing their interface. The ADCs, Assemblies and District 
Committees in Zambia are also discussed in a way that shows these two sides of 
institutional interaction to shed light on institutionalisation of participation.
However, it is conceptually clear but practically difficult to separate players from 
rules. Institutional analyses from the second point o f view may adopt specific 
organisational premises despite the policy/institution being the unit o f analysis. 
Hybrid analyses are therefore more common. Policies like decentralisation are often 
looked at starting from the rules before bringing in cases (countries, sub-national 
spaces etc) to validate the performance or otherwise of the specific rules under 
scrutiny. Previous Chapters and more specifically Chapter 3 show how the analysis 
combined actors and the rules as will further become clear in Chapters 5 and 6. Before 
discussing the actual study sites, I turn below to the actual methods.
4.3. The research methods
The research tools applied were consciously selected. The range was wide to increase 
options as well as in response to situations or opportunities as they arose (see 
Marshall and Rossman 1999). The challenge emerged when discussions about 
gathering data from the sub-District level were entered into with District level 
authorities in mid-2004. Being a period leading to the 2005 General or Parliamentary 
Elections in Zimbabwe (hereinafter the elections) there was a general concern that a 
study on participatory development might be construed as overly political to a point 
where it could be deemed opposition sponsored. The District Administrator (DA) in 
both Zimbabwean Districts was the reference point for the clearance process. This 
was despite the fact that the Chief Executive Officers and their Council Chairpersons 
had already written letters of support for the planned research. In Seke District, 
getting the DA’s support was easy. In Mutare, I was referred to the Province where I 
was further referred to the Ministry responsible for local government (national).
Using my Government contacts, the request was quickly approved with the caveat 
that I would not be involved in political activity. This was largely understood to mean 
that in interacting with respondents, the study would refrain from discussing the two 
main political parties in the country. Operationalising the approval conditions for 
fieldwork meant that the important starting point was to establish relationships with 
community leaders. In a way, this was the stage when de-facto approval was sought 
with the de jure  approval being used for community entry. At the same time, other 
strategies were used to gain the trust and confidence of the community. In one 
instance, I offered free transport services to an HIV and AIDS group for their food 
and medical provisions from the premises of an NGO supporting them. This opened 
up opportunities for repeated interaction with the community including being 
introduced to other relevant stakeholders.
The study thus proceeded slowly in terms of accessing field sites, which was a bit 
frustrating. In terms of implementation, interaction with the sub-District level 
generated issues and themes explored with District level organisations and structures 
i.e. grounding the inquiry. That notwithstanding, the study proceeded smoothly once 
the approvals were secured. Suffice however to note that the delayed approval for
fieldwork and the touchy nature of some stakeholders held me back in practical terms. 
Two ways around this were investment of more time into document analysis and use 
o f the survey method. As further elaborated below the survey had an additional 
advantage (beyond data gathering) of confirming me as student to the community.
4.3.1. Document analysis
The interaction between organisations on the one hand and with communities on the 
other is partly captured in documents (reports, minutes, letters, archival material, and 
other documents). Substantial grey literature on the themes covered by this study was 
accessed from development organisations and communities. NGO, Council and 
Government constituted main sources of the documents. As May (1997:157) puts it 
documents are ‘...sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and 
structure the decisions...tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the period to 
which they refer and describe places and social relationships’. For O’Laughlin (2007) 
documents are part o f institutional discourse and further notes that the poor are often 
not represented (see also Mosse 2004; Ferguson 1994).
In analyzing documents care was taken to account for the authors, timing, context, 
objectives, content (what is in and out) as well as the relationships between the 
authors and the targeted audience (see Gasper 2000; May 1997). Some of the analyses 
looked at organisational activities (current and past), Commissions of Inquiry, 
decisions taken, the nature of participants at meetings and the issues commonly 
covered in community-Council communications for instance. The analyses 
highlighted problems as well as successes regarding participation (structures, 
procedures and policies). Document Analysis was useful for the study in terms of 
defining research issues and analytical focal points. It was also critical in analyzing or 
comparing policy and practice. In most instances analysis of documents led to the 
identification of additional sources of information and complemented other methods 
used in the study (see May 1997), which was important given time, cost and data 
access constraints. Document Analysis also helped in bridging the national-local 
divide in terms of empirical evidence since some o f the questionnaire respondents 
were relatively inarticulate beyond the local level.
A number of problems were encountered in using this method. First, was one of 
access (see Makumbe 1996 regarding ‘classified information and cooperatives’ 
refusal with their records; Homan 1991). For public institutions, the Official Secrets 
Act was often cited as the basis for refusing access to some documents. 
Confidentiality regarding data at the level o f territory and transactions i.e. ‘private 
space and private data’ (Homan 1991) was a problem initially. This was because of 
lack of trust and past experiences with ‘lost documents’. Over time, the problem 
declined as trust grew and documents provided were returned. Second, were 
contradictions on factual matters with respect to documents written at different times 
and by different organisations. Some of the contradictions were quite illuminating 
while others had to be reconciled through field checks and key informant interviews. 
Third, was inability to access relevant documents referred to, either because they were 
lost or they became unavailable. Such vital documents were invariably on specific 
issues raised in interviews. This resulted in me being referred to other development 
organisations where at times the documents in question would not be available or the 
persons referred to would not have the time to help. Fourth, was poor document 
accessibility. Some of the documents were in poor condition making them hard to 
copy or were accessed in locations where copying facilities were unavailable. In some 
instances, the documents were not always carefully filed making it difficult to access 
them easily and thus made the whole search for relevant material quite tedious and 
time-consuming. Fifth, was the time-intensive nature o f document search and analysis 
and the possibility of it being perpetually ongoing.
All considered document analysis presents a number o f advantages compared to other 
methods. One is that document analysis does not raise as many ethical questions as 
other methods of primary data collection (Homan 1991). In my case, the method 
provided insights on past successes and failures, and conflicting interpretations of 
these. In some cases, initial assumptions made were changed in the process. One 
example was the Prime Minister’s Directive o f 1984, generally regarded as a unique 
starting point for analysing Zimbabwe’s decentralisation policies (see Brand 1991; 
Wekwete 1990). However, it has been found to have similarities with a 1965 Prime 
Minister’s Directive by the Smith regime under the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI). Relevant Zambian experiments under the country’s 1970s 
decentralisation policies also influenced the Directive. In a way, any analyses o f post­
independence participatory structures in Zimbabwe that accord ground-breaking 
status to the 1984 Directive can be as ahistorical as they can be misleading. This is 
because the 1984 Directive is a past policy experiment particularly on issues relating 
to coordination of sector Ministries, their role in facilitating development at sub­
national levels and the selection of state-affiliated structures as bases for organising 
rural local governance. The uniqueness of the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984 
perhaps lies in the independence euphoria, the broadening of participation structures 
in hitherto disenfranchised communal areas and the radical sidelining of traditional 
institutions. However, analyzing policies ahistorically passes up opportunities to 
explore why certain policy experiments keep cropping up under different governance 
regimes despite past failures. Accessing archival and unpublished material allows 
deeper understanding of how policies change, but also note elements of continuity.
4.3.2. Key informant interviews
Fifty key informants were interviewed (Annex 1). Some were interviewed once while 
others were interviewed up to three times over the duration of the study. The 
identification of informants was incremental, based on issues raised in some 
interviews and documents as well as being referred by other interviewees. No attempt 
was made to limit the number of key informants. The first principal guide was spatial 
i.e. people living, working or in a significant way involved in the development 
activities in the selected Districts. The second was issue-based, which in a lot of ways 
related to the ‘chain-referral’ or snow-ball technique alluded to above. Key informants 
were drawn from those working on local governance issues mainly at the sub-national 
levels i.e. traditional leaders, Councilors, NGOs and other people who were members 
of spaces or participated in recognized programmes.
One question about key informants is their representativeness regarding the subject 
under study. In both Zimbabwe and Zambia, it is fair to say that some measure of 
representativeness was attained. Through complex and iterative cross-checking and 
use of counter-referrals, most of the key decision-makers and implementers of 
programme activities were identified and interviewed. For this study, key informants 
were defined as those people informed about the issues under inquiry. Some o f the 
principal uses to which key informant interviews were put was to test alternative 
policy recommendations (asking why an option has worked or might (not) work),
cross-check certain pieces of information and to gather new evidence using semi­
structured question guides (see Annex 2.3). One general guide was developed for 
flexible use with different informants. Guides were at times sent in advance to allow 
key informants to prepare. Some interviews were done over more than one session. 
Most key informants were selected for specific themes but others were ‘generalists’.
Initial problems largely arose from potential respondents’ fear of talking to strangers 
on a subject (participation), which surprisingly to me was considered sensitive. The 
process of offering views -  it was sometimes felt - could create certain problems for 
interviewees. A separate problem was one of availability of time especially for 
District Administrators given their direct involvement in the land reform programme.
Another problem with interviews was the tendency to externalize problems: typically 
by being critical of all other development organisations but one’s own concerning 
contribution to institutionalisation of participatory development. This forced me in 
some instances to use positive confrontation using evidence from previous interviews 
with the same or different informants. As Pryke (2004) argues, as a researcher it is at 
times important to question the evidence from an interview to avoid colluding in the 
creation of falsehoods (see Hammersley 2000). This was however not about 
falsehoods but getting balanced views from informants through critical dialogue.
4.3.3. Attending relevant events
During the fieldwork period, a number of strategic events took place. I took the 
opportunity to participate at these events in different capacities. Attending events 
allowed for direct interaction with (and observation of) participants in near-natural 
contexts (see DeVault 1999; Marshall and Rossman 1999). In some, I went as a 
student while in others an independent consultant identity was used. Some of the key 
events attended included the re-launch of the national decentralisation policy (August 
2003 in Harare), the annual congresses of the Association of Rural District Councils 
of Zimbabwe (ARDCZ) and the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) in August and 
September 2004 respectively. I also took part in a Local Government Association of 
Zambia (LGAZ) brainstorm session focusing on the establishment o f Area 
Development Committees in addition to full Council and Ward meetings, joint
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Council and District government meetings, a Land Dialogue meeting in Manicaland 
Province and a District Development Coordinating Committee meeting in Kasempa.
These events acted as ‘theatres’ for institutional interactions. Except for two instances 
where participant observation was used (mainly asking questions) at all the others I 
was an observer. The two were the LGAZ brainstorming session and the DDCC 
meeting both in Zambia. The latter was partly convened at my request but lasted only 
1 hour focusing principally on the roles of different development organisations and 
the challenges faced by the DDCC structure. Joint meetings of this nature normally 
last at least half a day. Generally, participating in events enabled application o f mixed 
methods. Besides observation, informal interviews and discussions were undertaken 
on the sidelines. A detailed research diary was kept with observations and insights 
gained from these events. According to Davies (1999), participant observation is 
better conceived as a research strategy not a single method. For Bentzon et al (1998) 
observation shifts between passive and totally participant or involved.
Events organised by others are important research sites for at least three reasons. First, 
it felt easy for those involved not to notice my presence, as they got engrossed in 
discussions with each other. During the study participation in events worked well in 
cases where I sat in the meetings at strategic positions (e.g. not on the high table) and 
did not generate undue attention (e.g. sustaining a relatively stable note-taking pace). 
As participants got engrossed in their deliberations and focused on achieving the 
agenda o f the day my presence often became less of an influence and went unnoticed 
for reasonable lengths of time. At bigger gatherings e.g. the Congresses attended, I 
was not even introduced so it was easy to flow with the process without attracting 
attention. Except for the representatives of the study Councils in attendance at the 
ARDCZ congress, no other delegates knew me in a research capacity.
Second, events allowed me to gain contacts and follow up insights from publicly 
pronounced positions on relevant issues. Papers presented and speeches made detailed 
people’s views on key issues while they also acted as grey material that was 
subsequently analyzed. The context set by the speeches and papers was also used in 
follow-on interviews with relevant key informants not necessarily the presenters. The 
third advantage realized from participating in events related to ‘being introduced’ to
many people without necessarily going through the formalities that preceded the 
survey or other community entry processes. Where formally introduced it was a 
simple process of ‘.. .and today we have a research student who asked to be in our 
meeting...ignore him as he is here to learn from our process. I was introduced as 
powerless and insignificant, which helped to put people at ease when I met them 
again later. Being introduced also de-politicized my presence particularly the 
associated confirmation that key people had already sanctioned my participation in 
events.
However, there were instances where power shifts occurred during the observation of 
meetings and events. In one NGO-Council-Govemment meeting in Mutare, the very 
introduction as a student resulted in my being assigned the minute-taking role. After 
being encouraged to write on flip-chart, a glaring (genuine) spelling mistake attracted 
attention. The sarcasm following this mistake from the participants prompted the 
Chair (Council CEO) to revisit the introductions adding that I was a doctoral student. 
The emphasis on doctoral shifted the relationship significantly as participants had 
initially taken me as an undergraduate student on attachment. The shift was however 
positive in that while there was some power assigned to me as a result it opened more 
doors and new contacts as participants began to accord me significantly more respect. 
So an event that started with me in the background ended up changing focus making 
me an uncomfortable point of reference (my cover had been blown).
4.3.4. Focus group discussions
Four focus group discussions were done, one each in Kasempa and Mutare and two in 
Seke/Manyame. One discussion was with a Seke/Manyame newly resettled 
community to explore socio-economic activities and the relations with Council and 
other development organisations. The focus group discussion was also used to refine 
the research agenda, identify key informants and deepen understanding of Ward 15. 
Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) refer to focus group discussions or group depth 
interviews as a widely used method in social science research best applied at the start 
o f a study for exploration and conceptualisation but also useful at confirming 
findings. In undertaking the Ward 15 focus group discussion, low-intensity 
moderation was adopted largely because some of the participants were not known to 
me and as it was a fast track area, I did not want to risk antagonising them. As such,
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beyond introducing major topics through semi-structured questions, I did not interfere 
in the discussions. Bentzon et al (1998) note that open conversations, which focus 
group discussions represent, require that a researcher be familiar with cultural nuances 
of the study community. Such familiarity or in my case low intensity moderation 
increases chances of gathering emic without necessarily precluding gathering etic 
data. Emic data are data that arise in a natural or indigenous form while etic data 
arises from a researcher’s imposed view (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). However 
the same authors note that there is no data that are exclusively emic or etic (see also 
Lincoln 2003) and neither data are better or worse than the other but simply differ. 
The limited use of the method was because at this phase of the study specific issues 
were yet to be distilled. In addition, focus group discussions appeared risky at the time 
because the chances of being politicized were high. As a method Focus Group 
Discussion helped in grounding the analysis and cross-checking data already 
gathered.
4.3.5. Community diaries and follow-ups
To deepen understanding of the socio-economic activities and the type o f local 
institutions at the sub-District level in the Zambian District two research assistants 
were engaged and spent a month in two Wards with two different communities (total 
of three communities in the two Wards). The communities (Fwandanya Village in 
Kalombe Ward and Kalima and Kima Villages in Kelongwa Ward) were identified in 
consultation with local authorities including an NGO working in the area. In each of 
the Wards, one community considered relatively rich and another poor were studied. 
The selection was based on available District poverty data on poverty indicators from 
Kepa Zambia Foundation, Council and the DC’s office. The two locally identified 
assistants observed the activities and interactions over the month using a checklist 
(Annex 2.2) that I developed.
After the one-month stay with the communities, the diaries were sent to me. Resource 
constraints made it difficult to make a second visit to the District. However, 
information from the diaries was analyzed with follow-up questions raised with 
representatives of the NGO, local government, the District Commissioner’s Office 
and other stakeholders cited in the diaries by telephone contact. The choice of the 
method (Community Diaries) was largely influenced by language constraints on my
part. The sparse population in the District would also have increased logistical costs 
for me and as such, the community diaries came up as an effective substitute. 
Community Diaries were in addition to the Focus Group Discussion conducted with 
District Development Coordinating Committee members and semi-structured 
interviews with Council staff, SNV North Western and other officials (see Annex 1).
4.3.6. Questionnaire survey
In view of field entry challenges in Zimbabwe, it took me four months before I could 
get into communities. By the time I got field clearance, I was becoming anxious about 
my ability to conduct realistic fieldwork. The anxiety was compounded by the reality 
that things were changing very fast due to population movements especially in 
resettlement areas targeted for inclusion in the study, the economic crisis and the 
threat of a worsening of the political environment as we drew nearer to the March 
2005 elections. To capture the situation at sub-District level I used a household 
questionnaire to ‘freeze’ reality as it were.
The survey was also a good tool to establish my identity as a bona fide student. 
Someone clutching papers on a clip-board and asking questions is the image most 
communities have of student researchers. Sitting under a tree with a group of 
respondents is viewed more as a political meeting. Under some of the recent 
legislations in the country, a researcher would need police clearance to hold meetings. 
In this context, the informality o f some participatory methods (some of which had 
been intended) could have easily been viewed with some suspicion until trust was 
built. However, once my researcher image was confirmed the more informal meetings 
became easier to hold enabling use of more group-based participatory methods.
Six research assistants were recruited from the University of Zimbabwe and trained in 
the administration of the questionnaire (Annex 2.1). The survey was undertaken over 
a three week period in August and September 2004. I took part in the fieldwork, 
administering questionnaires as well and conducting key informant discussions in 
selected communities. After each courtesy call, the assistants would be distributed in 
the Ward and on average, each assistant completed three questionnaires a day. 
Respondents were those households where adults were found at homesteads along the
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way a research assistant was traveling. Only in Ward 15 Seke/Manyame were people 
waiting for a ZANU PF rally interviewed.
Research assistants were involved in evening discussion sessions with me. These were 
based on insights and highlights from the day’s questionnaire administration. I used 
these insights to develop lists o f key informants, project interventions and other 
activities that were subsequently followed up. At the end of the three weeks survey 
period a day long review of the process was done with all the research assistants. I 
facilitated the reflections capturing the assistants’ experiences. These focused on 
interviews that stood out, discussions with ‘guides’ and general observations, stories 
and preliminary analyses of issues being collated. This saw a broadening of the 
process such that the survey enabled both data gathering from individuals and entry 
into Wards. The survey ended up being a multi-objective tool, which allowed me to 
capture considerable qualitative insights.
Prior to entering communities for questionnaire administration I would visit 
communities to inform community leaders, mainly Councilors, traditional leaders and 
others especially political leaders to whom I was almost always referred. Homan 
(1991) calls them gatekeepers. They combine those with or without legal 
empowerment or status but generally control spatial access. Those with legal power 
require formally approaches so that they approve community entry. In one instance in 
Mutare District, I spent at least forty minutes in one such pre-meeting with a state 
security agent. Despite having all the relevant papers and the Councilor for the Ward 
being in attendance and fully aware of the study the state agent ‘lectured’ me on how 
naughty researchers can be. Citing some examples, which were more of political 
narratives than reality he re-emphasized why it was important for me to avoid getting 
entangled in politics. In a way this constitutes what in hindsight can be called 
‘productive inconvenience’ as I was able to understand the local dynamics and the 
local-provincial to national imperatives. Although some of these interfaces with 
‘inquisitive gatekeepers’ were unsettling from a personal security point of view they 
shed some light on the power issues in communities.
However, the same (productive inconvenience) cannot be said of an experience in 
Ward 7, Mutare District, when two of the research assistants were detained by a War
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Veteran for at least one-and-half hours with their survey material taken. The 
completed questionnaires were returned after negotiations facilitated by the local 
Councilor. Fortunately, the research assistants were not harmed but were naturally 
shaken by the event. This prompted a discontinuance of the survey process in that 
Ward after some 15 questionnaires had been completed. To the extent that the 
experience demonstrated the power games that War Veterans are known to play in the 
Ward (according to the Councilor) the experience was therefore insightful. Apart from 
the potential risk to the assistants, the event itself was thus a source of data.
125 questionnaires were administered in the two Zimbabwean Districts, 71 in 
Seke/Manyame and 54 in Mutare. The household survey instrument (see Annex 2.1) 
had 72 main questions in 8 main sections as follows:
a) General socio-demographic information about the respondent and their household.
b) Information on existing local level organisations of importance to the household.
c) Village governance data (structures and processes).
d) Financial services, agricultural input and production support.
e) Community projects in the Village or Ward both externally and locally supported.
f) Council-Community interface and Development Planning experiences/processes 
including appreciation of existing development organisations and their relationships.
g) Household assets, land resources and livelihood.
h) Extra questions for resettlement households (pre and post-2000).
The survey was not meant to be statistically representative. The analysis of the results 
focused on the insights generated from the 125 respondents. As such when I say high 
or low in relation to these results the reference remains n=125 or a specified sub-set 
thereof. O f the 125 respondents, 65 were male and 60 females with 76 (61.8%) being 
household heads, 37 (30.1%) spouses, 5 (4.1%) in-laws and the balance spread 
between children (3) and 1 each worker and sister o f the household heads. O f these 87 
(61.4%) were 36 years or above with the remainder being between 19 to 35 years. 104 
respondents or 83.9% had stayed in their communities for at least four years (48 
months). At the time new resettlement schemes were drafted into the study it had been 
feared that, the significant movements would affect eventual respondents’ knowledge 
of the dynamics in their communities and between communities and District 
structures. However, given that the land rights of newly resettled people were largely 
validated based on length of stay/occupation it is possible respondents rushed for the 
higher end of the scale provided in the questionnaire. It is also important to 
acknowledge that the questionnaire was rather long and relatively complex. The range
of questions was broadened beyond the focus of the immediate study to create some 
baseline data for future work and to ensure that the study was taken seriously. These 
factors notwithstanding, the survey captured a significant number of household heads 
and people who had stayed in the community for reasonably long enough to provide 
dependable data. Also regarding age, mature people with enough understanding o f the 
issues being studied were interviewed. Household like family is a contested 
sociological concept. Gaidzanwa’s (2001) definition of a family as people who live 
under one roof, cook and eat from the same pot approximates the operationalisation of 
the concept in the study. Furthermore, household was largely self-defined with the 
homestead being used to distinguish between households. A homestead is a cluster of 
houses belonging to one family and is physically and socially distinct from other 
homesteads.
4.4. Describing the study sites
Fieldwork for the study was undertaken between February 2004 and September 2005 
with intermittent follow-ups after this period. As discussed in section 4.3 above a 
number of methods were used to gather data for the study. In section 4.5 below I 
reflect on fieldwork experiences in some detail but below I detail the study sites. A 
District in Zimbabwe is an administrative area within a Province as shown in the 
Maps below whose administration is assigned to an elected Council.
4.4.1. The study Districts
The Districts of Mutare (1 o f 7 in Manicaland Province), Seke/Manyame (1 o f 9 in 
Mashonaland East Province) in Zimbabwe, and Kasempa (1 of 7 in North Western 
Province) in Zambia were chosen for the study. The Maps below show the regional 
location of the two Zimbabwean Districts, their agro-ecological and administrative 
structures. Selecting Districts was based on a combination of personal knowledge and 
interest, costs, and the proximity to (or remoteness from) provincial and national 
government. Another factor was spatial co-existence of Council and central 
government especially DA (most senior civil servant in a District) or its lack. In 
Mashonaland East (Harare area) Seke/Manyame is the nearest with a Council office 
1-2 hours from District Government Offices (not in same location). Unlike Mutare, 
Seke/Manyame’s Council offices are not in the provincial capital, Marondera. On the 
other hand, Mutare Rural District Council Offices are in the provincial capital and
within walking distance of District and Provincial Government. Given the level of 
interaction between the offices o f DA and Council Chief Executive Officer, distance 
is a practical constraint. Of the two Zimbabwean Districts, Mutare has a larger portion 
o f communal area compared to Seke/Manyame. Before the 2000 land occupations, 
Seke/Manyame was predominantly large-scale commercial farming area, two small 
areas for small-scale commercial farming (African Purchase Areas before 
independence) and about 15% communal land area with one Chief. Seke/Manyame’s 
pre-2000 agrarian and social structure contrasted with Mutare with at least 60% 
communal land area and two Chiefs. Because of proximity to the Harare Metropolitan 
area (Harare, Chitungwiza, Ruwa, Epworth and Norton) Seke/Manyame’s social 
structure changed radically as land occupiers from the nearby towns benefited from 
the land redistribution process. The Maps below show the Administrative and Agro- 
ecological structure of Zimbabwe as well as the study Districts (shaded in yellow 
stripes on the second Map of Zimbabwe). The Maps of the two study Districts are also 
shown indicating the Administrative structure (Ward boundaries and Numbers) as 
well as the land-use categories (large and small-scale commercial farming areas, old 
resettlement and communal). As noted earlier the large-scale commercial farming 
areas are where the new (post-2000) resettlement areas are found. The Figures below 
show the following:
■ M ap 1: Administrative structure of Zimbabwe (Provinces and Districts).
■ M ap 2: Agro-ecological structure of the country and shows study Districts (etched 
in yellow).
■ M ap 3: Seke Administrative District (Wards and the land categories, note study 
Wards VII, XV and XVIII).
■ M ap 4: Mutare Administrative District (Wards and the land categories, note study 
Wards 7, 22 and 24).
The selection of Kasempa was more out of convenience in that SNV Zimbabwe with 
which I was associated during the tenure of the study supported a field trip to North 
Western Province-Zambia. Kasempa was receiving capacity building support from 
SNV Zambia and was regarded (by SNV Zambia) as one of the most successful 
recipients of such support. At the national level, the District was also 1 of 8 that had 
achieved success under ZAMSIF and as such, it made a good and convenient choice 
for the study. Kasempa is one of seven Districts in Zambia’s North Western Province.
Maps 1-4: Zimbabwe’s Administrative Structure, Agro-Ecological Regions, 
Location of Study Districts and Detailed Study District Maps
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Table 6: Basic characteristics of the Districts
Variable. Mutare (Zimbabwe). Seke/Manyame
(Zimbabwe).
Kasempa (Zambia).
Provincial Location. Manicaland. Mashonaland East. North Western Province.
Land Size Estimate in 
square kilometers.
5 895.53sq km. 2 691.4sq km. 21 OOOsq km.
Population. 222 383. 76 923. 55 000.
Population Density 37people/sq km. 28people/sq km. 2people/sq km.
Number of Wards. 31 21 21
Agro-Ecology. Regions 1-5 bulk in 3-5. Natural Regions 3-4. Natural Regions 2-5.
District Economy. Agriculture; High value 
crops are coffee, tea, 
bananas and other fruits, 
tobacco, wheat, dairy and 
maize in all land areas. 
Timber plantations and 
smallholder irrigation.
Horticultural produce 
sales & off-farm products. 
Tourism sector.
Diverse retail sector. 
Cross-border trade.
Agriculture;
High value crops are 
tobacco, maize&  
wheat, dairy activities 
and horticulture sector 
supplying Chitungwiza 
& Harare.
Diverse retail sector. 
Subsistence farming in 
the communal sector 
with strong 
horticultural 
component.
Agriculture; 90% Small- 
scale, 10% Commercial 
Farms within 25kms o f  
Kasempa town. 
Subsistence agriculture, 
high shifting cultivation. 
Maize major cash crop & 
some cotton.
Natural resource 
extraction, tourism 
potential: District forms 
part o f  Kafue National 
Park (Zambia’s largest) & 
2 Game Management 
Areas o f  Lunga-Busanga 
and Lunga-Luwishi.
District Governance 
Institutions.
Elected Council.
Two Traditional Chiefs 
with at least seven 
Headmen each.
Elected Council.
One Traditional Chief 
with five Headmen.
Elected Council, 2 Chiefs 
and sub-chiefs. MP and 
Chiefs’ Representatives 
sit in Council.
District Land 
Classification.
Approx 70% communal, 
30% covered by old/new  
resettlement, small/large 
scale commercial farms & 
plantation land.
Approx 30% 
communal, 70% new  
resettlement & 
small/large scale 
commercial farms.
60% small-scale farming, 
25% indigenous Forest 
Land and 15% 
commercial farms.
Head of Government. District Administrator. District Administrator. District Commissioner.
Main forms of land 
tenure.
Customary.
State Leasehold. 
Private Leases. 
Freehold.
Customary.
State Leasehold. 
Private Leases. 
Freehold.
Customary.
Freehold.
State land (Parks & Game 
Management Areas).
Source; Field Data
M a p  5: Poverty  distribution by District  in Z im b a b w e
Seke/M anyam e
RDC.
M utare
RDC.
P e r c e n t a g e (% )
5 1 %  - 6 2 %  
(Medium Poverty
< 5 0
(Low Poverty)
6 3 %  - 7 9 %  
](High Poverty)
Source: G R Z  (2003c).
Table 7: Reasons for District selection (Zimbabwe)
D istrict. R eason s fo r  se lec tio n .
M u ta re . ■ R e s e a r c h e r ' s 38 pas t  e x p e r i e n c e  im p le m e n t in g  p ro je c t s  in th e  D is t r ic t .
■ B a s e d  in prov incial  cap i ta l  ( n e a r  the  se a t  o f  P ro v in c ia l  G o v e r n m e n t ) .
■ F irs t  s u b s t a n t iv e  C o u n c i l  CEO in the  c o u n t r y  ( lo n g e s t  s e rv in g  C E O ) .
■ D is t r ic t  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  C o u n c i l  n e a r  e a c h  o the r .
■ D is t r ic t  h a s  all th e  l ive  a g r o -e c o lo g ic a l  r e g io n s  a n d  l an d  c a te g o r ie s .
S e k e /M a n y a m e . ■ R e s e a r c h e r  i n v o lv e d  in a land  a d m in i s t r a t io n  s tu d y  in D i s t r i c t 19 (2 0 0 2 ) .  
* C lo s e n e s s  to  r e s e a r c h e r ’s b as e ,  fu r th es t  r e se a rc h  si te  2 h o u r s  aw'ay.
■ C lo s e n e s s  to  c en t ra l  bu t  2-3  h o u r s  f rom  P ro v in c ia l  G o v e r n m e n t .
■ C o u n c i l  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c e s  no t  in o n e  se t t l e m e n t .
■ R e c e n t  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  t u r b u le n c e  w i th  f re q u e n t  c h a n g e s  at C E O  level. 
M o s t  C o u n c i l  run  D e p a r tm e n t s  A c t in g  H e a d s .
■ R e c e n t  r e lo c a t io n  o f  H e a d  O f f ic e  ( f ro m  6 0  k m  a w a y ) .
Source; Field Data.
N otw iths tand ing  the reasons given in Table  7, it is also im portant to note the poverty 
profiles o f  the study Districts as shown in M ap 5. M utare  is a M edium  Poverty 
District while  S eke /M anyam e is a Low Poverty District (G R Z  2003c).
38 I w o r k e d  in M u ta re  ( a m o n g  o th e r  D is t r ic t s )  b e tw e e n  1994 a n d  1995 as  an  N G O  P ro je c t  O f f ic e r .
39 In 2 0 0 2  1 w a s  a m e m b e r  o f  a  T e a m  o f  L a n d  R e fo rm  a n d  R e s e t t l e m e n t  R e s e a r c h e r s  w h ic h  d id  a  s tudy  
o f  land a d m in is t r a t io n  i s su es  a n d  p r a c t i c e s  in th is  D is t r ic t  a n d  tw o  o th e r s  in d i f fe r e n t  P ro v in c e s  in 
ad d i t io n  to  a s tu d y  to u r  o f  T a n z a n i a  a n d  B o ts w a n a .
4.4.2. Selection of the study Wards:
The selection of Wards was purposive in that the research had to be undertaken in all 
three principal land tenure categories of communal, new and old resettlement areas. 
However, once this was settled the actual Wards were selected using a combination of 
factors summarised in Table 8 below. Suffice however to note that the document 
analysis, community meetings and key interviews with Council staff and some 
Councilors by this time were useful in determining the choices of Wards.
Some Wards were suggested during interviews, not all o f which were considered. The 
factors used to make actual Ward choices included poverty perceptions, problems 
either attributed to a Councilor or development organisations and cases o f Wards 
‘where nothing has happened before’ were volunteered as part o f Council’s equitable 
distribution of opportunities. In instances where choices were problem-related a 
feeling that the research was seen as a possible way o f corroborating evidence already 
available or helping in the solving of problems made me anxious. In some instances 
Councilors invited me to their Wards through the CEO e.g. Ward 7 Mutare. The 
rationale for volunteering one’s Ward was often part of making a Ward visible ahead 
of others besides genuine interest in hosting a research process for a Councilor’s own 
development management processes. In Table 8 (below) I show the characteristics of 
the study Wards and discuss aspects of the selection process.
Within Wards, the selection of communities especially for the survey was partly 
guided by the location of the community leaders who were to be seen before the team 
would start moving in the Ward. The leaders (political and traditional) gave ‘guides’ 
to the research team. The guides did not control household choices. However, with 
only one car for field travel in Wards that range between 20 to 50km wide and at a 
time when fuel shortages were being experienced in Zimbabwe, resource limitations 
played a part in determining intra-Ward travel. Notwithstanding this constraint, 
deliberate efforts were made to drop research assistants in pairs further from the 
Councilor or Traditional Leaders’ homesteads. The drop-off points and directions 
were planned strategically to balance coverage. Follow-up visits and the use o f a 
multi-method approach helped to reduce the biasing effects of these challenges. The 
selection of the communities in Kasempa followed the same consultative process as
was used in Zimbabwe where District Council officials, the District Commissioner’s 
Office and an NGO (KEPA Zambia) implementing community-based natural resource 
management projects in the District were involved.
Table 8: Characteristics of study Wards (Zimbabwe)
Mutare Ward 7. 1. N ew  resettlement scheme Ward which until recently was entirely a commercial 
farming area (banana and tobacco growing area).
2. Bordering with Mozambique with parts inaccessible due to land-mines.
3. Close to prov i nci al capital.
4. Councilor volunteered when study was announced to full Council (in absence 
o f researcher).
5. Young and educated Councilor who is an ex-soldier.
Mutare Ward 24. 1. Clustering o f  NGOs in area implementing different programmes.
2. Considered by Council as one o f  the poorest.
3. Furthest Ward in District on dirt road.
4. Communal area in regions four and five (drought prone and stressed 
livelihoods, water shortage etc)
Mutare Ward 22. 1. An old resettlement scheme Ward with governance challenges as new (hitherto 
absent) traditional leaders are being appointed.
2. Abutting Ward in which researcher implemented a project 10 years prior to 
fieldwork (1994-5).
3. Served by one o f  the longest-serving Councilors.
Seke/Manyame 
Ward 7.
1. Communal area bordering Chitungwiza Town with considerable land conflicts.
2. Council volunteered the Ward as the Councilor is seen as very organised.
3. The Ward has sub-Ward structures (devolved Ward governance).
4. Educated, relatively wealthy and internationally exposed Councilor who used 
to work in an NGO (YMCA).
Seke/Manyame 
Ward 15.
1. Councilor suspended a year prior to commencement o f  study.
2. Site o f considerable land occupation-related violence and bulk o f  unresolved 
land allocation puzzles (Eden Farm).
3. Active and formally recognized HIV and AIDS support groups known to 
researcher from start o f  study (not prior).
4. Other farmer organisations in existence (only one in newly resettled areas in 
District) formed around an older section o f  the Ward where farmers were 
settled in 1995 (combination o f  late Phase I land reform and post-2000 land 
reform).
Seke/Manyame 
Ward 18.
1. Relatively old Councilor facing challenges from traditional leaders.
2. Regarded by Council as ineffective (‘ ...w e  wonder how he won this time’, 
CEO, Interview 10 June 2004).
3. Researcher invited to a community meeting in Ward before survey. The issues 
identified for follow up merited inclusion.
4. Old resettlement scheme with land conflict issues (informal allocation o f  
grazing land by a villager who claimed to be a village head- dethroned at the 
community meeting referred to above).
Source; Author, 2007
4.5. Methodological discussion
This discussion reflects on all the main parts of this Chapter. The starting of the 
research got delayed considerably because of the need to secure formal approval. This 
was despite my having secured the ‘in-principle’ concurrence of the heads of the 
Council areas. Government sanction was needed and initially it was felt that the 
District level was critical. In Seke/Manyame District, this was not a problem but in
Mutare the DA suggested that a provincial approval was needed, which subsequently 
ended up being an approval at national level. Two lessons were drawn. One was that 
Councils do not yet fully control what happens in their territories. There is 
considerable deference to central government. Even the central government officers at 
District levels do not always have full confidence that the decisions they take will be 
sanctioned subsequently by higher offices. Suffice however to acknowledge that by 
the time the chain-referral for formal approval started in Mutare there had been a 
change of DAs within three months. The first DA had even written an introductory 
letter, which was however deemed inadequate by his successor without a provincial 
attachment. By the time the approval was secured an additional two months later, a 
third DA was in post. As a substantive and more established official, the new DA was 
more self-assured. Personnel changes in government accounted for the delays. For a 
swift process of approval of access to the field, starting at the national level would 
have been the best. However, from a research point o f view some piloting and 
District-level inquiry was critical before launching the full study.
Accessing the field is an important part of research. Gate-keeping varies from normal 
concern with research ethics (see Homan 1991; Marshall and Rossman 1999) to 
informal ways of controlling field access. Based on pre- and post-2000 personal 
research experience in Zimbabwe, the latter period was more difficult in terms of 
securing access to the field. As noted by Marongwe (2002), ‘...the politically 
sensitive nature of land conflicts meant that primary data collection...remained very 
random and no sampling was done. Ability to access an area largely dictated the 
choice of farms for field data collection’ (2002:17). The conditions imposed by the 
Ministry responsible for local government also reflect the research reality. Although 
the conditions did not deter my work, they raised fundamental questions about how 
politics is defined. This influenced the study in as much as it increased my curiosity. 
One way of dealing with this was by exploring the nature of Councillorship in the two 
countries. The emergent research theme was the political and partisan nature of the 
institution, which has far reaching implications for community relations. Conditions 
that might be imposed on a study present both opportunities and constraints.
The second lesson was that the formal approval process involving officials at District 
and national levels was one layer of power, which however was inadequate on its
own. Other approval processes below the District were needed for smooth 
implementation of the study. The nature of politics in Zimbabwe before, during and 
after fieldwork remained unpredictable. Papers from higher offices worked to secure 
entry into a community but other localized processes were needed to satisfy 
community leaders (formal and informal). These were critical to securing actual or 
practical access to the field. The informal leaders like those of socio-economic 
groups, religious and traditional leaders, party cadres and local technical staff 
(government employees) often hold sway in terms of actual access to communities. 
They also control access to data including community-level ‘official records’ and 
sanction access to such material. The experience in Ward 7 (Mutare) where survey 
materials were confiscated (but later returned) and research assistants detained is a 
case in point. Accessing the field has therefore these two aspects to it. Without 
exhorting the formal process, it is important to highlight that time is needed to prepare 
so that the research is not delayed. However, this is as useful as a passport is when 
one is going to a country where they need a visa. The passport on its own is 
inadequate without a visa. Moreover, like passports and visas, the two are not issued 
by the same authorities. The official approval granted by national authorities in 
Zimbabwe enabled the study to proceed up to the community where gate-keepers 
authorized actual entry into the field. Some of the gatekeepers (Councilors, traditional 
leaders, party cadres etc) practically facilitated the study through nominating their 
representatives who acted as ‘field guides’. Other more specific reflections on the 
research experience are discussed below.
4.5.1. Accessing institutional spaces and demonstrating value
A critical aspect to the study was access into institutions, which was not easy. 
Entering into institutional spaces can be through two ways. One is where official 
sanction is secured from higher authorities (see Homan 1991) and the lower 
institutional layers simply have to oblige because of the authority granted. The other 
is where specific organisations are identified as entry points. At a practical level, I 
found myself having to offer transport at least twice to Council and Government 
officials to enable them to undertake their work while I also observed their work. In 
Mutare and Seke/Manyame District, offering transport assistance allowed more time 
with Council Chairpersons. Beyond assistance without going out of my way, the study 
proceeded on the hope that a presentation would be made to the stakeholders and that
once completed the results would be available to them particularly the local 
authorities. This would be useful for their work to the extent that they will be able to 
find aspects that can be adopted or adapted for use. Beyond such optimistic 
expectations, there are practical challenges entailed in doing this.
Having said the above, the research experience shows how important it is for 
researchers to demonstrate value for the time they spend in institutions. It seems that 
institutions expect that a development research process will lead to some positive 
outcome (see Thomas and Mohan 2007; Makumbe 1996; DeVault 1999). This 
conforms to Belshaw’s (1976) observation that society rewards researchers whose 
work assists in solving problems. This explains the expectations of institutions 
hosting researchers. In my case, I felt that key informants and gate-keepers behaved 
as if they had something to hide from me or considered my research to be 
controversial (see Warwick 1983). Society’s rewarding of research that solves 
problems might also imply that it (society) might be unkind to situations that create 
the problems in the first place or obstruct their solution, which may be considered a 
corollary to Belshaw’s (1976) observation. To deal with both expectations and an 
inclination to deny access into institutions a researcher can focus their questions on a 
participating organisation’s challenges and ambitions. Doing this does not have to 
affect the integrity of the research or make it a participatory action research but at 
least to identify short-term gains that participating organisations may be able to 
realize. This research provided some space for exchange of practices between the two 
countries and the Districts in Zimbabwe. One concrete example was in relation to 
Council Chairs’ management of what were referred to as ‘errant Councilors’. 
Experiences from Mutare were shared with Seke/Manyame and vice versa with their 
consent and at the Chairs’ request.
The use of a multi-method approach helped in securing access to institutions 
especially the combination of key informant interviews, participating in events and 
document analysis (see Marshall and Rossman 1999; Bulmer and Warwick 1983). 
Where objections were raised to certain material being used this was respected. 
However, with growing trust, heads of institutions and other staff became more 
comfortable having me around and assisting. A challenge often not adequately 
discussed is exiting the institutional spaces on conclusion of the study. Desai and
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Potter (2006) discuss this in relation to researchers’ tendency to ‘take the data and 
run’ (see Thomas and Mohan 2007). A relevant dimension o f the same issue is what 
Whyte and Whyte (1984) refer to as field relations. However, since finishing 
fieldwork I have not had significant contact with ‘my field’. Perhaps, presenting 
findings and discussing a way forward on how the institutions can practically address 
issues identified by the study could be a realistic way o f giving back (see DeVault 
1999; Belshaw 1976). At the same time, some clarity at the start o f a study is required 
so that no promises of ‘changing the world’ are made.
4.5.2. Rewarding or assisting: the ethics of acknowledging and rendering 
assistance during research
Researching in a context where institutions are under diverse forms of stress presents 
challenges. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, some institutions are facing considerable 
strategic and operational challenges. Access into an organisation is invariably 
governed by the host organisation’s perception of possible benefits. In some cases, 
access is based on professional courtesy. With respect to the former, the study did not 
make undue promises to participating organisations. However, in some cases offering 
transport to facilitate field travel for Council or central government staff acted as 
some form of contribution. Free advice on pertinent issues was offered where 
requested without necessarily going overboard. This was through identifying possible 
processes, sources of information or support rather than offering specific technical 
input. Going beyond this would have been unethical for two reasons. First, my role 
would change and second the situation being observed would be significantly 
influenced. Some o f the requests, however, could not be met because of time and 
ethical considerations. It is however important to acknowledge the tensions associated 
with receiving and considering requests for assistance.
Another ethical dilemma related to the guides, Councilors and other people whose 
time was devoted to facilitating community entry. These people made a considerable 
contribution to the study. In Mutare District’s Ward 7, the Councilor took the 
opportunity during the survey to ask me to accompany him to other parts of the Ward 
he is unable to reach because of transport constraints. This request was complied with 
and combined with questionnaire administration and interviewing the Councilor. This 
presented both opportunities and constraints. Opportunities included interviewing the
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Councilor and observing him while in the Ward allowing me to understand how he 
administers the Ward. At the same time, the choice of households was affected and 
his presence within ear-shot of some of the questionnaire administration sessions 
might have affected responses.
Undertaking the research was looked at as building a relationship with the community 
and institutions. In this respect, offering support without going overboard was 
considered part o f being human and realistic. The possible biasing effect was 
controlled through using different data collection methods, data sources and flexible 
or iterative processes. This does not however remove the questions of whether and 
how to justify and compensate for the time of the people who participated in the 
study. Related is whether actual material compensation would not create problems for 
the study as well as others’ in future. The questions from my research experience, 
while not adequately answered, are not unique (see Thomas and Mohan 2007; 
DeVault 1999, Marshall and Rossman 1999; Desai and Potter 2006). However, it is 
possible to retreat to the notion above o f relationship building (see Whyte and Whyte 
1984). When doing research among fellow human beings and institutions small bits of 
support make a difference and are essentially about being humane. I proceeded on this 
basis and feel this did not affect the research findings and the conclusions drawn.
4.5.3. Researcher identity and field-level flexibility
Throughout the study, I identified myself as a researcher. This went some way in 
making it easy for people to relate and share their views. My other identities as 
consultant for instance were rarely used. During the first day o f questionnaire 
administration in Ward 15 Seke/Manyame District, the team was confronted with a 
dilemma when on entering the targeted Ward a ZANU PF meeting was in progress 
and local people were being mobilised to attend. Some of the research assistants 
expressed doubts about proceeding but I felt this would be an opportunity to interact 
with one important institution in rural Zimbabwe. After some careful negotiations, I 
was allowed to administer the questionnaires while the people waited for a senior 
politician who was to address the meeting. The image of a clip-board clutching 
researcher worked wonderfully in this instance and secured us entry into a group that 
would have been difficult to engage.
Twelve questionnaires were administered at this meeting. I proceeded to do a detailed 
semi-structured interview with the Ward Coordinator (a civil servant). No related 
opportunity presented itself with respect to the major opposition party MDC raising 
questions about whether a deliberate seeking out o f opposition followers was 
necessary. However, the people in attendance at the ZANU PF meeting might have 
been actively encouraged if not forced to attend and as such it is conceivable that the 
meeting had a more complex stakeholding than the convening institution would 
suggest. Responses to the questions were quite robust further reducing the risk of bias.
As fieldwork progressed, opportunities presented themselves where evidence from 
previous and different interviews, sources or from literature analyzed began to creep 
into discussions and subsequent interviews. This resulted in instances where such 
information was used, raising questions about the extent to which this influenced the 
direction of interviews, the quality of data and the interview relations. Although care 
was taken to conceal the sources where these were people, it is possible that 
respondents could construct their own images o f the sources raising issues of 
confidentiality. The iteration between specific forays into the field and analysis, 
mixing methods and interacting with diverse socio-economic groups in the targeted 
Wards helped in terms of depth and breadth of data collected. At the same time, the 
use of a Community Diary in Zambia created a mix of data completing the District 
and sub-District range of perspectives on institutionalising participation.
4.6. Conclusion
To conclude, the research experience involved mainly iterative processes of 
investigation on the ground, using a multi-method approach. This was possible in 
spite of frustrating experiences which somewhat restricted both access and progress. 
The different experiences and research emotions e.g. anxiety, uncertainty, concern at 
expectations of the research, shaped the process in positive ways as well. Researching 
institutions is a complex process as it essentially means looking into issues o f power. 
The decision to facilitate a research process by gate-keepers reflects who feels 
comfortable with a researcher or perceives some potential benefit (see Bulmer and 
Warwick 1983; Belshaw 1976; Homan 1991; Marshall and Rossman 1999). 
Organisational culture can also play a role, as in the case o f Zambia, where
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professional courtesy seemed to play an important role in opening doors perhaps 
precisely because I was not familiar. That raised questions about whether undertaking 
research in another country can be easier than undertaking research in one’s own (see 
Desai and Potter 2006). For a start, the familiar home contexts can breed complacency 
and people (potential respondents) might not have the same desire to accord a 
researcher adequate space. In some cases, they may fear that the research might 
uncover hidden issues that they would rather not disclose (see Bulmer and Warwick 
1983). Related is the possible loss of analytical rigor arising from accessing data that 
would not have been part o f the study if it had been conducted in an unfamiliar 
setting. This occurs where respondents digress to familiar issues. Notwithstanding 
these challenges, the study was done in a disciplined manner.
Approaching the study from a relational perspective was illuminating. The structures 
observed are theatres for interaction and interconnections. To this extent, therefore it 
is fair to say that interactions or relations need to be a feature of both analysis and 
action to make participation effective. This is what the next sections deal with i.e. 
what emerged from the analysis. In the next two Chapters, I discuss the empirical 
evidence from the research. The first looks at the findings as they relate to interactions 
while the second engages with people’s perceptions.
Pa r t  II; R e s e a r c h  F in d in g s , D is c u s s io n  a n d  
C o n c l u s io n
This part of the thesis is presented in three Chapters (5, 6 and 7). Chapters 5 and 6 are 
both on findings. The first deals with institutional interaction while the second 
discusses people’s perceptions of and responses to institutions. In these two Chapters, 
I detail the manifestations of the opportunities and challenges for participatory 
development based on the empirical observations of Zimbabwe and Zambia. In the 
process, the implications (of the opportunities and challenges) for institutionalising 
participatory development are shown. Findings are presented and discussed based on 
the conceptual framework (Chapter 3) and specifically Figure 1, which visualizes the 
overall analytical framework in terms of the spaces and places for interaction. 
For instance the influence o f the external context e.g. donors can take the form o f new 
planning methodologies or choice of some development organisations over others as 
implementing partners.
The analysis of the findings engages with the opportunities and challenges inherent in 
inter-organisational interface. The most critical issues arising from inter- 
organisational interactions are discussed in Chapter 5 as they relate to structures and 
spaces. The creation of effective communication mechanisms and improving support 
to sub-national structures and processes are central to enhancing participation and the 
performance of the institutions involved in facilitating participation. The defining 
feature of the sub-national institutions on which the analysis focuses is the 
facilitation and actual undertaking of development activities. Chapter 6 presents 
ordinary people’s perceptions of development organisations and responses to their 
development contexts. Combined, the two Chapters illuminate the ways in which 
participation is facilitated or obstructed in practice from these different perspectives. 
The findings relate to data gathered using all the methods discussed in Chapter 4. 
Suffice to reiterate that Councils and other governmental institutions co-manage the 
processes of development that the study observed but with increasing non­
governmental presence and funding. Chapter 7 pulls together the key discussions and 
concludes the thesis. I use the findings to contribute to answering the research 
question and to comment on the theoretical framework.
Ch apter  5: Institu tio nal  In t er a c tio n  as Develo pm en t  
Facilitation
5.1. Introduction
Development organisations interact as they perform their functions. The functions are 
defined from top-down, bottom-up and various combinations of both. Organisations 
attempt to make their activities relevant to community needs and to other actors 
operating in the same spaces. As such, these diverse interactions inform the thinking 
and doing of development. In this Chapter, I talk about institutional interaction as 
development facilitation and further show that the quality of such interaction is 
critical for doing development. Note here that institutional interaction is used broadly 
to cover inter-organisational and organisation-community (as groups, individuals or 
other formations) interface. In thinking and doing development, priorities are 
important. The study explored development priorities or agendas from the 
perspectives of ordinary people and key informants. However, development priorities 
are often contested by both ordinary people and development organisations.
Chapter 5 is about analyzing the inter-organisational interactions as these allow the 
surfacing of issues in relation to individual organisational performance, relationships 
and the role of coalitions or associations, how policy frameworks are utilized and/or 
interpreted and how higher level support enables performance by lower level 
institutions. At the same time interactions amongst organisations, allow the building 
of collective capacities, access to useful information and managing organisational- 
community interface. Key informants raised some o f these issues and opportunities 
during interviews. Events that I attended also enabled me to observe how some of the 
issues arise and play out. Organisations and spaces cited in this Chapter and the rest 
of the thesis are in no way exhaustive but suffice for exploring the research question 
and may guide or themselves require further inquiry.
An example of support from higher level to leverage performance at lower levels 
(Council in this case) concerns the Government o f Zimbabwe’s proposal to pay 
salaries to three top Council Executives (ARDCZ Congress August 2004) and thus 
enable Rural District Councils to retain Chief Executive Officers, Treasurers and
Engineers. It is expected that securing continuity at this level will enhance Council 
performance. However, some key informants observed that this could result in 
Councils losing their autonomy as key executives inevitably fall more under direct 
central government control. On a related issue, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Seke/Manyame District (Zimbabwe) observed that the fact that Council nurses were 
paid by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare at times presented problems in 
terms of managing them. A community meeting at a clinic, which I attended and cited 
later in Seke/Manyame exposed some of these challenges. I will elaborate on some of 
these issues in the sections below but suffice to observe that inter-organisational 
interaction is often around a development agenda whose setting and pursuance creates 
or blocks participation. The section below engages with this aspect of agenda or 
priority setting.
5.2. What development? Reflecting on agenda setting
Participatory development enthusiasts argue that the determination and pursuit of 
development priorities should rest with the people (see Chambers 1983; Ayittey 
2005). As such, I posed the question on development priorities to survey respondents 
and key informants. The idea was that in poor countries like Zimbabwe it should be 
generally easy to identify what has to be done. This section explores the development 
priorities highlighted by the respondents and informants. By assessing communities’ 
development ambitions and comparing these to those of development officials, the 
study established the extent of overlap. For the questionnaire survey, the Village was 
the planning unit while for key informants I often used the District with a satisfactory 
level of sub-District grounding of their responses.
The focus of development activities (what is done) can be as important as the 
planning processes, development structures and implementation (how development is 
thought through and done). This is because people are more inclined to take an active 
part in activities they perceive more important to their livelihoods than in those where 
they are unable to see benefits. An uninspiring development agenda facilitated by 
uninspiring institutions threatens participation. Development priorities form the 
content of development plans. Securing respect for those priorities by higher level 
organisations and officials in the eventual plans is critical for participation.
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Survey results indicate that agricultural development, water and sanitation are critical 
development needs in Zimbabwe’s rural areas. Key informants defined development 
in relation to food security, household incomes and community facilities like health 
and education services. In response to the question on the key development priority, 
31.1% (n=125) of the survey respondents indicated that agricultural development was 
a top priority and 22.7% indicated water and sanitation. Other priorities ranging in 
terms of frequency between 2% and 10% included micro-projects, energy 
development, communication infrastructure, and health and education services. The 
majority of the respondents (83.6%) indicated that their key priorities (different by 
Ward) had been included in the Ward Development Plans. Based on experience 
slightly above half (54.4%) believed that the priorities would not be respected.
Having priorities in Ward Plans shows hope in the planning system but the skepticism 
regarding actual implementation at 54.4% is high. 43.3% attributed their skepticism to 
doubtful quality of local leadership, 33.3% to bad track record and 23.4% other 
factors including level of community contribution and recognition that funding was 
generally unavailable (n=68). In the event that the need is not included in the District 
Plans 36.8% of the respondents indicated they would do nothing, 26.4% would try 
again, 20.6% indicated that they would raise issues with authorities and 16.2% would 
seek own funding (n=125). The option of raising issues with the authorities relates 
closely to the percentage of people who indicated having personally approached an 
official or institution with a development need (33.9%, see section 6.6).
From the foregoing, it is safe to say that controversies in development may not be so 
much about priorities. Rather the challenges seem to be about how development is 
done and that it is often seen as not being done. The overlap between official and 
community perspectives on priorities seemed to bear this out. In the case of the 
communities included in the study, the feeling that development (vis-a-vis their 
priorities) was not happening at all in their areas came through. Priorities and needs 
may vary in terms of order rather than the broad sectors in which people’s needs fall. 
Given recent droughts and the national economic crisis in Zimbabwe agricultural 
development or food security issues almost came naturally as an important area. The 
research also established that people generally have faith in the structures and 
processes established to identify their needs. However, their perception, borne of lived
experiences is that these processes and structures are not delivering. That very 
development activities are implemented appears to be a major source of frustration. 
The gap between what is planned and what is implemented (development deficit) is 
acknowledged from the level of Councilor upwards and is often used as a justification 
for not consulting people. Unfortunately, this lack o f consultation (on the assumption 
that what needs to be done is already known) limits the institutionalisation of 
participation at lower levels. A question can be asked about whether greater 
consultations may address more strategic issues about why existing local governance 
institutions are not delivering. This would lift participation beyond consultation about 
defining development needs.
The above makes discussion about local development agendas critical. A local 
development agenda reflects priorities that people in geographically defined spaces 
commit themselves to implementing. Such an agenda can be based on the local 
poverty context. Internal or external facilitators can help unearth people’s 
expectations and problems i.e. their poverty experiences. External facilitation may 
influence articulations o f development needs to fit what a community feels the 
organisations may or can provide for. This is what Whyte and Whyte (1984) refer to 
as formalized explanations (see Stewart and Shamdasani 1990 viz etic data). I 
defining development priorities, key informants often used the mandate o f their 
organisations. As such, AREX prioritised food security, DDF spoke of water and 
sanitation while Councils talked about services and community infrastructure. 
External organisations e.g. NGOs facilitate community use of existing potential but 
also bring or market new approaches in accordance with their missions/mandates. A 
development idea may be expressed as an obligation to meet extra-community 
expectations e.g. a community labeled a bread basket ends up with an obligation to 
produce for own consumption and ‘export’. Whether internally defined or ‘marketed’ 
local development agendas are articulated expectations. The agenda is local to the 
extent that its pursuit is spatially local, it generates benefits and uses as much local 
resources as is possible.
The nature of linkages amongst local institutions and with outside organisations is 
important for local development agendas. Development organisations link up 
vertically or laterally with others in similar sectors (say agriculture or health) or of the
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sam e type (e.g. governm enta l or non-governm enta l) .  The linkages may also be across 
sectors and institutional types. In term s o f  Figure 1, this relates to the extent o f  
linkages betw een  O rganisa tions 1-N on the one hand and their em beddedness  in local 
contexts  on the o ther i.e. do popular  o rganisations and the grassroots access and 
control deve lopm ent regim es? Im plem entation  o f  local deve lopm ent agendas requires 
more horizontal collaboration  and coordination. The totality o f  processes, institutional 
s tructures and procedures involved in the deve lopm ent process in an area m ake up a 
deve lopm ent regime. That regim e defines the form and extent o f  interactions, nature 
o f  the deve lopm ent agenda and affects deve lopm en t outcom es. O rdinary  peo p le ’s 
skeptic ism  about the security o f  their  deve lopm ent aspirations as they go to higher 
institutions indicates their  limited influence over spaces beyond the Ward.
To sum m arise , there is little difficulty in defin ing w hat the deve lopm ent priorities o f  a 
com m unity  are. People have clear  priorities based on the local poverty  context, 
deve lopm ent activities and deve lopm ent regimes. Figure 3 below  represents  these as 
three ‘pillars ' o f  local deve lopm en t agendas. Localness o f  the agenda is not 
necessarily  com m unity -d riven  since deve lopm ent ideas may com e from outside a 
com m unity .  W hat is spatially local are the execution and benefit distribution 
processes. The im portance o f  the three pillars varies with localities and overall macro- 
econom ic  and socio-political dynam ics . W hat is im portant is that i f  peo p le 's  core 
priorities are not secured they will perceive deve lopm ent as not being done even 
where som e other p rocesses are going on. A sked about w hether a new project had 
been brought to re sponden ts ’ com m unit ie s  61 .6%  said N o  and 32%  answ ered  Yes 
(n=125 with a 6 .4%  not applicable  response).
Figure 3: Pillars of local development agendas
L o c a l  
D e v e l o p m e n t  
A g e n d a s ,  r
Local D evelopm ent 
A ctiv ities (P ro jec ts, 
P rogram m es etc).
Local P overty 
C on tex t (S tatus, 
A nalyses etc).
Local D evelopm enta l 
R eg im e (A cto rs &  the ir 
C onnec tions  etc).
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This Figure (8) elaborates the differences in interpretation and resultantly the 
approaches that development actors (including ordinary people) adopt in what the 
framework o f Figure 1 represented as Joint Structures and Development Activities. It 
is also important to highlight that without necessarily using the terms in Figure 8, 
survey respondents answered questions in ways that related to the poverty issues they 
experience, the activities around them and the organisations they are aware of. 
Similarly, key informants also addressed issues of context, activities and actors (see 
section 5.4, Boxes 1 and 5 and sections 5.5.3, 5.5.5 and 6.5).
5.3. Planning and participation
Plans are important in development. How they are developed, their content and 
implementation arrangements are critical (see Brand 1991; Wekwete 1990; Mutizwa- 
Mangiza 1991). The planning and implementation stages provide scope for involving 
people and for development organisations to interact. This section looks at the 
institutional arrangements for managing the planning process as these have a bearing 
on the extent to which people can get involved. The development planning process in 
Zimbabwe has been in a state of change over the years in terms of main players. 
During the era o f Development Committees (mid 1980s to late 1990s), the process 
came up with ‘shopping lists’, which did not receive adequate funding for the 
planning processes, the planning institutions and the plans (Gasper 1997; see Francis 
and James 2003). Integrated plans focusing on specific geographical areas were also 
developed mainly by NGOs working in specific parts of given Districts.
Data gathered through key informant interviews indicated how planning cycles had 
changed during the RDCCBP era (after 1996) from national 5-year, District and 
Provincial Annual Development Plans to 3-year Rolling Plans. The latter have a 
component each of a review of a previous plan, an annual programme and proposed 
plan covering one year. The review contains achievements and incomplete activities 
to be carried over, while the annual programme covers activities for a given year with 
assured funding and future plans contain relevant activities (new and carry-overs) but 
not assured of funding. ‘Rolling’ arises from the realization that with reduced funding 
many relevant projects remain unimplemented. It made little sense to engage in 
rigorous re-planning rather than just reviewing existing plans and carrying over 
relevant aspects while realistically including new initiatives. Projects that some
communities in Zimbabwe complain about are still on plans rolled over repeatedly. 
Besides three-year rolling plans there are also strategic corporate plans that Councils 
in Zimbabwe are encouraged to develop. These constitute the most recent approach to 
planning although there are concerns about lack of adequate capacities in Councils to 
develop and implement them. The Ministry o f Local Government and other 
development organisations are currently promoting strategic planning approaches 
with Zimbabwean Councils. Key informants confirmed that public sector planning 
processes are under-resourced and hence are stressed structurally and procedurally.
Although the overall vision of ensuring grassroots participation has been maintained, 
the reality reflects a less satisfactory situation. The approaches employed in coming 
up with the plans vary. Some Councils use a Ward-to-Ward approach, others simply 
convene stakeholder (usually leadership) meetings to come up with plans there and 
then. Where participatory methods, e.g. PRAs, are used, they are rarely completed 
because of high time and financial costs. In Mashonaland East Province, three 
Districts have had partial PRA-based studies (Hwedza, Marondera and Goromonzi), 
which did not cover entire Districts. As such, the planning was not fully informed by 
these studies. Incomplete consultations result in Council Strategic Plans that are 
lacking in shared ownership and usually end up being done by consultants on a short­
term basis, i.e. not in-depth. Under SEDAP40 (1999-2003), Mutare Council’s planning 
in the 5 Wards targeted was PRA-based. The programme supported livestock 
restocking, environmental management, well-sinking and other project areas that 
communities prioritised. SEDAP also supported District institutions in terms of 
internalizing use of participatory methods. However, Council was not able to roll-out 
SEDAP experiences to other Wards during and after the tenure of the project.
5.3.1. Technical support towards planning
Council planning processes in both countries are supported by central government 
organisations as discussed in the section on structures below. Some sector-specific 
plans are developed outside the Committee framework. For instance, Physical Plans 
are supported by the Department of Physical Planning (DPP- Ministry of Local 
Government), agricultural development by AREX, health and education plans
40 An International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and Government o f  Zimbabwe funded 
project supporting, using participatory methods, agro-related development projects in communal areas 
in drier parts o f  the South-Eastern part o f  Zimbabwe hence its name: South-East Dry Areas Project 
(SEDAP).
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likewise. The difference between DPP and other central government institutions is 
that they do not have staff at District level. They are provincially based and come into 
Council areas on invitation. The plans they assist Councils in developing are 
essentially implemented by the Councils. However, other government departments 
and Ministries are present at District levels and below. They have their own 
Ministerial programmes, alongside participation in Council-managed ones. In 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, the District levels have planning structures either relevant 
Sub-Committees of RDDC/DDCC or Council Planning Units like in Zambia. As 
such, planning expertise is more decentralised in Zambia than in Zimbabwe.
It has been observed that while DPP offers technical support for plan preparation it 
has no other scope for influencing or guaranteeing implementation of the plans. 
Unlike in Zambia, Zimbabwe’s RDCs do not have District Planners. Interviews with 
the CEOs of the study Districts and Provincial Officials it was learnt that some RDCs 
employ Engineers and other single-sector specialists. However, these were unable to 
lead multi-stakeholder planning and visioning processes. For instance, the Provincial 
Planner for Manicaland indicated that the development plans that Councils prepare 
with the help of RDDCs are both delayed and often of poor quality (Interview 8th 
September 2004). He also indicated that once prepared plans faced funding problems 
as they lacked institutional champions. In terms of technical support towards Council- 
level development planning, the study learnt o f cases where support has been lacking 
from the Province41, slow42 and confusing (LGAZ brainstorming session, February 
24th 2005). The confusion often comes from introduction of different planning 
approaches and cycles by different organisations, in different sectors and often 
changing these without any continuity. This divergence in planning systems and the 
plans is elaborated below.
5.3.2. Clarity over plans and the planners
The process of coming up with plans and implementing them provides opportunities 
for people’s participation. The spaces in and cycles through which planning takes 
place constitute important areas where institutionalisation of participation can be 
implemented. The study observed opportunities and challenges in the planning
41 Chingosho (2002) Provincial Administrator’s Report to the 8th Review Meeting, Mash. East.
42 Mutare RDC (2000); C hief Executive Officer’s Report to the RDCCBP District Review Meeting.
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processes and products, which are discussed in this section. My analysis of the 
planning process from the village up established that there are many routes for 
Villagers’ priorities. These routes may lead towards implementation or the ‘dust-bin’. 
In Zimbabwe the main routes include the Parliamentary Constituency route, Member 
of Parliament and Presidential calls, District or Council-based processes, NGO 
planning avenues and, among other things, through farmers’ groups or associations. I 
discuss some of these in this section to illuminate organisational interaction and the 
opportunities and constraints to institutionalising participation.
In the 2000-2005 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Session the community of Ward 15 (and 
six others) in Seke/Manyame kept submitting project proposals under the grant 
scheme administered by the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and 
Employment Creation without success (Interview with Ward 15 Coordinator43, 15th 
August 2004). The project funding is on a constituency basis in Zimbabwe although, 
unlike in Zambia, there is no designated Constituency Development Fund. Their 
Member of Parliament and the Constituency Office for submitting applications is in 
another administrative District (constituency straddles two Districts). The projects, 
developed with the assistance of the Ward Coordinators were not being forwarded 
back to the Seke/Manyame office of the Ministry. In the interview, the Coordinator 
said submissions were often lost as Ministry officials promoted funding of groups in 
their part of the constituency. Ward 15 groups were no longer keen on submitting 
applications. Furthermore, the local MP was considered uninterested in this part of the 
constituency since he came from the adjacent District (Ibid). The Ministry staff in the 
two Districts had not discussed these in any detail. This is just one case where a 
political constituency straddles more than one District and where weak intra- 
organisational coordination stifles participation.
However, the main planning structures are the Ward and Village Assemblies in 
Zimbabwe and Area Development Committees in Zambia. Assemblies continue to 
relate to the Councils in ‘shopping-list mode’, and Councilors keep bringing requests 
for inclusion into Council plans. This is because people have some faith in the system
43 Ministry o f  Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation (now split in two, the other is 
Ministry o f  Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development since March 2005) employs Ward 
Coordinators and the key informant in this case was an employee serving two Wards o f  Seke/Manyame 
(see also Section 5.4.1).
as discussed above. There is therefore a disjuncture between the grassroots and RDC 
level planning realities. Plans are developed for sending to the national level not 
necessarily to Council. Council effectiveness is difficult to measure considering that 
Council acts as a route for people’s needs to the national level. Councils and 
Councilors can pass the blame upwards for lack of development since plans are being 
submitted to ‘someone’. Council success or otherwise is not directly associated with 
District let alone sub-District structures. The ‘someone’ is generally seen as 
government. As the buck gets passed up and down, the question becomes; whose 
plans are they? Are they community, Council or Government plans? When a 
community brings up priorities what expectations does it have of themselves and 
others regarding plan execution? Do local government structures (or other planners) 
pose as ‘father Christmases’ or development facilitators (see Kar 2003, Tilakaratna 
1987)? Ownership of planning processes and products is weak in both countries 
reducing accountability in/for development at community and organisational levels.
Other alternative planning processes may divert attention from Council plans or even 
contradict them. The first one is that o f Members o f Parliament (MPs) who often act 
as ‘planners’ in their constituencies. They often plan and implement programme 
activities during election campaigns. Some of these activities might not be in the 
Council development plans and are rarely implemented with direct Council support. 
Problems often arise when MPs’ projects are not completed. In most cases, the need 
to hand over such projects to Council is not consciously thought about at the planning 
stage. In other cases where a local Council is unable to raise resources to complete 
projects, the result can often be friction between the Council and the community on 
the one hand and the MP on the other.
Despite these problems, MPs are an important source of development support and 
information. Box 1 shows one project in Marange, Mutare District established with 
the local MP’s efforts. It has some of the challenges discussed above although 
positively changing the lives of some of the participating households. A number of 
questions were explored using this Dairy Project. Important questions include; 
Why/how did such a project, which is sensitive to agro-ecological conditions, find its 
way into a region evidently unsuited and with such inadequate infrastructural support? 
Since DDP, the main project sponsor has run out of funds and Plan International (a
potential funder) may not respond soon, what happens to the project? Should the 
project completely fail who is to blame? Is it the resource poor farmers and their local 
institutions or the MP? Could it be Council, technical support organisations or the 
project funders? Alternatively, is it all o f these?
Box 1: Marange Dairy Project (Mutare District Zimbabwe)
This is a smallholder dairy project implemented under a national Dairy Development Programme 
(DDP), a unit o f  the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA a Parastatal). DDP 
(working with others) offers technical and financial services to dairy farmers. DDP placed an Officer 
but during fieldwork, the project was not staffed. The Marange Project started in January 2002 and was 
introduced by the MP for Mutare West. Initial membership was 110 both males and females (35-40  
active) within 40kms o f the Milk Collection Centre (MCC). The number o f  active farmers has not 
changed but total registered members was 350 in mid 2005 (time o f  fieldwork). DDP fully funded 
construction o f  the MCC and it is almost complete (roofed, plastered, electric tubing and flooring) with 
painting, ceiling, ablution block and fitting o f  window panes awaiting completion. The milk processing 
plant and water facilities are outstanding. Promises in 2004 by Plan International (an NGO) to help 
with funds for the milk processing equipment were yet to materialize. Hand-dug wells did not reach 
water table and group was to contract a professional well-sinker.
At project inception (2002), 6 farmers received 2 in-calf (Red-Dane) heifers each from A RD A ’s 
Livestock Input Scheme. 4 died the same year from tick borne diseases. The cows have also shown 
poor reproductive performance (low conception rates, Contagious Abortion (CA) and high calf 
mortalities; 5 out o f 12 survived) which hinder performance o f  the enterprise. Project members’ asset- 
base: average land ownership is 4 ha per farmer, with indigenous cattle, which they are intending to 
cross-breed for milk production. The 190 registered farmers in 2003 had among them 250 cows and 
heifers, which were tested and found to be suitable for use as dairy cows. To improve productivity 
DDP purchased dairy bulls (farmers contributed 50% o f bull cost) and 10 have been delivered.
The Marange area is mainly ecological regions 3 to 5 with low levels o f  fodder production. Most 
farmers rely on veldt grazing for their cows, which only works in summer (+-5 months). Less than 10 
farmers have meaningful fodder banks with only 3 farmers having small plots (about half a  hectare) o f  
Bana grass, some multi-purpose legume trees (leucaena, sesbania and acacia species), which is 
inadequate to support viable milk production during the dry period. Farmers’ summer fields are not 
fenced making it difficult to maintain the small plots o f multi-purpose trees established during the dry 
season. Recurrent droughts worsen the situation in an area with inadequate water supplies. Most o f  the 
individual wells dry up during the dry season making shortage o f  feed a major problem for the project, 
which has reduced milk output per cow to below optimum levels. DDP has run out o f  resources before 
the project has been completed. It is hoped that Plan International will provide resources to complete 
the project.
Farmers receive seeds for multi-purpose trees from the International Centre for Research in Agro­
forestry (ICRAF) and from the Department o f  Livestock Production and Development (Government o f  
Zimbabwe-DLPD). All farmers received basic training in dairy husbandry courses facilitated by DDP  
with resource support from DLPD, Veterinary Services and other NGOs. The project has a Committee 
and operates as a fully developed association holding meetings monthly. There are some political 
differences amongst the members, which sometimes threaten to tear the group apart taking them away 
from productive matters. One expert informant who is very familiar with the project observed that: 
‘...the area is too dry to support viable dairy activities moreover dairy is for the poor not the 
poorest...’ (Interview 9th March 2005).
Source; Decoded from Project Documents, summarised from Field Visit and Interviews, 
March 2005.
What is fair to say is that MPs generally mean well when they out-wit their colleagues 
to get something (or anything) available nationally for their communities. Even when 
they do it out of self-interest to gain votes, this could be the only means available for 
some communities to receive support. In the early 1990s, I was involved in an NGO- 
managed grazing scheme44 project in Mutare District. 13 years on, I realise the 
community accepted it largely because refusing meant missing out on interacting with 
‘development people’. As such, I may argue that the resource-poor farmers may not 
be to blame for some o f the project failures but the institutions (including MPs) 
bringing the projects. However, the difference between the grazing scheme and the 
dairy project is that the grazing scheme was in the Council Annual Development Plan. 
While the questions raised, about involvement of MPs (and other players) in direct 
project planning and management require more project cases for more conclusive 
answers, in the context o f this study I make the point that the complexity o f project 
delivery channels and actors stretches District level planning. I acknowledge that the 
myriad avenues may serve to increase available options but they unfortunately limit 
institutional interaction necessary for effective and equitable participation.
The research observed that after Presidential or other national elections calls for 
project applications are made in connection with campaign promises. Most 
electioneering promises are neither originated by nor incorporated into RDC plans 
(Interview with Mash. East, Local Government Key Informant 27th May 2004). The 
2005 national election campaign in Zimbabwe was characterised, among other things, 
by the President’s high profile donation of computers to secondary schools. Given the 
acute shortage of learning and teaching materials, classrooms and other educational 
necessities there may be a basis to question whether computers were a priority. 
Further, a question may arise as to how well-informed national politicians are about 
local aspirations, and whether processes of local need identification mean anything in 
practice at national level. However, there is an alternative view that some macro 
initiatives require a strategic rather than a localised thrust.
Apart from politicians-cum-planners, sector Ministries and Government Departments 
also have a role in planning processes. District Development Plans are expected to
44 The scheme (Gwarada) never got completed and at the time o f fieldwork the fence in sections that 
had been completed had been removed and the area partially settled i.e. project abandoned.
integrate Ministry plans. RDDC and PDC processes facilitate the development of 
District plans for Council adoption, which plans become a guide for other 
development organisations working in the District or Province. However, District and 
Provincial key informants indicated challenges with contradictory submissions from 
Councils and line Ministry staff. At times, District level line Ministry staff and their 
provincial colleagues differ in their submissions. Ministries submit different plans 
through the two systems i.e. their line Ministry and the RDDC process. This can ruin 
the chances of a District Plan successfully attracting funding from the national 
budgetary process at a time when local government grants and local revenue are low. 
In terms of implementation processes, Box 2 shows some o f the challenges that curtail 
full and effective participation.
Box 2: Mutare Community-Based (water-point) Maintenance (CBM)
In Mutare, the District Development Fund-Water section under the Ministry o f  Rural Resources and 
Infrastructural Development implemented a programme o f water-point rehabilitation and flushing 
without the full knowledge or direct involvement o f Council in 2004. Councilors from a number o f  
Wards raised objections to this in a full Council meeting o f 14th December 2004. They particularly 
raised issue with the selection, training and replacement o f  Village Pump Minders (VPMs). Councilors 
and other stakeholders felt Water Point Committees that had been created under an NGO-supported 
District-wide programme in 2003 should have been used. Under this arrangement, tools and equipment 
for borehole repairs were kept by Councilors. Village Pump Minders would collect these for use and 
return. In the event o f  a Pump Minder leaving (through death or transferring from the Village/Ward) 
Councilors would facilitate selection and replacement in consultation with relevant Water-Point 
Committees i.e. representatives o f  the water-user communities. Instead o f this system DDF was 
selecting VPM replacements and allowing them to keep tools and equipment, which Councilors felt 
exposed the assets to abuse. Councilors also felt that the accountability o f  VPMs was becoming 
questionable and that performance in most Wards was declining. They attributed this to DDF’s 
approach and attitude. In response, the DDF representative felt that Councilors were interfering with 
his work.
This is a case where the interface between DDF-Water and Council (at District) and between DDF- 
Water Field staff and Councilors (at Sub-District) reflected tensions that were stifling community- 
based water point maintenance and safe-keeping o f  tools and equipment provided under an NGO- 
supported project. The arrangement where VPMs were selected and supervised locally, equipment and 
tools kept by the community and a water-point maintenance programme agreed at local level was being 
threatened. Because the three organisations were not represented in the meeting, it was not possible to 
get their views during the meeting. Subsequent follow-ups with all three organisations elicited different 
perspectives on the subject. However, they generally agreed that this reflected both community 
ownership and Council capacity challenges, which they encountered in their other different 
interventions.
Source: Summary of notes made from a Full Council meeting o f 14th December 2004
At the 2004 ARDCZ Congress, Councils raised issues of deliberate institutional 
overlap (see Mbaku 2004; Engberg-Pedersen 1997; Ayittey 2005). One organisation 
cited was District Development Fund-Roads section. Councils alleged that DDF was
duplicating Council road works. Clearly, the Fund has the authority to maintain roads 
and water points, but the lack of coordination and communication can increase costs 
and reduce outputs. Organisational effectiveness also suffers while Council plans are 
ignored. One predicament cited in relation to weak institutional interaction as shown 
in the above examples was the power that line Ministries have. Council executives 
and chairpersons, the RDDC and PDC chairs (Zimbabwe’s District and Provincial 
Administrators) do not have the power to force line Ministries to respect District and 
Provincial Plans. Although the Provincial Council has the powers of approving the 
Provincial Plans and District Council Chairs have occasion to defend plans, the Chair 
o f the Provincial Council (the Governor) has no budget. Decentralised plans have no 
national level link marketing the plans. The advantages of taking District Plans for 
collation into Provincial Plans are therefore not very evident given the limitations o f 
the Provincial Plan as a fundraising tool.
Some avenues may have restricted accessibility e.g. constituency grants (perceived as 
favoring pro-ZANU PF applicants), but a District picture needs to be developed. 
Concerns about the equitability of such funds are an important agenda in Zimbabwe. 
In Zambia, there is a plan to convert the Constituency Development Fund into a Ward 
Development Fund administered through a Ward Account (Interview with LGAZ 
Executive Secretary February 1st 2005). The pressure to proceed in this direction 
arises from the politicization of the fund. In Western Province’s Kaoma District, a 
member of an NGO (Women for Change45) in Mangango Area Association was 
nominated to be Treasurer on the District Committee disbursing the CDF resources. A 
local ruling party branch made an application purporting to be a community-based 
organisation entitled to CDF resources but the Committee refused their application. 
When political pressure was applied the Women for Change activist was sold out by 
the other Committee members resulting in her ouster. To save the CDF she 
eventually had to resign from the Committee (Interview with WFC Acting Director, 
February 1st 2005).
To summarise this section, two points can be made. Firstly, spatial units for planning 
and development facilitation are many. They are at once distinct and overlapping.
45 Women for Change is a Zambian NGO working on gender, human rights and social development.
Where no deliberate synchronization is done, they may result in inequitable resource 
deployment while also making development management difficult. The opportunities 
presented by a myriad of funding options may not lead to more participation. 
However, there are some cases where Councils have been in constant communication 
with other stakeholders that facilitate development. Related is the fact that while 
seemingly unwieldy, the many planning and delivery channels offer choices that are 
important for people’s participation. The channels allow use o f different ideas and the 
whole framework as depicted in Figure 1. My view is that the challenges faced in 
using the planning and development management structures do not constitute a 
rationale for ‘throwing the baby with the bath water’. It is also critical to appreciate 
that communities accept and participate in these different processes with good 
reasons. In some cases, there is a perception that each opportunity could be the last.
The second point is that there is scope for better coordination of the planning channels 
at District level, which is not being fully exploited. While it appears incumbent upon 
Council to do this, the situation in the study countries indicates serious weaknesses. 
Study findings suggest that the performance of Council in service delivery and 
relating to development actors is weak. Legal provisions confer upon Councils the 
responsibilities of collating relevant planning data, plans and the responsibility to 
monitor development within their areas including sustaining interventions started by 
other players. In reality, Councils are unable to hold the different actors accountable 
for their actions. As a GTZ official put it, ‘.. .people helping Districts to plan are not 
helping them (Councils) to achieve their (Council) plans ...they introduce more 
planning cycles and fund unplanned activities’ (LGAZ brainstorm session, February 
24th 2005). The Marange Dairy Project example, particularly the approaching o f an 
NGO, shows the serious challenges that exist.
Decentralisation literature engages with the type of challenges observed by this study 
particularly the fiscal decentralisation perspective (see Ndegwa 2002; Olowu 1990; 
Conyers 2003; Crook and Manor 1998). Often devolution is what is advocated for, 
and in the case of Zimbabwe this considered as critical to addressing budgetary 
challenges faced by the decentralised development planning process (see Makumbe 
1998; 1996; GRZ 2004). However, more devolution has to be balanced with growing 
recognition of the role a developmental state can play in development (see Fritz and
Menocal 2007). Read in the context of Kar’s (2003) self-respect and local innovations 
cited by Kamete (2002) and Mapedza and Mandondo (2002), the constraints faced in 
the Zimbabwean and perhaps Zambian situation perhaps cannot be dealt with through 
decentralisation-based initiatives. This brings me to the point discussed below, which 
builds on the importance of Council facilitation of development planning and 
organisational interaction.
5.4. Defining the effectiveness of Councils
In this section, I turn to the effectiveness of Councils from the perspectives of key
informants and survey respondents. The section provides a context for ensuing
sections by laying out how Councils, as pivotal institutions in local development
activities, are perceived and how they conduct their business. A key informant defined
an effective Council as follows:
‘One which articulates development in their areas for the people to be self- 
sufficient, works hand in hand with donor organisations who are there for 
development and creates a good working relationship with Ministries 
working in the Council area for smooth development’ (Interview January 7th 
2005).
As an aspiration-based definition, it is not typical but raises important points around
Council-community relations on one hand and with donors and government
departments on the other. The reference to self-sufficiency defines the ends of
development. Considering the diverse needs and capacities of any community,
development in this conception is a moving target making Council effectiveness
difficult to define let alone measure. Clarifying this may be based on the content of
development as shown in Figure 3, the way Councils interact with communities, and
how this gradually engenders local ownership and control of the development cycle.
Interaction provides mechanisms for defining and acting upon aspirations. The
Council Chair for Mutare argued that:
‘...an effective Council is one able to offer adequate services to the people 
living in its administrative area. These services include roads, clinics and 
schools’ (Interview 6th January 2005).
The Chair’s views imply that the services are already specified. Since there is 
legislation that defines Council functions, his definition o f Council effectiveness can 
therefore be regarded as legalistic. On the other hand, the key informant’s view above 
touches on issues of process. He also touched on facilitation and catalyzing
development as something an effective Council would do. However, self-sufficiency 
covers a lot of issues from material needs to spiritual well-being. Council functions as 
provided in the RDC Act cover a wide variety of sectors, which often results in 
clashes mainly with government departments. Another question explored with the 
Mutare Council Chair was about Council’s role in defining the development agenda. 
His response was that:
‘...elected representatives (Councilors) have a role to inform the 
communities of what they can demand from Council to enable them to 
develop relevant plans’ (Interview 6th January 2005).
An impression is created that a Council is positioned to both directly address 
development challenges (the Council Chair’s view) on its own and in partnership with 
others. The second view o f the Council Chair confirmed the legal position that there is 
already a menu of services to offer. These views, while mutually inclusive, have 
different implications on how communities and other development actors interact with 
Council. There are traditional services that RDCs offer to residents, like running 
health and education facilities, refuse collection in semi-urban settlements and 
providing water and sanitation services. However, in Zimbabwe these services are 
principally provided by Government Ministries and Departments (staffing, policy­
making, grants for drugs in clinics and per capita grants in schools) leaving Councils 
to play a peripheral role. In section 5.5.4,1 highlight how Councils are constrained to 
a point where they are unable to provide the services they should ordinarily provide.
The use of Councilors in facilitating development, while important, affects the type of 
development needs brought to Council. If a development plan already exists, do other 
organisations work with Council based on that plan or do they go directly to the 
community? Issues of resource channeling, communication structures and community 
perceptions of Council become important. Articulating needs and exerting demands 
for services generally depend on information flow and conceptualization o f Council 
roles. Council effectiveness can therefore be measured in relation to service provision. 
These services are as defined in local government legislation. However, residents and 
development organisations interfacing with Council relate more directly to plans and 
programmes, not the Act. Plans and programmes constitute spaces in which they 
interact with Council. As discussed in section 5.3 above the planning processes and 
products are often outside Council control. Councils’ ability to facilitate effective
participation is a product of the operating environment including the structures they 
operate in. I discuss these in this section to explore the challenges cited.
5.4.1 Operating environment and Council communication channels
The Ministries responsible for local government in both Zambia and Zimbabwe 
monitor Councils to ensure compliance with relevant legislation and policies. 
However, Councils often voice concern about the number o f directives and the degree 
of oversight. The examples in section 1.4 illustrate some of the cases where Councils 
consider the directives excessive interference. At the local level, local government 
functionaries observe and have to do their work with an awareness of the growing 
resentment of this form o f central control. This kind of tension is important for my 
discussion in two ways. One is that Government monitoring of local institutions is one 
way of ensuring that they perform their duties effectively. Ineffectiveness on 
Government’s part may result in underperforming local institutions. The second is 
that if monitoring indeed results in interference, then Councils may lose local 
autonomy while also becoming upwardly accountable i.e. not worrying much about 
local accountability. Again, the example of budget approval processes in Zimbabwe 
reflects this dilemma. Key informants in the Provincial Local Government Offices 
(Provincial Local Government and Housing Office, PLGHO and Department of 
Physical Planning and Housing, DPPH) in Solwezi46 observed that local authorities at 
times just listen to advice without following through on the advice given (Interviews, 
February 3rd 2005). This was surprising to the officials and was given as a reason 
behind weak performance by some Councils in the Province. The suggestion was that 
one of the roles of the Province is to support Councils in understanding Government 
policies. Councils that do not following government policies will be considered to be 
failing in their duties. The impression this view creates is that policy formulation 
excludes Council resolutions and activities. Only policies from central government 
are treated with respect rather than what Councils come up with.
An interview with a provincial employee of the Ministry o f Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development in Mashonaland East (Zimbabwe) also raised similar 
concerns about the relationship between the Province and Councils (Interview, 27th
46 The capital o f  North Western Province (Zambia).
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May 2004). The informant’s observation was that staff members in the Ministry at 
Pro vincial and District level were finding it difficult to monitor Councils. In Zambian 
in becoming more assertive and adopting policy-making as practice, Councils are 
taking more responsibility for policy outcomes and implementation. This implies that 
central government (from District up) has to find new ways of interacting with 
Councils. In Zimbabwe, the changes are attributed to fear o f political reprisals and 
Council claims to autonomy. In both cases, Councils are perceived by central 
government not to be listening to advice as they used to. The same Zimbabwean 
official asserted that Ministry staff often end up doing things they ordinarily asked 
Councils to do as monitoring Councils involves making and following up politically 
sensitive decisions (Interview, 27th May 2004).
In both countries, another reason for the disillusionment amongst sub-national local 
government staff relates to the time lapse between reports being made and the 
Ministry taking action. The delays are creating two sets o f problems. First, is that time 
lapses result in lost opportunities on the part of Council and second is demoralization. 
The Zambian key informants referred to above also felt that the flow of information 
on national development processes was getting patchy from the centre forcing them to 
rely more on Councils than on the centre. Essentially, they felt cut out o f the 
communication channel putting them in an awkward position. Ordinarily, they felt 
that they should be more knowledgeable than the local level structures, to which they 
were now resorting for information. This brings the relevance o f the provincial tier of 
local government into question. Makombe (1993) raised similar issues in the case of 
Zimbabwe. Apart from the communication dimension, the cost of maintaining a 
provincial tier of local government has also been discussed in Zimbabwe. This debate 
has proceeded alongside the one on the need to sort out District level overlaps.
RDCCBP facilitators who regularly visited Districts identified problems early and 
facilitated solutions. The situation now is different as only Local Government officials 
monitor Councils. The discontinuation of the facilitation model and its perceived 
replacement with policing often involving politicians has caused some centre-local 
friction. Zimbabwean Councils perceive the monitoring system as having become too 
political. Citing frequent invoking of Ministerial powers, key informants argued that 
this distorts relations and under the circumstances, the Ministry has found itself
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frequently descending to the District directly or using Commissions of Inquiry to 
obtain information or correct anomalies. However, the Ministry o f Local Government, 
like other government organisations in Zimbabwe faces resource constraints, making 
it only able to monitor Councils infrequently (Interview with Ministry official, 14th 
July 2004). One of the major challenges raised in the interviews was that Councilors 
were unable to administer Wards effectively let alone monitor Council executives. 
Except Ward 7 in Seke/Manyame, none of the other Wards where the survey was 
conducted in Zimbabwe have decentralised Ward structures. The perceived Ministry 
interference will likely continue until Ward and Council administration improve. 
Councilor capacity was cited as the limiting factor. Since Councilors come through 
political parties addressing this challenge may require involving political parties, 
which is a far-reaching change in the political cultures of the two countries.
Box 3: Overlapping Ministry and Council functions
Some sector Ministry functions and staff are also seen as interfering with Council and Councilor 
functions through their sub-District staff and activities. An advertisement for Ward Coordinators placed 
in The H erald  o f August 25th 2005 by the Ministry o f  W omen’s Affairs, Gender and Community 
Development illustrates this point reasonably well. The functions o f  the position were given as follows;
■ Facilitate communication in the Ward
■ Identify needs o f  the community
■ Sensitize communities on gender issues
■ Collect, keep and update records
■ Mobilize communities fo r  the establishment o f  income generating projects
■ Mobilize women to form and maintain Village Banks and Clubs
■ Mobilize communities fo r  agro-industries and conservation
■ Mobilize communities fo r  non-formal education
■ Monitor and evaluate activities at Village and W ard level
■ Network with government departments, NGOs and local leadership, and
■ Coordinate Village level activities o f  NGO and other development organisations.
The functions in italics constitute those where Councils are legally expected to take a lead in 
accordance with their mandate. Assigning these functions to an employee in a sector Ministry creates 
overlaps between Councilors and sector Ministry staff.
Source: The Herald, August 25th 2005.
The challenge is more with ‘political Ministries’ e.g. Youth Development and 
Women’s Affairs than technical ones like say Agriculture. This is because Ministry 
staff performs Councillor-like functions. In the process, unsophisticated and 
unsalaried Councilors are pitted against civil servants line-managed outside Council 
and relatively well-resourced in terms of logistical support. The level of resources 
available for supporting participatory processes and the different cadres deployed to
perform this function creates an environment, which at once presents opportunities 
while also creating avoidable duplication.
5.4.2. Zimbabwean local governance structures and comparison with Zambia
Table 9 shows the District level policy-making and development management 
structures in Zimbabwe. These constitute the framework for sub-national governance 
as they define the institutional relationships and contexts for decision-making. A row 
is added to show provincial structures, which mainly act as a support tier. Effective 
communication requires support in terms of traditions of organisational interaction as 
discussed above in relation to the Ministries of Local Government in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia. Information generation, processing, storage and dissemination by 
organisations working with Councils and actual implementation o f programmes 
complement such traditions. This section discusses some of the differences using the 
existing structures to draw out issues that affect participation.
Table 9: Local government structures in Zimbabwe
Level. Policy-Making Bodies. Council-linked Advisory 
Structures.
Non-Council Advisory 
Structures.
Province. Provincial Council 
(Chaired by Governor) 
made up o f  Chairpersons 
o f Councils in Province 
plus ruling party  Chair.
Provincial D evelopm ent 
Committee chaired by 
Provincial Administrator. 
NGOs and Private Sector 
usually attend by 
invitation.
District. Full Council (Chaired by 
a Council Chair)47.
Council Committees made up 
o f Councilors with technical 
support from Heads o f  Council 
Departments (Staff).
48Rural District 
Development Committee 
(RDDC) chaired by the 
District Administrator. 
NGOs and Private Sector 
usually attend on 
invitation.
Ward. 49Ward Assembly 
(Chaired by a Headman).
5UWard Development 
Committee chaired by Ward 
Councilor.
Government Extension 
staff and NGO Programme 
staff at this level.Village. Village Assembly 
(Chaired by Village 
Head).
Village Development 
Committee chaired by Village 
Head.
Source; Based on Author’s understanding o f legislation and practice.
47This was one principal focus o f  Zimbabwe’s RDCCBP (with some attention to the RDDC) to enable 
reduce role o f  government at District and Province as Councils’ performance improved.
48 Council Committees (supported by Heads o f Departments) overlap in terms o f  advising Council with 
the RDDC. Councils with adequate staff the technical advice given by RDDC members may not be 
needed. But not all Councils are at this stage in the two countries.
49 Assemblies not there before 2000, there were Development Committees (W ADCOs/VIDCOs) 
chaired by elected officials. Though sharing similar acronyms current WADCOs/VIDCOs are different.
50 Councils do not have technical staff at this level. That gap is occupied by government staff.
Zim babw ean and Zam bian system s differ in four ways. These differences reflect some 
institutional contradictions (see Engberg-Pedersen 1997; M baku 2004). In Zam bia 
M Ps, sit in Council. The DA and DC chair the Com m ittees in Z im babw e and Zam bia 
respectively. Chiefs sit in Council in Zim babwe, but are represented in Zam bia. A  
Governor, who is a political appointee, heads the Province while a Perm anent 
Secretary, a civil servant, heads the Province in Z im babw e and Zam bia respectively.
The inclusion of MPs in Full Council (in Zambia) brings the national and District 
policy-making spaces and policy-makers in contact enabling timely communication. 
This may explain why Provincial local government staff felt Councils were often 
more informed than them. Zimbabwe’s case is different as political hierarchies are 
retained. Second, the Zambian District Commissioner (DC) reports to the President’s 
Office whereas the Zimbabwean District Administrator (DA) is a Ministry of Local 
Government official. The DC appears to have a politically stronger mandate and store 
of influence than the DA. These two chair the Development Coordination Committees 
(DDCC in Zambia and RDDC in Zimbabwe).
Box 4: Functions of the RDDC (Zimbabwe) and DDCC (Zambia)
DDCC: Zambia
■ Be a dialogue & development
coordination forum between Council, 
line departments, donors and NGOs.
■ Receive project proposals from
development organisations in the area.
■ On request, recommend feasibility 
studies for projects accessing 
discretionary finance e.g. Constituency 
Development Fund.
■ Receive financial reports on such
(above) projects from Council.
■ Consolidate draft plans for Council
consideration and adoption.
■ Facilitate and coordinate implementation 
o f development at District level.
■ Receive project reports from members.
■ Monitor and coordinate sub-District 
planning & ensuring reports reach 
Council.
■ Evaluate projects and review District 
Development Plans.
Source; Adapted from the RDC Act (Cap Source; Government of Zambia 1995:2 and 
29:13, section 60:5a-e) 1996._______________Government of Zambia & PDA 1993.______
RDDC Zimbabwe:
■ Consider Ward plans submitted to it.
■ Make recommendations on matters to be 
included in Annual or other Long-term 
Plans o f Council.
■ Prepare Annual District Plan for Council 
approval.
■ On Council instruction, investigate 
implementation o f  Annual and other 
Plans o f Council.
■ Exercise other Council-assigned 
functions in relation to the Annual and 
other Council Plans.
However, Cabinet Circular Number 1 indicates that DDCCs are chaired by Council 
Secretaries (rural) or Town Clerks (urban) with the Director of Planning (urban) or 
District Planning Officer (rural) as Secretary (Government of Zambia 1995). 
Zimbabwe’s DA chairs the RDDC as stipulated in the RDC Act. The Committees 
perform practically similar functions. However, concerning policies establishing 
them, the Zimbabwean one emphasizes an advisory role frequently refers to Council 
taking a lead in terms of instructing or requesting the Committee to offer specific 
services. The RDC Act emphasizes Council’s use of the Committee as a pool of 
consultants. On the other hand, Zambia defines the Committee as a forum but assigns 
more managerial than consultative functions and powers e.g. receiving project 
proposals, Council financial reports, monitoring sub-District planning and ensuring 
that reports reach Council (Ibid). Zambian policy assigns considerable power to the 
forum. Besides the RDC Act, there are no other specific guidelines for the RDDC.
From the above, it is fair to say that in law the RDDC is dependent on the strength 
and leadership of Council. It is possible to argue that there is a contradiction in that 
the client (Council) does not chair their (RDDC) processes. Zambia’s defining of the 
DDCC as a forum and stipulating that Council is chair theoretically addresses the 
Zimbabwean problem. However, in practice, the DC and not Council Secretary chair 
the DDCC. Key informants noted that the DC has the necessary legitimacy to convene 
the forum with Council deputising. The Local Government Association of Zambia 
and other stakeholders who took part in a Lusaka brainstorm session on ADCs argued 
for the policy position to ensure Councils take charge o f development processes in 
their areas (see Government of Zambia and ODA 1993).
The argument was that the position of DC overshadows Council and is therefore 
unnecessary. A focus discussion with senior Kasempa Council staff members 
confirmed the existence of tensions between the offices of the DC and that of Council 
Secretary on matters of leading development (Focus Discussion, 8th February 2005). 
As DDCC head, the DC coordinates the development process. The participation of a 
broader membership encompassing NGOs and all government organisations at 
District level bestows considerable power and control on the DC. The DDCC 
discusses and makes recommendations on technical and practical issues in more detail
than Council does. This materially shifts the planning function from the office of the 
Council Secretary to that of the DC.
The question of who is or should be ‘boss’ of the District is a critical one in the two 
countries. It has a bearing on communication and the effectiveness of the structures in 
their consultative form (Zimbabwe) or their managerial role (Zambia). In Zimbabwe, 
the lack of capacity at Council level is often given as justification for having support 
structures. Numbers o f staff and skills are often cited. In both Zimbabwean study 
Districts central government employees far outnumber Council staff and government 
plays a key role in coordinating how its departments and Ministries work with 
Council. One important question is how Councils can increasingly become the leader 
in relevant processes. In both countries, it is unlikely that legislated transfers of 
central government functions to Councils will proceed, any faster than recently. The 
question is therefore how, not whether Councils make the best o f the limited powers 
that they have vis-a-vis central government. Tendler’s (1997) work based on Brazil, 
where the state successfully implemented programs with local government in a lead 
role, demonstrates possibilities worth exploring in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the 
two countries, Councils appear to explain their weak performance on disabling centre- 
local relations. While legitimate, concern with centre-local relations ignores the 
reality of weak horizontal coordination, which is within the reach of Councils.
A fundamental question is whether forums outside Council duplicate Council ones. 
Do they act as counter-attractions that distract Council capacity development and 
functioning? How do they work in ways that ensure that they transfer their capacities 
to Council while also tapping Council capacities? Should they cease and if so why? 
The perception amongst Council and Local Government Association informants is 
that the structures duplicate Council ones. One delegate at a land administration 
workshop that I facilitated in February 2003 observed that some o f the existing 
structures (for land administration in that case) had too many members to be effective 
(Workshop 4th February 2003). He dramatized this by equating it to decision-making 
by fans at a soccer match. Coupled with overlaps and tensions between technical and 
political players (the latter mainly Councilors) the institutional environment becomes 
difficult for promoters of participation. With Councilors acquiring more and better 
functional competencies through exposure and training (especially those with more
than one term), the gap between Councilors and some sub-District government staff 
might be closing51. However, as noted above, Councils have left a sub-District 
staffing gap in which central government is entrenched. A relevant question becomes 
whether Councilors should double up as policy makers in Council and implementers 
at Ward level. Answers may lie in Councilor capacities vis-a-vis government staff or 
by looking at organisational structures. Regarding the latter, suggestions in Zimbabwe 
at some point were for all District government staff to fall under Council (GRZ 1996). 
The competency gap between Councilors and sub-District government staff is 
narrowing in part due to loss of experienced staff. As an example, a District delegate 
at a land dialogue52 told the meeting that the calibre o f some agricultural extension 
staff was below the local farmers’ knowledge (Land Dialogue, October 14-15th 2004, 
Mutare). Other delegates including senior Ministry o f Agriculture officials noted that 
this was because of the brain drain at a time when the demand for staff was expanding 
(with the land reform). The Ministry deploys inexperienced and inadequately trained 
staff unable to advise effectively. As such, the overstatement of the competency gap 
between Councilors and technical staff perpetuates the overlap.
The third difference relates to the role of traditional leaders. Chiefs in Zimbabwe sit in 
Council while in Zambia chiefs nominate a representative to sit in Council on their 
behalf. The traditional leadership and elected systems in Zimbabwe are therefore 
highly integrated. The Ward/Village Assemblies are presided over by traditional 
leaders. However, although they are integrated, traditional leaders and Councilors are 
managed differently in Zimbabwe. Chiefs receive monthly allowances from central 
government. Chieftainships, numbering about 264 (Hlatshwayo 1998) with about 195 
substantive Chiefs in 2005 (Interview with Ministry o f Local Government, 13th 
January 2005) receive at least 10 times a Councilor’s sitting allowance. Since 2003, 
Chiefs are entitled to a government car loan and home improvement support (water, 
road infrastructure, housing, electricity etc). At District level, traditional leaders are 
managed by the DA’s Office. The issues perks and reporting formalities have often 
created conflicts. Some of the conflicts are played out in the field where Councilors
51 Community HIV and AIDS work and Participatory Research and Extension methods (in agriculture) 
used by AIDS Service Organisations and other development organisations employ local people’s skills 
to facilitate development.
52 Convened by the Ministry o f  Lands, Land Reform and Rural Resettlement at Rowa Training Centre 
(outside Mutare).
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are outnumbered (see Box 5 and Table 14). Plan International and Mutare RDC have 
partnered to address some of these challenges by supporting joint sessions through a 
District Assembly. This Assembly is neither a part o f the local government system nor 
is it in other Districts o f the country.
Box 5: Participation in areas with tense relations amongst community leaders
In the 2001, local government elections ZANU PF deployed a strategy o f  using War Veterans and other 
party cadres considered ‘strong’ enough to stand against the opposition. While there was internal 
dissent in the party members compromised in acknowledgement o f  the threat posed by the Movement 
for Democratic Change. In both Mutare and Seke/Manyame, this process o f  bringing War Veterans 
into Council was highly successful. On the ground however, the War Veterans’ campaign trails 
resurfaced conflicts with traditional leaders partly a legacy o f  the liberation struggle where traditional 
leaders were seen as collaborators with the oppressors. Related was also the general unpopularity o f  
War Veterans because o f  images o f  being violent and also because at the time they had benefited from 
the War Victims’ Compensation Fund (1996-8), pay-outs to War Veterans, Health Insurance and 
Pension Scheme (1997) and the land reform. Because o f  this element o f  grievance against War 
Veterans, local relations between elected officials and traditional leaders were bad. Mutare Rural 
District Council had also received requests for support from NGOs and other development actors on 
tensions amongst community leaders. A lso through its orientation programmes on the Traditional 
Leaders Act done with SEDAP support, the issue o f  conflicts and tensions had come up as frustrating 
development.
Council and Plan International, together with other development organisations agreed to set up a 
District Assembly. Plan International funded the Assembly, which aims to create a conducive 
environment. This was pursued through holding annual dialogue sessions (two-day workshops outside 
the District) where the roles o f  the different players were explored, relationships ironed out and 
collaborative strategies developed. The active support o f  Council, Plan International and other 
development organisations particularly Government Departments acted to deepen mutual 
understanding and cooperation. On the ground, the relations have improved. In an interview with 
Headman Mafararikwa and all Councilors in the study Wards, reference was made to the District 
Assembly as having helped to resolve tensions and remove local level polarization. At the height o f  the 
polarization ordinary people were finding it difficult to attend public meetings, interface with NGOs 
and other development activities as ‘camps’ had emerged. Tensions between or amongst organisations 
or community leaders can be a powerful basis for social exclusion (inclusion) based on alignment 
(perceived or actual).
Source: Interviews with CEO, Councilors, traditional leaders and Plan International.
The fourth difference is that at provincial level in Zimbabwe a Governor is in charge 
while in Zambia there is a Provincial Secretary. The Zimbabwean Governor is a 
Presidential or political appointee and has Ministerial status. However, lack of a 
budget and the small size of the Governor’s Office in terms of staff numbers have 
reduced its effectiveness (see Makombe 1993). Councils communicate with their 
Ministry through the DA/DC structure, which in turn links into the provincial local 
government offices. Often the Governor and the Provincial Secretary are not 
involved, as the principal audience is the Ministry of Local Government. The 
Province rarely acts as a distinct stand-alone planning and development management
sphere in both countries. It is constrained by lack of a development budget, the 
existing structures and weak communication channels (see Government of Zimbabwe 
1994b). Although politically omnipresent in Zimbabwe, the development 
management reality is less reflective of the power of the Governor.
In summary, the local governance structures in the two countries have four clusters of 
key players. These are Councils (with internal structures), central government 
(different departments and Ministries), traditional leaders and NGOs. The last 
category has no legislated place in the structures but because of the existence o f a 
number of NGOs and donors, Zambia specifically provides for them in the 
development forums (Committees). They also play a part by providing development 
resources but also burdening or stressing the system through placing demands for 
information, coordination needs and general support. Zimbabwe and Zambia do not 
differ significantly in regarding the structures provided for inter-organisational 
interaction. The above analysis has looked at this using the Council as a point of 
reference. Some of the questions that the analysis has raised include whether there is 
(or should be) a ‘District boss’ and whether non-Council structures duplicate Council 
processes. Answers to these questions are both affirmative and negative with 
qualifications based on the evidence gathered. Suffice to observe that the operating 
environment determines inter-organisational interaction. Overlaps cited between or 
amongst organisational structures at the District level, help but can hinder 
participation. Questions raised about the Zimbabwean and Zambian local governance 
structures reflect existing challenges i.e. the areas where action to institutionalise 
participation is needed. I also presented one case where some action was taken to 
address inter-organisational challenges for the better o f participation (the Mutate 
District Assembly), which although not backed by statutes, is an informal space where 
positive inter-organisational interaction is occurring.
5.5. Facilitating participation: the role of Councils
In this section I discuss Council level avenues for participation. Council level
accountability mechanisms, practical support towards development and accessibility 
of records by the public form the focus of this part o f the section. I then move to the 
role of Council in relation to other players particularly NGOs to explore how the 
partnerships work to advance participation.
5.5.1. Council as spaces for participation
The quality and participatoriness of decision-making processes in individual 
organisations remain limited (see Chatiza 2003; Conyers 2003). This is true o f many 
public organisations (see Thompson 1995) and the study confirmed challenges in 
Councils as well. The study noted examples of good practice and bad practice as well 
as indifference. Decision-making mechanisms are generally inaccessible in physical 
and conceptual terms. There is little information about decisions, and few means of 
analysis to allow us to understand them fully. Council minutes and reports are rarely 
published though relevant legislation formally allows access.
The public is not invited to Council meetings although the law provides for public 
attendance and access to minutes. Dates and agendas are rarely publicised and the 
way in which the meetings are held does not facilitate public access. It is fair to 
conclude that the public is also generally unaware of how to contribute to Council 
business and Councils equally lack the traditions, capacities and inclination to 
facilitate such participation (see World Bank 2002). The nature and kind o f possible 
public contributions are not detailed in the legislation neither is it compulsory that 
Councils facilitate participation in their business. In effect, the public does not 
exercise its right to participate in Council processes.
The reality in both Zimbabwe and Zambia is that Councils and other organisations 
lack the financial and technical capacity to facilitate consultations or engagement of 
the public. While this might be attributed to the limited culture of public probity 
which also afflicts central government processes it is important to note that no public 
institution is tasked with the role of ensuring public participation. In the event, no 
specific public institution sees this as its core business on the basis of which it is 
evaluated. As the World Bank (2002) notes some public officials in local authorities 
view the public as a nuisance. On the other hand, the Zimbabwean public is 
sometimes accused by those working in Councils of being ill-prepared to engage 
Councils constructively. According to the Chipinge Town Council Secretary, local 
Residents Associations are often unable to draw the line between genuinely holding 
Councils to account and interfering in local Council affairs (Interview, 1st September 
2004). At a NEPAD local government consultative meeting in Harare, the Town
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Clerk for Gweru expressed a similar view with regards to NGO practitioners 
(Workshop, 21-23rd July 2003). In expressing such views, Council officials seem to 
consider participation would be possible without interference, which imposes 
challenges enhancing participation particularly in terms o f demanding accountability.
5.5.2 Resident/citizen demands for accountability as participation
A businessperson at Kasempa town narrated attempts his Association made to seek 
Council accountability. As members of a local Market Association where Council 
collects funds, they raised complaints about inadequate services (refuse collection, 
water and sanitation). Council responded with threats o f license withdrawal. The 
Association remained adamant and considered using political pressure including 
through local MP, which forced Council retreat (Interview 8th February 2005).
In Mutare and Seke/Manyame, the research revealed that Councils often received 
written complaints. These were not always dealt with in a systematic manner and few 
people know enough of this mechanism. For example, in one case I observed that a 
community had complained about a Councilor for not addressing problems with their 
boreholes but nothing had been done. This suggests a second strategy, not 
intimidation but indifference to complaints. More generally, the problem observed 
was that Councils have no structured system of responding to, or encouraging 
communication from the public about their concerns.
However, cases o f good practice exist where complaints systems are in place and 
operating reasonably well. Interviews with the Council Chair and the Chief Executive 
Officer of Mutare, clarified that there were procedures for responding to public 
complaints. Most of the written communication was about Councilors either being 
corrupt, ineffective or inactive. Both interviewees explained that the Council Chair 
convened meetings with affected Councilors encouraging them to address issues 
raised without intimidating complainants. It seems that the letters and public 
comments were not ignored, or at least not routinely. I attended two Ward meetings in 
Seke/Manyame called on the back of written community complaints. The anonymous 
letter is another instrument that is sometimes used in Seke/Manyame to advise the 
Council of Ward problems, which the Council might not be aware of. In Chapter 6, I 
discuss how villagers directly approach development organisations, which shows that
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while letter-writing may be low other methods are being used. The challenge remains 
that Councils do not seem to have structured response mechanisms.
5.5.3. Requesting support as a space for interfacing with Councils
The procedure for seeking project assistance from Council affects participation and 
reflects the extent of interaction between Councils and residents. The case o f Mutare 
is used here but some of the procedures are similar to those used in Seke/Manyame. 
The process starts at community/Village level. The Village Head liaises with the local 
Councilor who in turn compiles and submits a Motion Paper to Council. The Motion 
Paper is forwarded to the relevant committee o f Council for deliberation and 
recommendation to Full Council. Presently, in Mutare the options for support are 
mainly donor organisations53 and NGOs with the response being conveyed through 
full Council then the traditional leadership institution or representative of a relevant 
group. Requests for public transport services are made directly to private operators 
through the Ward Councilor on Council stationery. Once the transport operator 
agrees to take up a route, a letter o f recommendation is written to Council for 
adoption. Other examples reviewed from Council minutes include the following:
1. Through a Motion Number R3/99 Chigodora Ward made a request to have a road (Mt 
Dangare-Burma Valley) rehabilitated. Council responded saying that the amount of 
money (levies) collected from the Ward was insufficient for the project. The motion 
was submitted in January and the reply came in March o f the same year. The levies paid 
constituted only 2% of the amount required (Mutare Rural District Council 1999). 
Council advised the community that the road had been put on top priority under the 
District Development Fund Rural Road Programme and set aside ZW$24 000 for 
maintenance. However, the community had to pay up their levies before Council could 
provide assistance.
2. The same principle was applied to another road rehabilitation request from Ward 25; 
Mabvengwa School access (Mutare RDC 200154) as the community only had a balance 
of 22% of total project cost in their Ward account.
3. In cases where individuals or groups seek assistance from donors or NGOs without 
Council knowledge they are advised to go through their Councilor and to ensure that the 
organisations they are approaching have been vetted. A Mr. Mangezi o f Ward 5 made a 
request, on behalf of his community for support with a footbridge across Sakubva River.
A communication from Council dated August 4th 2003 reads in part ‘... all development 
projects in the Ward are coordinated through the Ward Councilor and that all donors 
should be vetted by government before they participate in any development activities’.
53 Note however in common grassroots usage donors and NGOs are perceived as the same and the term 
used is often ‘ VemadonoP (Shona for those from the donors).
54 Minutes o f  an RDDC Meeting No. 1 o f  2001.
4. The Taga community in Ward 15 in Seke/Manyame used the letter method through 
their Councilor to request for water and road infrastructure in their area. Council did not 
formally acknowledge receipt o f the request. However, they were able to meet Council 
at a budget consultation meeting as they raised objections to the 2004 Council budget. 
Council acknowledged that they had received their request, was unable to meet their 
needs but that rates and levies would still be collected (FGD, 15th January 2005).
As shown above and discussed earlier, Councils use a variety of methods to deal with 
requests for assistance. Records of written requests were however more in Mutare 
than in Seke/Manyame. Mutare RDC in some cases also provides support for project 
applications to outside organisations initiated by groups. The mix of responses that 
Councils use as shown above assist us in understanding the methods of 
institutionalising participation. For instance linking Council assistance to residents’ 
responsibility to contribute to Council revenue may strengthen the relationship 
between the two. Residents become more aware of the operational realities within 
which services are provided. However, refusal to link the two as in the 
Seke/Manyame case may reinforce the perception that Councils are self-serving. 
Mutare RDC’s promotion of “pay-up to get service” facilitates development from 
own resources. Building and applying that culture in allocating development 
resources, including NGO supported interventions, encourages residents to meet their 
obligations and own development processes. That way support from and by non- 
Council sources does not undermine Council processes.
However, questions arise where local resources might never be enough (see Berner 
and Phillips 2005; Schneider and Baquero 2006) or where communities are too poor. 
The research established that decentralised information management systems are not 
in place. Communities rarely know their potential or actual contribution to 
development. Councils may add value to their work and that of other development 
organisations. For instance, timely provision of data on the local poverty context may 
save NGOs the resources they usually invest in baseline and feasibility studies. Such 
resource savings may enable NGOs and other actors to do more.
5.5.4. Poor means: (im)possibilities of Council development support
The functions of Councils are defined in relevant legislation in both countries. 
Because of the shared colonial history, 64 functions are scheduled in the relevant Acts
of Parliament in both countries. The Government of Zambia (2002:1) defines the
objective of Councils as:
‘...to provide services as stipulated in Section 61 of the Local Government Act 
Cap 281 .... However, some o f the functions have been transferred like water and 
sanitation from Councils to commercial utilities and maintenance of urban roads 
is being funded by the National Roads Board o f which most o f the money is paid 
directly to contractors.. . ’.
The mission statement o f Mutare Rural District Council also captures the essential
functions of Zimbabwean Councils. It (mission statement) is as follows:
‘...to diligently provide services to the Council inhabitants through planning, 
controlling and regulating development with a view to facilitate the 
improvement of their social and economic standards of living. Council also 
wishes to cooperate with central government, non-governmental organisations in 
providing essential services such as health, education, roads etc to the people of 
Mutare District. Account for public funds efficiently and transparently. To be the 
link between central government and the people, and to assist central 
government in their administration o f education services’ (Mutare RDC 2004).
Mutare RDC has broken down its mission into seven key areas (Box 6) which are still 
in keeping with its mandate as provided for in the Rural District Councils Act. The
quote from the Government of 
Zambia and the Mutare RDC 
mission statement show the 
general framework within which 
Councils provide services. The 
focus (aim) for the service
provision is clarified in the
mission statement. The transfer
of certain legislated functions from Councils to other organisations and the 
cooperation (with other organisations) referred to in the Mutare mission statement 
confirm that Councils’ responsibilities are now performed alongside or completely by 
others. These others may be brought in by central government or invited by Council.
Here I highlight some of the cases of overlap in performance o f tasks or outright
transfer of functions from Council. Such processes may act to curtail Council 
effectiveness but may also ensure service delivery. The complaints about water-points 
above (Box 2) constitute an example of challenges arising from the transfer of 
Council functions to organisations not directly accountable to Council but to central 
government. First, transfers o f functions do not proceed through any change of the 
enabling legislation. As such, the responsibility to plan and provide the services
Box 6: Key Council functions
1. Spearheading economic development.
2. Providing required services to Mutare (rural) residents.
3. Collect revenue due to council in order to sustain the 
development o f  the District.
4. Maintaining council roads.
5. Licensing all trading activities in the District.
6. Participating in the local governance o f  the District.
7. Maintaining proper accounts o f  council.
Source; Mutare RDC, 2004 (Poster).
remains a Council one. Councils in both countries find it difficult to exert their 
influence on the planning, delivery and sustenance of the transferred services. 
Residents keep complaining to through their Councilors. Second, the transfers are 
largely because Councils lack financial resources to provide services. Table 10 
presents the situation for Kasempa compared with the national picture.
Table 10: Expenditure trends 2000-2002 National versus Kasempa Council
District/General Rate Fund
% 2000. % 2001. % 2002.
Item. National. Kasempa. National. Kasempa. National. Kasempa.
Personnel Costs. 61. 81. 47. 86. 53. 86.
Service Provision. 10. 6. 16. 4. 10. 4.
Other Expenses. 29. 13. 37. 10. 37. 10.
T o ta ls . 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
Source; Government of Zambia (2001 and 2002).
For each line on the General Rate Fund, Kasempa’s performance was worse than the 
national average for all three years. Its personnel costs consistently took up above 
81% of the Fund whereas the national highest was 61% in 2000. Such expenditure 
heavily skewed towards personnel costs naturally left meager resources for service 
provision and other expenses. According to the Council Secretary ‘...Council is 
financially limping’ (Interview 8th February 2005). However, even the national 
average (of 12%) reflects that service provision expenditure is low in all Councils in 
Zambia. Kasempa Council’s deep financial distress is shown in that, its staff salary 
arrears run into years. The highest in February 2005 was fifty (50) months for the 
Director of Works followed by the Deputy Planner at 40 months (Ibid). Senior 
Kasempa staff members thus operate in a difficult environment and it is possible to 
wonders for how much longer they can hold on. The question becomes; what is 
keeping them in the job? When I posed this question, the response was commitment. 
An interview in the Kasempa town suggested that at least for the Council Secretary 
free accommodation and upkeep at the Council Guest House was covering some of 
the core costs. For Mutare RDC salary, arrears have never occurred while for 
Seke/Manyame delays in payment have been experienced in recent years. The delayed 
salary payments extended at most 15 days beyond the scheduled pay day.
Salary arrears lead to reduced staff commitment to work, morale and public 
confidence. The Kasempa Market Association representative referred to above 
(section 5.5.2) highlighted that some business people are no longer keen to offer
services to Council fearing that they would not be paid. As such, residents’ 
confidence in Council is low. It is however important to observe that civil service 
conditions in Zambia, as in Zimbabwe are generally bad such that Council staff may 
be better off than civil servants in terms of access to non-salary benefits like land. 
This is what often then results in Councils retaining senior staff. Councils also lack 
capital and operational equipment, which is a major problem. Government grants do 
not show signs of improvement implying that the situation of Councils remains bleak. 
National figures for expenditure in service provision were not readily available for 
Zimbabwe. However, the Governor for Mashonaland East Province shed some light 
by observing that ‘...concern still exists that Councils are managing very limited 
projects with internally generated funds’ (Karimanzira55 2002:6; GRZ 2004). He also 
noted that external assistance was no longer forthcoming. GRZ (2004) highlighted the 
need to look at Council financing as a government-wide obligation to curb 
perceptions where other Ministries saw Councils as a Ministry o f Local Government 
responsibility.
Key informants also confirmed that Councils were receiving ever smaller grants from 
central government and support from donors. For instance in 2002 Rural District 
Councils did not receive any resources under the Public Sector Investment 
Programme (PSIP) a source of cheap finance for Councils in Zimbabwe (Interview, 
14th July 2004). Ministry of Local Government records indicate that in 2003 and 2004 
only 5 and 3 out of Councils respectively got funding under the PSIP (Interview with 
Ministry Official September 1st 2005). Resource disbursement towards service 
provision has dropped alongside the proportion of local revenue. The DA for Mutare 
referred to the situation as ‘milking a dying cow’ where Council residents are very 
poor (Interview 3rd June 2004). Others however observe that Councils are failing to 
collect available revenue. Tables 11 and 12 show the proportion o f local to total 
income i.e. including external grant income, for Mutare and Seke/Manyame for the
2001-2003 period. The data reflect the resource strain under which the Councils 
operate. Mutare reflects a relatively higher dependence on external sources than 
Seke/Manyame. Mutare shows a slight surge while Seke/Manyame has seen a slight
55 Governor for Mashonaland East Province’s speech at the 8th Provincial Review Meeting.
decline in local revenue contribution to overall budget partly explained by loss of unit 
tax from farmland, which has recently changed hands.
Table 11: Mutare RDC, local as percentage of total revenue (in ZWD ‘000’)
R evenue type. 2001. 2002. 2003.
ZW D’000 % ZWD’000 % ZWD’000 %
Local. 16 187 25. 42 648 25.4. 130 872 29.
External 48 582 75. 125 166 74.6. 323 653 71.
Total. 64 749 100. 167 814 100. 454 535 100.
Source; Mutare RDC 2004.
Table 12: Seke/Manyame, local as percentage of total revenue (ZWD 000’)
R evenue type. 2001. 2002. 2003.
ZWD’000 % ZWD’000 % ZWD’000 %
Local. 23 564 53.6. 171 230 46.5. 205 045. 50.8.
External 20 434 46.4. 197 125 53.5. 198 862 49.2.
Total. 43 998 100. 368 355 100. 403 907 100.
Source; Seke/Manyame RDC, 2004.
The Mutare RDC Treasurer indicated that most o f the local revenue was spent on 
administrative expenses like salaries and maintenance (Interview 18th June 2005). 
Mutare links Ward-based development by ploughing back 70% of development levy 
collected from households towards a development activity approved by the Ward 
Assembly. However, the yields from such local sources are inadequate for the service 
demands placed upon Councils (see section 5.5.3). Apart from the effects of poverty 
on Councils’ local revenue streams, delays in grant disbursement, inflation induced 
budget overruns and upheavals (political and economic), which have reduced revenue 
collection also affect budget performance. Since 2000, changes in Council revenue 
streams have been observed. A Ministry of Local Government analysis o f 16 RDCs’ 
year 2000 budgets and 18 RDCs’ year 2001 income indicated that donor grants were 
29% (actual) compared to 24% for government grants in 2000 with the figures 
increasing for donors to 35% but dropping for government to 20% in 2001. Despite 
committing itself to 100% funding of transferred functions government has 
consistently fallen behind. For instance the City o f Gweru got 83% of its health 
entitlement in 1980/1 but this declined to 3% for the 1994-96 period before 
marginally climbing to 9% in 2001 and then dropping to 5% in 2003 (GRZ 2004:9). 
Donor and government resources have dropped to insignificant levels. The former are 
mainly funding humanitarian work through the UN system and NGOs. What is 
significant is that Government is aware of Councils’ resource challenges (Ibid). Table
13 shows local revenue and grant income shortfalls and surpluses for the year 2000. 
Except for the health grant where actual allocation was 36.9% more than the estimate, 
the state grant for the Capital Account was 21% below estimate while for the Roads 
and Works Account no allocation was made. On the local revenue side, the highest 
shortfall was for the Capital Account (89.2%) followed by 16.9% the Roads and 
Works Account, 16.5% for Odzi Township and 13.4% for the Health Account.
Table 13: Budget performance as at 31st July 2000, Mutare RDC
Account and budget lines. ZWD 000’ Budget 
Estimates.
ZWD 000’ Actual. Revenue 
(Shortfalls) and 
Surpluses.
Roads and Works Account.
1. Income; a) Local Revenue.
b) State Grant.
2. Expenditure.
3 477 2 889 (588) or 16.9%.
41 Grant income not 
disbursed
(41).
2 420 2928 (508) or 21% over 
expenditure.
Capital Account.
1. Income; a) Local Revenue.
b) State Grant.
2. Expenditure.
535 58 (477) or 89.2%.
100 79 (21) or 21%.
967 194 773.
Odzi Township Account.
1. Income; a) Local Revenue.
b) State Grant.
2. Expenditure.
425 355 (70) or 16.5%.
N/A N/A -
411 325 86.
Health Account.
1. Income; a) Local Revenue.
b) State Grant.
2. Expenditure.
232 201 (31) or 13.4%.
4 191 5737 1 546 or 36.9%.
3 973 5634 (1 661).
Source; Mutare RDC 2000 and own calculations.
Based on available evidence, it is safe to conclude that Councils are unable to provide 
meaningful services limiting opportunities for facilitating participation. The 
proportion of local revenue to grant income reflects challenges with local resource 
mobilization. Weak revenue affects Councils’ engagement with communities, which 
leaves other actors to perform functions that Councils should. In the process this 
creates a cycle of exclusion from residents/citizens’ livelihoods for Council. The 
resultant inter-organisational interaction becomes problematic for Council-based 
facilitation of participation. One way o f addressing the resource challenges is through 
NGO partnerships, discussed in the next sub-section. The situation of Kasempa 
Council reflects a paradox where Council attained level 5 in the ZAMSIF capacity 
and performance ladder entitling it to receive bigger grants while under-performing in
terms of local revenue generation. That it is possible for outsiders to see an institution 
as effective when locals are unhappy about the same institution raises questions about 
the models and sustainability of local governance systems in Zambia and Zimbabwe.
5.5.5. NGO presence: opportunities and challenges for participation
The study established that there were a number o f programme activities run by 
outside organisations in the three Districts. International and national NGOs like Care 
International, Plan International, CADEC, The Zimbabwe Red Cross, World Vision, 
Seke Home-Based Care and Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe have activities in 
the two Zimbabwean Districts. For Kasempa SNV Zambia, UNICEF, GTZ, KZF- 
IFAD and DCI were the main ones. These organisations are invited either by 
Government, individual Councils or communities. The study also observed a growing 
tendency for Councils to refer requests for assistance to NGOs. In Mutare, referring 
communities to NGOs has become a distinctive feature of Council policy. This was 
identified from an analysis of the documents provided on the management o f project 
requests. Box 7 shows one such case looked at closely.
Box 7: Handling project requests: the case of Ward 10, Mutare RDC
In 2003, the Councilor for Ward 10 submitted a motion to Council requesting support in exploiting an 
aquifer for irrigation purposes to address drought-induced food insecurity. The area identified has 
viable underground water resources but is in agro-ecological regions four and five. Rough technical 
details o f  the project were provided, which included electricity powered pumps, boreholes, water tanks 
and a 100 hectare irrigation scheme benefiting about 200 households.
Council acknowledged the viability o f  the water source and proceeded to suggest that the community 
needed the technical advice o f  AREX (the department responsible for agricultural research and 
extension) so that the total number o f  community gardens that could be established would be 
determined, the beneficiaries and a sketch map. Council further advised that its (policy) preference was 
for consolidated community gardens (CCGs). Despite changes to the project idea and the suggestion 
that the community needed to liaise with AREX Council was supportive o f  the initiative. There was 
thus agreement on the objectives (livelihood improvement) and confirmation o f  the need for the 
project.
Council promised to look for funding from NGOs, as they had no resources o f  their own. However, 
they were going to look for resources for the CCG i.e. fencing material, pipes and tanks.
Source; Official Letters, Mutare RDC, 2003.
Counter-reference amongst development organisations is an important way of 
ensuring services are delivered and that people’s identified needs are met. That this is 
happening in Mutare is a proxy indicator of good inter-organisational relations. It has
to be added though that the positive effects of counter-reference can be increased if 
organisations are more conscious of it and agree levels of support. I am guided in 
making this point by my basic knowledge of patient referral systems between medical 
institutions or professionals where certain minimum information is exchanged. As 
noted in Chapter 4, complementarity is largely based on relational awareness. 
However, basing counter-reference on an organisation’s inability to do their core 
business raises serious legitimacy and credibility problems. Loss o f confidence forces 
people to use alternative processes, which increasingly overshadow Councils and cuts 
them out of the development loop of provision, accountability and funding. In some 
of the reviewed documents, Councils advised communities to approach NGOs citing 
Council inability to meet their requests for support. In the case in Box 7 Council made 
suggestions about sources of funding and technical support. This reflects good 
practice that the research observed in both Zimbabwean Councils. Also giving a 
community the respect of a written response to a request is commendable. The AREX 
link-up could have been a Council responsibility i.e. Council opportunity to facilitate 
community-organisation interaction. Such counter-referral may cost Council its 
credibility as a development facilitator. It is likely that in future the community and 
Councilor may not bother approaching Council but instead approach other 
organisations directly. The change o f project idea from an irrigation scheme to 
consolidated community gardens (CCGs) and requesting for further community 
consultations could be interpreted as delaying tactics. Such a project re-design change 
may affect participation. In this instance, Council deliberately reinforced the parallel 
structures that weaken its position.
Box 2 presented Council and DDF-Water interface. Below I use three examples to 
show how inter-organisational interaction involving Councils and NGOs worked out. 
The first is a Mutare District the water sector, the other two are from Seke/Manyame.
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Box 8: Inter-organisational interaction at work: cases from the field
1. Council-DDF and three NGOs.
Mutare RDC implemented a CBM programme in 2003-4 in partnership with three NGOs and DDF- 
Water as the Government organisation with a mandate for the sector. The NGOs (Plan International, 
Catholic Development Commission-CADEC and the Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources- 
SAFIRE) funded training, tools and equipment as well as Council administrative costs. In an interview 
the District Head for DDF highlighted the project as one o f  the most successful interventions he had 
been involved in citing timely availability o f  resources and the effective coordination that Council was 
able to accomplish as key success factors (Interview 7th January 2005).
In one o f the project Wards (24, also a study Ward), CADEC worked closely with traditional leaders in 
the sanitation component o f  the same programme. In Nyamadzavo village the Village Head’s son was 
directly involved in facilitating the project (social mobilization, tracking project implementation and 
supervising distribution o f  building materials) on behalf o f  the Village Assembly. In a project-visit- 
cum-interview, a CADEC Officer indicated how use o f  traditional leaders in their component o f  the 
programme reduced pilfering o f  project materials and contributed to overall project performance 
(Interview 17th August 2005).
2. Council-DA’s Office and Farm Community Trust o f Zimbabwe.
As part o f  its programme activities the Farm Community Trust o f  Zimbabwe (FCTZ) a registered 
NGO, has been working to alleviate the negative effects o f  the land reform programme on Farm 
Workers. One such programme involved distribution o f  foodstuffs, clothing and household utensils. 
The distribution was implemented on the back o f  clearance by national and provincial authorities. In 
the second quarter o f  2004 the organisation had problems at one o f  its distribution centers in Ward 15 
o f Seke/Manyame where local communities under the leadership o f  ‘War Veterans’ demanded 
inclusion failing which they were threatening to forcibly take the consignment. A  report was made to 
the District Authorities who were not immediately able to help, as they were also unaware o f  the 
programme modalities. While the unwillingness to help may have been more a result o f  the sensitivities 
associated with helping Farm Workers (i.e. the political narrative that helping former commercial 
farmers and displaced employees was opposing land reform) than lack o f  involvement in the 
programme it is fair to conclude that;
a) FCTZ’s relations with the local community leaders appeared weak.
b) Its interface with District Authorities on the programme was also weak.
c) Consequent to the weak relations between FCTZ and the two local governance layers the 
participation o f  Farm Workers (FCTZ’s target group) was threatened.
d) The threats to FCTZ’s programme intricately combined the politicization o f  their target group and 
the institutional polarization around the post-2000 land reforms.
The intervention o f  the District Authorities eventually enabled successful implementation o f  the 
activities with modifications to the beneficiary targeting.
3. Council-DA’s Office and ZERO (Regional Environment Organisation).
ZERO identified and worked with farmer groups in Ward 18 Seke/Manyame, among other 
communities. The organisation distributed farm inputs in 2003 to groups based on a revolving loan 
fund model combining use o f  group savings and sale o f  the farm inputs to raise group loan capital to 
support income generating projects. In Village 4, a ZERO-supported group experienced losses due to 
the Village Head having allegedly misappropriated both funds and inputs. The organisation was neither 
able to recover the lost resources nor to resuscitate the group resulting the other five groups in the area 
subsequently collapsing. At the ward Meeting o f  26th May 2004, these allegations were given as one o f  
the reasons why the Village Head was being suspended. ZERO’S activities in the area had already 
reduced. One question this case raises relates to the extent to which NGOs can benefit existing 
institutional monitoring structures in this instance provided by Council and the D A ’s office to ensure 
the effectiveness o f  their programmes. To what extent would this reduce their costs o f  routine 
intervention monitoring? Equally critical is whether NGOs trust these structures (and vice versa)? A 
concern that can be raised from this regarding participation is the image created for this community and 
how ZERO may have inadvertently played a part in nurturing it by effectively engaging with other 
organisations.
Source: Fieldwork.
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The interfaces represented above show a number of spaces and levels of interaction 
pertinent to institutionalising participation. The first case shows a considerably strong 
relationship at both the District and sub-District levels despite the fact that the three 
NGOs were getting their funding from the international sphere. Case two shows 
interaction at the national and provincial levels and circumventing o f the District to go 
directly to the grassroots. Granted existing macro-level conflicts may have played a 
hand in the challenges the NGO faced it may also be noted that to involve all levels 
from national through grassroots may in fact be time consuming and expensive. I 
discussed this regarding the approval process for my study in Chapter 4. The 
questions raised on the third case are at the centre of this study. No conclusive 
answers exist except to refer to the partial evidence that seems to indicate the 
importance of District and sub-District organisational interface in dealing with issues 
of inclusion and exclusion.
In Kasempa, the support of UNICEF, SNV and KZF has enabled Council to 
implement a number o f programmes. UNICEF is working with Council on child- 
focused development while SNV has supported water and sanitation initiatives in the 
past and currently provides capacity building services. KZF is the implementing 
partner for a 6 year IFAD funded Forestry Resources Project, which was in its third 
year at the time of the study. The project is also supported with grants from the 
Government of Zambia, Development Cooperation Ireland and GTZ (Germany). The 
project aims to improve people’s livelihoods. It was introduced via the Province in 
2002 although actual implementation started in January 2003. The selection of 
working areas was done through the District Development Coordinating Committee.
Some of the NGOs operating in the two Zimbabwean Councils work based on 
partnerships with central government departments. In some instances, an NGO project 
establishes a distinct structure in which Council may only be a member. Some NGOs 
have principal partnerships with Ministries for programmes they then implement in a 
Council area. In such cases, it becomes the partnering Ministry with the responsibility 
to link up with Council to ensure that Council plans and policies are adhered to. In 
Mutare, Plan International assisted the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare’s 
Environmental Health Department with finances for their Malaria Control (spraying)
Programme in 2003 and 2004. In both years, the Department sprayed the same 
number o f Wards. A full Council meeting on 14th December 2004, Councilors 
quizzed Plan International over the exclusion of deserving areas. The Environmental 
Health Department’s District Head explained that they used information on hand like 
clinic admissions to prioritize since resources were inadequate to cover the whole 
District. Councilors remained unconvinced and cited corrupt practices by the 
Department’s staff. Council felt they should have been directly involved in the 
project.
Other NGOs e.g. KZF in Kasempa anchor Project Committees at Council. The rest of 
the KZF project structure starting at the grassroots level includes Village Resource 
Management Committees (VRMCs) and Producer Groups involved in actual natural 
resource extraction e.g. honey and craft producers. A cluster of villages in a 15 km 
radius establishes a Working Area Committee consisting of both VRMCs and 
Producer Groups. The communities included in the study had these producer groups. 
In the Kalombe, Kalima and Kima areas the Producer Groups were involved in craft 
and carpentry, honey production using modem bee-hives, reed-mat making and 
making tie n’ dye material from tree barks. Areas covered by Working Area 
Committees do not always coincide with Ward boundaries but the link is made 
through the District Forest Resource Management Committee at Council. This is 
made up of Council Heads of Departments, representatives of the Ministry of 
Community Development, the Zambia Wildlife Authority, Department of Agriculture 
and other relevant non-govemmental development organisations. Traditional leaders 
take part through their representatives who are members of the Working Area 
Committees. At the operational level, Council and the DDCC take part through the 
Area Development Committees. These structures are considered non-political 
planners of development based on identified needs and opportunities. The planning is 
based on information gathered through project-facilitated participatory analyses.
KZF’s roles include capacity building in community management of forestry 
resources and supporting sustainable income generating projects. There are 
components under the project which are sub-contracted e.g. feeder road rehabilitation, 
social infrastructure rehabilitation and rural credit facility management for the benefit 
o f Producer Groups. The rehabilitation of feeder roads is based on an assessment done
in 2004 and local contractors play a key part in this activity. The areas around the 
Kasempa town are not in the project. The three working areas were selected based on 
levels of nutrition, state of the roads, availability of forestry resources, proportion of 
single (female) headed households and poor economic activities. Areas with the worst 
indicators in terms o f these variables were targeted.
In both countries, it would seem that the partnerships between NGOs and Councils are 
mainly indirect. The study explored some of the reasons why this occurs. In the 
majority of cases, provincial and national NGOs negotiate their programmes and entry 
strategies with central government officials and only get into Council areas to 
implement. By the time they get to Councils, they already have rigid plans o f action 
and budgets. In other cases, direct community appeals to NGOs result in partnerships 
that initially circumvent Council. Even where the NGO-Govemment relations are 
entered into at District (e.g. the Environmental Health Programme in Mutare) Council 
appears a ‘junior partner’. NGO-Council relations remain weaker in comparison to the 
relations involving the NGO, the community and government extension staff. It is 
therefore often the case that a project relationship gets into government department 
and NGO reports before Council learns of it. To improve coordination, Mutare RDC 
extended a ‘standing’ invitation to all NGOs operating in the District to attend RDDC 
meetings (Minutes of RDDC meeting) at the start o f 2001.
Councils do not have sufficient staff to manage relationships with NGOs and to 
maintain updated records of NGO activities. Mutare and Seke/Manyame both have 
Engineers and Project Officers. Because these are essentially one-man teams unable 
to track NGO and Government activities in their areas. At field level, Councils rely on 
Councilors to mobilize communities and monitor development. This results in 
Councilors getting involved in activities that may be beyond their capacity while also 
the volume of work may become unwieldy. It becomes difficult to separate policy­
making and implementing roles of Councilors i.e. conflation of policy making and 
project implementation. Council thinness at sub-District level leaves room for NGO- 
Govemment interface more than with Council, which affects Council’s interaction 
with other development actors (Figure 1 Level 3 issues).
The research did not come across evidence o f regular NGO reporting or updating of 
Councils on their activities in the two countries. Analysis of District Development 
Committee minutes also indicated that NGOs do not attend these meetings regularly. 
It would appear therefore that NGO-Council partnerships are inadequately developed 
yet they could be an important basis for building Council planning, outreach and 
service provision capacities. Direct NGO-Council partnership cases however exist 
where NGOs seek out and develop them. NGOs exist in the three Districts, systems of 
counter-referring communities are in place and Council-NGO partnerships were 
observed e.g. in Mutare and Kasempa that sponsored opportunities for participation of 
different communities and development organisations. However, presence or absence 
of development organisations is a key aspect that presents challenges for participation. 
The Mutare-DDF Water case in Box 2 above touched on some of these.
What appears to be missing from a Council perspective is a detailing o f comparative
advantages and services that would attract NGOs to a Council area. While some
Councils in Zimbabwe have policies on how NGOs should operate, these seem to be
more of rules to be observed rather than benefits that an NGO can expect from
Council. Box 9 shows one example from Nyanga (Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe).
It is possible to conclude that in Zimbabwe at least, policies made in relation to
managing state-NGO relations are premised on a view that NGOs are generally up to
no good. Guidelines create a policing rather than a collaborative framework as they
detail what Council expects from NGOs. Areas like sources of funding, audited
statements, details of staff and future programme plans bring a security dimension.
The Government of Zimbabwe (Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social
Welfare) came up with an Operational Manual to guide the operations o f NGOs in the
humanitarian and development sector. Clause 2.1 of the Manual states the purpose as:
‘...to ensure effective harmonization o f governmental structures and NGO 
operations at all levels in line with government policy. This will ensure that 
NGOs play a significant role in complementing government and local authority 
efforts as well as empower communities to manage the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance’ (Government of Zimbabwe 2003a: 1).
The Manual further states that, since NGOs complement government they should 
follow government approaches and strategies, use governmental and traditional 
structures and that NGOs or individuals should not take advantage of the emergency 
situation to advance their interests {Ibid 2003, Clause 4.1, iii to iv). The same Manual 
directed that NGOs should not communicate directly (e.g. setting up a meeting) with 
lower levels of government without authority from higher levels o f government 
(Clause 8.1-2). The Ministry of Local Government had also come up with a relevant 
instruction in March 2003. Generally, the Manual guides organisational interaction 
and ensures governmental control or coordination of the interaction. The slant is more 
towards control than facilitation, which prompted non-governmental development
organisations resentment. 
Subsequent processes of 
coming up with an NGO Bill 
perceived to be repressive 
further highlighted strained 
state-NGO relations unhelpful 
to inter-organisational
interaction and participation. 
Minutes of ARJEX sub-District 
staff indicated dissatisfaction 
with ‘NGOs that burden us 
with their work without any 
incentives’ (AREX staff meeting of 04th April 2005, Marange area) reflecting 
different tensions at sub-national level. Challenges regarding inter-organisational 
interaction thus exist at all levels. Councils need to identify and address these to 
entrench participatory development in their areas.
Council partnerships with NGOs are common-place in the two countries and deliver 
practical opportunities for participation by ordinary people. However, it would seem 
that the partnerships are generally informed by central government guidelines rather 
than local initiatives. The Plan Intemational-Mutare RDC District Assembly and other 
working arrangements are all governed more from the centre than local realities. It 
makes the actors in such relationships more accountable to the centre than the locality. 
To use the conceptual framework (Figure 1) the spaces and activities they are
Box 9: Nyanga RDC guidelines to NGOs
1. Submission o f  a copy o f  registration certificate.
2. Organisational structure and key employees with 
addresses.
3. Sources o f funding.
4. Programme details: location in District, start date, 
end date and plans.
5. Nature o f the target groups or clientele.
6. Networks and linkage with Council, government 
structures and description o f  grassroots structures.
7. Audited accounts (to be send to Council, District 
Administrator and Department o f  Social Welfare).
8. A request for monthly reports to organisations in 7 
and signing Council memorandum o f  
understanding.
9. Detailed expectations o f  development organisation 
from council.
Source; Adapted from Nyanga RDC 09-2003._________
involved in attach significance more to governmental than grassroots expectations. 
NGDs are able to offer incentives to Councils and government organisations as part of 
enabling them to do their work e.g. offering transport to the field. However, there are 
cases where the NGOs are unable to justify to their funders why they may need extra 
cosls to facilitate Council and government involvement in development activities. 
Budgetary limitations and lack of funding for joint spaces and processes discussed 
above constitute critical constraints to participation observed in the two countries. 
This is not to take away the myriad opportunities presented by the partnerships that 
exist but to highlight one of the reasons why the partnerships fail after NGO support. 
It would seem from the study that other factors that strain partnerships include high 
material and skill competency gaps, ineffective local non-state forums, beneficiary 
selection ‘politics’, unfinished projects and NGOs’ quest for uniqueness versus 
standardized approaches preferred by governmental organisations. Material resources 
e.g. timely disbursement of resources for activities appears to play an important part 
in NGO-state partnerships at both central and local levels. Other issues include trust, 
track; record, personalities involved and the macro context especially Zimbabwe 
where politics has had a pervasive effect.
5.6. Anchoring national programmes in Councils
Generally, national programmes are either state or donor supported. Here I use both to 
show how inter-organisational relations particularly between Councils and central 
government influence participation. As discussed in section 2.6 the national 
programmes provide a conduit for participation in policy formulation, communication 
and implementation. National programmes are an addition to Councils’ direct support 
for activities, NGO partnerships and sector grants. For instance, ZAMSIF was 
instrumental in boosting development activities in Kasempa, among other Councils in 
Zambia. Resources came through Council to support community projects. Kasempa 
Council also received capacity building support enabling it to climb the ZAMSIF 
capacity building ladder to level 5 (the highest). However, the management of the 
projects and process was largely through the DDCC with sector organisations leading 
initiatives depending on the sector in which a ZAMSIF-supported project was. This 
meant that Council was not always managing programme implementation. For 
instance, expansion of Kasempa District Hospital was managed by the Health 
Ministry. ZAMSIF capacity building focused on project implementation and
coordination for DDCC and Council. If  the conclusion of ZAMSIF is not followed up 
with another major programme, Council will not be able to meet the expectations 
generated by the project.
Apart from the programmes discussed in section 2.6.3, Table 3, Zimbabwe has had a
Rural Development Fund (RDF) since 1999 (Box 10). This Fund has been
consolidated with the inclusion of IRWSS, CAP and SEDAP into a Rural Capital 
Development Fund (RCDF). RDCCBP, CAP, RDF and SEDAP are some of the 
major national programmes implemented in Zimbabwe with Council participation.
Mutare RDC participated in all 
four while Seke/Manyame 
hosted RDCCBP and RDF.
Mutare RDC employed a
Poverty Assessment Action
Plan (PAAP) Officer for the 
management of and received 
the last tranche of resources in 
2002. During CAP’s four year 
life Council implemented a 
number of projects like bore­
hole drilling, fitting of a windmill at a Primary School and repairs to classroom blocks 
(Mutare RDC records).
The RDF is administered under the Ministry of Rural Resources and Infrastructural 
Development. It was established in 1999 to plug gaps in the funding o f rural
development left by the PSIP, which is government’s main vehicle for infrastructural
funding albeit facing capitalization challenges as discussed above. From 2004, the 
Fund grew through the collapsing of CAP, the Dry Areas Development Programme 
(DADP) and the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (IRWSS) Programme 
into RCDF. The merging of the programmes was meant to reduce duplication. The 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Resources and Infrastructure 
Development stressed that this was also to increase government visibility compared to
Box 10: Objectives of RDF/RCDF
1. To promote and accelerate rural development by 
addressing social and economic needs o f  rural 
people based on their initiatives.
2. To redress disparities and imbalances in the levels 
o f development in the rural areas through an 
equitable system o f  resource allocation.
3. To stimulate rural people’s resourcefulness and self- 
reliance in rural development by promoting their 
participation.
4. To provide funding for rural infrastructure inclusive 
o f dams, roads, dip tanks, schools, clinics and clean 
water supplies.
5. To promote creation o f  employment for rural folk.
Source; Adapted from Government o f Zimbabwe, 
2 0 0 4 56.
56 RCDF Annual Report for the period covering January to December 2004.
NGOs (Workshop Presentation December 1st 2004, Mutare). My research did not 
come across any Council-NGO partnership on an RCDF-project perhaps confirming 
that the project counteracted NGO visibility.
All Districts in the country can access RCDF pursuant to its equalization thrust 
(objective 2 Box 10). The policy is that each Council gets at least one and at most five 
project grants per year. Projects submitted for funding are technically appraised at 
Council with the help of relevant government departments (RDDC). Once a project is 
recommended for funding a submission is made to the Ministry, which then funds the 
project’s core costs (no administration costs). Because most of the projects are 
infrastructural (road-making, borehole sinking, putting up or repairing buildings etc) 
payments are made to contractors directly on the back of a Council issued Certificate 
of Completion. These are procedures similar to what the National Roads Board 
(NRB-Zambia) uses for supporting road construction or rehabilitation in Council 
areas. In interviews with the Chief Executive Officers of Mutare and Seke/Manyame, 
concern was raised over delays in disbursements and the Ministry’s perceived refusal 
to decentralise the Fund (Interviews June 7th and 10th 2004). At the time of the 
interviews, the Ministry did not have provincial representatives but established these 
in 2005 although the actual financial disbursements remained in Harare. In an 
interview (20th July 2006) the Deputy Director of the Infrastructure Department of the 
Fund emphasized that Councils:
■ Lacked the capacity to absorb more Fund resources and to come up with proper 
technical designs and Bills of Quantities.
■ Were shifting to PSIP-type (infrastructure) instead of community projects.
■ Failed to complete projects on time leading to cost escalations.
The second of the above points resonates with those of the then Minister (Mrs.
Mujuru, now Second Vice President of Zimbabwe) as communicated in her foreword
to the Fund’s 2002 Annual Report. She highlighted the 2003 focus of the Fund as
‘Food Enhancement Schemes’ and proceeded to emphasize:
‘ . . .I  therefore call on all L ocal A uthorities to  d evelop  sm all com m unity  
irrigation schem es in order to strengthen food  security  at household  le v e l . . .W e  
need to integrate m any p rogram m es... I f  w e  integrate these program m es w e  w ill 
reduce expenditure on each  irrigation schem e enab lin g  us to do m ore for the 
p eo p le ’ (G R Z  2 002c:2 ).
The Annual Reports for the Fund for 2002 through 2004 detail the support received 
by RDCs. Mutare received support for 1 road in 2002, 1 irrigation scheme in 2003 
and a clinic, a cottage industry project at a Rural Service Centre and a community 
water harvesting project in 2004 (GRZ 2002, 2003, 200457). During the same period, 
Seke/Manyame received funding for a water supply augmentation project at Beatrice
CO
(the Growth Centre where Council is based) and 1 clinic (Makanyazingwa ) for the
2002-2004 period {Ibid).
Not all Government programmes are managed through Councils. Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural input loan scheme accessed through the Land Bank is an example. At the 
December 14th meeting, Mutare Councilors inquired whether any farmers had 
benefited from the scheme. Farmers had opened accounts with the Bank before 
submitting applications. The applications were developed with assistance from AREX 
for a fee. The Land Bank and AREX are part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. Councilors felt the organisations were making money from their poor 
constituents and complained about lack of information making it difficult for them to 
explain to the people. In a way, weak interaction between Council and these two 
programmes constrained effective Councilor participation and that of their 
constituents.
Implementation of national programmes through Councils has its challenges. The 
example of the Drought Relief Programme in Zimbabwe (2003-04) illustrates some of 
the tensions over approaches and expectations. Councils were chosen to implement 
this emergency programme in recognition of their reach and socio-political 
infrastructure for mobilizing people and delivering programmes. The Ministry of 
Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare (accounting institution) transferred 
resources to Councils for the two components, one involving purchasing and 
distributing food and another involving payment of able-bodied beneficiaries for 
public works undertaken in their areas as well as paying out public assistance funds. 
Implementation was guided by a Memorandum of Understanding. The District
57 RDF Annual Reports, Ministry o f  Rural Resources and Water Development.
5 8 An estimated 40 000 people will benefit from this clinic now (2005) operating although work is still 
in progress. Project co-funded EU Micro-Projects Program during the same period (2002 to 2004). At 
the time o f  fieldwork Council and DDF were disagreeing over siting o f  a new borehole or rehabilitating 
an existing water point.
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Drought Relief Committee, chaired by the DA was responsible for general 
programme management. Secondment of Social Welfare Officers to Council by the 
Ministry meant that technical implementation was fully anchored at Council. 
However, during implementation, some Councils allegedly abused/diverted funds, 
used interest earned and submitted returns late. In response, the Ministry instructed 
Councils to include Social Welfare Officers as signatories to the drought relief 
accounts. Councils resisted the Ministry instruction arguing it was in violation of the 
RDC Act and was tantamount to interference in the running o f Council affairs. The 
instruction was also viewed as rushed, an example of recentralisation, Ministerial 
bullying and using Councils as a scapegoat for programme challenges not of their 
making. Although accepting that some Councils had erred, ARDCZ argued that 
blanket withdrawal of the account and programme was inappropriate because errant 
Councils should have been dealt with using relevant procedures.
Councils’ refusal to accept the Ministry’s position was based on a number o f points59. 
One was that the Ministry acted in an uninformed manner and had unrealistic 
expectations particularly regarding the time within which accounts were expected. 
Based on District sizes and distances covered to pay programme beneficiaries 
Councils felt they were doing their best. Delays were also because beneficiaries were 
mainly the elderly, infirm, poor and other vulnerable members of communities unable 
to travel long distances to receive their benefits making it impossible for Councils to 
reduce payment points. This meant more centers and hence more time to pay out and 
submit returns. Councils also cited transport problems and argued that the programme 
over-relied on Councils’ meager resources and therefore delays had to be accepted 
because of that choice. They were thus unable to understand the expectations of 
‘miracles’ given this reality. They and most government departments in the country 
lack transport resources and public transport is unreliable for a programme with an 
insufficient administration grant (8% of transferred resources). Given sacrifices made 
to mobilize their meager vehicles, staff and other resources, Councils argued they did 
theii best. In fact, the Councils were incurring deficits, which would cripple Council 
operations. Councils noted that the programme was embarked on without careful 
planning, was poorly managed and under-provided. They had accepted it purely
59 Summarised from notes taken at the 2004 ARDCZ Congress.
because of its emergency nature. The Ministry responded to Council arguments by 
asserting the legitimacy and bases of its decisions. This case draws out some of the 
tensions associated with ‘acting in the people’s interest’ where central and local 
governments claim being best placed. Government funded national programmes seem 
to end up being means for central control over the local.
Accusations and counter-accusations aside research evidence suggests that as models 
of service provision national programmes show some promise. National programmes 
are not necessarily anathema to participation. Government provision o f project 
funding for supporting local development plays an important role. In the case of 
RCDF, each Council is assured of at least one project per year (and more should the 
government resource situation improve). However, Councils are often not provided 
with sufficient resources and information to manage the relations with communities 
and other organisations. The challenge arises from lack of resources within Councils 
for complementing these efforts. Lack of information, as in the Land Bank case 
above, may leave Council unable to help their residents and perhaps perceived as 
irrelevant to communities. Levels of support and discontinuance of good practice 
between projects is another cause for concern. The extent to which participation can 
be catalyzed by the few projects supported in this way may be very limited. Another 
point relates to central government’s influence in terms of policy direction and 
institutional arrangements through project/programme support. The flexibility shown 
under CAP, DADP and IRWSSP in Zimbabwe regarding resource disbursement and 
coordinated implementation appear not to have been transferred to RCDF. SEDAP 
and DADP initiatives in Mutare, are presently suffering some neglect as a result.
In Zambia, there are hopes that lessons learnt under the ZAMSIF will be carried 
forward. At least in the case of Zimbabwe, past experience suggests that government 
is unlikely to increase disbursement of resources directly to Councils or in a manner 
as flexible as CAP or ZAMSIF. This is not to suggest that some o f these projects did 
not have shortcomings but to urge identification and application o f lessons. Indeed as 
LGAZ noted in a Parliamentary submission in relation to the 2006 budget ZAMSIF, 
for instance had some serious shortcomings. These were cited as working directly 
through Provincial Facilitators without adequately building decentralised local 
government capacities and using the capacity building ladder as a sanction tool
focused on internal capacity rather than service delivery orientation. That less than 8 
of the 72 Councils reached the highest point (5) in the capacity building ladder 
confirms LGAZ’s assertion on capacity building. The LGAZ brainstorm session 
observed that perhaps ZAMSIF used a bottle-neck system to limit the number o f 
Councils reaching level 5 i.e. claiming more funds.
The Zambian decentralisation policy has raised hope for a devolution framework. It is 
hoped that local government’s position will be entrenched in the development process 
and existing sub-District problems will be addressed. However, having taken ten 
years discussing it the hope and enthusiasm needs to be guarded. A Decentralisation 
Implementation Strategy has been drafted and adopted but awaits implementation. 
Meanwhile, ZAMSIF and the Decentralisation Secretariat are shifting their 
institutional homes from Finance and Cabinet Office respectively to the Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing. While considered strategic in terms o f institutional 
responsibilities for decentralisation, moving away from the money (Ministry of 
Finance) and power (President’s Office) may slow the implementation of 
decentralisation. A general point to make is that macro power dynamics and 
institutional choices have an enduring effect on delivery and institutional interactions 
in implementing national programmes at sub-national level.
5.7. Traditional leadership structures and processes
There is a growing meshing of party political and Chieftainship issues affecting the 
functioning and perception o f traditional leadership, which government acknowledged 
(GRZ 2002b) in relation to a succession dispute in the Nyamukoho Chieftainship, 
Mudzi District, Mashonaland East Province. Chief-making traditions rooted in local 
customs were observed to be in competition with government employees, politicians 
and other local interest groups in promoting or influencing chiefly candidates. The 
Chigodora Chieftainship in Mutare District is one other, among a few more cases, of 
Chieftainships whose succession disputes have exposed problems within the 
institution.
These cases (Nyamukoho and Chigodora) are not used to generalise about 
Chieftainships in Zimbabwe. They are used to highlight some of the emerging 
questions about the legitimacy o f the institution, which affect people’s participation
since traditional leaders play a part in development structures and processes. 
Traditional leaders exist in all the study Districts as indicated by 91% of the survey 
respondents including Zimbabwe’s new resettlement areas. They are also a relatively 
well established institution in rural areas. Their tenure generally lasts longer than 
other office bearers e.g. Councilors and staff of development organisations. For 
instance in the six Wards of Seke/Manyame and Mutare 59.5% of the respondents had 
Village Heads installed after 2000, 24.3% between 1991 and 2000, 2.7% between 
1981 and 1990 with 13.5% before 1980. The higher figure for the 2000 period 
coincides with the land reform programme and passing o f the Traditional Leaders 
Act, which brought resettlement areas under traditional leaders’ governance 
structures.
However, the DA for Seke/Manyame indicated that there are no traditional leaders in 
new resettlement schemes in the District (Interview 8th June 2004) while in Mutare 
Council was urging the Ministry of Local Government to address boundary and other 
structural issues affecting traditional leaders (Mutare RDC 200460) a factor also noted 
at the ARDCZ Congress of 2004. This seems to suggest that on the ground people 
already have recognized Village Heads yet to be formally appointed by the Ministry 
o f Local Government. In both Districts, conflicts between traditional and elected 
leaders were acknowledged. In Mutare’s Ward 22 (old resettlement scheme) some 
traditional leaders selected by the residents had not received formal appointment 
letters/certificates from the DA’s Office because they had not been agreed to by the 
relevant Headman. Those nominated by the Headman had since received their formal 
letters/certificates from the DA (Ministry of Local Government). The fluid nature of 
the appointment of traditional leaders also affects old resettlement schemes in 
Seke/Manyame where community selections were still to be validated by the Ministry 
at the time of fieldwork in 2004-5. Seke/Manyame Ward 15 respondents (without a) 
Councilor61 indicated having Village Heads but without the proper certification.
60 Minutes o f a Full Council Meeting No. 4 o f  2004.
61 Councilor was suspended in 2003 by the DA on the instruction o f  the Governor without consulting 
residents. Field discussions suggested that the Councilor was dismissed for informal land allocations 
and protection o f some farmers targeted for eviction under the post-2000 land reform program 
(Interview with Ward Coordinator 15th August 2004, FGD 15th January 2005).
During land occupations, people created their own informal Committees, consisting of 
seven elected individuals. When government announced that resettlement 
communities were to be administered under the nearest Chief, communities had to 
constitute traditional structures. Most communities opted to select Village Heads from 
amongst the Committees o f Seven. As such, these Committees, which spearheaded 
land occupations and governed specific farms, provided most of the traditional 
leaders. Often the Chairpersons were appointed as Village Heads unless if  the 
Chief/Headman selected their own or it was felt that there was someone in the 
community with a lineage traceable to the nearest Chieftainship. The new traditional 
leaders have however not established Village Assemblies and Development 
Committees while some communities have repeatedly changed their choices.
Traditional leaders are ordinarily hereditary not elected. However, in old (pre-2000) 
and new (post-2000) resettlement schemes the popular vote has been used in some 
instances. 36.2% of the respondents indicated having a villager-selected head, 32.1% 
Headman-appointed, 30.1% inherited, which was mainly in communal areas and 1.6% 
a volunteer head (n=125). The phenomenon o f villager-selected Village Heads raises 
prospects for the democratization of traditional leadership. In both Zambia and 
Zimbabwe Chieftainship or traditional leadership generally is regarded as 
conservative and autocratic (see Mamdani 1996).
In parts of Zimbabwe and Zambia traditional leaders have been accused of promoting 
resuscitation of cultural practices seen as oppressive by women’s rights activists e.g. 
compulsory virginity tests, widow cleansing, circumcision, early marriages, property 
grabbing from widows and orphans. In Mashonaland East, a Chief was accused by 
District and Provincial Government Authorities of allocating land without consulting 
the local Council and not distributing inputs provided under the Zunde RaMambo62 
scheme (The Sunday Mail July 11, 2004). The payment o f traditional leaders in 
Zimbabwe has also led to questions about the effect such a policy has on their 
integrity and impartiality. These issues touch on legitimacy and perhaps 
appropriateness of the institution as a mechanism for deepening participation. The
62 Zunde is Shona for field and Mambo is Chief, Zunde RaMambo is a portion o f  a traditional leaders’ 
land where a community traditionally worked throughout the season with the produce being harvested 
into a C h ie fs  granary and used to feed disadvantaged members o f that community. Concept now  
adapted as response to plight o f HIV and AIDS infected and affected (orphans, widows etc).
questions notwithstanding, Government acknowledges the importance of traditional
leaders. Vice President Msika (200463) observed that their role in:
‘...supervising development planning structures (the Assemblies) ...and as the 
linkage between the people and their elected leadership...a synergy quite vital for 
the successful development o f our rural areas’ (2004:8 see UNECA 2005).
Addressing an annual congress o f traditional leaders in 2005, Zimbabwe’s Second 
Vice President, Mrs. J. T. Mujuru outlined the roles of traditional leaders as follows: 
‘...they support government programmes (identification and implementation), 
perform traditional rituals to enable smooth passage of development programmes 
(planning and implementation stages) act as the entry point for government 
programmes, operationalize development structures at Village and Ward level, 
ensure people’s development ideas are respected in national programmes, look after 
the vulnerable in society guaranteeing their welfare needs are catered for and 
provide information on existing programmes to enable (their) people to take 
advantage o f such’ (The Herald July 23, 2005).
The above quotes reflect the central role assigned to traditional leaders in 
development in Zimbabwe. Presence in Council, leading sub-District structures and 
government-recognized provincial and national Chiefs’ Councils evidence this 
growing significance. These realities determine how traditional and elected officials 
relate. Their interface forms the context within which legitimacy and effectiveness in 
facilitating development and other development organisations can be explored. Often 
traditional leaders’ new power and recognition by government as community gate 
keepers is seen as excessive. This creates the impression that all other development 
organisations need the blessing of traditional leaders for whatever they do in or with 
communities. Councilors are particularly affected by this perception, as some 
traditional leaders practice this.
Comments attributed to Mrs. Mujuru by The Herald give the impression that 
government expects traditional leaders to identify and incorporate the development 
needs of their subjects in government programmes. The expectation confirms that 
Council and government programmes may not always be the same and that traditional 
leaders are accorded a direct link with central government. This entrenches ambiguity 
in the relationship between Councils/Councilors and traditional leaders. In their role 
in Ward/Village Assemblies traditional leaders are expected to be the lowest tiers of 
local government and therefore link up with Council-facilitated planning, which often 
contradicts the central government link suggested in the quotation above. Both
63 Official address to the ARDCZ congress, 18th August 2004, Montclair Hotel Nyanga.
Councilors and traditional leaders fall under the Ministry of Local Government. 
However, the two institutions enjoy different statuses and are managed separately. 
Such ‘overlapping separateness’ is a source of tension as further discussed below.
Notwithstanding reservations in relation to their capacities, traditional leaders perform 
valuable functions in communities. The case of Kasempa demonstrates the 
importance of traditional leaders in programme implementation and general 
community maintenance. Chief Kasempa visits his subjects in their communities at 
least once a year to receive complaints on land disputes and other conflicts that may 
be occurring. Those that can be resolved on the ground are dealt with while others are 
dealt with after the visits. During the visits, the Chief also encourages people to take 
advantage of existing programmes in their areas (governmental and non­
governmental) and provides information on opportunities not known to visited 
communities. Chief Kasempa is managing an HIV and AIDS grant from the 
Community Responses to AIDS (CRAIDS) a national programme that provides 
funding for community efforts to fight HIV and AIDS. PACT Zambia and the 
Southern African AIDS Trust are some o f the international donors that support the 
project. The activities implemented include counseling, training and sensitization of 
communities, traditional healers and traditional birth attendants on HIV and AIDS, 
care-giving and counseling. These are implemented by a registered community-based 
organisation (the Royal Establishment Kubalisa Project) which has full-time staff and 
a Board of Trustees separate but with the regular support o f the Chief (Interviews with 
the DC, District AIDS Task Force and Council Officials, February and March 2005). 
The Zunde RaMambo in Zimbabwe is generally more widespread and is largely 
funded by the National AIDS Council a government Parastatal unlike the Royal 
Establishment Kubalisa Project, which is different in that it receives external support. 
Both cases however show the role that traditional leaders play in local development 
and governance. CADEC’s relationship with traditional leaders discussed above and 
Plan International’s work in Mutare reflects the extent of the opportunities that 
traditional structures present regarding facilitating participation.
Rural communities in the two study countries are governed by traditional systems at 
the primary (village) level and at the level of a chieftainship, which may cover more 
than one administrative Ward, e.g. Chief Seke’s area covers about 8 Wards, Chief
Marange at least 15 and Chief Zimunya about 10 Wards. At Ward level elected 
leadership come onto the scene and interface with traditional leaders. Despite 
differences in structures through which traditional leaders participate in local 
government processes, these are very important structures in the two countries 
including direct management of development programmes. The Governments of 
Zambia and Zimbabwe have had a history of relating to traditional leaders since 
independence that is not uniform. For Zambia during the Kaunda era Chiefs were 
Councilors and controlled development outcomes directly (Interviews in Kasempa 7th 
February 2005).
Regarding rural local governance, Zimbabwe appears to have proceeded on two 
extremes after 1980. First, sidelining traditional leaders through 1999 and then what 
can be referred to as near-complete capture and entrenchment in local government 
structures and ruling party politics since 2000. Using traditional leaders as 
communication channels for government and other organisations introduces a low- 
cost and innovative means of engaging with rural populations in the two countries and 
indeed most of Africa. In Zambia, it is fair to say that the traditional leadership 
structure has retained some distance from Government and the party unlike in 
Zimbabwe (see GRZ 2002b). In these different settings, traditional leaders remain 
critical in participation and development. They affect the functioning of Councils 
particularly in terms of community entry. The next section discusses relationships 
amongst sub-District structures from the premise that none of the key players at 
present is unlikely to be removed. I show and discuss the positive and negative 
experiences regarding institutionalising participation that the study observed.
5.8. Sub-District: some opportunities and challenges presented
The sections above set the context within which sub-District local government 
structures relate amongst themselves in ‘doing development’. Some themes affecting 
the relationships have been discussed, among them perceived or actual politicization 
of some of the structures and the duplication of services. Mixed experiences of the 
sub-District inform different policy initiatives e.g. ADC establishment in Zambia and 
the Assemblies in Zimbabwe. Existing structures created under the Village 
Productivity Act and the Local Administration Act (1970s and 1980s) heavily 
politicized the structures (Government of Zambia 2003, Interviews February and
March 2005). Zimbabwe’s 1984 Prime Minister’s Directive, which formalized ZANU 
PF structures (comparable to Uganda’s regularization of Resistance Councils, Porter 
and Onyach-Olaa 1999; Francis and James 2003), led to tensions with traditional 
leaders, which frustrated development in Zimbabwe (see Brand 1991). These 
scenarios suggest an underlying effort at de-politicizing, and in the case of ADCs de­
partying sub-District development structures. By creating Assemblies Zimbabwe’s 
experiences suggest that political parties need to be curtailed in this case by traditional 
power centers. De-partying local governance structures may thus democratise 
development processes with aspirations of minorities being respected alongside those 
o f major political parties. However, given the party-political nature o f local 
government in both countries (and elsewhere) it appears that a party-neutral lower tier 
existing, let alone working, under a distinctly party-political higher tier may be 
unachievable. This is more tenuous in a winner-take-all political system. Therefore 
seeking to de-party local government, while perhaps desirable may be difficult. Party 
politics is however not the only fuel for institutional tensions. Tensions remain 
between traditional and elected officials, more in Zimbabwe’s resettlement than 
communal areas in spite of changes instituted. That tensions still exist became evident 
at a Ward meeting held in May 2004 in Seke/Manyame District. Key issues on the 
relationship between the two were discussed.
Table 14: Areas of Councilor-traditional leader conflict
V illage. Issues raised against the C ouncilor.
1. ■ Delayed payments under the Council-adm inistered Public W orks Program m e.
■ Councilor not giving sufficient feedback to traditional leaders.
2. ■ Councilor by-passing the V illage Head going to V illage Com m ittees to get 
reports or to give instructions.
■ Late Public W orks payments.
3. ■ Getting inform ation on developm ent activities much later than other villages.
■ Comm unity boreholes w ere not being repaired.
4. ■ Friction with V illage H ead who had contested & lost Councillorship.
■ Village H ead’s proposals as Chair o f  Clinic Comm ittee opposed by Councilor.
■ Councilor holds m eetings in village w ithout the village head.
■ Labeling V illage Head an opposition politician.
■ The V illage H ead was accused o f  illegally allocating land in the village’s grazing 
area w ithout Council approval.
5. ■ Comm unity boreholes were not being repaired.
■ Comm unication break-down with Councilor.
■ Councilor not attending m eetings in the village (Village Head and subjects not 
satisfied with Councilor’s excuses).
6. ■ Councilor accused o f  gossip, deliberately misplacing Public W orks registers.
■ Village head (fem ale) not clear o f  the role differences and m andates.
■ Councilor accused o f  ‘loading developm ent in own village’ including under the 
Public W orks Programme.
Source; Fielc w ork (W ard 18 M eeting, Seke/M anyam e, M ay 2 6 th 2 0 0 4 ) .
The meeting was called by Council and the DA following written complains about the 
Councilor received by both offices. Other government department attended to listen to 
community needs and respond to queries raised about their work. The DA and the 
Council Chair co-chaired the meeting. During the meeting, each of the six Village 
Heads in the Ward was given a chance to raise the issues they had with the Councilor 
and on development issues generally. The Ward Councilor was not asked to respond 
although the rest of the community (in attendance) was invited to make comments. 
Conflict areas cited include Councilor’s inability to timely and satisfactorily 
communicate Council and broader government policy and delayed Public Works 
payments. Delays due to changes in programme policy for selecting beneficiaries 
especially the total number and proportion of able-bodied to those (elderly, infirm etc) 
receiving free benefits per village was not fully understood by the community. Cuts 
made to the programme meant numbers were reduced and the Councilor was having 
difficulty explaining these. The conflict also arose from local power dynamics, as 
Village Heads were new in this mid-1980s resettlement scheme that had existed for at 
least 15 years without traditional leaders.
The challenges of reconciling the roles of Councilors in their own villages and at 
Ward level were also evident in this case. Accusing the Councilor of circumventing 
the Village Heads created the impression that Councilors can only operate through 
Village Heads, something some Councilors are not comfortable with in both Mutare 
and Seke/Manyame. They argue that it slows their work. On victimization and 
favoring their village, anecdotal evidence from community members seemed to 
reinforce this perception. During interviews, cases cited were of input distribution 
where the Councilor’s village is perceived to have had adequate inputs ahead of the 
rest of the Ward. The allegations against the Councilor reflected a deep mistrust but 
could have been political gamesmanship in the presence of public officials. In 
Zimbabwe, traditional and elected leaders derive their legitimacies and influence from 
different sources (see Nugent 2004) and pieces of legislation. Colonial methods of 
‘stabilizing alien rule’ by using traditional institutions to administer Native Areas 
(Indirect Rule) created a negative institutional legacy (Mamdani 1996; Abbink 2005).
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However, both sets of leaders are unavoidably brought into contact by the institutions 
of Ward and Village Assemblies, which in this case did not seem to be functioning 
very well. Given that the Councilor heads the Ward Development Committee and 
their election and term runs concurrent to that of Village Development Committees it 
is fair to assume that they are the boss of such committees. Village Heads’ resentment 
o f being led by elected Councilors has serious implications for development activities. 
Unlike in communal areas where traditional leaders are not elected, in resettlement 
areas the source of legitimacy and authority o f both Village Heads and Councilors 
reside in the electorate (is not hereditary). The operationalization o f a communal area- 
type traditional leader in resettlement schemes is questionable at least for most of the 
current generation of resettlement area Village Heads.
It would appear from this study that the uneasy marriage of elected and traditional 
leadership systems may act to constrain participation in development. 
Institutionalisation of participation needs an anchor at this level for it to exist let alone 
to work effectively. The Mutare District Assembly discussed elsewhere in this thesis 
appears to be generating some positive results. However, general guidelines may be 
needed to ensure that roles are understood and relationships are improved. As 
discussed in the section on structures, there may well be a need to assign the 
responsibility to improving the relationships between these two bodies to a distinct 
institution and that it remains a continuous process.
In Zambia ADCs are replacing Ward Development Committees considered legacies 
of the Kaunda era where the party controlled all development and civic affairs. As 
such the ADC controversially proposes Councilors and traditional leaders be ex­
officio and represented respectively. The ADC is viewed both as the planning link to 
the DDCC while Councils look at the ADC as a link into Council, which creates 
tension in terms of the effectiveness of ADCs in acting as a mechanism for integrated 
development planning. Some key informants referred to ADCs as for ‘service 
delivery’, which is the forte of Council and thus ADCs may need to link more directly 
with Council than the DC-controlled DDCC. Whether ADCs will work effectively 
when the institutions above them are facing serious problems or whether they (ADCs) 
are a means for addressing the development planning malaise remains a key question. 
The type of support needed for ADCs or their equivalent in Zimbabwe to steer a
bottom-up improvement of the development process also remains unclear. The 
provision of such support also appears generally unstructured.
ADCs will be constituted via the vote as opposed to the Assemblies in Zimbabwe, 
which are already prescribed in law as the preserve of traditional leaders in terms of 
leadership. This makes the issuance o f mandate and representation quite direct for 
ADCs. However, there is a danger of exposing the ADC (and any other local 
organisations) to partisan politicking. The popular vote has been known to sideline 
women, youths and other interest groups raising the need to look at an interest or 
sector-based quota system following participatorily agreed criteria. Such an option 
may be essential given that in both Zambia and Zimbabwe local government (form, 
capacity building and relevant policies) has been held prisoner to political whims with 
more detrimental stops than starts (e.g. decentralisation programmes) against a 
background of weak local non-governmental development organisations.
Role definition and smoothening relationships are important but not adequate for 
institutionalising participation. The same meeting (Table 14) brought out issues that 
related to local institutions’ capacity, funding and horizontal-vertical linkages. These 
are crucial to the facilitation of development as they may act to constrain 
effectiveness of these structures if absent (capacity and funding) and unclear or weak 
(linkages). While there is strength in diversity, a myriad of under-funded, 
incapacitated and un-coordinated institutions may end up defeating the very purposes 
for establishing them. This is not to suggest that the answer lies in dropping some but 
to highlight the fact that the overlaps and conflicts may in fact arise from lack of 
capacities and enough resources to be effective.
5.9. Sub-District organisations’ performance of own functions
In Seke/Manyame District, only two of the twenty-one Wards held a Councilor- 
convened Ward development committee meeting with minutes in 2004. Documents 
reviewed and interviews conducted in the District would suggest that Ward 
development meetings are held at the instigation of District officials. They appear to 
have become more of an instrument for District-to-Ward not Ward level 
communication. Proceedings of such meetings are recorded and kept by District 
officials and rarely send back to the Ward. When sent they are addressed to
Councilors who may have neither the resources nor the inclination to disseminate 
them. Big Wards with poor communication infrastructure are often blamed as 
constraints to effective administration (Mutare RDC 2004, and ARDCZ Congress 
Discussions 18-20th August 2004). Bad communication infrastructure and traditions in 
a context of already low participation, this does not bode well for institutionalising 
participatory development. Granted the meeting is not the only means for 
participation, but it is important to note that other methods, such as letters, petitions, 
lobbying are socially exclusive and expensive. In Seke/Manyame District, it may be 
that institutionalising participation has not been helped by the frequent changes o f 
Executive Officers and high number of Acting Heads of Departments in recent years.
Mutare District uses different arrangements where Ward clusters o f five each meet bi­
monthly while individual Councilors are expected to meet their constituents more 
regularly. This enables cluster issues to be consolidated for the quarterly full Council 
meeting. The difficulty for me was to gauge the significance of debate and 
participation within these meetings, since no records of the cluster meetings were 
available at the Council Offices. However, one significant finding was that the cluster 
meetings were centered on conservation issues and as such were issue-specific. On a 
more positive note, this seems to have allowed for some form of galvanization as 
clusters shared related environmental management issues and concerns in a practical 
manner. The evidence might suggest that the incidence and quality o f sub-District 
interaction in the communities is low in both Seke/Manyame and Mutare Districts. 
However, in Mutare one can detect that mobilizing people around local environmental 
issues has arisen out of a longer-term process o f institutionalized participation. The 
main problem seems to be one of record-keeping.
ADCs were being established in Kasempa during fieldwork and it seems too early to 
assess their performance in managing or facilitating sub-District interaction. Key 
informants suggested that Councilors in the District were committed, continuing to 
attend meetings at a time when Council was not paying allowances (Interviews 8th 
February 2005). They noted that NGO/donor-funded programmes had provided 
opportunities for Councilor participation in development activities. However, DDCC 
members noted that Councilors serving in Ward Committees that have existed in the 
past faced difficulties arising from distances Councilors cover in their Wards (Focus
Discussion 8th February 2005). Because of this, Ward meetings tended to be based on 
District rather than local initiatives as in Zimbabwe. The situation in Kasempa 
therefore reflects a similar trend as in Zimbabwe.
In general, therefore, it would seem that conflicts exist at sub-District level especially 
between elected and traditional leaders more in Zimbabwe than in Zambia. The nature 
o f the local government structures in these two countries plays a role in this respect 
particularly the way in which traditional leaders are involved. Evidence seems to 
suggest limited interaction amongst sub-District structures without District 
facilitation. Written records are not readily available suggesting alternative inquiry 
methods are needed to uncover the extent of interaction. From what was reviewed and 
interviews undertaken it would be reasonable to suggest that the effect o f local 
institutional capacity and operational resources on interaction and performance is an 
area that has received limited treatment.
5.10. Conclusion
This Chapter has presented and partially discussed the main findings o f the study. The 
other part of the findings is in the next Chapter after which the main discussion then 
follows. Suffice to note that a number of opportunities exist for ensuring that people 
take a defined role in development through the work of specific institutions i.e. 
through the facilitation of District and sub-District level actors. This is because the 
structures and groups at sub-District level are often linked to or facilitated by one 
external organisation or other. Central government and NGO programmes seem to be 
major avenues through which development activities are undertaken in the three 
Council areas. Councils may articulate a niche focusing on facilitating other 
development actors as they lack resources of their own for development activities. 
Scope exists for such Council level facilitation in their areas and legal provisions in 
the two countries appear supportive. This explains why this Chapter was given the 
title of ‘institutional interaction as development facilitation’ to advance the argument 
that opportunities and challenges for institutionalising participation need institutional 
steering, a role considered to be adaptable to Council functions.
What seems to be a key challenge is lack of coordinated support to communities. The 
limited capacity of Councils to close some of the facilitation gaps at sub-District level
is an important aspect emerging from the research. Councilors end up performing 
practical development facilitation functions, which often takes them away from their 
policy-making role. At the same time, they rarely have adequate information to be 
able to perform well in practical development facilitation. Other challenges include 
lack of material resources and some inter-organisational conflicts. The institutional 
relationships therefore seem to provide, at once, immense opportunities and some 
constraints to institutionalising participation. Organisational conflict, planning 
overlaps and communication problems are some of the major issues that affect 
interaction and hence the opportunities (and challenges) for institutionalising 
participation. Because of weak funding and non-funding support to local institutions, 
the above assessment o f Councilors is largely true of other institutions.
This Chapter attempted to keep Council at the centre of the discussion. Council as a 
concept was used in different ways. First, as the collective body of Councilors, the 
Executive and Councilors at sub-District level. In most instances, the Executive 
(which actually delivers services) was the one referred to although the other two came 
into focus. It is therefore important to highlight, at least in brief, that choosing ‘the 
Council as Executive’ variant was because most of the opportunities and constraints 
lie in what can and perhaps should be done by Council staff more than by Councilors.
It would appear that central governments in both countries have an enduring effect on 
the District and sub-District institutional dynamics preferring one actor ahead of 
another (e.g. traditional leaders versus Councilors, NGOs versus Council etc) at any 
given moment. The ‘favored’ ones are assigned more space and powers to lead 
development processes and act as mechanisms of central control of the periphery. 
Central control and overall influence often weakens horizontal linkages, frustrating 
integrated local governance. I return to some of these issues in Chapter 7 but in the 
next (Chapter 6) I present findings as they relate to people’s perceptions of 
‘institutional interaction as development facilitation’.
C h a p t e r  6: Pe o p l e ’s A g e n c y : P e r c e iv in g  a n d  U s in g  
D e v e l o p m e n t  In s t it u t io n s
6.1. Introduction
In ‘doing development’ ordinary people interface with development organisations 
(local District and other, governmental and non-governmental) in the spaces I 
indicated as the local context, popular organisations and ‘development activities in 
District spaces’ (Figure 1). In some instances, the range and complexity of the 
development organisations that people engage with may be overwhelming as are the 
myriad practices the development organisations use as they interface with local 
people. Whereas in Chapter 5 I looked at organisational interaction as development 
facilitation, in this Chapter I look at people’s perceptions and use o f institutions as the 
other part of the equation without which development remains incomplete or 
theoretical. Most o f the evidence used in this Chapter was drawn from the 
questionnaire survey. However, key informant interviews, evidence from events and 
data from the Community Diaries (Zambia) are also used.
This Chapter includes exploration of people’s understanding of the available 
structures and spaces for development facilitation, analysis of their perceptions of 
inter-organisational relationships and pulling together the different rationales and 
mechanisms for use of institutions. These aspects have a bearing on institutionalising 
participation based on the strength and endurance of bottom-up processes. The 
analysis in this Chapter attempts to show the extent to which bottom-up and top-down 
processes influence the institutionalisation of participation. Some aspects discussed 
regarding Council effectiveness e.g. public resistance to payment of rates or levies can 
be explained by some of the findings presented in this Chapter. Regarding rates 
resistance, Hlatshwayo (1998) observes that the challenge is one of ensuring that 
community members commit to participating in existing structures.
The Chapter is structured into seven sections excluding the introductory and 
concluding parts. It starts off by discussing people’s appreciation o f the roles of the 
institutions they work with before exploring their perceptions of the relationships 
amongst key development organisations. These two sections illuminate issues of 
knowledge of existing structures, which is a prelude to issues of use and evaluation of
relationships. The third main section in this Chapter draws out factors that 
communities use to assess the performance of Councilors. Section four engages with 
Community-Councilor interface to establish processes and issues. The discussions in 
these first four sections are briefly pulled together in the fifth, which engages people’s 
use of institutions and officials and their (people’s) perceptions o f the helpfulness or 
otherwise of the institutions. Section 6.7 presents and discusses findings on people’s 
attendance of development meetings at Village and Ward levels to shed further light 
on the relevance of these spaces. Lastly I touch on ordinary people’s responses to 
opportunities and challenges to participation.
6.2. Understanding the roles of key institutions
The manner and extent o f relations between development organisations and the 
community rest on community understanding o f institutional roles. Community 
perception of whether their needs will be met, usually based on experience, is critical. 
As suggested elsewhere in this Chapter, many people do not have much faith that 
development organisations will help them. Nevertheless, they still participate in the 
processes facilitated by these institutions. Although they find their Councilors helpful, 
this may not be of any consequence, as Councilors do not have any resources to 
address the needs brought to their attention. They simply take requests and pass them 
on to those above them. The table below summarises respondents’ perceptions of the 
responsibilities of key development institutions in Zimbabwe.
These perceptions seem to indicate a fair understanding of the roles of the institutions 
involved. One area of overlap is land allocation seen as a function of Government 
Departments, the DA and Council. In terms of the law, Council is the land authority. 
However, in practice particularly under the land reform programme the DA’s office 
took general leadership of the programme with government departments involved in 
actual land parceling out. As such, these development organisations featured more 
than Council. Ward land allocation, de facto, is performed by traditional leaders 
although de jure it is a Council function. As discussed above, there are cases where 
traditional leaders allocate land without consulting Council often resulting in 
problems. As such, the effectiveness of an institution is dependent on both context 
and issues at hand. This explains why on matters of land and food distribution given 
the current context in Zimbabwe the central state has been in the lead.
Table 15: Perceived roles of different development institutions
Village
Head.
Councilor. Council. DA. Central
Government.
Land allocation
Leading
Communities.
Land allocation. 
Leading the Ward.
Land allocation. Land allocation. Land
allocation.
Collecting
levies.
Receiving levies.
Facilitating
development.
Address
development
problems.
Coordinating
community
infrastructure
development.
Coordinating
community
infrastructure
development.
Providing
extension
services.
Implementing
programmes.
Input provision. Input provision. Input
provision.
Overseeing
welfare.
Food for Work. Food for Work. Population registry.
Solving social 
conflicts.
Resolving conflicts 
and improving 
security.
Making laws.
Representing people 
in Council.
Representing people 
to government.
Working with village 
heads.
Monitoring 
Councilors and 
village heads.
‘Owner o f  District’ 
coordinating other 
organisations.
Source: Survey Data.
Another function where actors overlap is that of leading communities (Ward) 
performed by traditional leaders and Councilors. In principle, a Village Head operates 
at a spatial unit lower than the Councilor and therefore there ought to be no major 
problem. However, Councilors monitor development activities in Wards and in doing 
this they encounter Village Heads. The DAs for the two Zimbabwean Districts 
indicated that the role differences lie in that Village Heads cover customary issues 
while the Councilor leads the Ward community on development issues. Zimbabwean 
Wards have a minimum of 6 villages and no Councilor can manage to monitor all 
developments especially activities like land allocation in a Ward. Overlap thus occurs 
as gap-filling and is accepted until major problems are noticed.
Another interesting aspect was on the role of coordinating infrastructure development 
perceived to be both a Council and DA role. The reality on the ground confirms this 
as both development organisations play a role depending on whether a project is 
funded by Council or central government. Also as discussed earlier some NGOs have 
partnerships with government institutions and as such, Council will be less visible in 
such projects. As the most senior government official at District level, the DA is often
involved in officiating at community projects and functions making them more visible 
than say the Council Executive. The representation role was also split between the 
institutions of Councilor and DA (local and central government respectively).
People’s perceptions o f the roles of different public institutions seemed to vary from 
legally stated roles of concerned institutions. Popular understanding of roles appears 
functional or de facto  confirming the importance of lived experiences in how people 
relate to institutions. It is important however to observe that the perceptions were not 
far off from the stipulated roles. These perceptions have a bearing on the expectations 
placed upon an institution and may result in role encroachment. An example is where 
a government employee takes on the representative role of a Councilor through 
passing community requests or issues to Council. Up to a point, a Councilor may 
tolerate it until they begin to feel sidelined. Role encroachment, especially where 
District coordination is weak, may result in duplication and institutional conflict. 
Perhaps a point made about institutional visibility on the ground may be repeated here 
as well. The institution of Village Head is more commonplace than any other local 
governance institution. This creates the expectation that Village Heads should 
perform all conceivable functions at the lowest level. Notwithstanding advantages, 
problems as discussed in the next section often arise.
Cooperation, role encroachment or other forms of organisational conflicts may be 
played out at District level away from the field (community) but could also be 
expressed at community level. These help communities understand which 
development organisations work well together and which ones do not. The sub­
section that follows is based on an analysis of survey results where respondents were 
asked how they perceived the relationships between each of the development 
organisations in Table 15.
6.3. Perceptions of relationships amongst development organisations
Table 16 shows the views that respondents expressed about the working relations of 
different development organisations. A pair-wise ranking method was used in asking 
the question so that pairs of institutions were compared in turn. This is a relatively 
common technique used in PRA to establish priorities or choices.
Table 16: Perceived quality of organisational relationships (n=125)
Organisations. Perceived quality of relationship.
Very Bad. Very Good. Nil Response.
Village Head-Councilor. 14.6% 54.4% 31%
Village Head-Council. 23.3% 30.2% 46.7%
Village Head-DA. 25% 30% 45%
Village Head-Government 
Departments.
28.8% 32.7% 38.5%
Counci 1 or-Counci 1. 24.4% 27.9% 47.7%
Counci lor-D A. 20.5% 31.3% 48.2%
Councilor-Government 
Departments.
35.1% 26.3%o 38.6%
Council-DA. 24% 29.3% 46.7%
Council-Government
Departments.
38.6% 19.3% 42.1%
DA-Government Departments. 31.9% 19.1% 49%
Source; Survey Data, 2004
Two general points can be made about these data. First, the percentages are aggregate
valuations. The category ‘Government Departments’ represents at least six different
line Ministries, departments and Parastatals. For Village Heads it is equally a diverse
range of institutions given the areas covered by the study. Second, the percentages are
generally within the 20-30% range thereby representing less o f major variations
except in the case of Village Heads and Councilors. The study attached a lot of
importance to these perceptions because they were based on lived experiences.
Respondents often gave examples o f why they perceived certain relations to be either
bad or good. Key informant interviews, grey literature reviewed and the events that I
attended also seemed to confirm these perceptions. Interviews with AREX and DDF
in Mutare highlighted a perception amongst technical people that politicians were
constraining their performance. For instance, the head of AREX in Mutare stated that:
‘...politicians should increase distance from projects to create room for the 
technical people to do proper project implementation. The RDDC at times works 
better (because of fewer Councilors) than full Council where focus is often limited’, 
(Interview 12th January 2005).
As such, the fact that more respondents perceived the relations between government 
departments and other development institutions as very bad consistently more than 
they perceived other relations is an important finding. Minutes of Council meetings in 
Mutare also reflect the uneasiness between Councilors and thus Council and civil 
servants with reports o f problematic extension staff (Mutare RDC 2004). The same 
minutes in this case acknowledged that reports (about a particular officer) had been 
made repeatedly. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe, Councils and the DA/DC do not
have the power to intervene in relation to civil servants. An interview with a CADEC 
Officer and a Ministry o f Health Environmental Health Officer highlighted that 
development organisations were aware o f community machinations to exploit inter- 
organisational differences for their benefit (Interview 17th August 2005). Both shared 
the view that development organisations should work together so that communities do 
not come between them. This constitutes an acknowledgement of the power that 
community perceptions and actions have on inter-organisational relations. As such, 
communities may exploit differences and partnerships to their advantage.
Any process of institutionalising participation may do well to look at institutional 
relations. This can be done using different methods. Exploring people’s perceptions is 
an important area of inquiry because institutional relations are shaped by community 
perceptions, which define how communities behave when dealing with institutions. 
Cooperation and conflict may actually result from perceived similarities and 
differences that a community brings to the attention of development organisations.
6.4. Assessing Councils: community views
The survey indicated that 44% of the respondents perceive their Councils’
performance as very poor, 45% as average and 11% as high (n=125). Table 17 shows
some of the reasons why these perceptions are held. Suffice to highlight that the
corruption and ineffectiveness factor was the highest (47.4%). This perception is not
restricted to communities as some key informants also indicated its existence. A new
DA for Mutare observed that:
‘ ...the mentality amongst communities that their money is abused by Council is 
justified to some extent. Council needs to play its part. Mutare has adopted a 70% 
plough-back policy to allay such fears but other Councils do nothing’, (Interview 
11th January 2005).
The perception cannot be totally dismissed. Kasempa Council’s audit was two years 
behind in 2005. The example of Kasempa Market Association discussed in Chapter 5 
is also relevant in this regard where Council was not providing commensurate 
services. In the Focus Group Discussion in Ward 15, Seke/Manyame District 
participants voiced dissatisfaction with Council over use of public resources. The 
factors used in the assessment or to justify rating o f performance (Table 17) were 
about services that Councils provide (or do not) and the quality o f relations. Negative 
comments from respondents about their Councils included:
‘...they don’t work with people...only come to collect taxes...we are totally 
neglected...very little is being done...we have water problems...they are far from 
us...they delay in providing services...no feedback...roads impassable’ (Quotes 
adapted from questionnaire returns).
Positive comments included:
‘...Council gave us stands... sourced donors...periodically visit on land 
issues... reacts timely to problems... clinic fully operational...bridge 
constructed...maintain road’ (Quotes adapted from questionnaire returns).
Table 17: Factors used by respondents to assess Council (n=125)
Factor. Percentage.
Corruption and ineffectiveness. 47.4.
Weaknesses in establishing and maintaining facilities (infrastructure). 12.6.
Inability to work with people. 7.4
Extent o f  establishment (Council considered newly established). 16.8
Faces problems (transport). 5.3
Others. 10.5
Total. 100.
Source: Survey Data
The perception of corruption may explain the resistance to pay rates reported in the 
Zimbabwean Districts. A University o f Zambia study on governance also established 
relevant perceptions regarding Councils in Zambia. The study concludes that, the 
public has lost trust in public officials and rated Councils among the least honest and 
providers of the poorest services (Government of Zambia 2004). The high number of 
survey respondents rating Council performance as poor in Zimbabwe is linked to the 
reality that Councils lack resources as discussed in Chapter 5 i.e. Councilors not 
bringing something to the community. Given that Councilors bring little from Council 
this assessment appears an accurate one. Key informant interviews also confirmed the 
perception that Councils lack ideas and are doing nothing. This is both a ‘street’ 
narrative and a reality in Zimbabwe with which many people identify.
A second possible explanation for the low rating of Councils, particularly if compared 
to the rating of Councilors, is the effects of the practical and conceptual distances 
between the community (respondents) and Council (see Porter and Onyach-Olaa 
1999). This distance makes it difficult for ordinary people to offer informed bases for 
their ratings of Council beyond referring to services. Notwithstanding this caveat, it is 
revealing that the rating o f Councils is low not only from the respondents’ 
perspectives as it has been validated from other sources. Like with Councilors, 
respondents focused on tangible developmental variables to justify their assessments.
6.5. Community-Councilor interface
A constituent’s knowledge of their Councilor or other community leaders is a proxy 
indicator for participation in community activities. Knowledge is however not 
adequate, as people’s direct engagement with or actual benefits from the development 
process may flow from other means. Suffice however, to note that 96% (n=120) o f the 
survey respondents indicated knowing their local Councilors. For the 4% (n=5) who 
did not know their Councilor reasons ranged from not caring to know or living far 
away from the Councilor. If the number o f respondents knowing their Councilor can 
be used as an indicator of the level o f activity o f Councilors then at least in the six 
study Wards in Zimbabwe they may be considered active. This (knowledge) is 
however not an adequate basis for Councilor performance assessment.
In terms of performance assessment 46.4% of the respondents rated Councilors 
highly, 33.6% average and 18.4% very poor with 1.6% nil response (n=125). The 
performance of the Councilors is therefore perceived as relatively good in the two 
Districts. The bases for Councilor assessment combined specific development aspects 
like roads and drought relief, which outweighed other reasons like personality. The 
Mutare and Seke/Manyame cases where residents write letters or verbally complain to 
the Council about their Councilors’ performance are no longer unusual, and seems to 
be generating some kind of positive feedback loop between the Council and the public 
(Interviews with Mutare Council Chair 6th January 2005 and Seke/Manyame CEO 
10th June 2004). I can also confirm the importance of personality, development 
agendas, institutional and skills constraints more generally in the interface between 
the Councilor and the community. This also occurs in Seke/Manyame. The Councils 
manage complaints differently.
In Mutare, the Council Chair often intervenes when complaints are received. He does 
this either by making an impromptu Ward visit or having a formal meeting with the 
affected Councilor. In 2003, the Councilor for Ward 5 in Mutare was reported to be 
refusing people access to his home arguing it was not a public office. He advised 
constituents to wait for community meetings, which was difficult for those needing a 
Councilor’s signature for a variety of needs. Repeated requests did not help. 
Eventually the Council Chair visited the Ward following a case of indecent assault
involving the Councilor. This forced the Councilor to resign. The relationship 
between Councilors may also be mediated through religious, other political and 
traditional leaders. Errant Councilors may be reported to traditional leaders who may 
choose to intervene or influence the choice of an alternative candidate in future 
elections. In the 1996 local government elections traditional leaders in Mutare’s Ward 
24 worked to ensure that the serving Councilor was ousted at the polls. They 
successfully influenced their subjects to vote an alternative candidate.
The Council Chair, traditional leaders, specific interest groups and informed citizens 
are at the forefront of reining in Councilors and ensuring that they remain accountable 
to the public. However, 48% of the respondents did not rate their Councilors 
indicating that either they were happy with their Councilors’ performance or were 
suffering in silence. Perhaps the 48% who responded to the questionnaire saying that 
they had no complains about their Councilors and thus had no rationale for their rating 
fall into this category. The study found that there are no systematic ways for 
managing Councilor-community relations. Councilor monitoring is left to the Council 
Chair in the majority of cases. Since Councilors do not have performance targets. 
Personality and political considerations are central in Councilor monitoring systems. 
On the other hand, communities value development deliverables more than other 
variables. However, that Councilors’ development facilitation is conceived and 
funded by other non-Council development organisations means their facilitation is 
instrumental not transformative. Unfortunately, with no Councilor appraisal processes 
in place in Zambia and Zimbabwe a gap exists, which if addressed could considerably 
advance participation.
The Mutare Council Chair observed that new Councilors are often the ones caught up 
in problems, as they come into the Council with expectations of directly and 
personally benefiting through Councillorship. He noted that there are schemes 
contrived by some Councilors to gain personal benefits while performing their normal 
duties e.g. in facilitating access to grain and other services where the approval o f the 
Councilor would be needed. A Councilor in Ward 17, Seke/Manyame was alleged to 
have misappropriated some funds meant for independence celebrations in 2004. 
Although the affected Councilor had what appeared to be a valid explanation the 
question became one of trust and whether he should have handled the money despite
being the head of the Ward. The Council Chairs of both Zimbabwean study Districts 
acknowledged these types of temptations. They both highlighted that they generally 
advise their colleagues to appoint and oversee committees, which can directly perform 
such tasks instead o f controlling decisions themselves. Seke/Manyame’s Ward 7 
Councilor has established a decentralised structure that helps in Ward administration.
6.6. People’s use of development institutions
In terms of people’s use of development organisations 33.9% (n=42) o f the 
respondents indicated that they had personally approached their Councilor, local 
Council, the DA, an NGO or a government department over a development need. At 
face value, 33.9% using direct advocacy approach may seem low but it is significant 
compared to the figure o f two-thirds legally stipulated minimum attendance for 
Village Assembly meetings. Therefore, if as many as half the people expected to 
attend meetings use the direct approach then participation is considerable. The 
Councilor was the most frequently approached, followed by state departments 
including the DA, and other institutions e.g. NGOs. It appears that Council (at District 
level) was the least approached.
It seems that institutions were mostly approached for micro-level and short term needs 
like food aid and information for accessing services rather than for community 
infrastructure or other bigger development agendas, which naturally require more 
formal and community-wide consultations and plans. Compared to answers to the 
question on development priorities where respondents answered at vision level, when 
approaching officials, people go with practical needs e.g. inputs not agricultural 
development. While generally the direct approach is less frequently used this cannot 
be read as lack of active participation. What it may mean is that development 
organisations that use formal instruments like the letter will not interact with as many 
people as those using alternative methods like the meeting. Because of closeness to 
the people, it is not surprising that the institution of Councilor is approached the most.
When people approach development organisations, self-interest creeps into the 
articulation of development needs. The need is refined and communicated as bigger 
than personal. The person approaching a development organisation is usually 
passionate about or directly affected by the need for which they seek assistance.
Groups and individuals define needs from different vantage points, depending on their 
perception of the organisation or official being approached. The study gathered data 
(Table 18) on community perceptions regarding the helpfulness of development 
organisations. Responses were based on experiences of working with and approaching 
development organisations for specific needs.
Table 18: Perceived helpfulness of development organisations (n=42)
Organisation. Need Approached Over. Helpfulness Perception.
Helpful. Unhelpful. Lukewarm.
Council. Community 
Infrastructure 
(Comm. Infra.).
Micro-Project
Support.
25%. 25%. 50%.
75%. 25%.
District
Administrator.
Comm.
Infra.
Domestic
Problem.
Plans. Food
Aid.
14.3% 42.9% 42.9%.57.1% 14.3%. 14.3%. 14.3%.
Government
Department.
Comm. Infra. Farming
Issues.
Micro-
Projects. 25% 75% -
50% 25% 25%
Source; Survey data
The needs over which development organisations are approached also show some 
resemblance to the perceived roles. For instance community infrastructure (schools, 
clinics etc) features on all three institutions in the above table although this is a 
Council function according to legislation. Communities perceive Government 
Departments as least helpful, although they are seen to be as helpful as Council. The 
survey results show that Council is more lukewarm than the DA, which might explain 
why it is the least approached. Community infrastructure seems to cut across all three 
main development organisations but the majority approach Council. This spread may 
suggest people’s need to increase options but perhaps confirms an underlying 
understanding of the role o f Council. Going to other development organisations with 
the same need may also be a way of bringing those development organisations’ 
influence to bear on the organisation with the responsibility to provide the service.
6.7. Attendance of Village and Ward meetings as participation
Attendance of Village and Ward level development meetings is a useful indicator of 
participation. Attendance also shows the confidence and value that communities place 
in relevant institutions. At the same time, attendance allows interface, which is the 
basis for the making of contributions (by the relevant institutions) to people’s lives. 
However, attendance of meetings may be different reasons. At times, they are forced
to attend against their will, as was the case with some participants at the ZANU PF 
meeting discussed in section 4.5.3. Some respondents at this meeting told me that 
their security of tenure for the land they had been allocated depended on participation 
in party activities. Frequency of formal meetings and of household attendance may 
help us account for these possible negative interpretations. Besides Assembly 
meetings, communities also meet at religious gatherings, funerals, beer parties, 
school-assembly meetings and many others depending on time of year and type of 
society. By considering the different reasons why people attend formal meetings 
alongside the other non-formal ones, it is possible for researchers to develop balanced 
assessments of the quality of developmental dialogue and household participation 
therein. 22.9% of the respondents indicated that no Village Assembly-convened 
development meetings were held in their communities in 2005, 7.6% noted that the 
meetings had only been held once, 30.5% twice and 27.6% more than twice while 
11.4% could not remember the frequency. The law states that the Village Assembly 
should convene at least once per quarter. The responses indicate a measure of 
inactivity. If the 22.9% who indicated that no Village Assembly meetings were held 
are believed then the institution appears to be underdeveloped.
In terms of attendance 51.5% of the households were always represented at the 
meetings, 25.2% rarely and 23.3% never took part (n=107 excluding those who said 
the Village Assemblies never took place). Discounting the fact that attendance of the 
meetings could be a ritualistic fulfillment of community expectations, the attendance 
falls short of the ‘all adult villagers i.e. above 18 years’ as defined in the Traditional 
Leaders Act of 2000. Those who do not attend Village Assembly meetings do so 
because o f personal commitments or because they feel that the meetings have become 
politicized. Villagers who attend mostly go to get ideas, feel inspired by existing 
leadership, are leaders themselves, to resolve conflicts or to monitor progress on 
activities underway. As a space for participation, Village meetings are becoming less 
important in terms of their primary purposes of development planning (see Makombe 
1993, Plan Afric 1997; Brand 1991).
Compared to village development meetings Ward meetings were held more 
frequently. 53.9% of the respondents indicated these had been held three to four 
times, 34.9% once or twice and 1.1% more often while 10.1% noted that these had not
been held at all. The Ward meetings were attended by a higher proportion of the 
respondents at 75.4%, this despite the grey literature and key informant interviews 
having highlighted a relatively infrequent convening of the Ward meetings. The 
explanation given for this discrepancy is that the Ward meetings that respondents 
referred to are called for District-to-Ward dialogue rather than Ward level dialogue 
and it was difficult to separate these in interviews. Notwithstanding this change in 
focus, Ward meetings appeared to be attended by more household representatives than 
village development meetings. 76.1% of the respondents who attended indicated 
making contributions at the meetings with 60.8% of them perceiving their 
contributions to have been taken seriously. In effect, the institution of the Ward 
development meeting is alive but may have changed in terms of its focus.
6.8. People’s responses: filling gaps, exit or voice?
6.8.1. ‘Games’ people and officials play
This section does two things. It presents some of the interactions that were observed 
between communities and development organisations of relevance to the discussion. 
It also discusses some of the groups and initiatives that communities establish with or 
without the support of development organisations. First, some experiences witnessed 
after a community meeting attended and facilitated by government officials in Mutare 
District’s Ward 2. A villager borrowed a neighbor’s bicycle to get the official some 
indigenous vegetables out of season at that time of year. After catching up with him, I 
gave him transport in my vehicle so that we could all get to the garden at the same 
time. However, there were no indigenous vegetables in the garden and all he had 
wanted was for the officials to see his garden to enhance his chances of securing 
support generally and in relation to a cassava project the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, Gender and Community Development had promoted at the meeting.
At another farmer’s smallholder irrigation plot visited on the same day the senior of 
the Ministry officials told the farmer that her Ministry had embarked on a national 
cassava growing programme. The cassava project was suggested to the farmer as an 
alternative to the crops currently being grown, as they need more watering compared 
to cassava. Not quoted verbatim, the discussion went like this:
‘Are you willing to grow cassava?’ (Government Official-GO).
‘But are the soil conditions here suitable for that crop?’ (Farmer-F).
‘We will provide all the inputs, all you provide is your land’ (GO).
‘Yes I would like to take part’ (F).
‘Of course we will work with AREX’ (GO).
The discussion between the government official and the farmer above is not 
necessarily typical but it struck me as one way in which project imposition may result. 
It is not used to generalize the interaction but to discuss points of pertinence to 
institutionalising participatory development. First is the urgency with which officials 
and outsiders may seek to secure acceptance of ideas they consider useful for local 
people. This urgency is not about disrespecting locals, but often concern to impart 
knowledge and enthusiasm regarding new ideas. The urgent search for pilot sites as in 
the above case may short-circuit consultation processes, feasibility studies or 
assessments and stakeholder engagement.
Second, the time to discuss details might not be available (as was the case here). The 
process of selecting beneficiaries for a project might already be past forcing officials 
to visit groups or individuals they consider suitable. In a way, the selected person or 
persons have no immediate say in why they are selected. Third, the ‘frontline 
officials’ might have little knowledge of what they are promoting but are busy 
responding to directives from above and trying to meet deadlines. Oftentimes the 
good intentions of the outsiders in ‘imposing ideas’ are assumed away and regarded 
as anathema to participation when in some cases it is a workable strategy for 
addressing local knowledge gaps. Fourth, there may be no resources to support the 
development of an idea including exposing would-be beneficiaries to successful cases 
as a basis for ensuring informed buy-in (see Box 1).
On the part of the farmer64, the responses and questions typified a risk-averse 
decision-maker. In the above case, the new project appeared to be a diversion from his 
real needs (assistance to fence his land and buy more irrigation pipes). However, the 
manner in which the discussion proceeded sounded as if refusing the new project 
would jeopardize the existing relationship and its potential to generate more benefits. 
The farmer might have realized the new project could be taken elsewhere denying
64 The farmer has a 3 hectare gravity-fed irrigation scheme drawing water from an earth dam 
established before resettlement in the mid-1980s, successfully grows dryland tobacco, has 21 herd o f  
cattle and therefore very rich by rural standards. He however asked for assistance to purchase an engine 
arguing that his beasts were a form o f  social insurance ( ‘ ...in  case my eldest son gets married’).
him the benefits of regular official visits, which are a source o f information and a 
conferment of some social status. Quick expression of interest in the project appeared 
more of relationship-maintenance than interest in cassava growing. New projects 
appear to be accepted not for their appeal but for what they enable e.g. community 
visibility and proximity to officials both governmental and non-governmental.
At some of the community meetings attended during the research song and dance 
appeared to be important media used in development discourse. What was sung, when 
songs were sung, the names of people infused into songs and the general mood o f a 
community or group seemed to be carefully selected. Song and dance appeared to be 
used to motivate development practitioners encouraging them to do more and to make 
promises to communities. There was also sweet-talking and generous praise-singing 
interspaced with serious messages in the speeches delivered at meetings by visitors 
and communities alike. Communities robustly mix elements of sympathy-seeking (we 
are a forgotten lot, very poor, hungry etc) and confidence-inspiring expressions in 
speeches delivered to visitors depending on the visitor. Where a community has 
sufficient knowledge of the organisation they would be ‘saying the right things’ and 
select the right spokespersons. Some of the phrases appeared to ridicule officials, for 
instance;
‘...money comes (from central government) but never arrives (to communities)...’
and ‘...we have become too good at talking and less on action’ (Land Dialogue,
2004, see Mbembe 2001).
From the first case, it would appear that offering gifts is a strategic way of influencing 
decision-making and may determine whether support is provided, the location of 
projects and the beneficiaries. Officials often solicit for gifts and inquire about certain 
produce or services, leading them to communities where they may eventually locate 
interventions. Community members also seek one-on-one interface with officials to 
secure support.
Based on the above I cannot say that people opt out o f relationships with development 
organisations completely. However, they develop ways o f dealing with development 
organisations for their benefit. Development organisations have methods of getting 
things done with communities that, among others, include pre-selection of 
beneficiaries or contacts. The next sub-sections explore some of the groups that
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people form as a way of structuring their own participation in development. Some of 
the initiatives are facilitated by government and by NGOs. Except to the extent that 
Councilors are usually involved, the groups are rarely Council initiated. As such, they 
owe their existence to community initiatives and non-Council facilitation. Suffice it to 
say that they constitute an important strategy for addressing serious development 
issues while also drawing the attention of development organisations.
6.8.2. The type of groups communities establish
Notwithstanding the formal governance structures, communities form and participate 
in their own groups. These groups are formed from local initiatives as well as through 
the facilitation of different external development organisations. In terms of the first of 
the two most important groups that respondents belonged to, survey results showed a 
predominance of farming or productive groups as indicated by 41.5% of the 
respondents followed by religious groups at 32.1%, social groups at 15.1%, and 
micro-credit groups at 11.3%. These groups are established by people to pursue their 
interests. Groups present opportunities for individuals to approach authorities and 
NGOs for assistance with or without the blessing of Ward/Village Assemblies or 
Councilors. In Mutare’s new resettlement areas covered by the survey, these are not 
evident although in the Seke/Manyame sites these are already active. Four HIV and 
AIDS support groups (social groups), Taga Development and Taga Dairy Association 
(productive groups) and at least 10 project groups assisted by the Ward Coordinator 
are some of the examples in the community. In the Ward 15 Focus Group Discussion 
and the interview held with the Ward Coordinator of the same Ward these groups 
were considered the principal reference points, as there was no Councilor at the time 
of fieldwork.
Compared to resettlement Wards, communal Wards have more groups in both Mutare 
and Seke/Manyame. For instance, in Ward 2, Mutare District there are at least 21 
groups affiliated to a 15-member umbrella club. They receive financial, technical and 
general training support from the new Ministry o f Women’s Affairs, Gender and 
Community Development65. The groups range in terms of size from 3 to 18 members. 
Except for the bigger ones (above 6 in membership), the smaller ones are largely
65 Support began before former Ministry o f  Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation 
was split into two Ministries.
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formed around family relations (‘me, my wife, our children and our friends’ type). 
Their institutional support comes from the umbrella club and through it from the 
Ministry. The activities they undertake vary but include smallholder irrigation (on 
plots of 0.02 to 3 hectares), sewing, soap-making, handicrafts, confectionery and 
trading in basic commodities.
The groups are different from AREX ones (discussed below) although for those 
undertaking agricultural activities they receive support from the department alongside 
other farmers. All groups engage in at least one activity to improve household 
welfare. They use a Committee-based governance system with Ministry-facilitated 
constitutions developed within the Cooperative legislative framework. In interviews, 
some of the members explained how they lacked access to financial resources, 
necessary equipment or tools and the skills they would need to run their activities 
successfully. Suffice to note that the concept of a project as a community (and thus 
public) intervention appears to be challenged from the manner in which some of these 
groups constitute themselves along family lines and activities that would ordinarily be 
regarded as household activities.
While community support mechanisms exist on an unorganised basis, it would appear 
that existing groups had some external affiliation and required catalysis (see Berner et 
al 2005). In the Kasempa areas where community diaries were kept, groups like Safe 
Motherhood Groups (SMOGs), Community Welfare Assistance Committees, 
Producer Groups and Village Resource Management Committees, among others, 
existed largely linked to externally-facilitated programmes. Between the household 
and the lower-level local government structures (Village and Ward Assemblies in 
Zimbabwe and ADCs in Zambia), there are therefore a number of socio-economic and 
political formations that enable people to participate in development. However, 
external facilitation for their survival and growth is very important.
6.8.3. Farmer organisations
In Zimbabwe AREX is supporting a number o f specific or projectised activities as 
part of its mandate. Some of the activities are based on the promotion o f specific 
crops and clusters of groups o f farmers growing those crops. Some of the crops 
include cotton and small grains. In the Marange area of Mutare District, three wards
(Mutupo, Mukuni small-scale commercial farming area and Mafararikwa) are an 
example. Other crops emphasized include groundnuts and sorghum both considered 
suited to the agro-ecological conditions of the area. AREX is promoting small-grains 
more than maize and works in partnership with CARE International (an International 
NGO) to promote production of two sorghum varieties i.e. Chibuku and Marcia 
through an agro-dealer66 association. Farmer organisations therefore are formed 
around specific agricultural activities. In total AREX works with 52 registered 
Farmers’ Organisations in Mutare and there are many more not formally registered 
(Interview with Head of AREX Mutare 12th January 2005).
Working with Farmers’ Organisations enables AREX to offer extension services on a 
cost-effective basis since its resources are limited at present. The AREX head for 
Mutare also acknowledged that Farmers’ Groups in the Chigodora area o f Mutare 
provided the department with fuel twice to enable staff to offer services (Interviews, 
7th January 2005). During the army-worm invasion of 2004 he recalled how farmers 
in the affected areas directly provided transport and fuel support to AREX. Other 
development organisations find the AREX groups and Farmers’ Organisations useful 
launch-pads for their work. There have been challenges in this area with AREX 
feeling that development organisations especially NGOs are ‘reaping without sowing’ 
hence the sentiments discussed in Chapter 5 where AREX felt some NGOs burdened 
them without offering incentives. Moreover, the national Farmers’ Union (Zimbabwe 
Farmers’ Union- ZFU) perceives AREX-linked groups as rivaling it on the ground 
because some of them are affiliated to a splinter of the Union. At their 2004 congress, 
ZFU alleged that AREX was establishing farmer groups for organisations other than 
ZFU and thus undermining the viability of the Union (ZFU Congress 2nd September 
2004).
In Kasempa, there are a number of farmer organisations formed with support from the 
Department of Agriculture and Cooperatives (DACO). Table 19 shows some of the 
Cooperatives in Kasempa District and by sector.
66 These are mainly store-owners or rural retailers selling farming inputs to local farmers clustered into 
associations to promote a specific product. CARE has been in the forefront o f  promoting this approach 
to improve input accessibility for smallholder farmers.
Table 19: Types of cooperatives in Kasempa District (June 2005)
Cooperative Type/Sector. Main Activities. Number.
Agriculture. Seasonal and horticultural crop 
production.
48.
Multi-purpose. Farming and non-farming activities. 8.
Consumer. Running retail (commercial) ventures. 1.
Service-oriented. Catering. 2.
Study Group (pre-cooperative). Unregistered. 7.
Micro-credit. Savings and credit. 1.
District Cooperative Union. Apex Body; supporting pre-cooperatives 
and registered coops.
1.
Bee-keeping. Honey production. 1.
Total. 69.
Source; Field Data.
There are therefore mixed views on the importance of Farmers’ Organisations. 
However, from a service provision perspective AREX finds them strategic. In 
interviews with sub-District AREX staff in the Marange area, they felt these groups 
were helping transfer lessons as the department’s resources no longer allowed regular 
and effective visits to farmers. An important finding of this study is the 
acknowledgement of farmer support by government-related development 
organisations as enabling service provision. It is usual to talk of participation of 
people in relation to locally available materials needed for a project and labor not 
material input into an organisation’s budget.
6.8.4. Volunteering as participatory development
People often give up their time to assist others or to participate in programmes 
without formal material rewards and working irregular times, which is important in 
any community. These volunteers are a critical mechanism for ensuring people’s 
participation in development activities. Zimbabwe’s fight against HIV and AIDS, 
especially Home-Based Care (HBC) activities, draw significantly from local 
volunteers. This enables communities to get benefits and access external organisations 
through their neighbors selected and trained as volunteers. Volunteers tend to have or 
develop strong community bonds. This is because communities usually select socially 
acceptable candidates for training as volunteers. They also develop or acquire skills, 
which often enable them to facilitate programme implementation. The Diocese of 
Mutare Community Care Programme (DOMCCP) and Seke/Manyame’s Seke Rural 
Home-based Care (a secular programme) are some o f the organisations that depend on 
volunteers in the provision o f their services in the two study Districts. The SMOGs 
and CWACs in Kasempa also use volunteers for delivery of services.
Volunteers are not only found in the HIV and AIDS sector as they are there in other 
programme areas as well. In fact I can argue that most community leaders with the 
exception of a few (e.g. Zimbabwe’s traditional leaders) are volunteers. Their
importance in making participation exist and work is therefore very important. When
a volunteer is selected and trained, the newly acquired social status and zeal to help 
appear sufficient motivations for them to offer diligent service without expecting 
rewards. In all three Districts, some challenges with volunteers were identified. Some 
volunteers were beginning to demand more recognition and material rewards.
Following a Strategic Planning session, which I also attended in January 2006, 
DOMCCP got feedback from volunteers and stakeholders making them commit to 
come up with a volunteer policy as their volunteers threatened to revolt over
incentives (Interviews 22nd 
June 2006). The perks given to 
volunteers differ with
organisation in the AIDS
sector. While AIDS
programmes have built on 
traditions o f inter-household 
and intra-community mutual 
self-help, high poverty levels 
are increasing volunteers’
opportunity costs. Box 11 
provides a list o f the factors 
that influence the quality and 
duration of volunteering based on data from the DOMCCP Planning session and
interviews undertaken during the course of this study.
The above brings me to a broader reflection on how to make voluntarism a basis for 
participatory development. To what extent can development organisations work 
together to address some o f the above challenges say at District level? Would
standardization of incentives (e.g. Councilors and traditional leaders’ allowances in
Zimbabwe or incentives for HIV and AIDS care-givers etc) help in addressing these 
challenges? How would this work where some development organisations are unable,
Box 11: Factors affecting volunteering duration
■ Socio-economic status o f volunteer on volunteering.
■ The post-appointment learning and development
opportunities and their effect on status as well as non­
material benefits like recognition and access to benefits 
hitherto inaccessible.
■ The adequacy o f the simple motivation o f ‘being o f  
service to one’s community’.
■ Strength and nature o f  counter-attractions like other 
volunteer-recruiting interventions.
■ General availability o f  information and extent o f
‘volunteer unionization’.
■ Continued strength o f  the belief in the cause.
■ The socio-economic context for volunteers’ work. In a 
context o f economic and social stress volunteers’ 
opportunity costs are higher than in societies that are 
more prosperous.
■ Peer pressure and the role o f  the family in motivating.
■ The extent o f  the personal burden o f  volunteering.
Source; F ield  Data
because of affordability, organizational values of other reasons, to comply with set 
standards? How about uniqueness and individual identity o f organisations? The 
implications of the above questions for institutionalising participatory development 
are significant. For instance, once a volunteer withdraws their services the link 
between outsiders and the community may break dislocating local development 
processes. In some instances, disappointed volunteers have been known to constrain 
service delivery. In others, they introduce counter-attractions with the effect of 
disrupting community processes and internal-external linkages.
6.9. Conclusion
This Chapter has explored people’s understanding and use of development 
organisations. Such use is mediated through people’s own (local) organisations and 
structures or spaces created by outsiders. Through the study I learnt of the factors that 
communities use to evaluate the helpfulness of development organisations. Critical 
factors include perceptions of organisational relations, track record and the type of 
needs communities have. Local innovations and volunteering were discussed to show 
the avenues through which ordinary people channel their developmental agency. 
External development organisations play a critical role in facilitating people’s 
involvement in development. However, it was noted that external development 
organisations lack mechanisms for providing and receiving feedback and often lack 
time to facilitate development interventions as shown in the proposed cassava project. 
The perceptions of relationships and usefulness of development organisations 
combine to influence whether ordinary people take the challenge to participate 
through existing structures or resolve to use their own initiatives. Evidence from the 
study suggests considerable local participation in activities (including groups) that are 
directly linked to external development organisations. In some instances, the linkages 
are multiple and simultaneous leading some development organisations, as shown in 
the ZFU case, to complain that their work is negatively impacted upon. While it 
appears that to some degree institutional interaction plays a peripheral role in people’s 
own initiatives it cannot be completely ruled out of the endeavours of ordinary people. 
The chapter has also shown ways in which people’s agency critically and innovatively 
influences individual organisations as well as inter-organisational interaction.
C h a p t e r  7: D is c u s s io n  a n d  C o n c l u s io n
7.1. Introduction
Participation was defined as the taking of meaningful and voluntary action in 
development spaces, structures and processes. Institutionalising participation involves 
taking formal and informal actions to ensure that ordinary people have access to and 
control of such spaces, structures and processes. The key research question was posed 
as: what are the key institutional factors supportive of and inhibitions to 
participatory development at District level? This question was answered by 
drawing on the theory and practice of decentralisation and participation. The study 
finds that the main factors facilitating participatory development relate to inter- 
organisational interactions. Organisational interaction occurs in joint and separate 
spaces. Governments influence and participate in these spaces through policy and 
programme implementation. Governmental involvement strengthens but also distorts 
local organisational relations.
The study also finds that people’s participation acts as the bottom-up pressure essential 
for making organisational interaction responsive to local priorities. In Zimbabwe and 
Zambia, considerably rich and dynamic traditions of grassroots participation exist, which 
however lack extra-local influence. Using the analytical models of Amstein (1969), 
Pretty et al (1995) and White (1996), such participation remains at the nominal levels. 
Zimbabwe’s crisis has seriously strained organisational relations and capacities (see 
Mukamuri et al 2003), which has affected people’s participation. Decentralisation theory 
does not hold much promise for Zimbabwe considering that there is little left to transfer 
to the decentralised governance structures.
The factors listed in Box 12 (below) summarise the study findings and the analyses in 
Chapter 2, which particularly engaged issues o f mechanisms and structures used to 
institutionalise participation. I consider these factors critical for participatory 
development at the District level. I present the factors in a neutral way, i.e. not as 
either supportive or inhibitive of District level development. This is because, 
depending on context, each factor may have both supportive and inhibitive elements. 
With the exception of factor 2, the rest concern aspects outside the direct control of
any individual organisation. I use the evidence from the field to discuss how these 
factors manifest themselves in the case study countries and therefore the extent to 
which participation is enabled or constrained.
Having discussed the opportunities for and challenges to institutionalising 
participation in Zambia and Zimbabwe in Chapters 5 and 6, in this section I pull
together key issues and draw some 
theoretically generalisable
conclusions on the subject of 
participation in rural development. 
The research experiences deepened 
my understanding o f the research 
question and raised additional
questions. Exploring the question 
was a rich experience from a 
theoretical and practical
perspective. In the first section of
this Chapter, I elaborate on the 
factors in Box 12 to shed light on 
the meanings drawn from the
findings and contribute to debate 
on enhancing participation in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Other sections 
focus on the new insights from the study regarding local governance practices from 
the perspective of institutional interaction.
7.1.1. Traditions of grassroots participation
In any given community there are preferred or generally deployed mechanisms for 
participation at the local level or regarding engagement with outsiders. These 
preferred and generally deployed mechanisms o f participation are what I refer to here 
as traditions of grassroots participation. Available literature highlights ordinary 
people’s agency in different legal, social, economic and political contexts (see Mercer 
2002; Green 2000; Tilakaratna 1987; Haidari and White 2001; Connell 1997; 
Marshall 2005; McCall 1988; Kar 2003; Mapedza and Mandondo 2002). What is also 
critical are the structures that shape the agency (see Giddens 1984; Bentzon et al
Box 12: Factors supportive of participatory
development
1. Traditions o f  grassroots participation.
2. Participatoriness o f  development organisations in 
pursuing their mandates.
3. Relationships between development organisations 
(formal and informal, traditional and modern).
4. Direct delivery or provision o f  material benefits and 
facilitating generation o f  benefits through local 
processes and organisations.
5. Coordination o f  development activities and 
development organisations.
6. Form and relevance o f  support from higher or 
outside development organisations.
7. Effectiveness o f associations (NANGO, ARDCZ) 
regarding organisational interaction.
8. Planning, plans and planners in terms o f  their 
shaping o f  substantive and procedural issues in 
development.
9. The existing policy framework and the ability o f  
actors to carve out operational spaces and develop 
competencies without violating legal provisions.
1998). The effect o f development organisations and programmes on people’s 
participation was explored extensively using literature (see Oomen 2002; Thompson 
1995; Porter and Onyach-Olaa 1999; King and Cutshall 1994; Mungate 1993; 
Blackburn and de Toma 1998; Krishna et al 1997; Gaventa 2005; Cornwall 2002). 
This study identified various ways in which communities organise and engage with 
development organisations. Both self-organised and outsider-organised mechanisms 
were observed. Some o f the specific mechanisms deployed include writing letters of 
complaint, attending meetings, volunteering, directly approaching development 
organisations and membership of farming (or other) organisations. The use of these 
different methods varies by gender, age, social status, existing institutions, resources 
and, among others, available information. In Chapters 5 and 6, I presented examples 
from where these variables that collectively form what I call here ‘traditions of 
grassroots participation’.
7.1.2. Organisational participatoriness
An organisation’s perceived or proven use of participatory processes influences 
participation (see Thompson 1995, Staudt 1991). This constitutes an organisation’s 
own traditions of participation. For instance, the establishment of ADCs in rural 
Zambia is guided by the desire to limit the direct participation o f traditional leaders 
who are perceived as non-participatory. It is felt their involvement might limit 
people’s freedom in ADCs. In Chapter 5 ,1 also discussed the practices through which 
Mutare and Seke/Manyame deal with public complaints and generally communicate 
with people. Organisational expectations also arise from track records particularly in 
relation to internal resources to meet demands placed on an institution. Similarly, 
organisational mandates, at law as well as popular interpretations thereof, affect 
interaction and the extent to which other actors work with particular development 
organisations.
7.1.3. Inter-organisational relations
These occur in public spaces and in intervention design or during implementation. 
The relations are guided by existing policies (point 9 in box 12) but also depend on 
lived experiences. The strength of horizontal coordination of actors and availability of 
resources for development organisations to perform their functions thus dependability 
are key variables. One example, cited in section 5.4.2 of working to boost inter-
organisational relations, which also helped institutionalize participation, involved 
establishment of a Mutare District Assembly, which is an initiative o f Council and 
Plan International, an NGO.
7.1.4. Institutional delivery
Development organisations leave foot prints in communities where they work. The 
foot prints are both about development processes and actual products delivered. 
Organisations and communities use such knowledge of organisational foot prints to 
decide on the breadth and depth participation. The same logic applies to institutions 
like that of chieftainship (see Oomen 2002), Councilors and central government. 
Another relevant example is Zimbabwe’s decentralised development planning system. 
In recent years, the system is failing to deliver. The result is that ordinary people have 
become skeptical of its dependability (GRZ 2004; Hammar 2003; Conyers 2003; see 
also Government of Zambia 2004). Development organisations now participate more 
as a ritual than a meaningful process. People’s perceptions of, and development 
organisations involved in, the development planning process have been negatively 
affected. However, when schools, clinics, other infrastructure and governmental 
services were provided in response to villagers’ submissions the system was very 
popular. The tensions between NGOs and the Government of Zimbabwe at present 
are in part explained by the higher visibility of the former in rural areas than the latter. 
Actual delivery creates the necessary conditions for good relations and participation.
7.1.5. Coordinating activities and development organisations
Development processes are coordinated by local and national government-related 
development organisations within sub-national spaces. The coordination function is 
often contested. Central and local government development organisations lay a claim 
to the coordination role. The contested claims affect the extent to which ordinary 
people and development organisations participate. District Development Committees 
are often the spaces within which these tensions are played out. Such tensions 
constrain the Committees and reduce their attractiveness (see Gasper 1997; 
Government of Zambia 2004). In some instances, constraints and tensions in joint 
planning and coordination spaces force non-governmental organisations and donors to 
create alternative structures. In Zimbabwe, attendance of Development Committee 
meetings by government departments and NGOs was noted to be erratic. However,
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there are good practices emerging, as the case of Mutare Council-DDF and three 
NGOs shows. Sub-District structures are also affected by vague role assignment and 
weak development coordination. Traditional and elected leadership on the one hand 
and government technical staff on the other are often in conflict. Interventions by 
national politicians also stress the District planning and coordination system.
What often makes the coordination of development activities and functions more 
difficult is the limitations in resources both for coordination and actual activity 
implementation. Some national programmes do not provide adequate resources for 
coordination e.g. Zimbabwe’s Public Works programme discussed in Chapter 5. 
Some organisational conflict is more a product of resource stresses rather than role 
overlaps. The expectations that the public sector has o f NGOs regarding material 
support often stresses organisational relations particularly where the NGOs are unable 
to facilitate access to resources and incentives. District level planning and information 
management processes are often under-funded. Outside support for joint spaces and 
processes is reduced for fear of sustaining what is called the workshop and per-diem 
culture67 while District level budgets are inadequate for such expenditures.
7.1.6. Institutional support from above
Sub-District structures receive inadequate strategic and operational support from 
above. The party politicization o f traditional leaders in Zimbabwe and the support 
they receive has had the effect of distorting local relations (see Odotei 2005; GRZ 
2002a; Mukamuri et al 2003). Critically, central government rules and decisions have 
a stronger bearing on sub-national organisational relations than local processes. 
Consequently, in both Zambia and Zimbabwe integrated management and sustenance 
o f local development institutions is weak. I return to this issue in section 7.6.
7.1.7. Participation and institutional effectiveness: a role for associations
Associations like the National Association of NGOs (NANGO), the Association of 
Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe (ARDCZ) and the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union 
(ZFU) are avenues for people’s participation through their different structures and 
processes. They also represent distinct and sizeable constituencies whose activities are
67 This is where professionals hop from one workshop to another more for the associated financial 
benefits (per-diems or allowances) than to act on knowledge acquired or resolutions made.
pertinent to the furtherance o f participation. Associations have different roles 
including capacity development of their members, which could be a basis for building 
participatory cultures. In 2004 I followed NANGO processes on the NGO Bill in 
Zimbabwe, attended an ARDCZ biennial congress and the ZFU annual congress. The 
NANGO process illuminated state-NGO tensions at all levels particularly as the Bill 
followed the 2003 Operational Manual seen as part of confining NGO operational 
spaces. NGOs saw the Bill as a threat to NGO freedom generally and particularly 
targeted at advocacy and human rights organisations. Non-human rights NGOs saw 
themselves as safe, which strained NANGO regarding pulling together its 
membership. NANGO’s proposals for self-regulation, which were explained to 
Parliamentarians and other stakeholders, did not succeed, which showed how 
entrenched state-NGO differences were.
The ARDCZ and ZFU congresses reflected constraints faced by associations in a 
polarized context where they struggle to balance ‘delivering their constituents to the 
ruling party’ as a way of securing space and recognition and raising serious concerns, 
for instance, in relation to centre-local relations (ARDCZ) and government activities 
perceived as undermining non-state bodies (ZFU). For ARDCZ technical and political 
actors appeared to respond to different governmental signals from different parts of 
government. The heterogeneity of all three associations affected their ability to 
articulate clear and non-partisan advocacy agendas. Interpretation of signals from 
existing environment and organisational relations informed both the debates and 
outcomes. The associations’ experiences pointed to the need for an underlying 
democratic culture in society regarding how non-governmental development 
organisations operates and co-exists with state organisations. As such, although the 
thesis has proceeded on the basis of articulating the power of the local, I have not 
ignored the place or critical influence of macro-conditions, which are dictated upon 
principally by the central state and global trends.
7.1.8. Planning products and plan promoters
These create serious opportunities for participation. However, development 
organisations face coordination constraints regarding activities and actors (section 
5.3). Local steering and resourcing of planning systems and products (the procedural 
and substantive issues) remain weak, which constrains local ownership particularly as
local elected and traditional leaders seem pressured to ‘bring projects’ and fear 
engaging with their constituents if they have ‘nothing to bring/take’. This 
‘externalisation of the development process’ slows down local participation (see 
Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2005). Such external isation was borne out o f high 
development expectations at independence and the early positive state responses in 
the two countries. In Zimbabwe more than in Zambia, these immediate post­
independence responses had a lot to do with donor assistance made possible under the 
Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development initiatives (GRZ 1981) 
and a relatively stable economy. For Zambia, good world copper prices, among 
others, enabled meeting o f post-independence development demands. The current 
economic decline and donor flight in Zimbabwe contrasts sharply with economic 
recovery and donor support in Zambia. However, despite these different macro­
conditions the underlying local institutional challenges reflect close similarities.
7.1.9. Maneuvering in existing spaces
The existing national policy environment communicates good intentions but betrays 
centralistic tendencies in both countries. Mutizwa-Mangiza (1991) observed that a 
state without complete control of local government secures such control through 
recentralizing the national economy and other responsibilities. This is an assessment 
that remains true for Zimbabwe today. However, local actors do not seem to be 
innovative enough to extend their capacities and generate value within existing 
statutes. For instance, not all challenges faced by Councils in relation to local revenue 
collection require policy or legislative changes. This is because the challenges reflect 
lack of citizen-Council trust, limited Council visibility at sub-District levels and weak 
Councilor capacities. More can (or could) be done by and through Councils under 
existing legislation in the two countries than is often acknowledged. Similarly, more 
can (and could) be done by other local development institutions without radical 
changes to existing policies and laws while at the same time that same maneuvering 
may act to initiate medium to long term policy shifts.
7.2. Projects as learning and conflict spaces
Physical, economic and social projects are (and have been) important in addressing 
poverty and mobilizing society around critical issues. Project funds mostly come from 
outside benefiting communities, although local resources (time, labor, materials etc)
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are used during implementation. Regarding benefit delivery, projects in the two 
countries have mixed results but are not always complete failures (see Ferguson 
1994). However, it is important to look at projects as spaces within which relations 
are (re)-shaped. The (re)-shaping of relationships provides useful lessons in terms of 
how development is done, particularly the institutional arrangements beyond benefit 
delivery to communities. The Public Works Programme in Zimbabwe shows how 
local and central government relations were organised and how implementation 
generated debate. ZAMSIF sheds similar light on relations e.g. the handling of the 
District Health sub-project in Kasempa District. Zimbabwean programmes analysed 
in Chapter 2 also provide insights into how projects are used to influence the doing of 
development. Perhaps it is in influencing how development is done that projects 
generally fail, considering that challenges regarding inter-organisational relations and 
their effect on development remain resilient.
Projects do not appear to address core social mobilisation issues. Often, communities, 
project promoters, and hosts-cum-implementers focus more on material project 
outcomes than participation. A combination of preconceptions about solutions (see 
O’Laughlin 2007; Ferguson 1994; Nyoni 1987; Chambers 1983; 1997), the role of 
outsiders and short-term interests (Mansuri and Rao 2004; see Booth 2003; McGee 
and Norton 2000; Calderisi 2006; Browne 2007; Moss et al 2006) detracts from 
project effectiveness. In addition, most project conflicts concern organisational 
relations especially accountability than project design or implementation. Learning 
and sustaining project-based participatory practice from projects are curtailed by 
organisational relations. As Illich (1997) argues, existing models of development 
(projects included) are not meant to work. Mitlin and Bebbington (2006) also note 
that the importance of social movements is less about influencing specific policies and 
programmes but the terms in which society debates poverty and social change (see 
Cornwall and Brock 2005). The point becomes about the extent and quality of 
interface in different spheres and at the different levels not actual project outcomes.
Hiding institutional conflict is positive and negative, deliberate and inadvertent. It is 
done by organisations and their representatives as well as by individuals. The example 
of the conversation between the farmer and a government official (section 6.8.1) 
shows situations where potential conflict is at once avoided and deferred. Hiding
conflict could be positive if eventual implementation of a project helps develop 
mutual understanding amongst development organisations. It is negative where it 
weakens project design rendering implementation impossible. Another challenge with 
projects is the high number of externally supported ones. This is not to undervalue the 
existence of local initiatives but to highlight that joint spaces and Committees 
resultantly become more externally than locally stimulated. It is therefore not 
surprising that after external support initiatives dependent on external stimuli falter 
(see Moyo et al 2000; Mansuri and Rao 2004).
I acknowledge that development is not the same as projects and projects are not 
synonymous with donors/NGOs. However, the perception on the ground suggests that 
people tend to equate the two. As such when a community says there is no 
‘development’ in their area or a politician promises to respond to community needs, 
bringing a project and/or an NGO is generally what is meant. ‘Nothing happening’ is 
thus the same as limited interaction with authorities and the outside world. 
Communities do not seem to regard the regular extension support and Village 
meetings to discuss and address social problems as development. Similarly, 
contributing to infrastructure development at the local school is hardly regarded as 
development unless a donor/NGO is involved at some stage of the project. The study 
found that these ‘small things and regular activities’ continue to take place but are not 
seen as the ‘real thing’. The search for the ‘real thing’ shapes interaction and allows 
ennoblement of some actors ahead of others. This is what promotes the culture of 
‘looking up and out’. In many ways, this constitutes a distortion o f what development 
is, or should be about (see Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Mararike 1995) for which 
outsiders (NGOs, government etc) are largely responsible.
Taking development to communities is seen as similar to projects. Let me refer to this 
as extemalisation of local development. Extemalisation starts with amplification of 
local needs to a level where external assistance is seen as the only basis for leveraging 
change. Such amplification simultaneously underplays local competences, resources 
and experiences. Extemalisation breeds a level of helplessness from local through 
national level. If there is any lesson emerging from projects it would appear that it is 
about ‘projectisation of development’. Externalising and projectising development has 
some resonance with the practice especially amongst cattle keepers. Cattle farmers are
known to resist disposing of their animals to meet household needs. Some tend to 
articulate their needs as community needs and thus projectisable to enable them to 
access outside assistance. Development organisations, Councils included, also tend to 
adopt a related approach. Instead o f addressing emergent community needs in the 
normal course of their work, they regard requests for assistance more often as special 
and requiring unique responses. The requests then get blown beyond their existing (or 
developable) competences. Such a disposition blurs the difference between 
development needs that can be met locally and those that require external or special 
responses. This culture affects both communities and development organisations (see 
Kar 2003; Kar and Pasteur 2005). Making development about things (materialisation), 
projectisation and extemalisation of development appear unsuited to institutionalising 
participation. Alternatively put, where materialised and projectised development 
becomes about outsiders intervening in locals’ life worlds making the taking of a 
meaningful and voluntary part (participation) merely nominal. In their joint and 
separate spaces, development organisations need to work to undo such a disposition 
and to localize the doing of development.
7.3 New forms of local governance
Tandon and Mohanty (2003) question the distinctiveness and difference of civil 
society from the state. I am persuaded to concur with this if  the referring of 
community assistance requests by Councils to NGOs, official requests for assistance 
and growing recognition of NGO activities are considered. My reasoning is that 
development organisations in any given District ideally work in keeping with the 
development vision of that locality. The activities they execute further an agreed 
agenda. As such, a community request for assistance to Council or any other 
organisation can be shifted to the organisation best placed to respond to that need. 
Such a referral system for development activities suggests that NGOs have become a 
recognized part of local governance (see Krishna 2003; Johnson and Wilson 2000). 
Councils are also supported by NGOs and international donors to cover expenses 
ordinarily covered from treasury e.g. salary payments under CAP for PAAP Officers 
in Zimbabwe, covering expenses for travel and meetings, payment of allowances and 
other forms of support that NGOs/donors provide to public organisations. It is in this 
context that local governance seems to have acquired new dimensions and actors. 
These dynamics have implications for the public sector and communities.
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The situation in Zimbabwe presents some policy and practice contradictions. At 
policy level and in terms of political rhetoric NGOs are Western and therefore 
undesirable. Nugent (2004) captures this view when he notes that ‘ . .in general NGOs 
contributed to the weakening of the post-colonial state’ (2004:237; see Nyangoro 
1999). Since 2003, the policy and legislative maneuvers to monitor NGOs reflect this 
position (GRZ 2003a; CPIA 2005). This has been occurring alongside growing NGO 
visibility in development and humanitarian work. The guidelines that the Government 
o f Zimbabwe has developed in recent years betray unhappiness with NGOs and often 
a perception that they are a nuisance particularly those involved in human rights and 
advocacy work is evident. In terms of their growing programme visibility government 
responded by collapsing four o f its programmes into one (the RCDF) to ensure that 
grants become more meaningful and thus activity at the sub-national level becomes 
more visible. The RCDF is an example of what I have called projectisation of 
development and in this case a projectisation o f government presence. The work done 
by Women for Change in Zambia and other advocacy organisations has also ruffled 
government feathers and presents a challenge in terms of conceptualising and 
operationalising NGO-state relations something requiring further research.
Trends in Tanzania where international development assistance is coming through the 
state have been observed to influence state-NGO-donor relations (REPOA 2007) by 
bringing the three closer together. The Tanzanian dynamics read in relation to Figure 
1 highlight the role the international sphere plays working more in alignment with the 
state. The situation is different in Zimbabwe where the international sphere seeks 
ways of relating directly with the people of Zimbabwe (EU 2007) making new local 
governance shaky. What may be of interest in post-crisis Zimbabwe is to explore how 
the donor/INGO-facilitated inter-organisational relations survive a possible 
‘donor/INGO-state romance’. What role will NGOs and other non-state organisations 
play, how will their stores and flows of influence be affected between individual non­
state organisations, with the state and with the international sphere? As Marshal 
(2005) observes regarding the perceived separateness of religion and socio-economic 
development, there are ‘many holes in knowledge and awareness o f work across 
different silos of action’.
Tensions notwithstanding, there are opportunities for the transfer of good and 
participatory practice through this ‘new public administration’. The sharing is more 
practical at the District level. Meetings, projects and other spaces provide the venues 
for such exchanges. Constraints to exchange of lessons are more operational and 
attitudinal than structural and policy related. In Zimbabwe, perceptions and often 
unsubstantiated political rhetoric fans acrimony between the state and non-state 
organisations. The study exposed the predominance of national level control of the 
interface between non-state and sub-national governmental structures in Zimbabwe. 
The operational guidelines that are made at local level e.g. the case of Nyanga RDC 
are drawn more in response to central dictates than local realities. This explains the 
weakening of NGO participation in sub-national joint spaces or Committees in 
Zimbabwe, further reducing scope for productive interaction. The lack o f funding and 
logistical resources in government organisations including Councils strains relations 
and exposes capacity weaknesses. Strained relations arise from expectations brought 
on NGOs to cover expenditures that should ordinarily be covered from public sector 
resources. NGOs often find it difficult to fundraise for or justify such spending.
In Zimbabwe, more than in Zambia, the state feels more secure working with non­
state organisations in spaces that it manages than in autonomous forums (see 
Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 2001; Hammar 2003; Pankhurst 2002; Bond and 
Manyanya 2003). An emerging question is how Councils can ensure that the state 
feels more secure even when it indirectly controls spaces where NGOs are active. 
This is because Councils approach NGOs for assistance but are generally unable to 
protect them from state persecution. State security is not used in regard to civil unrest 
but to policy and programmatic comfort. As Nhema (2002) observes, the 
Zimbabwean state has used a corporatist approach to managing relations with non­
governmental development organisations and often takes over their agendas or co­
opts certain of their members (see Essof 2005; Raftopoulos and Savage 2004). Issues 
that arise relate to government’s preparedness to be seen as a partner of and be held 
accountable by non-govemmental development organisations and general capacity to 
manage such interaction (see Mukamuri et al 2003; Nugent 2004).
Granted that some analysts (see Chambers 1989, Fritz and Menocal 2007) argue that 
the state has to grow in order to respond to poverty issues the question is whether
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NGOs constitute an acceptable extension of state capacity. As presently constituted 
the Zimbabwean state appears ill-adapted to such a dispensation. A future state may 
find value in nurturing collaboration and partnerships (see Nyangoro 1999; 
Abrahamsen 2000) making the experiences from Mutare and Seke/Manyame 
instructive. Additional research work is however needed to analyze how state-NGO 
relations have evolved in the last seven years where the Zimbabwean crisis has 
deepened. The framework presented in this thesis is useful in exploring this question.
7.4. Planning, planners and plans: rethinking decentralisation
In sections 5.2 and 5.3, I engaged with the subject of planning and observed that the 
units o f planning, the planners and development facilitation are many, which broadens 
spaces for participation but also overlapping. I gave examples of interventions based 
on chieftainships while others follow administrative boundaries like the Ward. In 
some instances, this creates inequities in resource deployment and confusion in terms 
of planning cycles in part a direct consequence of the complex taxonomy of planners. 
I also noted that the myriad planning processes and products are often not 
appropriately collated at District level. This is a point discussed above in regard to the 
challenges of coordinating multi-stakeholder processes where streams o f resources are 
at once varied and non-local in the main. In the relevant sections o f Chapter 5 I 
acknowledged the benefits and provided the rationale for how and why so many 
planners exist. I also shared my thoughts on why communities participate in such 
seemingly confusing processes.
Using evidence from the study I was able to construct the bases upon which 
development plans are arrived at (Figure 3) and presented the main challenge as one 
of the process not the content or priorities for development. The process relates to the 
quality and availability of planning information, collation of and comparison of 
available plans and synchronization of different planning approaches. Process 
weaknesses arise in part from the absence of a distinct anchor institution. While for 
the purpose of clarity in the thesis Council was chosen as the anchor institution this is 
not always the case in reality. As noted, District development coordination functions 
in Zambia and Zimbabwe are contested for practical and policy reasons. Outside 
organisations coming to work in Districts either ignore divisions or side with one or 
the other between central and local government. To receive whatever is available
District actors accept interventions and progressively influence interactions along the 
way. Capacity building programmes in both Zambia and Zimbabwe have not resolved 
this (coordination) challenge. This explains why central government and Councils 
plan for/with and service the same communities at times in parallel. While central 
government screams duplication in relation to NGO activity, the inter-governmental 
overlaps are the most apparent and perhaps this is where any institutional re­
arrangements for enhancing participation may need to start.
One of the findings of the study relates to the doubling up of implementation and 
policy-making roles on the part of Councilors and Members of Parliament in 
Zimbabwe. Policy-making and implementation are not here viewed as solid and 
unrelated boxes. The role of Councilors in policy-making and monitoring often takes 
a back seat once they get involved in direct implementation of activities. For 
Councils, the situation is compounded by lack of sub-District staff to perform 
functions that end up being performed by Councilors. For MPs, it relates to the 
pressure to deliver electoral promises directly. In a way, this reflects a faltering 
governmental delivery system. As MPs deliver services through projects, they 
simultaneously subvert the national and local planning and implementation process. 
An example of subverting implementation processes is where an MP ends up 
supervising Ministry staff often creating an uncomfortable situation for the staff 
member concerned and distorting the concerned Ministry’s personnel management 
hierarchy. Relatedly, direct delivery to the electorate sustains political patronage and 
diminishes citizens’ right to expect particular governmental services irrespective of 
the type of MP they have. To sustain such a situation results in governmental decay. 
Two things also tend to occur. One is conflation of the party and government if  the 
MP belongs to the ruling party and the other is field conflict between MPs and 
government where the MP is in opposition.
Councils are generally not evaluated on the basis of actual plans (outputs, outcomes 
and impact). In any District or Council area there is always a myriad of development 
organisations often operating in the absence of comprehensive or District-wide plans. 
The nature and level of plans is a key issue. Should the plans be anything above the 
local level in terms of both the ideas and the resources for implementing them? The 
community and planners helping them rarely separate those local needs that are for
local implementation using local resources from those that require external inputs and 
need external imperatives. There is a general conflation of these two borne out of an 
era when considerable resources were available (Zimbabwe) and perpetuated by 
existing externally-funded programmes (Zambia). Community responsibilities for 
their own plans in terms of institutions, resources and actions are inadequately 
articulated and developed. That it is inoperable and undesirable to leave the poor to 
their own devices (Berner and Phillips 2005; Chambers 1989) is not the same as 
proceeding to the other extreme of doing everything for the community. It becomes a 
question of balance between subsidies (level and form) and community self-respect 
(Kar 2003) bearing in mind limitations of the project (see Illich 1997).
There are limitations in terms of decentralised monitoring o f plans in the two 
countries, which results from challenges with human resources, communication 
infrastructure and local institutional capabilities. Councilors are unable to service their 
Wards in both countries because they lack resources. Except for Ward 7 
Seke/Manyame they do not have supportive structures to aid Ward administration. 
Public transport and communication infrastructure facilities are unreliable and 
generally inaccessible in most parts of the study Districts. As such, the prospects for 
improving planning and coordination of development in the study Districts remain 
weak. The debate on decentralisation and experiences in the two countries do not 
present immediate solutions to these challenges. Inter-governmental role assignment 
remains entangled making relations with other stakeholders difficult to smoothen. The 
pursuit of decentralisation policy frameworks has achieved basic institutional set ups 
in the two countries. However, resolution of the challenges discussed in this thesis 
requires other frameworks.
I acknowledge the importance of the need to untangle inter-governmental overlaps to 
reduce resource inefficiencies. This is one of the central outcomes of decentralisation. 
However, PRSPs and MDGs, among others, have provided a fresh impetus to the 
decentralisation debate (UNCDF 2006) as have ideas around the constitutionalisation 
o f local government (see Aslop and Kurey 2005). The growing importance of 
partnerships within and across national spaces, international protocols and other core 
globalizing forces and processes (ICT particularly) shape decentralisation processes 
differently. This is because the nation state is no longer the exclusive source of
impetus, resources and ideas about social and political organisation and the 
sustenance of local organisations. One lesson for decentralisers that this present study 
has drawn is that local embededness of local governments rather than exclusive 
dependence on resource and role transfer from central government is attaining greater 
importance. Locally-resourced growth and horizontal partnerships are more critical 
than the legislative bases upon which most decentralisation programmes have 
proceeded. The law’s inadequacies (see McGee et al 2003) and experiences from 
Zimbabwe where the law can be whimsically altered and applied by the state further 
reflects the importance of non-legal or social mobilisation bases for decentralisation.
UN Habitat (2005) highlights that governmental budget deficits are a critical aspect 
affecting the nature and process of decentralisation. Let us call this ‘resource stress’. 
Recourse to non-traditional funding sources and alternative approaches (in this case in 
housing finance) provide alternative impetus for decentralisation and a way around 
the resource stress. Zimbabwe’s multi-faceted crisis has thrust a lot of its citizens 
(corporate and individual) into informality and at times illegality. Some roles being 
undertaken by non-state development organisations are hitherto public sector 
responsibilities. As such, this study shows that decentralisation and by extension 
participation are not simply about policies and practices enunciated and followed 
through by conscious and capable governments but can be regularisations of lived 
realities. In Zimbabwe, the realities are as much a product of state stress and 
incapacity as they are of citizens’ adaptations to the ongoing crisis. Planning, Planners 
and Plans are therefore evolving from multi-stakeholder platforms that are not 
ordinarily defined in a traditional decentralisation script or legislation. It is therefore 
important to revisit the debate on decentralisation in the light o f some o f the findings 
o f this study particularly in relation to people’s agency and new forms of 
organisational interaction (see Narayan 2005). The entrance of War Veterans onto the 
political and traditional institutional scene particularly structured through ‘Jambanja’, 
(a form of violent informality regarding access and control of development processes 
and spaces) raises more questions. This phenomenon requires further elaboration and 
research.
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7.5 Party infrastructure and traditional governance systems
Available institutional structures are largely dominated by the political party. Ruling 
parties have had an enduring effect on local governance in the two countries since 
independence retaining far-reaching influence over rural and urban governance. 
Policy-making, interpretation and implementation generally oscillate between the 
party and government to the exclusion of ordinary citizens including those within the 
ruling parties. At independence, Zimbabwe used Local Government Promotion 
Officers to regularize party into local government structures. During the one-party- 
state era, the Kaunda Government in Zambia made similar partisan changes. The 
political polarization in Zimbabwe is largely evidenced by the ruling party’s equating 
of the state and ZANU PF, which explains the capture of most local governance 
institutions as party infrastructure. Making local governance institutions partisan is 
destroying professionalism amongst policy makers and community leaders. Box 13
captures some o f these aspects 
at a national level. The capture 
of traditional leaders (see CPIA 
2005), which has a pre­
independence history, is 
causing institutional
disharmony. This increases use 
of local governance structures 
more as mechanisms for 
controlling local dissent (see 
Gasper 1997) than facilitating 
democratic development.
However, traditional leaders are implementing relevant social programmes e.g. in 
HIV and AIDS in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. The institution o f traditional leader is 
not integrated in modem local governance and thus the fortifying role that Ray et al 
(1997) refer to does not occur in that many places across Africa (see Vaughan 2005). 
The involvement of the Asante (Ghana) where they are implementing education 
programmes is perhaps one of limited examples (UNECA 2005). The study raised 
questions about the institutional sustainability of how Zimbabwe has integrated the
Box 13: Seeing ZANU PF and Government?
‘ ...Z A N U  PF and Government have the habit o f  creating 
chaos and then turning around to present themselves as 
gallant knights in shining amour, coming to the help o f  the 
defenseless, poor and victimized. It is abhorrent that anyone, 
claiming to represent or act in the interests o f  the public 
could consider rendering as many as a million people 
homeless in the middle o f biting winter weather...The 
government should not delight in the suffering o f  people 
when it does not have a ready made alternative for 
them ...The Government and the City Council [o f Harare] are 
demonstrating that they do not care about visiting more 
hardships on the people for which they have failed to create 
jobs and housing’.
Source: The Standard [Comment] May 29th 2005.
institution in local governance. In addition, questions about de-partying local 
governance, defining the extent of central government’s reach and obviating 
distortions to horizontal relations without precluding Governmental regulation 
become important. The study provides no answers but recommends additional 
exploration. Zambia’s experience sheds different light as government has retained 
some distance from traditional leaders. The proposed ADCs are attempting to ‘keep 
Chiefs in their palaces’. A broader study to explore what a headman in Mutare 
District referred to as their role in reining in Councilors may be needed. The 
revelation suggests that traditional leaders can contribute to making local governance 
institutions responsive and accountable. How other actors are able to do the same for 
the traditional institutions becomes critical. Whether local governments are safe and 
accessible in the exclusive hands of political parties remains a key question. I am 
mindful o f the implications of such a question on establishing and managing national 
governments but emphasize that the national level was not my research concern.
7.6 Tame or thin? Reflecting on institutional jungles
While in Zambia new institutions in the form of ADCs are being installed in rural 
local governance (since 1993), in Zimbabwe no such major institutional insertions are 
under-way. There is also no evidence that existing local institutions await removal. 
Gasper (1997) also cautions that not everything can be tidied up into non-overlapping 
blocks. This is because institutions and the spaces they exist in are at once separate 
and overlapping or integrated i.e. what I referred to as ‘overlapping separateness’. 
This is not to discount what Ayittey, commenting on similar issues, considers ‘...utter 
institutional chaos and misgovemance’ (2005:21). The points above form the bases 
upon which this sub-section and the rest o f the thesis has proceeded i.e. working with 
what is evolving (Zambia) and what already exists (Zimbabwe). Having 
problematised the local institutional terrain as dense and under-funded, it appears 
somewhat a climb-down to assert that it is unlikely that the ‘forest’ will be thinned.
No radical changes in structures are evident in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. This 
acknowledgement is based on the analysis of literature and primary data. However, 
questions were raised in relation to the definition of the anchor institution. What 
become essential are the criteria for selecting the anchor institution and defining how 
institutions can enhance responsiveness to popular aspirations. This is the process I
generally refer to as taming institutions including ensuring role clarity to reduce 
avoidable duplication. The taming of the institutional forest at sub-national level 
requires local input and capacity strengthening. However, in Zimbabwe the impetus to 
create thick institutional ‘forests’ at local and national levels comes more from 
national than local processes.
The study demonstrates that a sustained bottom-up articulation of the counter­
productiveness of untamed ‘institutional forests’ is critical in Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
Councils can be the rallying point for such articulation but this has its limitations 
arising from the options available to central government particularly in establishing 
and inserting other institutions or re-assigning functions with minimum to no local 
oversight as grassroots capacities may not exist to perform such a role. However, 
anchoring all local institutional management in Councils may result in power 
monopolization. If Councils are politically controlled by the opposition, there will be 
a greater likelihood o f heightened centre-local tensions. What is important is that 
taming institutions as much as is possible should be from local (public) resources 
considering the limitations of approaches funded from outside. In any event, it is 
important that governments in both countries and elsewhere should devote attention to 
sustaining local development organisations more meaningfully than what current 
evidence suggests. Councils’ articulation of decentralisation issues tends to be selfish 
as it excludes the interests of other local governance institutions. In Zimbabwe, the 
lobbying for recognition by traditional leaders has benefited from such exclusionary 
Council tactics. Traditional leaders approached government as marginalized entities. 
The divide and rule tactics used by central government, itself a pre-independence 
strategy, has sustained such a ‘silo mentality’ amongst local organisations. Again, 
Ayittey’s (2005) observation is useful as he notes that the ruling African elite 
generally is averse to implement real institutional reform and that such refusal 
produces un-ending crises.
Taming local institutions may allow for easier institutionalisation of participatory 
development. Users (communities) become more acquainted with organisations that 
exist for longer doing real activities rather than an environment where key players 
keep changing and mandates both overlap and are routinely cross-allocated from the 
centre. Frequent (and often unilateral) changes of the functions of supra-community
link institutions68 may get the community confused regarding where to go with 
different issues. Changes at this level also create new momentum through setting 
incessant impetus to change or introduce new (more/different) local organisational 
structures. The latter may occur because each outside development organisation feels 
its activities cannot be held prisoner to the existing confused and weak institutional 
arrangements and thus proceeds to create ‘special local committees’ to oversee its 
activities or special link/contact points. In Zimbabwe, a number o f arguments were 
given to justify changing the early version of the VIDCO to the Village Assembly 
with its new context. However, there are good things that were lost in the process 
particularly popular accountability of elected members, which is something the 
Zambian ADCs seek to build upon.
As Ferguson (1994) puts it in reference to the World Bank’s description o f Lesotho, 
some presentations constitute a rearranging of reality to fit a specific policy decision 
or to justify actions to be taken. This applies in a lot o f ways to central government’s 
(in Zimbabwe and Zambia) definition of local government as lacking capacity. 
Between 1980 and 1996 in Zimbabwe, ‘local government weaknesses’ appear to have 
been articulated for two reasons. One was to justify continued central government 
direct service delivery (through line Ministries). This justification was evidence- 
based, as the colonial government had not only neglected communal areas from a 
service delivery perspective but also in terms of institutional capacity development. 
The second justification was aligned to raising resources principally from donors for 
capacity building of the local authorities (both urban and rural). The first reason also 
applies to the 2001 and later period. The post-2001 period has been associated with 
dwindling state resources (own and from donors) available for development activities. 
The limited resources are being allocated centrally. Since 2001, the need for 
government to be visible vis-a-vis NGOs has also come into play. In other words the 
weaknesses of local development institutions, while undeniable, need to be 
problematised in ways that explore the power dynamics inherent in such 
characterizations. Based on the study, Councils in Zimbabwe are not necessarily as 
hopeless as central pronouncements seem to suggest, which lends credence to the 
ARDCZ’s argument that government uses ‘proof by selected instances’ since only a
68 This is particularly the case with Government Sector Ministries in Zimbabwe.
few erring Councils seem to be used to justify what ARDCZ considers to be 
centralistic tendencies. Power relations thus constrain the taming and thinning of local 
institutional arrangements although rational (non-political) reasons are often offered.
7.7 Poor people’s agency
Poor people’s agency, discussed by Green (2000, 2002), Mapedza and Mandondo 
(2002), Kamete (2002) and Stiefel and Wolfe (1994), among others, is evident 
amongst the Zimbabwean and Zambian study communities. However the efforts of 
the communities exist in a stressed environment owing to harsh socio-economic 
circumstances (in both countries), physical isolation for some of the Kasempa 
communities, political polarization (Zimbabwe) and a generally unresponsive public 
sector. Feltoe (2006) highlights the myriad legal hurdles ordinary people and 
associations have to surmount to raise concerns with public institutions. To respond to 
Narayan et al’s (2000) question, it appears no one can hear the poor. The low levels of 
responsiveness are particularly evidenced by weak accountability cultures amongst 
the study Councils. People’s agency is pursued through local groups, NGO-facilitated 
interventions and the social animation efforts of Councilors and traditional leaders.
People are also not passive in their interaction with the various groups o f animators as 
shown in Ward 18 Seke/Manyame and in Mutare where either through writing letters 
of complaint or speaking at meetings they raise objections to the way their 
development is governed and seek redress. They also act with their traditional leaders 
to hold Councilors accountable and link up with national level actors to secure 
benefits as well as make representations on pertinent issues. Evidence from Mutare 
suggests that communities can manipulate development organisations to maximize 
benefits or accentuate inter-organisational conflicts if that increases benefits. This is 
another way in which their agency and socio-political power is deployed. Apart from 
wielding and using their power in their interactions with development organisations 
local people use song and dance at meetings to influence decision-making. Locals’ 
skills are however not effectively mobilised. Volunteering to offer services as in the 
case o f HIV and AIDS interventions in both countries, SMOGs and CWACs in 
Zambia constitute other ways of showing agency in the study Districts. Outside 
interventions and assistance add value to people’s processes but in some cases disrupt 
local momenta through holding meetings too often, introducing interventions that do
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not get finished on time, delay in meeting project obligations and using approaches 
and entry methods that are disruptive of community rhythms. The study therefore 
established that people’s agency is alive and robust despite stressful contexts.
7.8 Empowering local policy-makers
The roles of Councilors tend to be restricted to information dissemination and 
mobilization rather than developing the overall frameworks within which 
organisational plans will evolve. In other words, for as long as policy-makers are 
‘seeking and bringing projects’ and mobilizing people to take part in ‘available 
projects’ the policy-making role remains under-developed. The planning process and 
the resulting plans will be more external than internal. Because physical projects are 
not the only spaces for facilitating development, Councils cannot use lack o f 
resources to deliver projects as an excuse for not ‘doing development’. Facilitating 
planning and implementation are contributions Councils can make to local 
development based on locally available resources. Where Councils demonstrate value 
to other development organisations they will become more able to guide development 
even without direct material input.
Zimbabwean Councils do not have joint sessions with Parliamentarians (Members of 
Parliament or MPs) in their areas. What tends to happen is that Parliamentarians 
assume a supervisory role and in cases where Councilors and MPs are from the same 
political party the structures and relationships in the party take precedence. 
Operational challenges also make it difficult for these two policy-making spheres to 
interface. However, this separateness often reduces opportunities for integrated 
policy-making while also limiting the influence of local policy-spheres on national 
policy-making. Whether policy-makers should bring projects to communities is not 
that important here. However, they should generally enhance popular understanding 
of policy-makers’ roles which may benefit from more effective interface between 
Councilors and MPs. This may act to deepen the control of the local policy-sphere, 
which is currently not locally entrenched while grounding and making the national 
policy-sphere both accountable and accessible to the local space.
The work done by Nugent (2004) and Mbembe (2001), among others, reflects how 
traditional leaders in Africa were used to manage the native question and to quell
political feuding by colonial administrators. These ‘uses’ of traditional authority have 
been continued by post-independence administrations in Africa with an essential slant 
towards extending central government control. The desirability o f traditional leaders 
in local governance has received some treatment (Ray et al 1997) but practical 
realities throw up mixed reactions. In Zimbabwe the perceived partisan nature of 
government’s use of traditional leaders and the better remuneration they receive 
compared to Councilors for instance acts more to destabilize than empower local 
governance institutions (see CPIA 2005). For Zambia, the perception that the use of 
traditional leaders may obstruct the evolution of local democratic traditions has left 
the majority in their palaces while others like Chief Kasempa run visible programmes.
The law is important in terms of making provisions for people’s active and formal 
participation in the development processes. However, practical realities are often at 
variance with the letter and spirit of the law. Governments (in Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
issue policy directives, and develop and implement programmes, which define new 
roles for both government and Councils without necessarily changing the local 
governance laws. Underpinning societal values, democratic traditions and capacities 
play a more critical role in determining whether participation occurs or not. While on 
the one hand Councils contend that central government interferes in their operations 
they surprisingly do not create opportunities for citizens to participate in Council 
operations. This is the proverbial situation of the ‘pot calling the kettle black’.
7.9 Some proposals for improving the role of Council
‘...decentralisation and local government reform have focused on the supply 
side of formal systems and not on strengthening the demand side through actions 
that enable citizens to effectively use the space created by new rules and 
regulations...In general there has been insufficient attention to the relationship 
between citizens and local governments, and there are very few cases of 
investment in strengthening poor people’s organisations...so that they can 
effectively play the new roles assigned to them’ (Narayan 2005:13).
The above quote captures the main purpose of this section, which is to respond to the 
anxiety posed in section 4.5.1 about demonstrating value to institutions, which 
researchers study. I discuss ways in which the role of Councils may be improved in 
the two countries. The study suggests that governmental institutions at the sub­
national level have considerable challenges in terms of facilitating participation.
Government is generally seen as the ‘black sheep’ in the family of development 
institutions. While acknowledging that the responses to the questionnaire were not 
differentiated by specific governmental organisation, the point remains that the 
perception that government is not doing enough permeates state-society relations in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. A number of points can be raised to explain this situation. 
One is that because of government’s complex and multi-layered nature it is too easy 
to blame it for everything not going well. The other is that respondents and key 
informants were comparing governments against previous performance generally 
viewed positively. It is also important to acknowledge the role played by unrealistic 
independence expectations and election-time promises in creating high (and perhaps 
difficult to meet) expectations. The promises are also often made without proper 
assignment of responsibilities. This creates a ‘Father Christmas’ image.
As noted in this Chapter, the materialisation of development has also accentuated 
viewing government as under-performing despite government playing other roles. At 
the same time, Councils have not played their existing and potential roles in 
development facilitation innovatively enough. I return to this latter point but first let 
me engage with how else government can be seen, which may underpin more people- 
led and grounded development in the two countries. Central government at the 
District and sub-District levels is an employer of professional staff, which can be 
better utilized. This is despite the fact that numbers, performance, 
commitment/motivation and skills utilization especially within local authority areas 
may be inadequate. Although there are always questions about the quality of planning, 
its responsiveness, and the quality, timing and extent of people’s participation 
government is undeniably an important service provider, provides policy-making 
platforms and tries to provide for policy clarity. In both countries, these roles are 
considered evident and their performance reasonably effective. Evidence includes the 
presence of civil servants within reach of the remotest village or villager.
However, the study noted areas where people’s participation in policy making and the 
skills/performance of policy-makers is far from desirable for the institutionalisation of 
participatory development. As a host and coordinator of multi-stakeholder processes, 
programmes/projects and structures and a node for connections to the outside world, 
central government plays a critical function. In these areas questions about quality and
reliability of communication, performance of support functions towards non-state and 
state structures at District level, and effectiveness o f resource deployment 
mechanisms, need to be asked and answered. What can be asserted though is that 
government plays an important role despite these questions. Councils can do a lot to 
complement central government by facilitating the answering of these questions in 
ways that are relevant to local areas. This brings me to the roles that Councils may do 
well to play if participatory development in Zimbabwe is to take root considering the 
acknowledgement above (that thinning of institutional actors is not in the offing).
A number of local government roles can be identified based on the findings. One is in 
relation to monitoring the provision of services by other development organisations in 
Council areas including funding the joint spaces where planning takes place. For 
government the implication may be giving up District development coordination 
including the holding of the necessary resources. The development organisations, 
which Councils will monitor, include central government departments and NGOs. In 
all three study Districts, this is a Council role that is inadequately articulated and 
performed. As for government, the local government monitoring role appears to be 
assigned to the central government representatives (DC or DA). The challenges that 
the DCs and DAs have in holding central government organisations accountable and 
ensuring that their work is effective means they cannot perform this function. Head 
offices of line Ministries often appear far removed from the grassroots to be able to 
monitor their field organisations and on their part field staff resent being held 
accountable by ‘bare-foot politicians’ (Councilors mainly but also traditional 
institutions, DCs and DAs). For non-governmental organisations, self-regulation 
mechanisms are inadequately developed leaving a considerable gap that Councils may 
do well to plug. Implications for Councils include placing staff at the sub-District 
level strategically to perform the monitoring role (and enablement function below). 
That Zimbabwe’s RDC is the basic unit of devolved authority with Ward and Village 
structures lacking corporate status (Makumbe 1998) makes emplacement o f Council 
staff below the District is critical.
The other role relates to actual service provision. This research established that 
Councils have limitations in this regard. Resource limitations constrain performance 
particularly where development is exclusively about things to be delivered. Mutare
RDC’s linking of levy payment to actual service provision may raise popular 
appreciation of Council roles and increase revenue flows if complemented by other 
development organisations. Where other development organisations place importance 
to Council revenue generation and help communicate positive messages about 
Council, trust building between Councils and citizens is bound to grow compared to 
situations where other development organisations speak ill of Councils in the course 
of their work. For Councils this implies opening up to other development 
organisations to enable the organisations to offer informed trust-building support.
A third role is with regards to facilitating others’ service provision: enablement. In 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, Government will always have national programmes 
implemented within District spaces and for the foreseeable future remain unable to 
increase grants to Councils. Councils need to acknowledge this reality and begin to 
realign themselves to regulate government service provision in their areas. The 
Herald of July 28th 2007 quotes the Zimbabwe President as urging Councils to be 
aggressive to ensure that Ministers (and Ministries) deliver services to the people. 
Because the delivery of national programmes is through de-concentrated central 
government (field administration), Councils have a key role to play. Councils can 
facilitate access to such services, influence the manner in which such services are 
delivered, set and ensure adherence to local standards, policies and delivery 
mechanisms and generally articulate demand for specific services (agenda-setting). 
Enablement covers providing and updating planning and other data, community 
mobilisation, building local organisational capacities (e.g. Assemblies in Zimbabwe, 
ADCs in Zambia) and providing services to development organisations (e.g. 
accommodating development organisations).
Some Council roles discussed above are defined in existing legislation and some are 
being performed. However, I emphasize the opportunities, which in my view are 
currently not being maximized. Councils need to go beyond these nominal 
stipulations to define ways o f working that at once redefine relations, unlock 
collaborative potential and enable articulation o f relevant development agendas. 
Enablement will also entail assisting with operational resources where needed. This is 
already happening owing to under-funding o f government departments but on a 
limited basis dependent more on personal relations than as part of Council mandate.
The discourse on decentralisation has tended to focus on the legislated transfer o f 
functions from central to local government. It has invariably ignored functions that 
local government bodies are able to develop and attract from other development 
organisations including non-governmental organisations. Articulating the spheres of 
governance based on a clear division of functions between the centre and the local 
should not be premised on a static interpretation of statutes. One function defined in a 
static way relates to central government’s monitoring of the local sphere. In Zambia 
and Zimbabwe the presence of de-concentrated government within local government 
areas, which are inadequately monitored and supported presents a role for Councils as 
service provider to and facilitator of the central government departments. If  central 
government is unable or unwilling to effect meaningful fiscal decentralisation 
(Ndegwa et al 2003; Conyers 2002) then central government ought to be held 
accountable for the delivery of programmes by Councils.
The service provision to, and monitoring and facilitation of central government 
departments can be extended to Parastatals, NGOs and the private sector as already 
stated above under enablement. This places a premium on responsibilities and 
functions for local government bodies hitherto latent at least in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. These are functions relating to ‘enabling others’: provision o f information 
to their constituencies to help them access available organisational services, attracting 
development organisations to their areas, servicing the information and other needs 
and developing critical policies within which development organisations operate to 
the best advantage of local populations. This includes developing and sharing 
coherent visions for development, brokering organisational linkages, and setting and 
ensuring adherence to minimum service-delivery standards. The standards could be in 
terms of community entry and exit, minimum service thresholds, programme 
management or organisation-community interface and community contributions.
The points made above relate to critical functions for the institutionalisation of 
participatory development. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe the functions are 
inadequately performed. Performing these functions will be complementary to 
traditionally defined Council roles. As stated elsewhere in this chapter these are ideas
that challenge the way decentralisation has been perceived hitherto i.e. as a mere 
governmental structuring framework.
7.10. Conclusion
The study explored some of the basic shakiness of the post-colonial Zimbabwean state 
(see Raftopoulos and Savage 2004, CPIA 2005, Prankhurst 2002; Nyangoro 1999; 
Carmody and Taylor 2003; Dixon 2002; Bond and Manyanya 2003), its uneven 
decentralisation (Brand 1991; Conyers 2003) and thus shallowness of its democratic 
processes, which affect participation and development. Some o f the challenges that 
the Zimbabwean state and its structures face are prevalent elsewhere in Africa (see 
Ayittey 2005; Vaughan 2005; Calderisi 2006). State and non-state development 
organisations seat uneasily together to think and do development. Narratives about 
institutional relevance and irrelevance, renewal and obsoleteness, legitimacy and 
illegitimacy are generally informed by the development paradigm from the ESAP to 
post-ESAP particularly as these paradigms have featured changes in the role as well 
as resource endowment of the central state. The shift from command economy 
through the early 1990s, to market-based reforms, which were unsuccessful for a 
number of reasons back to a command economy since the late 1990s has created 
serious policy and practice aches and pains. This is because the re-introduction of 
state-led development processes is occurring amidst resistance from civil society and 
business, who consider it undesirable to close policy spaces opened up during the 
early days of ESAP and anchored in democratisation processes that swept the country 
and continent thereafter (see Enemuo 2000; Olowu 2000; Pankhurst 2002; Carmody 
and Taylor 2003). In addition, the state does not have adequate resources to return to 
its ‘fiscal populism’ of the 1980s (Davies and Rattso 2000).
Overall, answering the research question was a rewarding while challenging process. 
There were tensions in terms o f using the evidence that I got, limited as it was in the 
fast-changing Zimbabwean environment. To give an example, inflation was 624% in 
January of 2004, dropped to below 120% by year-end but by July 2007 the issuing of 
official inflation figures had been stopped as the rate had breached 7000%. Some of 
my findings are therefore only good at the level o f principles. Council budgets for 
instance have become meaningless and local revenue collection is now purely for 
institutional maintenance not facilitating any form of participatory development.
Another tension related to balancing evidence with my own lived experiences and my 
‘Zimbabweanness’ as it relates to interpretation of events and articulating aspirations 
on the subject area for the research. Early versions o f my thesis reflected this tension 
more clearly. I have not removed the ‘Zimbabweanness’ and the self from the way I 
have written the thesis as I consider these as important strengths. But some of the 
frustrations with the deteriorating situation may be evident for instance in the 
methodology Chapter.
In Box 12 I presented the main factors that I found as critical to answering the 
research question. In a lot of ways my thesis has attempted to define and explain the 
local governance crisis in Zimbabwe without hiding the commendable traditions of 
grassroots participation and inter-organisational interaction. My concern is that the 
weakening of local institutional interaction is destroying these sound traditions which 
are for participation. In their local groups and as volunteers ordinary people seem to 
reasonably control the spaces and interactions they are in. However, this slows to a 
trickle as the levels shift upwards (Figure 1) whether this participation in direct, 
representative or stakeholder facilitated spaces. In questioning the usefulness of 
decentralisation to Zimbabwe’s local governance crisis, I have sought to flag the 
importance of inter-organisational interactions and addressing constraints to 
collaboration rather than uncritically accept, let alone hope, that more decentralisation 
will be a panacea to the institutional stress.
I have identified areas that need further work. These include state-NGO relations, 
particularly how to improve the policy and programmatic comfort of Government 
where it indirectly controls development spaces, horizontal relations between 
traditional leaders and other local power centres, dealing with the political party in 
local governance and the ‘silo mentality’ amongst local governance institutions that 
promotes vertical alignment ahead of horizontal relevance. With respect to state-NGO 
relations, what is critical to assess will be the effect of state capacity on the relations, 
funding models for non-state development organisations and the effect of state 
relations with the outside world on NGOs. This has to be explored in a context where 
citizens’ trust of public institutions is low and local development organisations or 
spaces are starved of strategic support from the national level. The assertion by Hall
(1995) and other commentators that NGOs are not always the best builders of civil 
society may also need interrogation in the Zimbabwean context where community- 
capacity building efforts sometimes resulting in full-fledged CBOs has taken place. 
Anheier (2004) and Ackerman (2004) raise pertinent issues regarding the participation 
of social actors in sectors or activities generally regarded the preserve of the state. 
Their work may be instructive in exploring the research issues posed above.
Characterisations o f the notion o f ‘elite capture’ invoke an individualised cooption of 
influential people (see Essof 2005) or those with resources continuing to access public 
goods and services ahead of the poor. In Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa, the 
cooption of a whole institution of traditional leaders raises different questions 
pertinent to local governance. Because the central state is the patron, national 
government changes expose the local institution and fundamentally destabilises local 
relations. Some further work may be needed to avoid the stop-start integration of 
traditional institutions in local governance that the ZANU PF government has 
implemented since 1980. The phenomenon of Zimbabweans in Diaspora, from the 
perspective of participation in the country’s development processes raises additional 
unanswered questions as the study looked at ‘residents in situ’. Given their growing 
importance in terms of sustaining livelihoods and supplying ‘development visions’ 
back home, it is imperative to explore how this reconfigures participation. In a post­
crisis Zimbabwe, some may return while other Diasporans will remain abroad and 
continue to have ‘offsite’ influence on development and policy-making.
The work that Gaventa (2005) and Cornwall (2000, 2002), as well as others at IDS 
focusing on methods (see Brock and Pettit 2007), reflects an increasingly interesting 
area of study regarding spaces, levels and forms of power on the one hand and 
methods for participatory development on the other. The question of state and NGO 
interface as posed above may benefit from an analytical framework that combines 
these perspectives. I suggest that anchoring analyses on what actually happens in the 
spaces in terms of organisational interaction, observing and documenting the forms 
and effect of interaction and its role in advancing organisational and ordinary people’s 
participation (as defined in this study) is critical. This will extend our understanding 
o f how it all works or in most cases why it fails to work.
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5. Consultancy Report on the Institutional and Organisational Development process 
facilitation for local authority partnerships for service delivery: the case o f Mwinilunga 
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23. Report on CBM orientation visit to Nyanga RDC; Mutare RDC (2003), REF XC/157/14.
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25. 2005 PSIP Bids; Manyame RDC (2005).
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A n n e x  1: L is t  o f  K e y  In f o r m a n t s /I n t e r v ie w e e s
Name. Institution name & type. Position.
1. Cheelo (Mr.). DPPH, Gvt, Zambia Planner, North Western Province-NWP.
2. Chibwe69 (Mr.). Kasempa Council, Zambia Director o f  Works.
3. Chigidji (Mrs.). D A ’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe DA, Seke/Manyame.
4. Chigovera (Mr.). DDF, Gvt, Zimbabwe District Head, Mutare.
5. Chikukwa (Mr.). AREX, Gvt, Zimbabwe District AREX Head, Mutare.
6. Chinaka (Mr.). Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe CEO, Mutare.
7. Chivavaya (Mr.). D A ’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe DA, Mutare.
8. Guta (Mrs.). Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe CEO, Seke/Manyame.
9. Humure (Mr.). Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe Treasurer, Mutare.
10. Jafirisi (Mr.). Veterinary Services, Zimbabwe Veterinary Assistant, Mutare.
11. Kambizi (Mr.). Council, Ward 7, Mutare Councilor.
12. Kizeza70 (Mr.). DC’s Office, Zambia. DC, Kasempa.
13. Kupakuwana (Mr.). Min. o f Local, Gvt, Zimbabwe Assistant PA, Mash East.
14. Kuora (Mr.). Council, Ward 18, Zimbabwe Councilor Seke/Manyame.
15. Kuwanda (Mr.). Min. o f Local Gvt, Zimbabwe Under-Secretary (Rural Councils) and
from mid 2005, Director in Min. o f  Rural Resources and Infrastructure Development.
16. Maambira (Mr.). CADEC, NGO, Zimbabwe Programme Officer.
17. Machaka (Mr.). Plan International, NGO, Zim-bwe Programme Manager.
18. Mafararikwa (Mr.). Ward 16, Mutare, Zimbabwe Headman.
19. Majaka (Mr.). PLGH, Zambia Officer, North Western Province.
20. Makoni (Mr.). D A ’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe DA, Buhera.
21. Malichi (Mr.). FODEP, NGO, Zambia A/Provincial Secretary, NWP.
22. Mapfoche (Mr.). AREX, Gvt, Zimbabwe. Officer, Taga (Seke/Manyame).
23. Maponde (Mr/Mrs.). Ward 16, Mutare, Zimbabwe Farmers.
24. Matema (Mr.). Veterinary Services, Gvt, Zim-bwe Veterinary Officer.
25. Matsinde (Mr.). Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe CEO Buhera RDC
26. Maumbe (Mr.). Council Ward 7, Zimbabwe Councilor, Seke/Manyame.
27. Mauye (Mrs.). SNV, Zambia Coordinator, North Western Province.
28. Mbolela (Mr.). LGA-Zambia. General Secretary.
29. Mpingo (Mr.). Min. o f Local Gvt, Zimbabwe Deputy Secretary (Rural Councils).
30. Mtetwa (Mr.). AREX, Gvt, Zimbabwe. Supervisor, Marange (Mutare).
31. Mubaira (Mrs.). D A ’s Office, Gvt Assistant DA Seke/Manyame
32. Mukelabai (Mr.). SNV, Zambia Advisor, North Western Province.
33. Mukwaira (Mr.). Min. o f Local Gvt, Zimbabwe Deputy Secretary (Traditional Leaders).
34. Mulafulafu (Mr.). CCJDP, NGO, Zambia. Executive Secretary/Officer.
35. Mubaiwa (Mr.). Council, Local Gvt, Zimbabwe Council Chairman, Seke/Manyame.
36. Mushipe (Alderman). Council, Mutare Council Chairman, Mutare.
37. Mutseka (Mr.) D A ’s Office, Gvt, Zimbabwe DA, Mutare.
38. Mutsindikwa (Mr.). Min. o f Youth Development Ward Coordinator (Zimbabwe).
39. Nabanda (Mr.). CCJP, NGO, Zambia Coordinator, North Western Province.
40. Ndlovu (Mr.). Association o f RDCs, Zimbabwe Programme Officer
41. Nyamande (Mrs.). Ward 15, Seke/Manyame Farmer and AIDS activist
42. Salimu (Mr.). ZAMSIF Manager, North Western Province.
43. Simoonga (Mr.). PLGH, Gvt, Zambia Auditor, North Western Province.
44. Siyanga (Ms.). Women for Change, NGO, Zambia Acting Executive Director.
45. Tshumasi (Mr.). Kasempa Business Association Chairman (Zambia).
46. van Arkel (Miss). SNV, Zambia Advisor, North Western Province.
47. van der Drift (Dr.). SNV, Zambia Advisor, Lusaka/National.
48. Zvauya (Mr.). Min. o f Health, Gvt, Zimbabwe Environmental Health Officer.
49. Zvipiripiri (Mr.). Council, Ward 16, Mutare Village Head’s son.
50. Zvirevo (Mr.). AREX, Gvt, Zimbabwe AREX Officer, Marange.
69 Met on February 8th 2005 together with the Council Secretary and the Deputy Council Planner. 
Subsequently Mr. Chibwe was contacted via phone to follow-up relevant aspects o f the study.
70 Met separately on February 8th 2005 and later he facilitated/participated in a full DDCC meeting 
where I met at least 12 other District Officials and learnt about the institution (DDCC).
A n n e x  2: R e s e a r c h  T o o l s /I n s t r u m e n t s  
Annex 2.1: Household Questionnaire
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE.
NB 1. The questionnaire focused on groups and community level organisations, Village and Ward 
governance processes and institutions for people’s participation in development.
2. In all settings the questionnaire was administered to individual households (defined as groups o f  
people who ordinarily live, prepare meals and eat together). Where more than one distinguishable 
household share a homestead only one household was interviewed and respondents were principally
household heads or their spouses.
Household ID ;_________________________________________
Date o f  Interview;_____________________________________
Name o f  Interviewer/Enumerator;______________________
Province;_____________________________________________
District;_____________________Ward;__________________
Village;________________________________________________
Section A: General
1. Name o f Respondent;___________________________________________
2. Gender o f Respondent; l.M a le  2. Female.
3. A ge o f  respondent;________ years.
4. Position in Household; l.H ead . 2. Spouse. 3. Other_______
5. Length o f  time staying in Community;
1. 0 to 12 months. 2. 13-24 months. 3. 25-36 months. 4. 37-48 months.
5. Less than 5 years. 6. More than 5 years.
6. Household structure.
Name. Relationship to 
Head71.
Age. Gender 
1M, 2F.
Main
Occup72.
Empl
Stat73.
Level of 
Education74.
Head.
etc.
7. Are there any children o f school-going age in your household?
1. Yes 2. No.
8. Do they go to school? 1. Yes. 2. No. If yes how far is the sch oo l_________kilometers?
Section B: Local Level Organisations.
9. List the local level organisations or groups that exist in your community and the reasons why people
join them or partici pate in them.
Name of group. Type (religious etc 
see below).
Main activities or why people join them.
1.
10. Which o f the organisations are you or other members o f  your household a participant of?
| Nam e. | Household | Im portance  to | A ttendance | W h eth er l.S ta te  | W hether
71 U se the following codes 1 for head, 2 for spouse, 3 for child o f head o f  household, 4 parent, 5 other 
relative, 6 servants and 7 other non relatives.
72 For main occupation use 1 for farmer, 2 trader, 3 fisherman, 4 handicraft, 5 private sector 
employment, 6 public sector employment and 7 other specify.
73 Use 1 for wage earner e.g. landless labourer, 2 self-employed without employees, 3 se lf employed 
with employees, 4 unpaid family worker, 5 inactive (e.g. student/retired).
74 Use 1 for none, 2 incomplete primary, 3 for complete primary, 4 for incomplete secondary, 5 for 
secondary completed, 6 Vocational and 7 University.
m em bership
(tick
appropria te )
household lH igh , 
2M edium , 3Low.
last 6 m onths; 
1. Once, 2. 
Twice, 3. 
T hree  times.
o r  2 .C om m unity 
set-up.
l.fo rm al
2inform al.
Religious groups.
Social service groups.
Environmental and natural resource management groups.
Productive groups.
Credit/Finance groups.
Membership groups with an outreach outside the community (members within and outside the community)
Others specify.
11. Give details about the two most important organisations for your household?
Nam e o f group. Follow-up questions.
1.
Do you/members of your 
household hold positions in 
group?
1. Yes.
2. No.
Why did you choose the group?
How did you join? Did you make a contribution and if so how much money did 
you pay? How much money do you pay monthly and/or annually? How many 
days in a year do you give to the group’s activities to stay a member?
What are the main challenges for this group/institution?
How actively do members in the group participate in making decisions in the 
group?
2.
Do you/members of your 
household hold positions in 
group?
1. Yes.
2. No.
Why did you choose the group?
How did you join? Did you make a contribution and if so how much money did 
you pay? How much money do you pay monthly and/or annually? How many 
days in a year do you give to the group’s activities to stay a member?
What are the main challenges for this group/institution?
How actively do members in the group participate in making decisions in the 
group?
12. What services have you accessed through these groups/organisations?
Group. Services accessed through them  (tick as ap propriate).
Education Electricity. Water/Sanitation Credit/Savings Agri­
inputs.
Irrigation Health Land, forestry 
& water 
rights.
1.
13. Do you or any members o f  your household take part in the management or development o f  the
school (e.g. being member o f  PTA/SDC)? 1. Yes. 2. No.
14. If yes in what way?
1. Providing labour at the school (e.g. brick making). 2. Member o f  the PTA/SDC.
3. Donating to the school. 4. Other sp ecify_____________________ .
Section C: Village Governance.
15. Does your village have a Village Head? 1. Yes. 2. No.
16. If yes when was the current head selected/appointed?
17. How were they selected/appointed?
18. What other structures are involved in managing/governing the Village?
19. Are there other outside organisations involved in running the affairs o f  your Village?
Organisation. Activities in last 12 months.
Section D: Financial Services, Agricultural Inputs and Production Support.
20. Over the last year did you or any member o f  your household borrow or obtain credit or help for 
your activities? 1. Yes. 2. No.
21. If yes indicate sources;
Source and Nam e 
e.g. o f NGO etc.
A m ount borrowed 
o r  o f support 
given.
W hat guaran tee  
was requ ired?
Reason fo r 
borrow ing.
W as source 1. In 
village o r  2. O utside?
Friends or 
Neighbors.
Community Credit 
Society.
Government Bank.
Commercial Bank.
NGO Scheme.
Government.
Council.
Other Specify.
22. What procedure did you use and what constraints did you face in the process?
Source. Procedure. Constraints.
23. What have you or other members o f  your community done about the constraints?
1. Nothing. 2. Approached the concerned organisation.
3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.
4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.
24. Did you get agricultural input support last season?
In p u t type.
Source of support.
Neighbors. Government. NGO. Private
Company.
Other.
Fertilizer.
Maize seed.
Cotton seed.
25. What procedure did you use and what constraints did you face in the process?
Source. Procedure. Constraints.
26. What have you or other members o f  your community done about the constraints?
2. Nothing. 2. Approached the concerned organisation.
3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.
4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.
27. Did you receive agricultural production support during last season?
Type of 
support.
Source of support.
Neighbors. Government. NGO. Private
Company.
Other.
Draft power.
Work parties.
28. What are the major production constraints that you face?
29. What have you or other members o f  your community done about the constraints?
3. Nothing. 2. Approached the concerned organisation.
3. Approached local Councilor, village head or other local leadership.
4. Raised issue with Council, DA or other higher leadership.
Section E: Community Projects.
30. Are there any new projects brought into your community in the past two years?
1. Yes. 2. No.
31. If yes describe the two most important ones;
a.  . b.___________________________
32. Who brought these projects into the community?
Project. Sponsor/organisation th a t b rought iro ject.
GoZ. RDC. Private Co. NGO. Local
Politician.
Other.
a.
b.
33. Were you/members o f  your household involved in the project? 1. Yes. 2. No.
34. In what way(s) were you or the local community involved?
Project. C om m unity involvement. C om m unity contributions.
1.
Project
choice.
2. Location. 3 .Im plem entation
Strategy.
1.
2.
35. Is the community (beneficiaries) satisfied with the project?
1. Very satisfied. 2. Satisfied. 3. Not satisfied.
Explain your response;_________________________________________________________ .
37. Are there any projects initiated by villagers in your community? 1. Yes. 2. No.
38. If yes describe the two most important ones;
a.   . b. _________________________
39. Were you/members o f your household involved in the project? 1. Yes. 2. No.
40. Have these (two projects) received external support? 1. Yes. 2. No.
41. If yes indicate sources.
Project. Sponsor/organisation that brought project.
GoZ. RDC. Private Co. NGO. Local
Politician.
Other.
a.
b.
Section F: Council-Community Interface and Development Planning 
Experiences/Processes.
42. Do you know your Councilor’s name? 1. Yes. 2. No. 3. N o Councilor now.
If yes, what is their nam e?__________________
If do not know them why is that so ? _____________________________________________________________ .
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43. How do you rate the performance o f  your Councilor?
1. Very highly. 2. Average. 3. Very Poor.
Explain your response;_______________________________________________________ .
44. How do you rate the performance o f your RDC/Council?
1. Very highly. 2. Average. 3. Very Poor.
Explain your response;_______________________________________________________ .
45. How often were Village Development Meetings held in the past year?
1. Not at all. 2. Once. 3. Twice. 4. Don’t know.
46. How often did you or members o f  your household take part in Village Development Meetings in
the last 12 months? 1. Never. 2. Rarely. 3. All the time.
Explain your response;_______________________________________________________ .
47. Have you ever attended a Ward Development Meeting? 1. Yes. 2. No.
48. If yes did you contribute any views at the meeting? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Did you find your views being taken seriously? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Explain your response;_______________________________________________________ .
49. How often were Ward Development Meetings held in your Ward in the past year?
1. Not at all. 2. Once or twice. 3. 3 to 4 times.
50. What are your village’s top two development priorities? (NB; agreed by Village)
51. Have these been included into the Ward priorities? 1. Yes. 2. No.
52. Do you feel the priorities will be respected? 1. Yes. 2. No.
Explain your response;_________________________________________________________
53. If the needs/priorities are not included what will the village do?
54. Have you ever personally approached your Councilor, Council, DA, an NGO or other Government 
Department with a village need? 1. Yes. 2. No.
55. If yes proceed with table below;
O rganisation
approached.
Developm ent Need/Priority. Response.
1. Helpful 2. Lukewarm 3. Unhelpful
Councilor.
Council.
DA.
Other Govt. Department.
Traditional Leader.
56. How well do you understand the roles o f these organisations?
O rganisation. Role.
Village head.
Councilor.
RDC.
DA.
Government Departments.
57. In your view how well do these organisations work together?
Departments.
NB; Use 1 for very well, 2 for just about well and 3 for very badly.
Section G: Household Assets, Land Resources and Livelihood.
58. Do you own any o f  the following?
Asset type. N um ber owned. How acquired.
Cattle.
Goats.
Sheep.
Plough.
Harrower.
Wheel-barrow.
Cart.
Planter.
Tractor.
Others specify.
59. Do you/does your household own any land? 1. Yes. 2. No.
If yes how much (in hectares/acres)?__________
60. How did you acquire the land (tick appropriate box)?
1. Village 2. GoZ i.e. 3. Private 4. RDC 5. 6. 7.
head resettlement. Purchase. allocation. Leasing/ Sharing Inherited
allocation. renting. with from
parents. parents.
61. Did you pay any amount to be allocated land? 1. Yes. 2. No.
If yes how much did you pay in ZWD______________ .
62. Do you have documented proof o f  your land claim? l .Y e s . 2. No.
If yes are the documents registered at a Government Office? 1. Yes. 2. No.
63. Does your village hold meetings to plan about village/common land?
1. Never. 2. Rarely. 3. All the time.
64. Do you or your household members attend the meetings? l.Y e s . 2. No.
If yes what role do you play in such m eetings?____________________________________ .
Section H: Extra Questions for Resettled Households (new and old).
65. When were you resettled?_____________________
66. Where were you before being resettled?
1. In communal areas in the District.
2. In a communal area outside the District.
3. In a communal area outside the province.
4. In an older resettlement scheme.
5. On a  large scale commercial farm.
6. From city (name town/city)_____________________________
7. Outside Zimbabwe (indicate name o f  area)_______________ .
67. What socio-economic facilities did you find in place in your new community?
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Facility. T ick if present 
on arrival.
I f  not p resent on a rriv a l how long did it take to  be 
established.
Primary School.
Secondary School.
Clinic.
Shops.
Roads.
Public Transport.
Dip tank.
Marketing Depot.
68. Do you sometimes work together with your neighbors? 1. Yes. 2. No.
If yes, in which areas or on which activities?
69. What was your socio-economic status at the time o f  being resettled and what is it now?
Category. S tatus.
A t resettlem ent Now.
Marital status.
Age.
Employment status.
Land ownership.
Number of cattle.
Number of ploughs.
Educational level.
Master-farmer training.
70. How many other families from your original community were resettled here?
71. How do you compare your original with your new area in terms o f the following?
Facility, service o r resource. R ank  on arriva l. R an k  now.
Land (amount, quality etc).
Other natural resources (trees, water etc).
Grazing for your livestock.
Health facilities.
Roads.
Transport.
Rainfall (pattern, reliability etc).
Credit.
Schools.
Extension services.
Water and Sanitation facilities.
Market infrastructure.
Village governance.
Ward governance.
General relationship with; 
■ Government.
■ Council.
■ DA.
■ Other organisations.
NB use 1 where your old area was better than the new area and 2 where the new area is better than the old area.
72. What are the most frequent conflicts that occur in your community?
Conflict type. M ain causes. Resolution m echanism s.
Land boundaries.
Natural resource extraction.
END.
Annex 2.2: Community Diary Guidelines
To compensate for language and time constraints this method was used to ensure that study accesses 
community (sub-District) development dynamics pertinent to the research question. The Diaries were 
kept in relation to the following questions or guidelines.
1. History o f  the community, current inventory o f  infrastructure and basic services (roads, schools,
clinics, water and sanitation, bridges etc) in the community and comments on quality, access etc).
2. Village Governance;
a. How is the Village organised generally and for purposes o f  development activities?
b. What structures exist (legislated/formal and informal)?
c. How well are the Village structures perceived and how well do they work with outsiders?
3. ( Main local level organisations or groups that exist in the community;
a. What activities the local organisations undertake? What services do people access through 
these groups/organisations?
b. Who participates in them and how? Do people make contributions and if  so how much 
(ranges) do they pay monthly and/or annually? How many days in a year do they give to 
the group’s activities to stay a member?
c. How people join and why?
d. Most popular organisations in profiled communities and why?
e. What are the main challenges faced by these groups/institutions? How are the challenges 
dealt with? How are external organisations involved and if  so which ones, how and why?
4. iHow the community relates to Council and how do they assess its performance?
a. Services provided by Council in the community (quality, delivery mechanisms etc).
b. How often and using what methods does the community interact with the Councilor, 
council, government departments from the District level and any other organisations.
5. Seasonal calendars (principal socio-economic activities from January to December) and main 
livelihood activities;
a. What are the main farming types (livestock or crop based, mixed etc)?
b. Average landholdings per family (ascertain with local extension staff)?
c. What other livelihood activities exist, which times o f  the year are they pursued, which 
groups are involved (or types o f  households) etc.
d. What are the existing sources o f  financial, agricultural inputs and production systems 
support in the community?
e. Household assets and wealth differentiating variables (livestock, homesteads, land etc).
6. Livelihood-related constraints faced and how they are managed/addressed;
a. Principal livelihood threats experienced (link to seasonal calendar if  possible).
b. Who is mostly affected? How the threats are addressed?
c. Most successful ways o f dealing with constraints (cite cases where shared).
7. Other organisations e.g. NGOs working in the community.
a. Which ones are these? What are they doing and with who?
b. Targeting and institutional arrangements for activity/programme implementation.
8. Any other stuff deemed useful in coming up with a ‘participation profile’ o f  the community.
Annex 2.3: Question Guide for Key Informants
Semi-structured questions were used in two main phases o f  the study as shown below. The specific 
guiding questions were overlapping but generally deeper and case-specific explorations were 
undertaken in phase two.
Phase 1 [April to August 2004]; Exploratory.
For Zimbabwe the exploratory phase looked at the four overlapping periods in which local governance 
evolved or changed distinctively. They include the pre-independence era, early post-independence to 
amalgamation (1980-93), the Amalgamation period to the Traditional Leaders Act 2000 and then the 
period since enactment o f  the Traditional Leaders Act. The sub-questions or issues that the study 
pursued using semi-structured questions were within the framework o f  decentralised local governance 
and included the following;
1. The structures for participation; arrangements and functionality, challenges and strong points for 
Councils, sub-District structures, Councilors, traditional leaders etc.
2. Resourcing arrangements for rural local government during the four periods. Both internal and 
external sources critical to assessing the viability o f  local government structures.
3. Monitoring (accountability) mechanisms for local governance structures/institutions with 
respect to the systems used, their effectiveness, constraints and improvements over the years. The 
role and effectiveness o f ordinary citizens in the monitoring process.
4. Key institutional stakeholders in local governance and their roles (general and specific i.e. some 
best and worst cases). The stakeholders o f  primary concern include religious groupings, business 
organisations, clubs and associations notwithstanding individual residents o f local authority areas.
5. Specific development interventions managed in terms o f  experiences (good and bad practice) and 
improvements or changes made as a result o f  bad and best practices.
6. Local institutional capacity building; who does it, how and the key issues.
Phase 2 [from September 2004 through May-June 2006]; Detailedfollow-up.
In this phase detailed organisational profiling and interaction analysis was done on the back o f  deeper 
exploration o f  organisational structures and networks. The guiding questions included;
1. The structure, functions and powers o f  the ‘respondent organisation’ (explored in the light o f  broad 
issues distilled from exploratory phase, question 1 above).
2. The relationship between the ‘respondent organisation’ structures and other local organisations’ 
(governmental and non-governmental) structures i.e. policy processes and operations.
3. Administrative structure and budget o f the organisation (staffing, budget for operations and 
administration, sources o f  support and levels).
4. Nature and range o f  relevant resource/accountability networks and their main activities.
5. Processes o f  developing and implementing development plans, projects and programmes i.e. role 
o f the ‘respondent organisation’ and other organisations. This focused on specific planning years, 
projects and programmes and followed-up examples o f  inter-organisational relations in specific 
programmes, localities and processes. A sector follow-up was often used to learn about and assess 
prevailing conditions for cooperation/collaboration and constraints faced.
6. Constraints faced by development organisations (including the ‘responding organisation’), 
available responses both individual and collective.
7. Alternative ways o f  arranging existing development relationships and processes. Efforts done by 
the ‘responding organisation’ as well as others to promote such alternatives. Assessment o f  
potential for success or identification o f  pre-conditions.
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